

TAX-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS

TUESDAY, JUNE 8, 1954

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
TAX EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The special committee met at 10:15 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 304, Old House Office Building, Hon. Carroll Reece (chairman of the special committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Reece, Goodwin, Hays, and Pfof.

Also present: Rene A. Wormser, general counsel; Arnold T. Koch, associate counsel; Norman Dodd, research director; Kathryn Casey, legal analyst; John Marshall, chief clerk.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Who is the witness this morning?

Mr. WORMSER. Professor Colegrove.

The CHAIRMAN. Professor, we have the practice of swearing all witnesses, if you do not mind. Do you solemnly swear the evidence you give in this case shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. COLEGROVE. I do.

Mr. WORMSER. Will you state your name and address for the record, please, Professor?

TESTIMONY OF PROF. KENNETH COLEGROVE, EVANSTON, ILL.

Dr. COLEGROVE. My name is Kenneth Colegrove, and my address is 721 Foster Street, Evanston, Ill.

Mr. WORMSER. You are temporarily in New York on some assignment at Queens College, Professor?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes; I have been teaching in Queens College this year.

Mr. WORMSER. You are, as I understand, retired as a professor of political science at Northwestern University?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes; at Northwestern University we automatically retire at age of 65.

Mr. WORMSER. Would you give us briefly your academic career, Professor?

Dr. COLEGROVE. I took my A. B. degree at the State University of Iowa and later took my Ph. D. degree, doctor of philosophy, at Harvard. I have taught at Mount Holyoke College, Syracuse University, and for 30 years I taught at Northwestern University.

Mr. WORMSER. Do you have any honorary degrees?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes: I have the honorary degree of doctor of letters at Columbia University. President Nicholas Murray Butler conferred that degree on me after I had written a book on the Senate and the Treaty-making Power. He wrote me at that time saying he had already expected to write that book himself, but the trustees had never allowed him to resign so that he could write the book. His trustees offered me a degree, and, of course, you never turn down a degree from Columbia University.

Mr. WORMSER. What other books have you written, Professor?

Dr. COLEGROVE. I have written books on International Control of Aviation; Militarism in Japan; and the American Senate and the Treaty-Making Power. I think I am remembered most for my 20 or 30 articles in the American Political Science Review and in the American Journal of International Law upon Japanese Government and Politics and Asiatic Diplomacy.

Mr. WORMSER. Now, Professor, what positions of any consequence have you had in any of the learned societies?

Dr. COLEGROVE. I was secretary-treasurer of the American Political Science Association—that is the professional society of political science teachers in the United States—for 10 or 11 years, from 1937 to 1948. And I have been a delegate from the American Political Science Association to the American Council of Learned Societies.

The American Political Science Association is a constituent society of the American Council of Learned Societies.

Mr. WORMSER. As I recall, you were at one time on the executive committee of the American Society of International Law?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Oh, yes; I have several times served on the executive committee of the American Society of International Law.

Mr. WORMSER. What Government posts have you held, Professor?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Well, I have been consultant during the war to the Office of Strategic Services. I have been a consultant for the Department of Labor. I have been a consultant for the State Department. And I served with General MacArthur in Tokyo immediately after the war in the Office of SCAP, or the Office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, in Japan.

Mr. WORMSER. As an adviser in political science or some aspect of that?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes; as an adviser on constitutional questions.

Mr. WORMSER. Have you any other comment you wish to make, Professor, before we start? I understand you have no statement.

I had intended to have a copy of the questions you had asked me to put to you prepared for the committee, but something went wrong in the office, and we have only 2 or 3 copies available.

Is there anything you wish to add before I begin?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Counsel, I must say that I am a somewhat reluctant witness this morning. My reluctance stems from the fact that there is a feeling, I think, on the part of many people, that witnesses regarding the foundations may be overcritical, may wish to smear the character of the officers of the foundations. I must say that my acquaintance with the officers makes me think that they are men of the greatest integrity, men of the greatest competence. I highly respect them. Some of my students are officers in the foundations.

Then, in another aspect, I think sometimes witness before congressional committees are rather roughly treated by the newspapers;

sometimes the very best newspapers misquote them. And that is a little unfortunate, I think.

Again, I must say that since being asked to testify before this committee, I have not had an opportunity to go back to my home in Evanston, which is right north of Chicago, to check up on some data I probably ought to have before I testify here, but I understand you wish me only to speak of the philosophical background or such aspects as I really have witnessed; and perhaps I can trust my memory for these.

I am glad to come before the committee, aside from that reluctance, because I think it is the duty of every citizen, and particularly professors, to assist Congress in its functions of investigation. It is our duty to do so, just as much as it is the duty of young men to serve in the Army, even give their lives for their country in the Army, or the duty of citizens to vote, or the duty of citizens to pay taxes. And citizens also have the duty to testify before congressional committees.

Mr. WORMSER. Well, Professor, you did testify at one time before the McCarran committee in the IPR hearings. Would you give us some brief resumé of the purpose of your appearance in that hearing and any comments that you think may be of interest?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Counsel, I did testify before the McCarran subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate on internal security laws regarding my knowledge of the I. P. R. and other phases they were investigating. I think what struck your eye in that testimony was a part of my testimony where I said I could not understand why it was that the Rockefeller Foundation continued its very large grants to the Institute of Pacific Relations long after it had received information which proved to be very reliable information that the IPR had been taken over by Communists, pro-Communists, or fellow travelers, and had become a propaganda society, and also an organization which was very effective in selecting personnel for the Government. The information that something was wrong with the IPR began to come into our heads about 1942 or 1943. I was among those naive professors who thought that the IPR was doing a great service. And it was. It started out as really a magnificent research organization. But it undoubtedly was captured by subversive elements about 1938 and 1939 and 1940, but we didn't wake up until 1942 or 1943. At that time I resigned from the editorial board of Amerasia which had a connection with IPR.

By 1945, we were convinced that something was very wrong; and my testimony was connected with that point.

Mr. WORMSER. Was that before the Kohlberg disclosures?

Dr. COLEGROVE. No; that was the time the Kohlberg proposals were made. And what I couldn't understand later on was when Alfred Kohlberg was able to get the consent of one of the very high officers in the Rockefeller Foundation to investigate why the foundation would not make an investigation of the IPR. The investigation was never made, and the Rockefeller Foundation continued to give very large grants to the Institute of Pacific Relations even after that.

Representative HAYS. What year was that?

Dr. COLEGROVE. That was 1945. That was comparatively early, you see. The grants went on until, I think, about 1950 or thereabouts.

Of course, the Rockefeller Foundation now admits that it was a mistake, and perhaps the officers feel that bygones ought to be bygones and no further investigation should be carried on. But it seems to

me, in the interest of American people, and in the interest of scholarship in the United States, and in the interest of scholars like myself, that we may never be misled again, that we ought to have the whole story of why the Rockefeller Foundation failed to make the investigation in 1945.

Representative HAYS. Did you, as a member of that group, ask the Rockefeller Foundation to make an investigation?

Dr. COLEGROVE. No. I was not an officer of the Rockefeller Foundation. I was simply what you call a member.

Mr. WORMSER. You mean of the IPR, Professor?

Dr. COLEGROVE. I mean of the IPR. The membership was very loose. Anyone who subscribed to their publications was a member. They called us members. We thought of ourselves merely as subscribers.

I protested to Mr. Dennett in 1945—I think that is the date; it is in the McCarran subcommittee hearings—regarding the activities of Mr. Edward Carter. I had discovered that he was pressuring the State Department to throw over Chiang Kai-shek. I protested very vigorously at that time, and I think my protests came to nothing at all.

Representative HAYS. Now, did you say that the first notice that the foundation had of, as I believe you termed it, the subversiveness of the IPR, was about 1943?

Dr. COLEGROVE. No. The first that I knew of it were the charges made by Alfred Kohlberg. I resigned from Amerasia in 1943 because of a difference of opinion between myself and Mr. Philip Jaffe, who was the editor in chief, and who later was implicated in the taking of documents surreptitiously from the State Department.

Representative HAYS. What I am trying to do, Professor, is to find out for the purposes of checking the record of grants, about when you people became aware of this, about when it trickled down to you—that there was something wrong there.

Could you give us a year for that?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes. I was aware of a very unfortunate situation in Amerasia by 1942 and 1943. My eyes were not opened until that time. I suspected, of course, the IPR. I was not an officer of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Representative FROST. When did you resign from Amerasia, Professor?

Dr. COLEGROVE. In 1943, and it was at that time—

Representative FROST. And it was at that time that you became suspicious?

Dr. COLEGROVE. I became suspicious in 1942 and finally resigned in May of 1943. I am speaking from memory. I haven't looked at my notes.

Representative FROST. Were you aware of the fact that the Rockefeller Foundation reduced their grants considerably in the year 1944 to the IPR?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes, there was a reduction of grants made.

Representative FROST. Because of some talk that perhaps they were off on the wrong track?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Undoubtedly that had some influence. But I was not an officer of Rockefeller Foundation or of the IPR, and did not understand the reasons on the inside.

Representative HAYS. The figures we have, Professor, show that for the 2 years, 1944 and 1945, they only got \$36,000. That would seem to indicate that someone in Rockefeller became aware of the thing you did about the same time. Then our figures show from 1946 to 1950, they were given a total of about \$400,000, mainly because the Rockefeller Foundation wanted to try to reorganize the thing under the leadership of Dr. Wilbur, Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur, after they had gotten rid of Carter and Field. I am not asking you, of course, to say the figures are accurate, but does that generally correspond with what you know about the situation?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes; that is the situation as I understand it.

Mr. WORMSER. Professor, no investigation, so far as you know, was made by Rockefeller or Carnegie of the IPR situation, nor for that matter was one made by the IPR itself?

Dr. COLEGROVE. I hoped, as a result of Mr. Kohlberg's charges, that the Rockefeller Foundation itself would investigate, instead of asking the IPR to conduct a self-investigation.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom was Kohlberg's request for an investigation made, Professor?

Dr. COLEGROVE. It was made to Joseph Willits, an official of the Rockefeller Foundation, one of the outstanding men, a man of great integrity, and a man of competence and scholarship. I have great respect for Joseph Willits, and he must have had a good reason for not investigating. But that reason, it seems to me, ought to be told to the American people.

Representative HAYS. Just exactly what did Mr. Kohlberg say in his report? I get a letter about every week or two from him, most of which I throw in the wastebasket.

I read a few of them. But they seemed to me to be a little bit off the beam, and perhaps these people felt the same way about him. Is he considered a reputable authority that you would pay attention to? ~~Maybe~~ I have been misjudging him.

Dr. COLEGROVE. Well, I have a great deal of respect for Mr. Kohlberg. He sends out these very voluminous letters. Some of them are full of charges he makes against people that I think it is not necessary to make. But he also has a vast amount of information. I find these letters he sends sometimes very useful. Again, Mr. Kohlberg had been in China frequently during the war and had been shocked at his observation of what some of the officers of the State Department were doing, particularly connected with the whole episode of Gen. Patrick Hurley.

Mr. WORMSER. Professor, these charges were thoroughly substantiated, weren't they?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Oh, yes. All of the charges of Mr. Kohlberg were examined by the McCarran subcommittee, and I think in a unanimous report the McCarran subcommittee indicated that all of the charges of Mr. Kohlberg were proved true.

Representative HAYS. I am not discussing that. The point I am trying to get straight in my own mind is that he has a habit of crying "Wolf" pretty frequently, and every time he cries it, obviously it hasn't been documented. He could have been right at that time, and perhaps was for all I know.

Dr. COLEGROVE. Well, I may say, I always found him accurate in his statements, and certainly this time when he cried, "Wolf, wolf," there was a wolf.

Representative HAYS. I see. This was the beginning?

Dr. COLEGROVE. And he has been crying "Wolf, wolf," justifiably ever since then, without effect—I suppose because it has been repetitious. The charges at the time corresponded with what I was thinking myself with reference to the IPR.

Representative HAYS. Just briefly what were these charges? That Field and Carter were not right? Just what did he say, if you can remember the highlights of it?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Briefly, the charges were these: They were expanded, of course, in the McCarran subcommittee. But, briefly, they were to the effect that the IPR, instead of being a research institution and engaged only in research, had branched out into propaganda, into the selection of personnel for service in Government and into policy-making even in the State Department. In other words, supporting a policy that was very much against Chiang Kai-shek, very much against the Chinese Nationalists, and aimed at overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek, of the Kuomintang, and destruction of the Nationalist Party in China.

The CHAIRMAN. Based upon your experience and observations, to what extent is it your opinion that the IPR did exercise a substantial if not controlling influence in the selection of personnel not only in the Far East but those assignments in the State Department that had to do with the Far East and ultimately the policies that were adopted in the Far East?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Chairman, I would rather testify only with regard to things I have seen with my own eyes. I will take one case with reference to the selection of personnel for General MacArthur's headquarters in Japan.

The IPR had become extremely influential with the State Department and with some other branches of Government. I must say that no one knows better than you and your committee that the selection of personnel is one of the headaches of Government. The selection of expert personnel is one of the headaches of Government. The American Political Science Association was often called upon to furnish suggestions of experts in the field of political science.

During the war, when I was secretary-treasurer, we frequently had requests, which we complied with, by giving a list of personnel and giving something about the personnel so that they could select someone among the dozen or two dozen names that we would submit.

In 1945, as secretary of the Political Science Association, I submitted a list of names of experts for the army of occupation in Japan, and for the army of occupation in Germany. It was a list of political scientists who would be helpful on the Government side. I didn't put my own name on the list at all, but in January of 1946, I had a telegram from General Hilldring saying that General MacArthur had asked for my services in Japan.

I came down to Washington to be processed and briefed, and I was surprised to find in the Pentagon that the recommendations that the American Political Science Association had made in the matter of personnel had not been accepted. I had a great deal of trouble in getting from the Chief of the Civil Affairs Division in the Army this list. He passed me off to his deputy, and his deputy passed me off finally to a very excellent young colonel. From him I received the list.

I was shocked when I saw the list, because there were none of the recommendations that we had made.

I took that list over to an old friend of mine who had served as Chief of the Far Eastern Division in OSS (Office of Strategic Services). His name is Charles Burton Fahs, a very outstanding specialist in Japan and a man of great integrity. And I remember that Charles Burton Fahs was astonished by the character of the names that had been recommended.

We checked those names off. Some of them were known to us to be Communists, many of them pro-Communists or fellow travelers. They were extremely leftist.

I went back to the Pentagon to protest against a number of these people, and to my amazement I found that they had all been invited, and they had all accepted, and some of them were already on their way to Japan.

I wanted to find out where the list came from, and I was told that the list had come from the Institute of Pacific Relations.

And so General MacArthur, who had very little control over the personnel that was sent to Japan at this time for civil affairs, practically no control, had to receive a large group of very leftist and some of them Communist advisers in the field of political science.

Well, does that illustrate what you want, Mr. Chairman, by reference to the influence in the selection of personnel?

I might just add this, on the slightly humorous side: During the war we had the National Roster, which you probably remember. I think they are trying to improve that and make it a great machine for selection of personnel. We used to say that the theory was that you get the names of a hundred thousand scientists all over the United States, social scientists, natural scientists, and so on. You put their names on cards. You put their competence on cards. You put their experience on cards. You put it in the machine. Then when some organ of Government wants an expert in this or that, all you have to do is to press two or three buttons, and out comes a card with the name of a perfect expert, just the one you want for the assignment. But nobody knows better than your committee that it will be a long time before such a machine is invented and used.

Representative HAYS. I have a pertinent question right here, professor. Did General MacArthur take any pertinent advice from any of his advisers about anything?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Well, these advisers who came out, particularly the leftists, were immediately spotted by MacArthur's G-2, General Willoughby. We used to say that General Willoughby could tell a Communist a hundred miles away.

Representative HAYS. He is the same fellow, though, who couldn't spot them at China when they poured through at the Yalu River. Wasn't that the one?

Dr. COLEGROVE. That was out of the jurisdiction of Willoughby.

Representative HAYS. I thought he was the G-2 head man.

Dr. COLEGROVE. He was G-2 for General MacArthur.

Representative HAYS. I understood that somebody gave MacArthur advice that there were no Communists up there.

Dr. COLEGROVE. Oh, no. I have seen the reports that Willoughby made. Willoughby was telling MacArthur in 1946 and 1947 and 1948 that the Communists were going to attack South Korea in June.

Representative HAYS. Well, who advised him about that famous, "We will be home by Christmas, boys," statement?

Dr. COLEGROVE. That is something that we would like to find out, too. How that statement was made.

You see, the jurisdiction of General MacArthur over Korea came to an end in 1948. The State Department took over. The Army was out completely. And it really was not General Willoughby's business to investigate North Korea. But you know General Willoughby. He would investigate everything under the sun. And his reports were always pessimistic reports to General MacArthur.

I might say this with reference to the personnel and with reference to the question you asked about advice.

Luckily, in this case, the subversives that came out to Tokyo were very soon discovered by General Willoughby. And, of course, General MacArthur's staff was decidedly anti-Communist, very much opposed to that kind of adviser and the kind of advice that they would give. General MacArthur takes advice, of course, but it is only on the highest level. There was a tight little ring of generals around General MacArthur. They consisted of General Willoughby, the G-2; General Courtney Whitney, a remarkably competent man, head of the Government Section; General Marquat, who was head of the economic Section; there was a very able professor from Stanford University who was head of National Resources; there was Colonel Carpenter, head of the Legal Section, and two or three others. And none of the Communists who got out to Japan had any other chance in operations than to do research work and reporting. General MacArthur would meet once or twice a day with the upper echelon of his office, and the policy was entirely made by them. I may say that many of the facts that they used in persuading General MacArthur to do this or that were facts dug out by the researchers in the Government Section or the Economic Section, but the policy-making in Japan was quite different, I think, from the policy-making in the army of occupation in Germany. It was on the highest level. None of these subversives got a chance at all in policymaking.

I do think that there was just one point where they did damage, that was in their contact with the Japanese people, a contact which MacArthur couldn't control.

I think there were some unfortunate contacts between these leftists and the Japanese people.

Representative HAYS. I was going to ask you a question about something you said. You seemed to leave an implication by the way you stated it. Perhaps you didn't mean to, and I want to clear that up.

You said it was quite different from Germany. None of the subversives had a chance to make policy.

Did you mean to imply that some of the subversives did make policy in Germany?

Dr. COLEGROVE. No. What I meant to say was that the policy-making went down into a lower level in the army of occupation in Germany.

I was trying to indicate where policy was made in General MacArthur's staff. It was only on the very highest level, with a group of officers he trusted, who were competent, hard-headed, very realistic officers.

The CHAIRMAN. Since General MacArthur has been referred to, it happens that I have known him for a great many years and knew him

as a captain when I was in the 42d Division. I believe he was a captain. And I have known him over the years since, not intimately, but I have had a very good opportunity to observe him.

Dr. COLEGROVE. I know he thinks highly of you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I am pleased to know that. I have been impressed that General MacArthur has a great capacity to advise with subordinates, advisers of all types, and then assemble in his own thinking the information given him, classified and adopted as his own. I mean expressed his own views; but his views being based upon the advice and information that he has received. Is my estimate of him somewhat justified?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Oh, wholly justified. I think you have sized General MacArthur up very accurately. He is a constant reader. He reads documents late into the night. He is a constant reader of history and of government works. General MacArthur would have made one of our outstanding historians if he had ever gone into the profession of history rather than that of a professional soldier.

Representative HAYS. I think Hollywood lost a great man there, too.

Dr. COLEGROVE. I went to Japan a little prejudiced against General MacArthur, having been in Washington continuously. I was bowled over by appreciation of his efficiency and his ability to lead. I must say he handled the Russian situation well, when the Russians wanted to send an army of occupation into Japan. They wanted to occupy Hokkaido and northern Honshu, which would be easy for them to chop off by aggression. General MacArthur avoided that by assigning them way down to Kyushu in the south, and of course the Russians didn't want to go there, where they would be hemmed in by the Americans and the British. So they didn't occupy any part of Japan. That was a great advantage, because there was only one army of occupation really, that of General MacArthur. I think you could say General MacArthur was the first high-ranking officer who got tough with Soviet Russia after the war. And you might say it begins with the speech which Courtney Whitney made before the Allied Council in March, the first part of March 1946, when Russia behaved in a very impertinent, insolent way to the United States, demanding information, and criticizing policies of the occupation which were really democratic policies. General MacArthur, through Gen. Courtney Whitney, made a resounding reply to the Russians that kept them quiet for quite a while.

I must say that episode rang a bell all through the official life of the United States. James F. Byrnes heard it. He was then Secretary of State, and shortly after that, in the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, he began to take a tougher stand against the Russians. By the time Jimmy Byrnes left the Secretaryship of State, he was following a rather strong policy against Soviet Russia.

Representative HAYS. I just have one other question.

You have mentioned several times, Professor, these subversives who went out to Tokyo. Would you like to name them for the committee, who they were?

Dr. COLEGROVE. I would rather not, Mr. Hays. They are all named in the McCarran subcommittee report. I haven't got that list with me. I have a list in my library in Evanston, but I haven't been able to fly to Evanston to consult it. I wouldn't want to trust my memory

upon that. But I can say this: Every one is named in the report of the McCarran subcommittee.

Mr. WORMSER. Professor, I would like to ask you this: Do you think the IPR incident is an example of the danger involved in foundations financing outside research organizations which don't have, let's say, an academic standing for research, instead of perhaps doing it through universities? Would you comment on that?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Well, Mr. Wormser, everything in life is dangerous, and I think the answer could be that they can be a powerful help, a great assistance to the Government, and at the same time, of course, they can be very unfortunate. Of course, it depends upon the character of the organization.

Now, here was the Institute of Pacific Relations, supposed to be a research organization, which had been captured by subversives. And yet it was actually furnishing names of personnel to fairly important officers within the Government.

Mr. WORMSER. If the organizations wanted to have that kind of research done, wouldn't it have been far safer and sounder to do it through the universities, who, after all, have a certain discipline and a certain check on research and what not?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Oh, yes. I would agree with that. I think the universities are much more sound and much more safe than most of the operating societies. But, of course, a university is a local concern. Let me say, the American Political Science Association might be helpful in the selection of personnel, because we are supposed to know all the political scientists in the United States better than the Government does. And our advice ought to be worth something.

Representative HAYS. You could get in a position, there, Professor, couldn't you, where you would have people saying, "Well, now, let's not give any to that university or this one, because they are not safe." And bringing in all different shades of opinion, you could have that same problem arise there, couldn't you?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Admittedly. That might well be true. Every system is more or less dangerous in one sense, and every system has some elements of help.

Mr. WORMSER. Professor, would you comment on the general area of the dependence of the academician on foundation grants?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes. Today a professor of political science who wants to conduct certain research that is costly is in a rather difficult position unless he gets a grant from a foundation or through an operating society, like the American Council of Learned Societies, or through his university, based upon a grant from a foundation. And that means, of course, ultimately, the foundations pass upon the kind of research which shall be done, particularly with reference to the subjects of research which should be undertaken.

Personally, I have been more or less a lone wolf in my research. I suppose you can divide professors into categories. There are professors who would rather work alone as a one-man project on a subject that interests them deeply. Others want to investigate, let's say, certain phases cooperatively.

If you are in a cooperative research project, you are doing one section. You may not know what the other man is doing in the other section. You finally have to get together and have things parceled out. Probably the greatest books in the world were written by the

"lone wolf" philosophers who work alone, like Immanuel Kant, in his study, and who has received practically no assistance from anyone. You have the difference there between Plato and Aristotle. Plato was a philosopher who paced the walk, the peripatetic school. His students listened to him carefully. He didn't do much listening himself.

Take Aristotle, on the other hand, Aristotle, in writing his book called *Politics*, investigated 158 constitutions. Now, he didn't do all that himself. Aristotle must have had quite a considerable research staff or group of devoted pupils. That is cooperative research. Aristotle had evidently a large research group working with him. So you find two kinds of professors, the ones who would like to engage in cooperative research and others who would like to make a study that they control entirely themselves and do all the work themselves.

Mr. WORMSER. They are all dependent on foundation grants in the last analysis, though?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Oh, yes. Now most of it depends upon foundation grants.

Mr. WORMSER. Does that result in a situation, Professor, where the academicians are somewhat reluctant to criticize the foundations?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Oh, yes, you don't like to bite the hand that feeds you. It is not quite civilized to do that. There is that tendency. And, of course, there is a tendency almost to fawn on the man who gets you the research project. I have tremendous respect, let us say, for one of the men in my own profession who had a great deal to do with the granting of research funds. That was Prof. Charles E. Merriam of the University of Chicago, one of the greatest of our political scientists, and a man of the greatest integrity. I remember a conversation I had with Professor Merriam in Paris, when he came out to Europe to investigate the Laura Spellman Rockefeller Fund, which was in the process of being changed at that time.

I remember a conversation in a Paris restaurant at that time, I think, the Cafe Majeure, in which Professor Merriam said, "Money is power, and for the last few years I have been dealing with more power than a professor should ever have in his hands." He said, "I am nothing else than a Louis XIV academic agent." Somebody sitting next to him said, "Well, Professor Merriam, not Louis XIV. You had better say Oliver Cromwell."

And Merriam said, "Call me any name you want. I have too much power in my hands."

Well, Merriam controlled a large part of the research that was doled out by the Social Science Research Council, and I think that he was extremely able in his selections. But I do think there is the tendency, in the case of a great man like Merriam, for the younger men to get in almost a fawning position with reference to them.

Now, I don't mean young men running to help him on with his coat or to pick up his papers or to carry his valise down to the depot. I mean something more subtle than that. I don't mean even laughing at his jokes or getting students to come into his classes. I mean something quite a little bit more subtle than that. Perhaps I can best explain myself by giving one incident with reference to the American Political Science Association.

We hold an annual convention every year, in which we have roundtables and sessions where pertinent questions are discussed, and professors and experts lead the discussion. As secretary of the American

Political Science Association, I used to assist in developing these programs. And I noticed that there was tremendous competition among the heads of roundtables to get Professor Merriam to appear on the roundtable, or Prof. Charles A. Beard, who is a remarkable scholar. The competition was terrific. Merriam and Beard were very generous. They generally accepted those invitations. But from the standpoint of managing the society, it was very clear that having Merriam and Beard upon too many roundtables cut off a lot of the younger men that ought to have participated. So we put through a rule that no member of the Political Science Association should appear at any roundtable more than two times each year. That caused quite a little bitterness among various chairmen of roundtables who were trying to build good programs.

I remember one man who was a chairman and who bitterly denounced me saying, "You have ruined my chance to get a social science research grant, because you have cut me off from getting better acquainted with Professor Merriam. You have not been fair to me." I didn't realize how chairmen of roundtables, professors themselves, were bidding for Professor Merriam not only because of his talents but because of his control of so much money for the Social Science Research Council.

Representative HAYS. Professor, if I were to grant everything you say to be true, and I am not going to dispute it with you, you are just talking about a rather human tendency there, aren't you, that could be applied to most anything? Not only heads of foundations, but I can give you a little example in politics. When they have a big picnic or something out in my district, if the chairman of the picnic is uninhibited, he shoots for the President, knowing he isn't going to get him. Then he tries for the Governor, and if the Governor is tied up, then they try for the Congressman, and if he is not available, they will settle for the sheriff or somebody else, you see. But they just come down the line. It happens over and over and over again. I don't know what you are going to do about it. I don't believe even the law would stop it.

Dr. COLEGROVE. Both of these items, the one you have described, and the one I have, are right out of human events, aren't they, human nature? It is there, and of course it will operate.

Representative HAYS. And, of course, Professor Merriam's profound observation about "Money is power," I don't think was quite original with him.

Dr. COLEGROVE. Oh, no.

Representative HAYS. It is a thing that we have known back since the time of maybe this Pharaoh they are digging out now.

Dr. COLEGROVE. The Stone Age, probably, when money was in the form of stone.

Representative HAYS. And that is another thing we just have to muddle along with and deal with as best we can.

Dr. COLEGROVE. I think we should realize that we have these human aspects to deal with and they can't be ignored.

Representative HAYS. That is right. I agree with you.

Mr. WORMSER. I asked the question, Mr. Hays, to bring out the point, if it is true, that there is a reluctance on the part of academicians who are dependent on grants, to criticize the foundations.

Representative HAYS. I realize that, Mr. Wormser, and I am sure that Dr. Colegrove has his opinion about that, and I am sure he

believes in it. But I have enough letters from people, from professors of political science, sociology, and so on, who say they have never gotten a grant, and some say they have gotten a grant, who will testify. I am willing to concede that with some people that would be a point that would be well taken, but I don't think you can apply it like a blanket over everybody. Do you agree with that, Doctor?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Oh, no, you can't generalize completely. That is quite true.

Representative HAYS. Because there are some people—we had one here last week who admitted he was a foundation baby. Yet he came in and criticized the foundations. So there are people who will criticize if they think the criticism is justified, no matter what. You have got to assume that there is enough integrity in the country that people will do that. Don't you agree?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes. I will agree wholly with that.

I must say that some people think there is considerable paternalism and pontification on the part of the grantors. My own experience has been that the officers of the foundations have leaned over backwards not to pontificate or to assert their opinions too greatly.

I recall one case where it seemed to me that there was a little "lecturing" done, to use a mild term, by a foundation. I don't resent it, but I know Prof. Frederic A. Ogg very greatly resented it. The American Political Science Association established a committee on the study of American legislatures, and particularly Congress. A very able young political scientist was made head of that committee. His name was Dr. George Galloway. And the officers of the committee were directed to go out and find \$50,000 to carry on this investigation of Congress. So Professor Ogg and myself had that task. We went to the Rockefeller Foundation. Joseph Willits turned us down, I think probably correctly. Then we tried the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, and a remarkably fine scholar was head of that. It was near his retirement. He was Dr. Walter Jessup. I think he listened to us with a little impatience, and at the end of it he gave us a lecture that was nearly twice the length of our presentation of the case, in which he berated us rather strongly for not teaching with conviction. He chose me as a horrible example. He used to be president of the State University of Iowa, and knew my father very well, who was a president of a small Iowa college. And Dr. Jessup at that time said that he felt the small colleges were doing a much better job than the great universities, because teachers were teaching with conviction.

He used as an example of lack of teaching with conviction the fact that we didn't treat the Constitution of the United States like Robert Browning treated the old square yellow book, in *The Ring and the Book*. I couldn't quite remember his words after Ogg and I left. Ogg was quite incensed. He went back to his hotel. I went over to the public library, on 42d Street in New York, and looked up "*The Ring and the Book*," just to find out what President Jessup meant. You probably remember the poem from your school days. I had forgotten it. But in talking about the old book, 200 years old, which Jessup compared with the Constitution of the United States, Browning says: "You see this old square book? I toss in air and catch again, swirl by crumpled vellum covers, pure crude thought secreted from men's minds when hearts beat hard, blood ran high, 200 years ago."

Well, I think that is what President Jessup meant with reference to the Constitution of the United States. It was pure solid thought, and we, political scientists, weren't teaching that Constitution with very much conviction.

I was sorry to say, however, that President Jessup didn't carry out as fully as I think he should have carried out the giving of help to the small colleges and not concentrating the research grants in the operating societies, who practically ignored the small colleges. And I think you realize, in Ohio, which is full of small colleges, that there is more of genuine American tradition taught in those small colleges than in most of our large universities.

Representative HAYS. I might as well get in a plug for Ohio here and say it has more colleges than any State in the Union.

The CHAIRMAN. Not to be left out entirely, my congressional district has seven colleges in it.

Mr. GOODWIN. Without attempting to make any odious comparison with the sovereign State of Ohio or the sovereign State of Tennessee, let me say that on the authority of the Federal Office of Education, I find that in Massachusetts there are 72 institutions of learning of college grade. As a matter of fact, it is often said back home that if and when our textiles should all go down to Tennessee or points south and if we should lose our other industrial establishments, never having had any agriculture compared with the Middle West, all that would be left for Massachusetts would be our summer resorts, the Berkshires, Cape Cod, and the North Shore, and our colleges and educational institutions.

Dr. COLEGROVE. I might say that I happen to be one of the trustees of a small college in Iowa, Upper Iowa University. We have only four buildings; a library, a girls' dormitory; a physics hall, and a gymnasium. The science building burned down the other day. It was proposed that we apply to some foundation to get the money to rebuild this hall. And, of course, we knew that it would be absolutely impossible to get assistance for that university, that small university.

The CHAIRMAN. When the foundations come on, that is one question I expect to ask, not as a criticism, but in order to get the explanation: Why have the foundations changed the policy which has done so much good in the past and, I think, has built up so much goodwill for the foundations? The policy has been changed to veer away from that type of expenditure to other types that some people think are open to greater question. But I won't ask you, of course, to comment on that, because you are not in a position to do so.

In referring to Mr. Jessup, are you referring to Jessup, senior, or junior?

Dr. COLEGROVE. No, President Walter Jessup.

The CHAIRMAN. Walter Jessup?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Walter Jessup, who formerly was president of the State University of Iowa.

You know, Mr. Chairman, I might follow through on one other aspect, because it does show the operations of a professional society like the American Political Science Association.

All the foundations turned us down on this study of Congress. But we did find the money.

Mr. DeWitt Wallace, editor of the Reader's Digest, gave us \$5,000 one year and \$5,000 the second year. And we conducted our research, a study of Congress, on that very much reduced budget.

I am of the opinion that we sometimes spend too much on research. The Political Science Association made this study on less than \$10,000.

I might say this, that our study impressed Congress so much, especially Senator LaFollette and Representative Mike Monroney, that on the basis of this study they called hearings and drafted a bill for the reorganization of Congress, which I think most of us believe has been a very helpful piece of legislation.

I might just add this, also, that the committee under Dr. Galloway advised the Congress that the salaries of Congressmen ought to be raised in both Houses to \$25,000. The Congressmen themselves didn't have the courage to go that high. It shows probably that political scientists have more courage than Congressmen.

Representative HAYS. Talking about this Reorganization Act, you know, Congress is composed of human beings, too, and they are just about as hard to make laws for, I guess, as the average American.

Do you recall one of the significant things about that was the elimination of a great number of committees?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes. That was one of the recommendations.

Representative HAYS. Of course, what they did was that they eliminated committees and every committee created 7 or 8 subcommittees, so we wind up with more committees than we had before.

Mr. WORMSER. Professor, do you see a strong tendency in the social sciences, and research particularly, for high centralization, resulting in a sort of a concentration of power?

Would you comment on that, please?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes. It is much more convenient for the foundations to deal with the operating societies if they are located in New York or Washington, such as, for instance, the American Council of Learned Societies, or the Social Science Research Council. The large foundations who give most of the money are, of course, in New York. I think there has been a tendency on the part of most of the foundations to hope or expect that the professional societies will move down to Washington. And that has been the case with the society that I have been connected with so long. I am no longer the secretary of the society, that is the American Political Science Association.

I think there is no question that the foundations wanted us to come to Washington. And shortly after I resigned, the American Political Science Association did move its headquarters to the Capital.

Representative HAYS. You don't see anything sinister in that, do you? It is just a matter of convenience, isn't it?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Well, it is a matter of convenience for the foundations, I think. I would prefer this: The American Political Science Association is an association of teachers of political science. They are located all over the United States. I felt, as secretary, that I owed an obligation to every member who taught, whether it was in a large university or in a very small, little college of two or three hundred students. And our headquarters had generally been in Evanston or in Ann Arbor, right in the center of the United States. And we tried to have our annual conventions held as near the center of the United

States as possible. We also tried to keep the dues down to \$5. When the association was moved to Washington, the dues went up to \$10. And you know that is more than a lot of professors in small colleges can afford. In a large city, \$10 isn't so much, but in a small town, professors who are getting only \$1,500 or \$1,800 a year, or \$2,000—they are lucky if they get \$2,000 or \$3,000—that is too high a fee for annual dues. So I see both unfortunate and fortunate aspects of the location in Washington.

Mr. WORMSER. Professor, my question wasn't directed solely at the geographical aspect. I meant also to include the concentration in effort; that is, the tendency for the foundations to direct their research through intermediate organizations, like the Social Science Research Council and the Council of Learned Societies, and so forth. Do you see that tendency?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes, of course there is that tendency. It follows from human nature, of course. There is more day-to-day conversation and consultation between the officers of the professional societies and the officers of the operating societies, like the American Council of Learned Societies, and the officers of the foundations.

I think that the officers of the professional societies are extremely good listeners and follow pretty carefully the advice that is given them by the foundation officers.

Mr. WORMSER. Professor, we have had some testimony to the effect that there has been this conscious concentration of research direction, mainly through what we have referred to as the clearinghouse organizations, and also to the effect that the Government now spends on the aggregate in social research more than all the foundations put together, and that this government research has also come more or less quite substantially under the direction of these same groups. Would you comment on that, and add to your comments your conception of whether that is a desirable factor or a desirable development, this high concentration of direction in one group, however well qualified?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Well, I think the present danger, Mr. Wormser, in that respect, is due to the fact—because the concentration is apparent—the danger is partly due to the fact that the foundations have been demanding and giving grants for research that is more particularly slanted toward the left than toward the right. That seems to be the tendency of the times. You can't say what is the reason our research has been so much leftist research at the present time. You can't blame the foundations for it. It goes along with the spirit of the times.

Do the foundations merely follow the spirit of the times, or do they contribute very much to the spirit of the times?

Was Plato a product of a great civilization, or was later Greek civilization a product of Plato and Aristotle?

The causes and effects are so completely mixed up.

But there has been a tendency, I think, on the part of the foundations to select subjects, promote subjects, which are somewhat leftist.

Representative HAYS. Right there, what do you mean by "leftist"?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Well, you know, President Roosevelt used to say, "You will find me just a little left of center."

I suppose you will have to take half a compass in this. The middle of the road is center. Then toward the left, of course, is from center

toward radicalism. Toward the right is from center to ultraconservatism.

Representative HAYS. Or you could use a comparable term to radicalism, "reactionaryism"?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes, reactionaryism would be a very good word for the other extreme, a very good word. It is extremely hard to say why that swing occurs.

The CHAIRMAN. Since I am sometimes referred to as a reactionary, I would like to have your definition of a "reactionary."

Dr. COLEGROVE. Terms like these have to be used in the sense of a relative comparison.

The CHAIRMAN. You need not reply to that.

Mr. GOODWIN. Wasn't it Calvin Coolidge who said, I think, in a message to the Massachusetts Legislature: "Don't hesitate to be as reactionary as the multiplication table"? Doesn't that form the basis for a pretty good definition of reaction?

Dr. COLEGROVE. The multiplication table never changes. It is a fact. We all accept it.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure that I am fully in accord with your statement about the spirit of the time being leftist so far as the great masses of the American people are concerned.

Representative HAYS. I am not, either. I don't like that term. I would rather he would use "liberal."

The CHAIRMAN. It is my evaluation of the American people that they are very sound in their thinking, and they are very apprehensive about some of the movements which you probably have in mind as being leftist, and when they are given an opportunity to express themselves I think they will usually express themselves. I think the American people are certainly not left of center, the majority of them. They try to stay in the center.

Representative HAYS. Well, of course, you will have to decide what left of center is. As I have pointed out many, many times, social security was considered pretty leftist when it was first advocated. So was bank deposit insurance considered very leftist, if you want to use that term. But now not even a reactionary advocates doing away with it.

The CHAIRMAN. We ought not to get off into this. But, again, as a "reactionary," I was in favor of Federal deposit insurance before there ever was any Federal deposit insurance, and I was very much for it when it was adopted, so I don't think that is a fair example, nor am I sure that social security is. But, anyway, that is aside from the question, so I think it is best not to get into it.

Dr. COLEGROVE. The comment of Mr. Hays seems to be correct that movements go back and forth. Whether you accept the pendulum theory of history or whether you accept the cyclical theory of going around in circles that Plato and Aristotle used, or whether you take the spiral theory of the Marxians, there is constant change. And words change, too. The term "liberal" is an extremely hard word to deal with. It has to be put in a historical context. We might consider the Liberal Party of England, which was, you might say, the left side of English parliamentary history, for a hundred years, as against the conservative side with Gladstone on one side and Disraeli on the other. The Liberal Party today would probably be considered very reactionary, because they believed in laissez faire. They believed in no interference by government.

Representative HAYS. Even a more striking example, it seems to me—perhaps you will agree—is the present Conservative Party in England. By our standards, the Conservative Party would be considerably to the left of center, wouldn't it?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes, by our standards.

Representative HAYS. But it still calls itself the Conservative Party.

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes, it still calls itself the Conservative Party. And the party that Premier Yoshida presides over in Japan, the Jiyuto, is the Japanese translation for "liberal," and it is one of the most conservative parties in the whole world.

Representative HAYS. That points up very succinctly the difficulty we have in defining the terms we use here every day.

Mr. GOODWIN. Is that not also true in trying to define even "center"? Roosevelt said he was a little to the left of center, which raised some suspicion in my mind as to what he meant by center.

Dr. COLEGROVE. I suppose the only definition is "middle of the road at the time." And it is not the same road every year. But "middle of the road" is the approximation.

The CHAIRMAN. When I was down home driving a wagon to town and walking on foot, I always found the middle of the road kind of hard to travel. It usually had rocks in it. So I had to get over on one side or the other just a little bit.

Mr. WORMSER. Professor, could I focus this discussion in this way: Has there been a tendency among the foundations, and in this concentration of power generally, to believe that conservatism is against progress? Might that explain the rationale of grants toward the left rather than to the conservatives?

Dr. COLEGROVE. There is a tendency, I think, in the faculties of our colleges and universities which I suppose is the spirit of the times—and times change—to think that the conservative is opposed to progress, that it is the great obstacle to progress. And research that comes up with conservative results they would say is bad research.

This often happens. I have actually heard very distinguished professors say, with reference to certain other professors, "He is not a liberal. He is opposed to Soviet Russia." Now, that, of course, is a very unfortunate use of the term "liberal." But for years and years there has been a tendency in the American classroom—you may have noted it in Columbia University—to think that intellectualism and liberalism or radicalism were synonymous; but if a person was conservative, like Edmund Burke, he was not an intellectual. That has been a rather unfortunate aspect, it seems to me, with reference to teaching in universities.

I would like, if I may, to say one word regarding the students of these professors. Universities swing back and forth, in this direction. There was one man who founded the graduate school of Columbia University. His name was John W. Burgess. He was one of the greatest political scientists the world has ever seen. His work called Political Science and Comparative Law practically bowled over the profession. He founded political science in the United States. He was one of the most conservative of men, one of the most conservative scholars, and he stood at the top of his profession in the eighties and nineties and the first decade of this century.

Among his students were some outstanding conservatists. He was a conservative professor and turned out a lot of conservative students.

Chief Justice Stone was one of his students. Nicholas Murray Butler was one of his students.

On the other hand, he turned out quite a number of students, probably just as many, who were what we would call liberal, or left of center. One was Professor Merriam himself. Another one was Charles A. Beard, a distinguished scholar. And most people don't realize it, but Franklin D. Roosevelt was one of his students. We know at Hyde Park there is evidence that in all his career at Columbia University, Roosevelt took notes in only one course; he didn't pay any attention to any of the others so far as note-taking was concerned. He took very full and complete notes on Professor Burgess' lectures on constitutional law.

Well, here was a very distinguished founder of a graduate faculty of law and comparative government. He turned out all kinds of students, on the right and on the left. I think Columbia University has swung more and more to the left. Professor Burgess would not be today considered quite as high in Columbia as he was back in the eighties and nineties. You have that swing back and forth.

Now, I think probably John Dewey and his influence at Columbia promoted that swing very considerably. The philosophy of experimentalism contributed to it. And, of course, Beard, an able man, went to England. There he met, of course, the very impressive movement of the Fabian Society there, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, particularly. And Beard was one of the devoted students of Burgess. Professor Beard brought back to the United States the doctrine of the economic interpretation of history, which he got through the Webbs and through the Fabians, and wrote his book called *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*, which followed the Marxian thesis.

Professor Beard then taught at Columbia University and left Columbia University because of a difference with President Butler about 1918. But he exercised a great influence among the political scientists and historians.

Toward the end of his life, he became much more conservative. Professor Beard died a rather conservative professor.

I remember, when the spirit of the times of the American Political Science Association was carrying the younger members along to left of center, further left of center, Beard was the idol of our political scientists. He was an eloquent person then. He seemed to be so reasonable.

But when Beard changed, toward the end of his life, I remember very distinctly in 1949, this fine old man gave his last address before the American Political Science Association. And he was hissed. The times had gone way beyond Charles A. Beard. In fact, he had gone back a little along the path that he had traveled in his youth.

Mr. WORMSER. He was hissed because he had turned toward conservatism, Professor?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Apparently because he had become a little anti-New Deal, and partly because he opposed bitterly the foreign policy of the New Deal. He was bitterly opposed to it.

Professor Beard became the founder of what we call the revisionist school in American history.

Mr. HAYS. Well, that is an interesting thing. You say he opposed the foreign policy of the New Deal. I have heard a good many

charges that they did not have any, and I have sort of halfway agreed with that. Just what do you mean by that?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Professor Beard thought it was a matter of the whim of the President of the United States at that time, that the President was interventionist; and Beard thought he tried to drag the United States into war.

Professor Beard became our outstanding isolationist, far more isolationist than Senator Taft. I think it is incorrect to call Taft an isolationist. Beard really became an isolationist.

Mr. HAYS. That is what I wanted to know, whether that was what you had reference to.

Mr. WORMSER. Professor, the pragmatism movement which started with James at Harvard, I assume had considerable influence in this movement which turned a good deal of universities thinking to the left?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes, the history of Harvard University in this field is very much the same as Columbia University's. I think Columbia University went further than Harvard did. Maybe Harvard is not as wide awake as Columbia University is. Dr. A. Lawrence Lowell, who was president of Harvard University for a considerable number of years, was chairman of the department of government, and he was quite as conservative as John W. Burgess was. He had a powerful effect in England, too. His study of the English Constitution and the English Government had great influence in England as well as in the United States. In the eighties and nineties and at the turn of the century, Harvard was extremely conservative in the social sciences, just like Columbia.

Then I think on the philosophical side, the psychological side, Harvard went the same way as Columbia did. One of the leaders, of course, was William James. And his book called *Varieties of Religious Experience*, I think, has undermined the religious convictions and faith of thousands of young people in the United States.

You know, Mr. Wormser, with all the attacks that have been made upon religion by certain scientists, by the empirical school, and right at Columbia University and Harvard University, I think that we are finding among scientists themselves a realization that science doesn't have all the answers to reality; that there are experiences of religion, questions of religious faith, that may, after all, be just as much a part of reality as the study of the stars or the study of atomic energy, or anything else.

I see, so far as science is concerned, a move away from the complete control of empirical thinking and a return to a little more rational or a little more humanistic consideration for religious principles, moral principles, and ethics.

Mr. WORMSER. You do not think, then, that you social scientists are capable of producing all the answers?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Oh, absolutely not. No. No, we do not have all the answers in social science. We are rather dangerous people to trust implicitly.

Mr. WORMSER. Would you comment somewhat, professor, on the scientific method as related to the social sciences? We have had some testimony to the effect that they are not, strictly speaking, sciences at all; that you cannot translate the methods of the natural sciences closely into social areas.

DR. COLEGROVE. Well, the scientific method, of course, is something that various people define in various different ways. If you say the scientific method is a method which will allow you to generalize only upon facts or observation of phenomena which you can see, and prove they exist through the senses, then, of course, the scientific method is very much limited.

MR. WORMSER. You are referring there to Mr. Hays' favorite term "empiricism."

MR. HAYS. Do not tag that term on me. I did not think it up. In fact, it is not my favorite one.

DR. COLEGROVE. Well, in one sense that was the difference between Aristotle and Plato; Plato being more the armchair philosopher, the idealist, and Aristotle, in many respects, the founder of the great school of empiricism.

But the trouble is about going the limit in one direction and ignoring the other side.

MR. WORMSER. Well, what is the other side, professor?

DR. COLEGROVE. As far as empiricism is concerned, it is holding too completely to the technique of purely statistical method, of dealing only with data which can be observed by the sensory organs, opposed to evidence which can be treated by inference or by argument on accepted principles, or building up assumptions that lead to accepted principles.

Now, on the rational or idealistic side, the side, for instance, that Immanuel Kant was dealing with, he tried to take into consideration other aspects of civilization than those you can actually see and touch. I refer to Kant's "categorical imperative," for instance, where he said that what he was impressed by was the starry firmament above his head and the moral law in man's breast. Now, the moral law comes from reasoning. It may be a priori reasoning, but it comes from reasoning and from faith, and from willingness to accept a religious or unexplainable part of our human existence. I think Kant struck the happy medium when he speaks of the starry firmament above, which, of course, can be empirical, and the moral law in every man's breast, which, of course, is deeply religious.

Does that answer the point?

MR. WORMSER. Yes; it does. You made some analogy with Marxian dialectics which was not too clear to me. Would you develop that somewhat?

DR. COLEGROVE. I think among us political scientists, a great many of us tend to accept the pendulum theory—I am using these debatable terms—that politics swings to the right and then you swing to the left. You will find that American history will swing, over a period of 10, 20, or 30 years, to the right, and then swing, over a period of 10, 20, 30, or 40 years, to the left, and so on. That would be a pendulum theory.

The cyclical theory of Aristotle, more or less of Toynbee, although he doesn't admit it is cyclical, is that civilization goes in great cycles. With Aristotle, the cycle was, so far as government was concerned, progress from aristocracy to kingship, from kingship to a great disaster, to mobocracy, and out of mobocracy to some kind of a democracy. From democracy you sell out to the rich men, the oligarchy. Finally, the brainy men, the aristocrats, come back, and finally you have the king. You have swung around the circle. The spiral theory, which is

Marxian, is also cyclical, of course. History advances; you have the struggle of the plebes and the patricians in Rome, the Roman Empire, the passing to feudalism, which they call a form of slavery, the rise of the bourgeoisie and the industrial age; sweeping around in a cycle. But it is a spiral. You are always landing one place, in the Marxian theory. You are aiming right at the classless society, the dictatorship of the proletariat and then the perfect Communist society.

Mr. HAYS. Do you subscribe to any of those three theories, doctor?

Dr. COLEGROVE. What is that?

Mr. HAYS. Do you personally subscribe to any of those theories?

Dr. COLEGROVE. I think there is something to every one of those theories. You can assemble a lot of data that looks as if the pendulum theory was right, that you swing from the right to the left, or from radicalism to conservatism, and so on. And if you take Greek history, Greek history followed the Aristotelian cycle several times.

Mr. HAYS. You can almost document the history. Of course, when you try to apply those theories to the future, that is when you run into difficulty.

Dr. COLEGROVE. The only cue you can follow is that history repeats itself. History follows somewhat the same pattern.

Mr. WORMSER. Now, professor, do you think the foundations have been in any way responsible for this general tendency in education and research? I cite a couple of notes you gave me on the failure to emphasize American institutions as sound.

I think you referred to the emphasis being laid on what you call the "pathology" in studies of the American Government, and little attempt to find out what makes our government work as well as it does; a tendency rather to present what is as somewhat wrong and to look for ways to change it to make it better, instead of how to find out what makes it work so well. Could you tell me what this trend has produced and to what extent you think foundations are responsible for it?

Dr. COLEGROVE. I think foundations could hardly be said to have been the originators of any such tendency, but they certainly have promoted it.

Curiously enough, people are sometimes much more interested in pathology, in disease, than they are interested in the healthy body.

Mr. WORMSER. By "pathology," you meant the ailments in our society?

Dr. COLEGROVE. The ailments, yes. Or let us say the sore spots, slum areas, rather than fine residential areas, and so on. I think there has been unfortunately a tendency on the part of the foundations to promote research that is pathological in that respect, that is pointing out the bad aspects of American government, American politics, American society, and so on, instead of emphasizing the good aspects. You have that difference right in Charles A. Beard himself. His *Economic Interpretation of the United States* is Marxian and pathological. When he wrote *The Republic*, that is sound. He is dealing there with the sound part of American Government.

Mr. HAYS. Don't you think, Doctor, that again we are running into the human variable, there, in this pathological approach? I mean, we could use this committee as an example. It has been entirely "pathological" so far, pointing out the defects, you see. It is just like a person going to the doctor, is it not? If you are sick, you go. If you are well, you tend to forget about him. You do not need him, you think.

Dr. COLEGROVE. I would say that the better policy for the foundations would be to try to encourage more study of the healthy portions of American society rather than laying so much emphasis upon the pathological aspects.

Mr. HAYS. I agree with you. Personally, after 6 years in Washington, I would like to see them do a study on why the Government works as well as it does.

Dr. COLEGROVE. That would be a profitable study.

Mr. HAYS. It is a mystery to me.

Dr. COLEGROVE. That would be a profitable study. James Bryce had something to say on that, too, years ago.

Mr. WORMSER. Professor, would you say that in that area science, in the sense that it is used by social scientists, has been used as a sort of cloak for reform; that there has been this conscious movement to reform our society; and that that has sometimes taken a distinctly radical trend?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes. Undoubtedly. If you are going to study the pathological aspects, the natural tendency of human nature—we are getting back to human nature, of course—is to find out how to cure it, how to alleviate it, and so on. And if the foundations contribute overmuch to pathological studies, and not sufficiently to the studies with reference to the soundness of our institutions, there would be more conclusions on the pathological side than there would be conclusions on the sounder traditional side of American government, American history, and so on. That would inevitably follow.

It seems to me sometimes the foundations have gone out of their way to try to get a non-American solution for some of our pathological aspects; as, for instance, when the Carnegie Corp. brought a Swedish scholar over to the United States to study the social problem in the South, the racial problem in the South. I think Gunnar Myrdal was a rather unfortunate selection, or rather the promotion of his conclusions was unfortunate. We were told that here was a wholly objective foreign scholar who was going to study one of the difficult problems of American life, namely the situation of the Negro. And it was concluded that, of course, his method would be right, because he had not lived in the United States a long time, he was not connected with the race that he was studying, and he was a foreigner.

Dr. Myrdal was a Socialist, pretty far left, indeed extremely left. He was not unprejudiced. He came over here with all the prejudices of European Socialists. And the criticism that he makes of the American Constitution, the criticism that he makes of the conservatives of the United States, are bitter criticisms. He didn't have any praise at all for the conservatives. He did praise what he called the liberals. And he implied that it was the conservatives in the United States who created the problem and who continued the difficulties of any solution. I felt the foundations did a great disservice to American scholarship in announcing his study as an objective non-partisan study whose conclusions were wholly unbiased. It was almost intellectual dishonesty.

Mr. WORMSER. Professor, the term "social engineering" has become rather widespread. We seem to find social scientists conceiving of themselves as sort of an elite entitled by their peculiar qualifications and by their presumed ability as scientists to solve human problems,

justified in telling the rest of us how we should organize ourselves and what form our society should take.

Would you comment on that, on this social-engineering feature which has arrived in the social sciences?

Dr. COLEGROVE. That, of course, grows out of the overemphasis on the constant need for reform. The assumption is that everything needs reform, that unless you are reforming you are not progressing. I think it is in large part due to the failure of the foundations, the failure of many of the scholars they choose, to fully understand what the principles of the American Constitution are, what the principles of American tradition are. Some of them, I know, do not accept those principles as sound. They even attack the principles. Of course, we all know that the principles should be examined and reexamined. But there is a tendency on the part of those who get grants from the foundations to think that they must turn out something in the way of reform; not a study which does not suggest a definite reform but a study more like Myrdal's study, *The American Dilemma*, which poses a condition in which there must be reform.

Mr. WORMSER. Does that tendency to insist on reform in turn tend to attract the more radical type of scholar, with the result that grants are made more generally to those considerably to the left?

Dr. COLEGROVE. I think undoubtedly it does, especially in the cooperative research, where a large number of people cooperate or operate together on one research project.

Mr. HAYS. Professor, in specific example, I am thinking now that over the weekend, I saw an article in one of the Ohio newspapers, of one of our cities up there, one of our larger cities, in which they had made a study of juvenile delinquency. It was merely a factual study about what part of the city these cases came from. They had figures from the court records to show that about 73 percent of them came from a slum area of the city. Now, that, of course, is pathological, if you are going to study that. But then if you did study it, you would pretty nearly have to come up with some kind of a recommendation about how to alleviate it; would you not? You could not come up and say the American tradition says we have slums, and we have always had them, and it is a thing we cannot do anything about, so we are going to have juvenile delinquency. You pretty near have to suggest some kind of a reform, if the study is to be of any value; do you not?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Oh, most certainly. And, of course, that is the kind of reform that constantly has to be in operation. Because there is always the tendency, in a large city, for districts to become depreciated districts. Houses tumble down, or are not kept up, and the population becomes very congested in such places. And there, of course, crime thrives. I would say that not all of those studies are really research; those are investigations which should follow research principles laid down. They are routine studies.

Mr. HAYS. But you came up with this fact that we have these statistics. Now, then, your study from there would have to be concerned with, "What are we going to do about them?" And there, of course, you leave your facts more or less behind and go off into the realm of theory inevitably.

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes. Those solutions are based on what has been done in a great many other cities, and the achievements in those cities. And in many respects, that would be routine. It is obvious that cities

need probably better inspection. A large number of buildings need to be torn down, reconstructed. How are you going to get the money to tear them down? What sort of projects are going to take their place? How are you going to get capital to go into the building of better tenements?

All of that is a routine study that has to be made constantly in the cities if they are going to keep them clean, keep out crime, and make decent places for people to live.

Mr. WORMSER. Professor, back to this term "social engineering," again, is there not a certain presumption, or presumptuousness, on the part of social scientists, to consider themselves a group of the elite who are solely capable and should be given the sole opportunity to guide us in our social development? They exclude by inference, I suppose, religious leaders and what you might call humanistic leaders. They combine the tendency toward the self-generated social engineering concept with a high concentration of power in that interlocking arrangement of foundations and agencies, and it seems to me you might have something rather dangerous.

Dr. COLEGROVE. I think so. Very decisively. There is a sort of arrogance in a large number of people, and the arrogance of scholarship is in many cases a very irritating affair. But there is a tendency of scholars to become arrogant, to be contemptuous of other people's opinions.

Mr. WORMSER. However able they are, Professor, you would not think it would be socially sound for us to be governed or directed by any group of elite, whoever they might be?

Dr. COLEGROVE. No. And, of course, if a certain group considers itself as the elite, as having all the answers to all the questions, as a great many professors do—

The CHAIRMAN. The hour of noon has arrived, and I am wondering how much time the professor will require.

Mr. WORMSER. I think I can finish with him perhaps in 15 or 20 minutes. Or he would not mind coming back after lunch?

You would not mind coming back after lunch, would you, Professor?

Dr. COLEGROVE. No, if that will suit the convenience of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. (Whereupon, at 12:05 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., this same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The hearing was resumed at 2 p. m.)

The CHAIRMAN. Are you ready to proceed, Professor Colegrove?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Mr. WORMSER. Professor Colegrove, I believe you wanted to make a correction in relation to the recommendations made for technical staff in MacArthur's headquarters?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Counsel, not a correction. I probably didn't get in the whole story.

I was not informed by General Hilldring, as to the source of the recommendations. I later, however, was informed by General Schulgen, the deputy for General Hilldring—Hilldring was Chief of the Civil Affairs Division in the Department of the Army—that the

lists supplied to the Army, besides the American Political Association list, which was never used, came from the IPR, the Institute of Pacific Relations. A Colonel Rae, assistant to the deputy, informed me that there were really two lists. One was from the Institute of Pacific Relations, and the other from the American Council of Learned Societies, and the selection had been made from those two lists.

Mr. HAYS. Just as an interesting commentary, how did your name get on the list, or was it on the list, or how did you get into it?

Dr. COLEGROVE. I don't know. I may have been on one of the other lists. I just don't know. Evidently a selection had been made in December and early January. I got a telegram from Major General Hilldring about the 15th of January. I found later on that the selection had really been made back in December from the two lists. I never saw the list, except the list that General Schulgen gave me of the persons who had been appointed.

Mr. HAYS. Were you the only one who shared your general views on this group? Did you stand alone, with all the rest of them left, or what?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Oh, no. There were some very good names on the list. I was disappointed that my list had not been used. I had Dr. David Rowe and Dr. Harold Quigley on my list.

Mr. HAYS. No, maybe you are not following exactly what I am trying to find out, Professor. Of the people who were subsequently chosen, was every one of the group, of this so-called left-wing group, except you, or were there other people who shared your general views?

Dr. COLEGROVE. There were some good level-headed experts who were selected. Dr. Cyrus Peake, for instance, who is now in the State Department, an excellent Chinese scholar, and also Japanese scholar. He was on one of the lists. In fact, he was also on my list, but I was given to understand my list was not used. Peake was one of the best expert officers sent out.

Mr. HAYS. The reason I question you along those lines: I got the impression this morning, and I think it was generally left, that there weren't any good people. And after all, this is your opinion of who were good and who were bad. But I sort of got the impression there weren't any good ones on the list. But of the group that went over, there were some that you would approve of?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Oh, decidedly. I gave the wrong impression then. There were evidently some good men on that list who were selected. I assume that their names were on 1 of the 2 lists for the IPR or the American Council of Learned Societies.

I am just assuming that. But there were some very good men, top-notch men.

Mr. HAYS. Perhaps this morning we were a little too "pathological" in our approach to it.

Dr. COLEGROVE. Perhaps. Perhaps I got bogged down in pathology.

Mr. WORMSER. Professor Colegrove, some of the critics of this committee have apparently conceived the idea that it wishes to impose some sort of "thought control" on research or to promote conformity in research, according to some theories of its'own. I think I can safely say, as the committee's agent, that it unanimously hopes for the opposite; that it hopes for the freest kind of intellectual competition.

Is it your feeling that this concentration of power which I have mentioned, this sort of close working together of the foundations and

the clearinghouse agencies has, in itself, tended to impose a kind of uniformity or conformity on research in the social sciences?

Dr. COLEGROVE. I think it has, Mr. Wormser. I think it has very decidedly. And it may be largely due to the fact that 1 man, or 2 or 3 men, have such great leadership that they are permitted to make the selections as to the projects.

Now, for instance, at the University of Chicago, where many of the projects were carried out, on the nomination of Professor Merriam, obviously one man making the selections—I do not mean to say he was the only man, but he was influential—would have a tendency to create a uniformity, a conformity, that would be in the direction in which that man was thinking. That could happen on the conservative side as much as it could happen on the liberal side, of course.

I felt that Professor Merriam was always very sensitive to foundation opinion. I remember one episode when I was on the University of Chicago Roundtable with Professor Merriam in 1944, I think, when the subject of our discussion was the question of the soldier vote. President Roosevelt at that time was interested in allowing the boys in the Army to vote in the presidential election. In the course of our discussion before the roundtable opened, I mentioned one point that I wanted to bring up, and that was whether in the United States we ought not to have an educational qualification for voting. Some States have it, you know. Merriam thought that was a good point, but Merriam was overruled by the officers of the University of Chicago Roundtable, who said they did not want us to discuss that question; that they were not interested, although Professor Merriam himself raised that question with the officers. Merriam shrugged his shoulders and said, "You see how we are down here." I felt a little disappointed in Professor Merriam that he did not compel that discussion, since they were having him on the radio as the head of that particular discussion or series of discussions.

Mr. WORMSER. Well, Professor, let me put it this way: If foundations acted independently in designing, let us say, and awarding grants in research in the social sciences, or if they acted through individual colleges and universities, would there not be more of what you might call intellectual competition than if they appropriated a large part of their funds in the research area through intermediate organizations which have a tendency to control or direct the type of research?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Well, I think the universities are better equipped to produce diversity and variety of investigations. That would naturally follow, when you have large faculties, one man interested in a psychological phase, another man interested in a philosophical phase, or economics, and so on. If you have a large committee of the faculty, I think you are more likely to spread the researches.

I want to tell you also one thing about the professor who wants to be a "lone wolf" in conducting investigations all himself. There is a good deal to be said for that kind of a study. Take Hobbes's *Leviathan*, for instance, one of the books we think highly of. Take Locke's famous *Treatise on Civil Government*. Both were "lone wolf" studies, done by one man, Hobbes, or Locke, in their own libraries. They were not cooperative studies. Of course, way back in those days, you had to have somebody finance the study, and lordly patrons contributed, of course, to these researches.

But I would like to see more individual projects done by one man, with maybe one assistant, if he wants an assistant. I think that would spread research around more.

Then I would like to see the foundations sprinkle more of these research projects around the small colleges. There is a wealth of brains, a wealth of competence, in our small colleges and universities, which does not have its share in research grants at the present time. I would hope that the foundations would give much more attention to what is going on in the small colleges. The tendency is to concentrate this in the large universities, if they use the universities, or concentrate in the operating societies.

Mr. HAYS. Now, Doctor, when you are talking about grants, obviously I think you will have to agree with me that in the field, we will say, of cancer research, there would not be much that you could do with a grant in a small college. That would have to be concentrated in something like the New York Memorial Cancer Hospital, or something of that type. So you are talking now—or if I am wrong, correct me—about grants in the social science field, and sociology, and those fields.

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes, I am limiting my remarks to the social sciences. But I can see even in cancer an opportunity for small studies by one man. I know of one such study made by Prof. Harold T. Davis at Northwestern University.

Mr. HAYS. That is not exactly a small college.

Dr. COLEGROVE. No, but it was just a one-man study.

Mr. HAYS. Yes, but I am speaking about the physical equipment he might have to have that would not be available.

Dr. COLEGROVE. He did not need any physical equipment except a good medical library, and, of course, Northwestern has one and the University of Chicago has one and the city of Chicago has several. He did his work entirely in taking the results of research in cancer by the greatest experts on the subject of cancer. He must have gone over three or four thousand articles. Then he applied the statistical method to the medical findings and by use of the statistical method, he reached some remarkable conclusions which have, I think, made an important impression upon cancer specialists over the entire United States if not Europe.

Mr. WORMSER. Professor, two university presidents told me that they thought in principle it would be a good idea to distribute it among the smaller colleges, but actually it was only in the larger universities that you found the men competent to do research in these various areas.

I think one partial answer to that is that in some of these empirical studies no talent is required. They are more or less quantitative studies, which a professor in a smaller college might be able to do just as well as a university professor. What is your idea as to that?

Dr. COLEGROVE. I would agree with that. There are many small colleges located near the center of a State where the professor—if he is dealing with the area situation—could quite easily do a lot of traveling just as well from a small college as from a large university; I think the foundations have not yet explored enough into the talent that can be found in the small colleges.

Of course, there is a tendency for a young man in a small college who gets a grant and thereby attracts attention to himself to be

pulled into a university. Personally, I regret to see the small colleges raided in this way by the great universities taking off the faculties of these small colleges—teachers who are doing so much good for the American people.

The CHAIRMAN. But there would be less likelihood of the so-called raiding both of the faculty and the graduate students in the small colleges if grants were more general and made available to the outstanding faculty members and the outstanding students, don't you think?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Oh, yes, quite true. Quite true. We have had a number of universities that have raided small colleges almost to their destruction. President Harper of the University of Chicago raided Clark University, took pretty largely all of its talent to the University of Chicago. But that was before the foundations were greatly operative; and of course he did it by offering, on the one hand, research facilities, and on the other hand, much higher salaries than they were getting at Clark University.

Mr. HAYS. There is just the point of the whole thing. You yourself say that is before the foundations got into the picture. It happened. And it is the same thing that is happening to the one-room school, the little red schoolhouse. Everybody likes to get nostalgic about it in talking about it, but they are slowly disappearing, and I do not think that the foundations have anything to do with that, do they?

Dr. COLEGROVE. No, it is the better transportation system and the better facilities offered to the pupils at the township schools.

Mr. HAYS. It has only been in the last 10 years that you dared to run for office if you had not been born in a log cabin and had not gone to the little red schoolhouse.

The CHAIRMAN. I have met both requirements.

Mr. WORMSER. Professor, I would like your comments on this subject, if you will. The trustees of these foundations have a distinct fiduciary responsibility which they recognize, in principle, at least, as the trustees of public funds. It seems to me the most important trust function they have is to exercise judgment in connection with the selection of grants and grantees. Does it not seem to you that to a very large extent they have abandoned that trust function, that trust duty, and have delegated the whole thing to other organizations? That in certain areas they have used these intermediate organizations to fulfill their judgment function for them, which they, as trustees, should exercise? Would you comment on that?

Dr. COLEGROVE. I think that has very largely occurred. I do not quite like to put it this way, but the trustees are in many cases just window dressing to give popular confidence in the institution. In the United States we think an institution needs a very distinguished board of trustees; and, of course, you know, from college experience, a great many men are made trustees of a university because the university expects them to make a large donation to the endowment fund or build a building or something like that. And to offset a group of rich trustees, you put on some trustees who have large reputations in the literary world or in other fields than merely finance.

Many of the trustees, I am afraid, have gotten into a very bad habit. They are perfectly realistic. They know why they are put on the

board of trustees. And they are not as careful as they should be in taking responsibility for the operation of those organizations.

I think the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which was set up under Elihu Root and President Nicholas Murray Butler way back, I think, about 1908, had a board of trustees picked by President Butler, and I think Butler expected to get a great deal of advice from those trustees.

But I do recall many years later President Butler told me that he had to use very extraordinary methods to get his trustees to meet even for the annual meeting.

Mr. WORMSER. Then, in practice, they delegate their authority partly to other organizations. Of course, where they do make their own grants directly, they delegate enormously to their professional employees, the executives, who do not have the same trust responsibility but are merely executives.

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes, they delegate their authority in several directions. Trustees delegate their authority to the president of the foundation. The president in large measure even delegates his authority to the heads of departments. A president of one of these large funds sometimes is a little hazy about what is happening in this division or in that division. And in these heads of departments—let's say of the Rockefeller Foundation, where you have the social sciences and humanities—you will find a delegation of authority in the case of the social sciences to the operating society, the Social Science Research Council, and to the American Council of Learned Societies in the case of the humanities. So you have a delegation of authority in two directions there.

Mr. WORMSER. So whether a foundation fulfills its obligation to the public rests primarily on the selection of its employees and the association with these intermediate groups. Is it your opinion, Professor, that these employees—I don't mean in a derogatory sense to say "employees", the officers of these organizations—are on the same caliber as a whole, do they compare well with university executives or those who would administer grants under university administration?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Well, I think those of us in political science feel that Joe Willits, who was a professor of the University of Pennsylvania before he took the position that he has at the present time, is an outstanding scholar, a most competent administrator, a very good judge of human nature. And yet he cannot give all of his attention to the expenditure of these vast sums.

What applies, of course, to the Rockefeller Foundation applies even more forcibly to the Ford Foundation, which is much larger.

Mr. WORMSER. One witness, Professor Briggs, testified that in his opinion there wasn't one single employee in the Ford Fund for the Advancement of Education, from the top down to the bottom, who had had enough experience in the areas in which they were operating to make proper judgments. That does not sound very good for foundation practices, if they select men as carelessly, let us say, as that. I am trying to make a comparison with universities, because I am interested particularly in the possibility that a better medium for foundation largesse may be through the universities, instead of through professional agencies.

Dr. COLEGROVE. Oh, quite true. I think it would require a larger number of topnotch administrators in the foundations to exercise more

critical judgment than can be exercised at the present time. Even there, however, you would have to choose between universities; and if you are going to the small colleges, there is a case where you would have to have many careful surveys and studies, and an acquaintance with the personnel and faculties of those universities. Probably the staffs of high-grade men, let us say men serving under Dr. Willits, ought to be a little higher caliber.

MR. HAYS. Professor, right there, no matter how a foundation handed this money out, you would find somebody to say they did not give it to the right people.

Dr. COLEGROVE. Oh, yes.

MR. HAYS. And if they gave it all to the small colleges, you could undoubtedly set up a committee who would say that was a terrible thing and they wasted money and were not getting results, and so on. So all of this testimony is a matter of opinion, is it not? I mean, as to this particular phase. Dr. Briggs says and you say that it should not be done through these societies; that it should be done the other way.

Dr. COLEGROVE. It is opinion based on our observations.

MR. HAYS. Yes.

Dr. COLEGROVE. My observations would be in a little different field than Professor Briggs' observations would be. I would say, trying to be cautious in what I do say, that based on my observation I think the foundations have not given as careful a study to some of these phases as I would like to see.

MR. HAYS. Well, now, you talked a little bit ago about the delegation of authority. Do you have any specific ideas about what we could do to remedy that, if that is bad? I mean how are you going to get away from it?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Well, you cannot avoid delegation of authority, but a good administrator has to know how to delegate. He has to choose to whom he is going to delegate, and choose what powers he is going to delegate, and then finally he has to have his system of reviewing the achievements of persons to whom power to make decisions has been delegated.

MR. WORMSER. May I interrupt to help Mr. Hays' question?

MR. HAYS. You are sure this is going to be helpful?

MR. WORMSER. Yes, sir.

MR. HAYS has said that it seemed to him a trustee should not act as a trustee of a foundation unless he was willing to give the time to it that was necessary. It seemed to me that that was a very apt remark. And I wonder if that is not the answer, that these men are so busy with their own lives that although they are eminent they are not capable of being trustees of foundations. That is no criticism of them as persons.

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes; undoubtedly many of the trustees would not serve if they felt that they would be called upon to do much more than go to the meetings, hear the reports, and sometimes not say a single word. You would not have as brilliant, as lofty, as remarkable, a collection of men as trustees if you required a little more responsibility on their part. I would say, on the whole, the board of trustees is too large. There are too many remarkable men, in New York and elsewhere, who are trustees of more than one foundation. And just as we exercise in the American Political Science Association a "self-

denying ordinance" where no member of the association speaks more than twice in an annual meeting, I would like to see these interlocking trusteeships more or less abolished. You cannot abolish them by law, of course. You could abolish them by practice. So you would reduce the size of the board of trustees and then expect more consideration, more consultation, more advice, from the men who had accepted this great responsibility.

Mr. WORMSER. Was that not your idea, Mr. Hays, that they should be working directly?

Mr. HAYS. Oh, sure. Exactly.

Mr. KOCH. Here is something that worries me. Suppose I had a great big motor company or a steel mill or this and that, and they picked me because they wanted, as you say, window dressing. The first thing that puzzles me is why they need window dressing in a foundation of this kind. If you are running a foundation where you go to the people every year, like the Red Cross or the March of Dimes, for money, then you want to impress the populace that there are big names behind it. But here, where Mr. Ford or Mr. Carnegie or Mr. Rockefeller plumps millions of dollars in the laps of the foundation, and they do not have to go to the public for 1 cent more, I always wonder: why do they need big names in that case? And would it not be better, instead of picking me, the head of a big steel mill, pick somebody who was a little more familiar with the educational field? Because I can see exactly what I would do if I were that fortunate head of a big steel mill. As soon as somebody said, "Let us do something about education, or study this," if I were honest, I would immediately say, "I do not know anything about it, so what do the professors say?" And the professors would immediately tell me what they thought the trend of the times was, and I would say, "I will be safe if I follow the trend of the times."

And it seems to me the dismal part of the testimony so far is that there has been so much unanimity among the big foundations in following the supposed trend of the times. I would rather see one day Rockefeller in this corner slugging it out with Ford Foundation in this corner to try to argue a particular thing. Here we get into a depression, and we find out Professor Beard and Professor Muzzey have said things they later veered away from, and yet all of the foundations at that time may have put their money in the direction of that project, pushing the pendulum along much farther than it probably should have been pushed. And yet there was no foundation that said, "Well, change may be necessary, but let us find out what is good about the old order so that, when we decide on the change, we have at least heard both sides."

It seems to me there has not been that debate. And it may have been because the big names probably said, "We don't really know much about it ourselves. We will have to see what is the fad, what the ladies are wearing in Paris today, or what the trend is in education." I therefore wonder whether it would not be better to suggest that where they do not need big names they get lesser names who can spend more time and are a little bit more familiar with the subject matter. That, unfortunately, was an awfully long speech, but that has been worrying me.

Dr. COLEGROVE. I think you have given an accurate picture of the actual situation. The large number of famous names on the list of trustees is due to the old superstition that our institutions must be

headed by a famous group of men. And I will say frankly it is to impress Congress as well as the American people; to impress public opinion as fully as possible. It is an old superstition. It is not necessary at all. With a group of 7 trustees, using 7 because it is an odd number, I imagine most of these trustees if they were trustees of only one other organization, maybe trustees of a church, would be able to give more attention to their duties as trustees of foundations. They could not pass on the responsibility.

Mr. KOCH. Another element is this. Let us say during the depression 70 percent of the people were in favor of a change; 30 percent wanted to try out the old system a little while longer. All of them paid additional taxes, because many tax-exempt foundations did not have to pay taxes. I should think the 30 percent in the minority would at least like to feel that at least 30 percent of the tax-exempt money should be used to sell my kind of Americanism or my kind of economic system. And yet if the foundations all followed the trend, the minority group does not have the benefit of that terrific money. Because—I won't say the propaganda—but the education that they can sell is something terrific. And yet the minority just does not have the benefit of any of that money, even though they share the tax bill along with the majority.

Mr. HAYS. But you are arguing like the people who do not believe in smallpox vaccine. Then we should just go along trying to get over smallpox without it for a while longer.

Mr. KOCH. No, I say if people pay money they ought to be able to decide how they spend their money. In your case, nobody pays for smallpox vaccine except those who get it. But in this case we have all paid, because the foundations get tax exemption, those who are entitled to it. And yet I do not get my share of the educational experimenting, because it so happens unfortunately that 55 percent of the people seem to think that something else should be gone into.

Mr. HAYS. But then you are arguing that you should keep on experimenting with something that it has been proved will not work, and I think that is just a waste of time.

Mr. KOCH. No, I do not argue that at all. I like to feel that both sides are fully debated, so that when we decide on legislation we at least know it has not gone in on default. Because these very leaders of the early thirties, many of the big leaders themselves, who started pushing away, have swung back a little. Now, if they had not been given such a big push by the foundations at the beginning, maybe they would not have gone so far as to require their coming back again. I mean, it is just a matter of proportion that puzzles me a little bit, whether at least some of the foundations should not see to it that both sides are properly presented, so that we can more intelligently discard the old system. And that is just one thing that puzzles me a little bit about their method.

Mr. HAYS. Perhaps some of their difficulty might come from the fact that it is difficult to get someone to defend the point of view that has become generally discredited.

Mr. KOCH. That may be true.

Mr. HAYS. You have had a little difficulty right here in this committee. It is a little hard to get people to come in and testify in favor of the case the staff set forth in their initial report. Because apparently, with all due respect to Dr. Colegrove, and I am glad to have

his testimony, which has been very interesting, apparently a majority of the opinion in the field is on the other side.

Mr. KOCH. But you are happy that Professor Colegrove has presented his case.

Mr. HAYS. Surely.

Mr. KOCH. And in a number of cases the minority view has not even been presented.

Mr. HAYS. But the thing that I question, Mr. Koch, and I think you and I both know what we are talking about, is the unusual way we went at it. I only know of one previous instance where you ever set forth a verdict and then had the trial, and that was in Alice in Wonderland, or Through the Looking Glass. It was done that way there.

Mr. KOCH. From my point of view, and I am sure the general counsel agrees, we felt it was obligatory to tell what were the criticisms. I will tell you quite frankly when I was appointed associate counsel, the first thing I said was, "What is wrong with foundations?" And then when we started to ask questions we found certain things professors and others criticized. We felt those things should be put before the foundations so that they could come in and state whether or not there was validity to those objections. We did not intend, surely, to render a verdict, but just to say "This has been said about or against foundation practices. Let us see whether there is any merit to it."

Mr. HAYS. Doctor, I seem to have been impressed mainly in my undergraduate days with the theory of the pendulum. And then you mentioned the second one.

Dr. COLEGROVE. The cycle theory.

Mr. HAYS. We seem to be working on the cycle theory, because we start out doing a pathological job here. I like that term. I am glad we got that in here.

Mr. KOCH. But you said we improved after the lunch hour.

Mr. HAYS. Then we criticize the pathological approach in the foundations, but by your own admission that is exactly what we started out to do here.

Dr. COLEGROVE. I think on this one aspect we are looking at it from the pendulum theory. If the foundations have gone too far in dissipating their authority, you might try to swing the pendulum back by trying to get the foundations to insist on more responsibility on the part of their trustees. And I mean a responsibility such as Nicholas Murray Butler used in the beginning of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, when President Root and later President Butler would talk over with the trustees, the few that they could get, a very detailed discussion of what Professor Shotwell was doing, let us say, and bring Professor Shotwell in and let him explain. You can do that with 2 or 3 trustees, just as you could with 20. They are all there in the room. You would get a higher sense of responsibility if there were, let us say, just seven trustees. Those men would have to understand, "Well, here I have a responsibility. I will be at the annual meeting, and I will be at each quarterly meeting." The projects could be reviewed, the propositions taken up, by the trustees themselves. It would be very curious to have minutes of some of the foundation trustees' meetings these days—I have not seen them recently—to see how little there is of that actual discussion or disagree-

ment over the content of projects and the selection of personnel for the projects and the selection of the projects themselves.

Mr. HAYS. Professor, right there, that sounds very good, and I think perhaps you have a very good idea. But then we come to the difficult part of the application.

With a foundation as large as some of these are, and dispensing as much money as they have and making as many grants as they do, it is something like breaking up the New York Yankees. That seems to be the only alternative. Or, "Let us do away with big corporations." Because, obviously, the president of the United States Steel Co. cannot know everything that is going on, and neither can his board of trustees.

So I am inclined to go along a hundred percent with your general idea, but the practical aspect of it is what I find difficult, how you are going to do it. If you can give us any light on that, I would be very receptive to hearing about it.

Dr. COLEGROVE. Well, it gets back to what you were mentioning this morning, Mr. Hays, with regard to human nature. We cannot get rid of human nature, and these human problems all come up when you want to push the pendulum back.

Let us say the Rockefeller Corp. reduced its trustees to 5 or 7. Would you be able to find 5 or 7 great outstanding men in New York or around the country who would be willing to accept that responsibility?

Mr. HAYS. That is a question, of course, that is an imponderable, and I don't know whether anyone can answer it. We have had conflicting testimony. There have been 11 days up to date, and I cannot remember exactly who said what, or what page it is on, but there was testimony in here to the effect that these foundations had too many nonentities in them. Now we hear that they have too many names that do not give enough time. So it is almost a case of being damned whatever they do, as I see it. And I do not know how they are going to escape one criticism or the other. Both of them have a certain validity, don't you think?

Dr. COLEGROVE. I think most of the trustees of the foundations are excellent men, with great reputations, who have made contributions to industry, to science, to literature, and so on.

But you have there the practical question that they have dodged their responsibility.

I must say whether you can get 5 or 7 men who would be willing to take all that responsibility themselves is something we could not answer until it is tried. I would like to see it tried as an experiment.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have some more questions, Mr. Wormser?

Mr. WORMSER. Yes, I do.

Professor, to your knowledge, have these foundations or their operating agencies to any extent engaged in direct political activity themselves?

Dr. COLEGROVE. I think, generally speaking, the foundations have not engaged in any direct political activities. The operating societies have, and, of course, some of the learned societies have engaged in political activities.

I want to talk about only the things I know of myself. I will take one example, with the American Council of Learned Societies. Last summer, when the position as Librarian of Congress became vacant,

there were a few of us who felt that Prof. Reed West, of George Washington University, was an excellent recommendation for this vacant position. And we persuaded Senator Taft to look into the possibility of sponsoring Prof. Reed West. I must say that I was acting only as a citizen. I have no connection with the American Political Science Association at the present time, other than being a member. I am not an officer of it. Quite a number of persons supported West and arranged a dossier on Professor West for Senator Taft. Taft became persuaded that West was just the man for the position of Librarian of Congress.

I understand that Senator Taft made up his mind on this while he was in the hospital, the last time he went to the hospital. The last telephone call he made, from the hospital to the White House, was asking the President to support Professor West.

My understanding is that the President said that if it was all right with the Hill he would, or someone said it for the President. And Senator Knowland, Senator Styles Bridges, and, I believe, the Speaker, Speaker Martin, all agreed to recommend West. Shortly after that, Senator Taft died. It was the last political act he took.

We found, however, those of us who were supporting Professor West, that some of the operating societies had moved in, like the American Council of Learned Societies, also the American Library Association, and the Social Science Research Council, trying to persuade Governor Adams and the White House that they should be allowed to name a group of persons from whom the White House would select the recommendation for the nomination of Librarian of Congress. It was a quite interesting little battle, and the few political scientists who engaged, trying to get West into the post, were defeated, and the man supported by the American Council of Learned Societies and the American Library Association and the Social Science Research Council finally got the appointment.

Now, as a member of a professional society, I felt it was not quite in keeping for the American Council of Learned Societies to engage in this political activity.

Mr. HAYS. Well, did they do it as a body, or did they do it as individuals, as you were doing promoting the other fellow?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Well, it was a little more subtle than that. It was the officers that did it, the paid officers located here in Washington, D. C. The American Council of Learned Societies is composed of 23 or 24 societies. The American Political Science Association is one. At the last meeting of the American Council of Learned Societies, which was in February—I am a delegate to the American Council of Learned Societies—I protested what had been done, but I didn't get very far with the protest, because it had already been accomplished.

Mr. HAYS. Doctor, if you had been an officer, as you were at one time, of the American Political Science Association, would you have felt it incumbent upon you to refrain from pushing the candidacy of Mr. West because you were an officer of that society?

Dr. COLEGROVE. I think in that particular case, yes, because the Librarian of Congress is in a rather strategic and important position. When I advised governmental agencies, it was with reference to experts for particular tasks to be performed. Now, the Library of Congress includes the Legislative Reference Service, which does a great many things for Congress.

Mr. HAYS. None of which many Congressmen feel they do very well. Let me put that in the record.

Dr. COLEGROVE. Well, there are all sorts of opinions about it.

Mr. HAYS. That is mine. In fact, not to interrupt you, it might be said that the Appropriations Committee felt the same way, because they cut their appropriations the other day, and one of the members said at lunch the other day that you were never able to get anything from the Legislative Reference Service if you called them except the book, which you could have gone over and gotten, and then you would have to look up the passages anyway.

Dr. COLEGROVE. I think it would be much better if the Legislative Reference Service was a separate organization from the Library, completely under the control of Congress, and more actively under the control of Congress. To attach it to the Library of Congress is combining two functions, which more or less get in the way of each other.

Mr. HAYS. I can sympathize with your point of view on losing this appointment, but let me just say that rather than the American Council of Learned Societies or anyone taking advantage of you, I think fate played a dirty trick on you.

Dr. COLEGROVE. Oh, yes.

Mr. HAYS. Because with all due respect to Senator Taft, and I hold him in the utmost respect, and I collaborated with him, strange as it may seem, on many legislative proposals here, there is nothing that loses in influence any quicker than a politician who either dies or is defeated for office. It ceases just as if it had been cut off right there.

I might point out to you, and this is interesting in passing, that I had a little matter pending in one of the departments that I was very much interested in, and sent it to Taft. Someone had gotten to him, and it affected somebody in the State of Ohio, not in my district. And they had sold him the idea that it should not go through. For 7 months it stayed dormant, and at 4 o'clock in the afternoon that he died, the Department called me up and said, "The thing is going through as you want it." So you see how quickly your influence goes. That is what happened to you. And I will say in praise of the Senator that had he lived your client would probably have been the Librarian today.

Dr. COLEGROVE. Undoubtedly. And those supporting Professor West said as vigorously as they could that this was the dying wish of Senator Taft. But, as you say, as soon as a man is dead—

Mr. HAYS. Those things all sound good in an eulogy, but they do not go much further.

Dr. COLEGROVE. I do think, however, that you are bound to get a little political influence on the part of an operating society which is located right in Washington, D. C. Now, where the American Council of Learned Societies, it seemed to me, was at fault, was in not getting the permission of the constituent societies before engaging in this political activity.

Mr. HAYS. I have a question right there, Professor.

Here is a book called English for Turks. I want you to look at it and see if you have ever seen anything like it. I am not going to cross-examine you on it. I just want you to look at it for a minute and look at the flyleaf, and then I want to ask you something about that kind of a procedure. I have a similar volume here, English for Indonesians.

Dr. COLEGROVE. I might say that this represents the new process of printing used by the American Council of Learned Societies, and they really have made quite a contribution in that direction.

Mr. HAYS. Yes. That book is put out under the auspices of the American Council of Learned Societies, as is this one, and we have another one over here on—I cannot read this language very well. This is Korean.

Well, I would not know it unless somebody told me.

Now, would you consider these to be political acts?

Dr. COLEGROVE. No. This is purely a literary project. I must say that you can have a political use made of these textbooks. Let me say that the American Council of Learned Societies has made a real contribution with reference to the Arabian studies. And as you know, our oil companies have sent a large number of American experts out to Arabia.

Now, these experts are agents for a private company. It is very obvious that if these experts can learn Arabic, they will do a more efficient piece of work out there. Vice versa, oil companies have a problem of getting the Turks and Arabians to speak English, trying to get the experts to speak both Arabic and English and getting the Arabs to speak English as well as their native language. This is not political at all. This is a pure expert linguistic undertaking. It may be motivated in the beginning, as to the money paid for it, by a political purpose.

Mr. HAYS. I understand the Government is paying for it, and that is why I am asking; because this society is working in close cooperation with the Government. It is just conceivable to me that someone could, off the cuff, say, "Well, they are engaging in politics. They are even putting out language books for the Government and sending them all over the world."

Dr. COLEGROVE. That statement would not be accurate. Because Americans going abroad are not so good in languages, you know, we need to learn foreign languages. And the American Council of Learned Societies has done a great deal of good there.

Mr. WORMSER. Could we get closer to the whole problem? Have you seen in the work of the foundations any evidence of actual political slanting?

Dr. COLEGROVE. From the foundations themselves?

Mr. WORMSER. Yes.

Dr. COLEGROVE. Decidedly. The Carnegie Corporation, in selecting Professor Myrdal, of Sweden, to do the work on *The American Dilemma*, was obviously slanting the problem of the South.

Mr. HAYS. Now, right there, I do not know much about this Myrdal. I know he wrote a book, and what was the title of it?

Dr. COLEGROVE. *The American Dilemma*.

Mr. HAYS. *The American Dilemma*. It just happened that at lunch hour I was reading a newspaper, the morning paper, and I saw in there some reference that the Supreme Court had cited this book in arriving at its decision.

Now, do you mean to tell me that the Supreme Court is citing subversive works here?

Dr. COLEGROVE. I did not say it was subversive.

Mr. HAYS. I want to get that straight.

Dr. COLEGROVE. I think it was slanted. Just as an illustration, Professor Myrdal, who was a left-wing Socialist, a very left-wing Socialist in Sweden, was very anticonservative, and he made unwarranted attacks upon the American legal system, as too conservative, and attacks upon the conservative groups in the United States. He practically indicated that a conservative is not an intellectual.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Justice Burton of Ohio is no leftist, and he apparently went along with this decision, citing this book, and I am just wondering if it is the unanimous opinion that this book was bad, or if it is just an opinion that some people have, or if there is anybody besides the Supreme Court that will endorse the book. Let me ask it that way.

Dr. COLEGROVE. I don't think that the Supreme Court in citing this book endorsed it. They were using the book as evidence. And the book has a lot of evidence. Its evidence is perfectly all right. There is no question about it. I am criticizing the book on the ground that it was held up to be an objective scientific study. And it contains really "snide" remarks—I hate to use that remark—against the conservatives all over the United States, and especially the conservatives in the South, remarks that would make Senator Byrd just wince.

Mr. HAYS. I will take your word for it, Doctor. But that brings us to a thing that has happened in this committee, and I would like to get your opinion on it, just for the record. I think it might have some value, some weight.

Do you not think that on any book that there has been controversy about, you could probably take that book and pick a paragraph or a sentence out of context here or there to prove either side of the controversy that you wanted to?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes. You can do that even with *The Federalist*. But in this Myrdal book, it is the constant slurring of the conservatives, right along the line.

Mr. HAYS. Let me say I am not criticizing you, because you are saying the whole tenor of the book you disagree with and do not like.

But the point I am making is that we have had people who come in here before this committee and cite a paragraph in the book, and then you read back another paragraph out of the same book, and they immediately say, "I do not buy the whole book, but just this paragraph that I agree with." That could happen very easily, could it not?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Of course.

Mr. HAYS. I compliment you for taking that approach. You say you do not like the tenor of the whole book, and that certainly is your right and your privilege, and you have every right to your opinion on it. As I say, I am not in a position to argue with you on it, because I have not read the book.

Dr. COLEGROVE. The difference between this book and *The Federalist*, written by Hamilton, Jay, and Madison, was that *The Federalist* did not pretend to be unprejudiced. They said, "We are for ratifying this document as the Constitution of the United States." Hamilton and Jay and Madison did not pretend to have any unbiased or unpartisan approach.

Mr. HAYS. And as to this book, you say it was advertised as being unprejudiced, but in your opinion it was prejudiced?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Very prejudiced. It would be just as convincing to appoint Professor Hayek to go over to Sweden to, let us say, make an appraisal of the social-security system in Sweden.

Mr. HAYS. You will have to enlighten me. Who is he?

Dr. COLEGROVE. He is one of the strong defenders of *laissez faire* and an opponent of economic planning. His book called, *The Road to Serfdom*, is an argument that economic planning will inevitably lead to destruction of civil liberties, creation of a dictatorship, and loss of our freedoms.

Mr. HAYS. I am interested in a person whose mind works like that.

Now, as I understand it, *laissez faire*, taken literally, would mean to let the Government stay out and leave everything alone. What would you have done in 1933 with 12 million unemployed and people on the verge of starvation under a *laissez faire* system?

The CHAIRMAN. I do not myself put that construction upon *laissez faire*, so I do not think we can start out with assumptions that that is what *laissez faire* means.

Mr. HAYS. If you do not put that construction on it, you will have to have a qualified construction of what *laissez faire* means, because I happen to know what it means, and it is one you cannot shade. It means to let alone.

Dr. COLEGROVE. Dr. Hayek does not take the position regarding *laissez faire* that the British liberals took in 1840, 1850, or 1860, which was complete *laissez faire*.

Mr. HAYS. He takes the position, then, that we will have *laissez faire*, but we will have it in the modified form that Professor Hayek thinks is necessary.

Dr. COLEGROVE. That would be correct.

Mr. HAYS. Then, of course, you get back to the same old thing of who is going to decide about how much *laissez faire* or how much planning we are going to have. And then we get back into the same debate that we have been in for 20 or 30 years.

Dr. COLEGROVE. How far are you going on one side, or how far are you going on the other side; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything further on the question of foundations?

Mr. WORMSER. I would like to cover just 1 or 2 more questions.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to interrupt right there and say if you are implying that I am questioning Dr. Colegrove on something that is not on foundations I picked this name out—

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no. I did not.

Mr. HAYS. I was just trying to develop the idea and get a little light on who he is.

Dr. COLEGROVE. That is a very good point. I think it is well to keep in mind that there are really no "liberals" today of the old English school. They have moved with the trend of the times.

Mr. HAYS. And no foundations moved them. The times caught up with them and overran them; would you not say?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Of course, it is cause and effect again. Whatever the foundations have done, of course, has been to promote the trend this way or that way.

Mr. HAYS. The whole question of whether the foundations promoted the trend or the trend pushed the foundations is almost the old "which came first?" argument, "the chicken or the egg?" is it not? And I do not see how we can settle it.

Dr. COLEGROVE. The only way to settle it is to get back on the pendulum basis and see whether we have gone too far.

Mr. WORMSER. I would like a little briefing on what you mean by slanting. Reading from your notes here, you mention an undue emphasis on internationalism and globalism, a submersion of the national interest, Federal expansion at the expense of States rights, a passion to build a new social order, and a drive at all levels of education to make it a tool for social change.

Without going into too much detail, could you give me an answer to that?

Mr. HAYS. What page is that on?

Mr. WORMSER. Page 5, question 16.

Dr. COLEGROVE. In my opinion, a great many of the staffs of the foundations have gone way beyond Wendell Willkie with reference to internationalism and globalism. Of course, Wendell Willkie is part of this time, too. There is undoubtedly too much money put into studies which support globalism and internationalism. You might say that the other side has not been as fully developed as it should be.

Now, a great many of these other sides have been taken up, partly in speeches in Congress. The little book that Bob Taft wrote the last year he was alive with reference to American foreign policy was a very helpful book. It was based upon considerable research in Mr. Taft's office and was not supported by a foundation. But the foundations these days have been supporting too few books like one book which they supported some years ago by Charles A. Beard, called *The National Interest*. That came out in the early thirties, supported, I believe, by the Rockefeller Foundation. I am not too sure about that, but one of the foundations supported it. That started a good deal of thinking on the other side of the fence.

Mr. WORMSER. Is there not a tendency of Americans to sacrifice the national interest of our country in dealing with foreign affairs?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Professor Beard, even that early, felt that we had. But you can name just a few books or studies on that view which the foundations have supported.

Beard's thought was more or less this. I am talking about the Beard of the last half of his life rather than the first part of his life, when he was almost a Marxian. Beard thought that Churchill of Great Britain or Briand of France were always thinking: What is the best interest of Great Britain? What is the best interest of France?—in all of the international conferences. But there is too frequently a tendency of Americans not to think in international conferences on foreign policy about the national interest of the United States. We are thinking always of what is the interest of the whole world.

And that kind of thinking brings us to the point where we are too likely to make sacrifices to accomplish this globalism which England would not be willing to make under Churchill, or Attlee for that matter, which Laniel would not be willing to make, or Bidault, or whoever is Prime Minister of France. That is a very unfortunate tendency. And I think there is a tendency toward slanting. It seems to me the foundations should go out of their way at the present time to promote more studies like Beard's famous book called *The National Interest*.

Mr. WORMSER. Then there has, Professor, been this tendency to promote what you might call excessive federalism in derogation of

States' rights. Do you feel the foundations have promoted that concept?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes. Very distinctly. And under Professor Merriam particularly. Merriam felt that States were not more than Provinces or soon would not be much more than Provinces. I know that Professor Merriam used to annoy my neighbors up in Evanston. Evanston is a suburb of Chicago, but it has never been incorporated in Chicago. Merriam always had it in for Evanston, because it would never go into Chicago. We felt, in Evanston, we had better schools, we had better parks, we had better police, and we wanted to be an entity by ourselves. Merriam could never forgive us for that. He thought we ought to go into Chicago.

Well, that is probably a little off the subject, but the point I am trying to make is that the kind of research Professor Merriam selected, the kind of research he developed, was a research that looked toward the submersion of the States under the National Government.

Mr. HAYS. Now, Doctor, you do not object to going back to this international theory. You will agree with me that in the age we live in today you are going to have to have a certain amount of knowledge of international affairs. You will agree with me, I think—I heard you mention Paris a little bit ago—that after these deliberations end this afternoon, you and I could go up to New York this evening and get the plane and be in the Cafe de la Paix or Maxine's for lunch tomorrow.

Dr. COLEGROVE. That would be very pleasant.

Mr. HAYS. Yes. I would rather do that than sit here. I want you to know, if I seem to be a little nervous today, that the *America* left without me yesterday. I am staying here for enlightenment. I feel I am making a sacrifice. But all of that aside, we are only 12 hours away from Paris or London.

Did you say you wish I had not sacrificed?

Mr. GOODWIN. I am sure you would not have had as good a time.

Mr. HAYS. Well, that is debatable.

So the thing that you object to, as I follow you, is not that we have a great and consuming interest in the world around us, but that we, you feel, have not had along with that enough enlightened self-interest, as somebody put it. Is that it?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes. It is probably due to an attitude, which attitude I think has been partly created or simulated by the foundations, the attitude of accepting globalism, internationalism, without seeing where the United States fits into the picture other than paying the bills. Because, of course, European and Asiatic countries expect us to open the pocketbook and pay the bills for all of these projects, all of these compromises. If we have a compromise in Indochina, that is going to cost the United States a lot of money. We can be sure of that.

Mr. HAYS. Of course, as I cited here the other day, the French papers are carrying the story right now that the United States is willing to fight in Indochina to its last dollar as long as France will put up its last Frenchman. So there are two viewpoints on that, too.

Dr. COLEGROVE. They expect us to send our boys over to fight in the rice paddies of Indochina. They have gone that far now. They used to just expect us to give money. Now we have to give, besides equip-

ment, the lives of our American boys to fight the hordes of Asia, which is a great mistake.

Mr. HAYS. Well, your friend, Dr. Rowe, who has the same general viewpoint as you do, said flatly here on Friday that we ought to do that very thing. He said 2 years ago we should have.

Dr. COLEGROVE. I think we ought to give Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese forces on Formosa help logistically, transport them to Indochina. We should transport some of the South Korean Army to Indochina and give them all the equipment, but not use American boys to fight in Asia.

Mr. HAYS. Of course, if you are going to give them all that equipment, you had better transport someone who will fight, should you not?

Dr. COLEGROVE. The Koreans showed they could fight, the South Koreans did.

Mr. HAYS. They did, too.

Mr. WORMSER. I would like to interrupt with one final question of Professor Colegrove. I think we have kept him an excessive period of time.

I gather it is your opinion that the overindulgence in the empirical method which you believe the foundations have been, let us say, guilty of, has resulted in something in the way of a decline in morality, that in the schools particularly, morality has taken a good beating, we have had substituted for it what I believe is called moral relativity, and that the foundations, if they fail, have failed perhaps primarily in the direction of not having provided us with more leadership.

Dr. COLEGROVE. We certainly need more leadership on the ethical and moral side. There is really no doubt about that in my mind. And I would like to see the foundations help the American people in that way. We need to create or develop in the United States more leadership, not only in science, not only in empirical science, but also on the moral and ethical side, rationalism, if you want to put it in that sense.

Now, with all the money that the foundations have spent, they have never developed an Abraham Lincoln. They have never developed an Immanuel Kant. They have never developed a Thomas Jefferson. They have never developed a James Madison. We need that kind of leadership at the present time. I suspect that that leadership is going to come from the small colleges, where a more sane attitude toward American traditions, American morality and ethics, is taken than in the large universities.

Mr. HAYS. Doctor, do you mean to say that Abraham Lincoln is underdeveloped? That maybe is an unfortunate term, but there are probably more biographies here than in the case of any other American. I am guessing, but would you not say that is probably true?

Dr. COLEGROVE. Oh, yes. He is the subject of a lot of good books.

Mr. HAYS. But you think the foundations ought to make some grants to write some more books? Or on Thomas Jefferson? I suspect Thomas Jefferson would run a close third. Perhaps George Washington would be second. And I am a great admirer of Jefferson. I have probably 20 or 30 volumes on him myself.

Mr. WORMSER. I do not think he meant that.

Mr. HAYS. I am trying to find out what he meant.

Mr. WORMSER. I think he meant that there should be a greater effort to produce men like that.

Mr. HAYS. That gets into a very philosophical discussion. I am interested, too. I would like to produce another Abraham Lincoln out in my district, so that when I get done with the job I can have a worthy successor.

Dr. COLEGROVE. Well, you can't say that is a task that foundations could accomplish. But they have not developed the climate that produced an Abraham Lincoln. And I am thinking now of both sides of the fence.

Abraham Lincoln is representative, you might say, of the deep heritage of the United States. And Jefferson represented the deep heritage of the United States.

Jefferson was a very cultured man, who went to Europe, read French books and British books, but he was always thinking, again, in reference to the national interest, or in reference to the history of the United States and whatever destiny the American people would have.

There is too little emphasis in our schools at the present time, in spite of all these books, to the contributions of Jefferson, Washington, and Lincoln to the history of the United States in relation to our present situation.

The question is: Are our public schools, our universities, furnishing the climate out of which can appear another Washington or another Jefferson?

I am afraid the climate is not very congenial for that.

Mr. HAYS. Of course, leaving Jefferson aside, no university furnished the climate for the other two. They made their own.

Dr. COLEGROVE. Yes. Maybe it is a task that the foundations can never achieve. Maybe they can accomplish very little in that. But I would like to see the foundations try.

Mr. HAYS. The original idea I had when I started this series of questions: You talk about the moral climate. Now, there is no argument but that we want to create as good a moral climate as we can. But I am wondering how the foundations are going about this. If they make a grant to some religious order, you can immediately see what a hullabaloo that would cause. You would have somebody influencing them not only as to politics but dragging religion in and trying to influence the religious attitude. And it seems to me that they might be treading upon very delicate ground in that situation. And again let me say with all deference to you that you have set forth a very worthy objective in very general terms, but when we come to specifically implementing that objective, I am at a loss as to how I would go about it. If I were a foundation trustee, I would not know. Would you?

Dr. COLEGROVE. If you were a foundation trustee, Mr. Hays, you would give your attention to it and try to have that problem studied.

Mr. HAYS. But on this specific problem, I would be a little bit afraid to give it to one group or another in the religious field. I would be afraid to make a donation or a grant to train ministers, shall I say, in the Presbyterian faith, without giving an equal grant to every other religious faith, for fear someone would accuse me of religious bias. And I just say from a practical standpoint we are dealing with something that if there is any solution to it, I would like to know about it.

Dr. COLEGROVE. I would like to see more studies on the question of what leadership is and the part that morality and ethics play in leadership. I think the codes of political ethics that are springing up over the United States are making some contribution in this way. I do not know any of the foundations that are making a study of these codes of political ethics.

Mr. HAYS. One foundation was going to set up a fund to study Congress, I understood, with the idea of suggesting some improvements. And immediately that was met with a barrage of criticism. Some people questioned: Who are these people that are going to question the integrity and the sacredness of Congress?

Personally, it is to me a little bit like the old newspaper story of the man biting the dog. I mean, Congressmen are investigating anybody. I have no objection if somebody wants to investigate Congress. But it caused a lot of criticism.

Dr. COLEGROVE. I think probably most of these studies should begin at the grassroots.

The CHAIRMAN. My constituents have been investigating Congress for a long time.

Mr. HAYS. I, again, because of my great affection for the chairman, will not comment on that either.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

Mr. GOODWIN. No question. I want to make a statement a little later.

I want to make a brief statement, Mr. Chairman. After I have made it, I will ask unanimous consent that it be placed in the record of today's proceedings at the point in the morning session immediately after reference to the number of institutions of learning in the several States.

Mr. HAYS. May I ask unanimous consent that in deference to our colleague from Massachusetts we have deleted the remark that came along in there somewhere that the Harvard College was the second most left to Columbia. I think we ought to just take that out, so that there will not be any reflection on Massachusetts at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Professor Colegrove, for your presentation today.

The committee is deeply appreciative of your generosity in coming down here and giving us the benefit of your experience.

It is now 3:35. I question whether we ought to proceed any further.

Mr. HAYS. I would like to agree with you, and I want to say that if we are going to take up this monumental piece of empirical research, I hope you can wait until morning.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will adjourn, then, until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning in this same room.

(Whereupon, at 3:35 p. m., the hearing was adjourned until 10 a. m., Wednesday, June 9, 1954.)

