Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, yesterday, in the first of three addresses on the new world order, I sought to cast that concept in historical perspective.

Today I shall begin to describe a four-part American agenda that I believe can give meaning to this concept in the decade that will carry us into the 21st century.

The construction of a cooperative world order, I argued yesterday, is a quintessential American idea that traces to the grand vision championed by President Woodrow Wilson, whose revolutionary proposals were in turn rooted in the precepts of our Founding Fathers.

It seems appropriate for me that the Presiding Officer is the Senator from Pennsylvania, whom I have known for years as a practitioner, as an academic, as a university president, and now a U.S. Senator. He has labored long and hard in the vineyard of international relations in an attempt to lay out for this country what the world order should look like and what role the United States should play in it. So, I am particularly pleased that Senator Wofford happens to be in the chair today to give some assessment to what the Senator from Delaware has to say.

I hold that it falls to this generation of Americans to complete the task that Woodrow Wilson began.

Although President Bush introduced the phrase new world order into our vernacular some 2 years ago, he has behaved as if the concept is alien.

Our current President and his administration have shown neither the aptitude nor the will to infuse this idea with meaning through coherent agenda for action.

My theme is that we must rescue this concept from negligence and pursue an active new world order agenda.

For the opportunity America confronts today--to fulfill Wilson's vision of a world of cooperating democracies--comes to us not as a luxurious option we can forgo with impunity, but as an imperative without alternatives.

As mankind advances toward the third millennium, we face problems on a planetary scale, problems arising from the spread of industrial technology and the spread of humanity itself.

These problems--of daunting magnitude and complexity--pose a challenge that mankind can meet only through rigorous cooperation among nations.
The imperative to cooperate carries with it another imperative: that America lead the world into the 21st century as boldly as it led the West in a half-century of cold war.

In the decisive years ahead--years that will determine the very nature of life on our planet--international cooperation on the scale necessary will succeed only if the world's preeminent nation assume that mantle of visionary leadership.

Conservatives who are instinctively disdainful of the very idea of multilateral cooperation can be relied upon to contort the concept into the specter of a multinational, socialistic bureaucracy that would steal our sovereignty, regulate our lives, and depress our economies. These habitual distortions must be overcome.

The call for cooperation is precisely that, a call for intensified, global cooperation: in scientific research and education; in the establishment of agreed standards, incentives, and procedures relating to the preservation of animals, plants, and vital resources; in treaties to control dangerous arms and dangerous pollution; in international peacekeeping and the deterrence and defeat of military aggression; in the development and transfer of sound technologies for sustainable economic growth.

Cooperation does not mean the loss of American sovereignty. It means exercising our sovereignty in joint actions to protect our interests and ultimately American's survival as a flourishing society.

Where cooperation takes us on a difficult path, we must liken that choice to the decision to wage war when we choose sacrifice now so that our Nation may later be secure for its children.

Three-quarters of a century ago in the wake of the great war that devastated all of Europe, Woodrow Wilson advanced the concept of collective security not as a utopian ideal. But as the only practical means by which nations could in the modern age ensure their own security.

Wilson's predominant aim was to defend the principles of democracy and self-determination by enacting a multinational barrier against potential aggressors--those who would impose their will upon others by military force. President Wilson's warnings proved tragically prescient and his concerns remain relevant today.

But on the eve of the 21st century basic facts of life on Earth--alarming facts we may wish to deny but which are undeniable--require us to expand our understanding of security.

Collective security today must encompass not only the security of nations but also mankind's security in a global environment that has proven vulnerable to debilitating changes wrought by mankind's own endeavors.

Collective security today must mean security against direct assault--and security against indirect assault through environmental degradation.
Thus, in setting an American agenda for a new world order, we must begin with a profound alteration in traditional thought—in the habit of thinking embodied in the terms 'political,' 'military' and 'economic.'

Politically, we must learn to gauge our national policies in their effect on global cooperation, and to evaluate our national leaders in their capacity to engender that cooperation.

Militarily, we must think of national defense as relying on strong American Armed Forces, but also, in equal measure, on our ability to generate actions of prevention and response by the entire world community.

And, most fundamentally, we must now see economics not only as the foundation of our national strength but also as embracing the protection of our global environment, for economics and the environment have become inseparable.

No longer can the world's environment be an afterthought for national leaders a rhetorical grace note embellishing themes of public policy, that are viewed wrongly—as more fundamental.

The concepts of ecosystem and biosphere, far from being esoteric, must become integral to all national policies and be accorded the highest priority on the international agenda.

Even if we cannot detect it in the behavior of the Bush administration, the conclusive litmus test of our success in achieving a new world order will be our ability to manage, through multilateral cooperation, the panoply of threats to the global environment.

With that preface, I propose today the outline of a four-part American agenda: directed, politically, at cementing the democratic foundation of a new world order; directed, militarily, at protecting world peace through a new strategy of containment designed to stop the proliferation of dangerous weapons; directed, again militarily, at fortifying this containment strategy with an expanded commitment to secure the peace by collective military action where necessary; and, finally, directed, in the economic-environmental realm, at launching a concerted, full-scale multilateral effort to promote and reconcile—the broadening of global prosperity and the preservation of our global environment.

CEMENTING THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATION

The first part of our agenda, 'cementing the democratic foundation,' consists primarily in overcoming the geopolitical legacy of communism.

The components of this central task are twofold: to buttress stable democracy in the former Soviet empire and to champion the cause of democracy in China.
To focus on the great Communist tyrannies is not to ignore, or even discount, the cause of democracy elsewhere.

Nor is it to accept the absurd conceit embraced by the Reagan administration: that rightwing dictatorships are more benign than those of the left and uniquely able to evolve toward democracy.

Perhaps the sturdy Reaganauts lacked a perspective they might have gained from closer exposure to the torture chambers of the world's military juntas and other bastions of the right.

The Reaganauts may even have reconsidered after witnessing the spontaneous collapse of the Soviet empire and its dissolution into 20 independent nations, most of them emerging democracies.

Priority attaches to the two great citadels of communism for the very reason that America waged the cold war: because that dangerous and debilitating ideology has controlled nations of tremendous geopolitical weight.

Today, with the Communist world engaged in, or on the brink of, democratic change, we must advance to the policy that was always implicit in our strategy of containment.

Whereas our goal over 40 years was to check and repel, our aim now must be to include and integrate.

If successfully accomplished, the integration of these states into the community of democratic nations would establish solid bedrock on which to build the new world order.

The joining of the second world to the first would complete the new order's foundation: Bringing the world's major nations into a concert of cooperating democracies.

As to China, global statistics underscore the potential significance of a democratic transition in that nation.

By the analysis of Freedom House, a widely respected source, the world's present population of 5.4 billion divides along a political fault line--between some 68 percent of people living in conditions that can be described as `free' or `partly free,' and 32 percent who are unprotected by basic institutions of democracy.

Were China to undertake the democratic reforms that huge numbers of its citizens so clearly crave, the percentage of the planet's population living in full or partial democracy would rise to the historically unprecedented, almost astonishing, level just under 90 percent.

Until such change occurs, China will remain history's final bastion of the totalitarian idea.
Its pathetic gerontocracy, brutally in control of one-fifth of humanity, hovers on the world scene as an anachronistic menace, possessed of a nuclear arsenal unconstrained by international commitment, unreliable as a diplomatic partner, and recklessly dispensing on the world market advanced weapons technology that may yet produce an international catastrophe.

For their part, the countries of the former Soviet empire--the eight nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the 12 former Soviet Republics--have already escaped the nondemocratic category defined by Freedom House.

But success in this transition is by no means assured. Plagued by decades of economic mismanagement and lacking strong democratic traditions, these countries remain vulnerable to relapse into tyranny. Their future is pivotal to our hope for a new world order and American security.

With a successful transformation to free-market democracy, these states will be joined in a fabric of European civilization extending from the Atlantic to the Urals and beyond, across the continental sweep of the Russian Republic.

If transformation fails, the world community faces not only lost opportunity, but also the direct danger of chaos and civil war--perils rendered incalculable by the same Soviet nuclear arsenal that for years has posed a threat to all humanity.

Our priority on democracy in the former Soviet empire and China does not, it bears emphasis, entail neglect of democracy's cause elsewhere.

Where America can be influential, we should employ that influence as a matter of principle as well as geopolitics--and with vigor, generosity, and confidence.

A prominent moral imperative is South Africa. There, the monstrous stain of apartheid has, at long last, begun to dissolve--

A process hastened by the economic sanctions imposed by Congress over the adamant objection of a Reagan administration that had adopted a collaborationist policy called constructive engagement.

Elsewhere in Africa, and in Asia and Latin America as well, the United States should never fail to align itself with, and help to propel, history's continuing winds of change.

With new democracies that have only tentatively taken root we should foster active partnership.

Against the world's remaining dictatorships, we should take our stand with none of the exceptions or equivocations of past realpolitik.
But Mr. President, if American foreign policy once compromised these principles in the name of cold war competition, such compromise no longer has any rationale.

In the Middle East, the cause of democracy warrants particular American concern.

There, our interest in regional stability—the kind of long-term stability only democracy can ensure—is both moral and practical, centering on a humanitarian interest in Israel's security and an economic interest in world oil supplies.

Great words, including new world order, were spoken as the United States went to war against Saddam Hussein, and in the war's aftermath, the administration undertook the grand objective of Arab-Israeli peace.

Yet, with Kuwait's Emir safely restored to his throne and notwithstanding its efforts to foster Arab-Israeli dialog, the administration has pursued a policy hardly more complicated than more pressure on Israel and more arms sales to the Arabs.

Having saved the oil monarchs the President has failed to exercise even the power of suasion to induce them to distribute their wealth more wisely or to introduce the most gradual democratic reforms.

Nor is the failure simply a matter of omission. It is a conscious and purposeful policy.

Last year I offered a modest proposal that would have required the President in connection with major arms sales to the Middle East, to certify to Congress that the purchasing country had made progress in the building of democratic institutions.

Although I included a so-called `national security waiver' that would have enabled the President to make sales even without progress, the White House threatened to veto this measure.

The Bush administration was adamant in opposing any effort to highlight the question of democracy in the very countries for which Americans had just been sent to fight and die.

So veiled have been our values, so perverse the aftermath of the war that Kuwaiti officials now dare to reproach the American Ambassador for his mere mention of democracy.

As this simple travesty symbolizes, we are—in the most volatile of the world's regions—engaged in the classic mistake of statecraft, and that is accepting the short-term status quo at the cost of our values and our long-term interests in stability.

But, Mr. President, it is in the central arena—American policy toward the former Soviet empire and China—that the Bush administration has been most glaringly weak in purpose and in action.
THE FORMER SOVIET EMPIRE

The collapse of the Soviet empire, beginning in central Europe and culminating in the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself, ranks among history’s great watersheds--a moment that has challenged us to shape the future flow of world events.

As I hear some of my friends tepidly debate aid to Russia as if it is such a dangerous thing to suggest to the American public I am reminded of all those in this Chamber who hailed the brilliant architects of our cold war strategy resulting in the collapse of the Soviet empire. I listen to those men and women on this Chamber floor who herald the brilliance of the creation of NATO, the Marshall plan, the world economic institutions and say therein were the seeds planted for the destruction of the Soviet empire and then lack the courage to come forward and make the case in stark terms that the interest of our children are at stake in the survival of democracy in the former Soviet Union.

I am reminded, Mr. President, only as a student of history, not a participant, in the late forties of a President, who, having great courage, stood before the American people and said: We are about to give massive amounts of aid to the country that just killed your son, your father, your brother, your daughter, your wife, your husband.

How popular must that have been? Where would the world have been had we had a President with the same conviction or lack thereof, that we have today, running the country in 1947, 1948, 1949, and 1950? How many of you think he would have gone back home to you and said, with only 16 percent of the American people supporting the Marshall plan, we must for the good of America and the safety of the world invest in the very nations we just spent billions of dollars decimating? Where would we have been but for the men and women, Republican as well as Democrat, with the courage to lead in a time of monumental change?

Mr. President, a half century ago, the Roosevelt and Truman administrations responded to such a moment with greatness; they were `present at the creation' as architects of a new era. The Bush administration, if not absent, has been little more than an onlooker. The administration's indecision in the face of historical challenge cannot be attributed to outside resistance. On the contrary, there has been a virtual consensus, within the United States and among our allies, as to the ends and means of a sound Western policy in the former Soviet satellites and the former Soviet State.

The central and agreed premise is that the great engine of transformation must be private initiative, and that our goal must be to foster the conditions and institutions necessary for a free economy and a free body politic to thrive.

In this task, there has been unanimity among western governments to rely primarily on the multilateral financial institutions. Led by the International Monetary Fund, and including the World Bank and the new European bank for reconstruction and development.
But reliance upon these agencies will leverage the American contribution, draw upon valuable technical expertise, and help integrate the aid-recipient States within Western economies.

Reliance on these agencies will leverage the American contribution, draw upon valuable technical expertise, and help integrate the aid-recipient States with Western economy.

There is also consensus that the United States and others should supplement multilateral aid with direct assistance, primarily educational and professional exchanges, which can be cost-effective in building democratic institutions, and accelerating privatization through such fundamentals as the establishment of legal codes governing business practice, taxation, and property ownership.

The problem is one of implementation: Despite much talk of action, little has been done. Belying his claims to acute foreign policy skill, the President has been negligently slow--slow to see the revolution that Mikhail Gorbachev had begun.

The President was slow, once he did see it, to conceive and implement programs of transitional support for Eastern Europe and later the Soviet Republics.

Finally, this administration was slow to disengage from its embrace of Mikhail Gorbachev once it became clear that others, not Gorbachev, sought full democracy.

Only by sheer inadvertence, it seems, did President Bush possibly help to accelerate constructive change, when he delivered what one pundit dubbed as his `chicken kiev' speech. This speech to the Ukrainian Parliament, aimed at discouraging centrifugal forces, could only have inspired the reactionaries who just days later led the failed coup of August 1991.

It was the coup-makers' effort to prevent the independence of the Republics that brought Boris Yeltsin to the top of a tank and yielded the full and sudden collapse of the entire Soviet empire.

Meanwhile, both multilaterally and bilaterally, the administration has presented a portrait of listlessness, invoking prudence as a mask for lethargy and bureaucratic gridlock.

On the multilateral front, where the United States can pool its contribution with others for such key purposes as currency stabilization, the President has failed to exhibit the leadership simply to elicit congressional approval--including a majority in his own party--for our now 2-year-old pledge to the IMF to support that organization's basic functions.

The American share is a reasonable 19 percent of $60 billion in world contributions, much of which could be used for post-Soviet aid. Rather than leading the IMF, the United States is the only major Nation now deficient, an embarrassing impedient at the very moment this organization is being called upon to perform a critical role in undergirding the post-Soviet democratic governments.
Bilaterally, the administration has been equally dilatory, not least in its near-paralysis in getting organized.

Consider this, from a Nation spending $300 billion each year on national defense: as recently as February 1992, the United States had no diplomatic presence, formal or informal, in any of the former Soviet republics except Russia--none of the 11 others--with the sad exception of two lonely Foreign Service officers assigned to an apartment in Kiev.

Not until this spring did the President finally appoint a full-time coordinator for U.S. policy on the post-Communist transition.

The administration's frail response to Soviet collapse is evident also in its bilateral programs.

For 2 years, the Foreign Relations Committee has tried to grant the President authority to run low-cost exchanges throughout the crumbling Soviet state--to expand human contacts and knowledge of free-market democracy.

Yet, Mr. President, the administration steadily resisted, apparently in thrall to its two most dreaded fears: rightwing criticism and congressional initiative.

Even after submitting his own belated aid request this year, the President has only tepidly called for enactment.

Meanwhile, our only serious bilateral undertaking thus far--a program proposed by Senators Nunn and Lugar to subsidize the dismantlement of Soviet nuclear weapons targeted on the United States--was enacted last fall in the face of determined indifference on the part of the administration.

Although the President later chose to claim credit for this initiative, the administration's actual implementation has been plodding.

Ultimately, in the emerging post-Soviet states, our most compelling purpose is to foster job-producing commerce--to prevent economic free-fall in the short term and to promote economic partnership in the long term.

To these ends, I have for 2 years urged creation of a network of American business centers, beginning in central Europe and extending eastward, as a cost-effective means to facilitate trade and investment in a challenging new environment.

Yet not until March of this year did the first American business center open in Warsaw.

Whereas the President reportedly plans no more, a vital administration would create a dozen in Russia alone.
But if the Bush administration's post-Soviet policy has lacked energy, its China policy has lacked principle.

For the last 3 years, the Butchers of Beijing have had little to fear from Washington.

Seeking to keep open channels of communication, the President has opposed serious congressional effort to impose serious sanctions--or even to link trade to more reasonable Chinese policies on human rights and the sale of dangerously destabilizing arms to the Middle East.

In resisting what could be a rewarding use of American economic leverage, the administration has rekindled a rare passion.

One it displayed earlier in opposing similar congressional efforts to enact sanctions against Saddam Hussein during the 2 years before the gulf war.

Future historians may well observe that opposition to sanctions against tyrants was the one subject that excited the Bush administration as much as its obsession with a cut in the tax on capital gains.

No one can expect that trade sanctions against Beijing would yield a sudden transformation of that regime.

But American foreign policy should leave no doubt, and the Bush administration has left much doubt, that the United States stands squarely on the side of China's brave and aspiring democrats.

Eventually, they will prevail--the democratic idea today is too powerful to resist--and we should do all possible to promote their early accession to power.

Our means may be limited, but this is a purpose we can well advance by helping to spread awareness of democratic values, and accurate news of contemporary events, among a vast Chinese public now denied such basic knowledge.

It is to this end that I wrote legislation creating the commission that is now studying the logistics of launching a Radio Free China.

In Europe, Freedom Radios played an historic role as instruments of information and inspiration, a role extolled by Vaclav Havel, Lech Walesa, and other champions of liberation, as they attest, that constant current of reliable reporting--the steady breath of truth--helped to fan the flame of democracy in the hearts and minds of citizens throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, a flame that suddenly in 1989 became a torch and then a wildfire.
The China Commission's report to Congress this summer will set the stage for the enactment of legislation I will introduce this week--the Radio Free China Act--that will commence similar broadcasts into the People's Republic of China.

(Mr. LIEBERMAN assumed the chair.)

Modeled on Radio Free Europe and unlike worldwide networks such as the BBC and the Voice of America, the new radio will emphasize factual reporting about events within China.

Support for these broadcasts will place us where we belong:

On the right side of history, and unequivocally on the side of those Chinese democrats who will ultimately accede to power and with whom we must hope to cooperate in the building of a new world order.

Although we cannot cement the foundation of a new world order until democracy is secure in both China and the former Soviet Empire, we need not wait in beginning to shape the structure that will rest atop that foundation.

For even as they struggle to consolidate democracy, Russia and its neighbors have demonstrated a genuine interest in upgrading and mobilizing the institutions of the United Nations system.

Within the United Nations, the center of gravity has shifted dramatically in favor of cooperation.

For its part, as the sole remaining nondemocracy on the Security Council, China seems disinclined to highlight its status by acts of conspicuous obstructionism--and, where it is obstructionist, China should be challenged.

We therefore have both incentive and latitude to advance both incentive and latitude to advance now on the three other parts of our new world order agenda.

FORGING A NEW STRATEGY OF CONTAINMENT

In the military realm, our agenda for a new world order is twofold:

To impose strict worldwide constraints on the transfer of weapons of mass destruction and to regularize the kind of collective military action the United Nations achieved ad hoc against Saddam Hussein.

Both items on this agenda--more effective prevention and more effective response--are rendered feasible by the close of the cold war.
The end of the expansionist Soviet threat enables us to refocus our energies on forging a new strategy of containment.

Directed not against a particular Nation or ideology, but against a more diffuse and intensifying danger—the danger that nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and ballistic missiles to propel them, could pass into the hands of rogue-states or terrorists.

At the same time, Moscow's reincarnation as the capital of a democratic Russia raises the prospect of systematic big-power cooperation, under United Nations auspices, in deterring and defeating threats to world peace.

In short, the kind of expanded commitment to collective security envisaged by the United Nations' founders but blocked heretofore by cold war polarization.

Our pursuit of the first of these goals—a new strategy of containment—must begin with a concerted effort to be rid of the enormous nuclear arsenals the cold war begot.

Soviet nuclear warheads are perhaps best understand as more than 10,000 potential Hiroshimas.

Until they are safely dismantled or placed under new controls, the risk that civil strife in the former Soviet Union could lead to a diversion or misuse of even a few of these devices will pose a severe hazard to the world.

Acting boldly to cope with this risk can yield dual benefit.

By joining with Moscow to demonstrate a post-cold war will to curtail our own immense armaments.

The United States can acquire added moral authority to lead others to accept the unprecedented constraints that a new strategy of containment will entail.

For both reasons—to reduce the threat that still inheres in the Soviet arsenal and to set an example that enhances the stature of American leadership in arms control worldwide—we must act decisively.

Curtailing existing arsenals of devastation must underpin a containment strategy aimed at preempting the menace of new arsenals.

The framework for this effort is the START Treaty, on which the Bush administration has for several months been engaged in clarifying obligations of the former Soviet Republics where nuclear weapons are currently deployed: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.

The outcome of these discussions—embodied in the so-called Lisbon protocol—has been satisfactory, assuming it can be implemented:
Russia will become the only nuclear power of the four Republics, and the other three are pledged to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and thereby forswear nuclear weapons acquisition.

The question, then, is how Russia and America will handle their cold war nuclear arsenals.

As both sides recognize, the START Treaty is only what this acronym connotes, for the treaty's ceiling, limited each side to some 7,000-9,000 nuclear warheads, are as obsolete today as a statue of Lenin on a square in St. Petersburg, Budapest, or Prague.

Over recent weeks, both Russia and the United States called for further reduction, with the Bush administration proposing common ceilings of 4,700 and Moscow offering 2,500.

At the Yeltsin-Bush summit this month, the two Presidents compromised by agreeing to a second START Treaty. This new treaty--START II--would lower the two arsenals to levels of some 3,000-3,500 by the year 2003.

This step was constructive and, on the American side, much-heralded, since President Yeltsin agreed to ban land-based ICBM's with multiple warheads.

These missiles, the heart of the Soviet arsenal, have long been regarded as highly destabilizing because they combine extreme lethality with vulnerability to preemptive attack.

But the compelling issue is whether this scope of reduction--and this pace of reduction--are adequate.

Is it wise, in the post-cold-war era, to maintain this level of nuclear armament? And is it wise to set an entire decade as a timetable for reduction?

By placing ourselves now on this positive but modest path of reduction, are we incurring an avoidable danger and surrendering the opportunity for much more dramatic and valuable progress in curtailing the worldwide nuclear threat?

On the question of timing, it is true that the task of nuclear reduction is complicated by sheer technical difficulty.

Massive nuclear dismantlement has never before been on our agenda, and we lack the technology to accomplish it quickly.

But the principal barrier to deep cuts--the ideological animosity and distrust that characterized the cold war--has disappeared, yielding virtually unlimited opportunity if we will seize it.

For their part, Russian leaders seem willing to negotiate far deeper reductions than the President has yet been willing to contemplate.
They, more than the Bush administration, appear open to the kind of drastic cuts that would represent a fundamental reorientation away from excessive military expenditure and away from an illusory concept of power—a reorientation by which Moscow and Washington could together lead the world toward a more rational focus on mankind's truly menacing problems.

Unfortunately, the Bush Pentagon appears driven by an unreconstructed desire for unilateral advantage and a conviction that—even in a post-cold war world and regardless of whether others are willing to cut—the United States will have good use for literally thousands of nuclear warheads.

As a consequence, the new obstacle we face in achieving truly deep cuts in the Soviet nuclear arsenal, and containing the growth of other arsenals, is the Pentagon's rigid attachment to its own.

While this phenomenon was perhaps predictable, we cannot afford complacency while Pentagon planners develop new post-cold war rationales for maintaining what they will undoubtedly call a 'robust U.S. nuclear arsenal for the 21st century.'

Instead, our actions should be as revolutionary as the circumstances in which we find ourselves.

Seen from this perspective, the agreement to cut the START levels to a combined total of 7,000 warheads within a decade seems more a defense of existing arsenals than a radical change: The creation of a high floor rather than a low ceiling.

Our goals, I submit, should be far more ambitious:

We should seek a steady, mutual drawdown to a common ceiling of no higher than 500 warheads, a goal we should waste no time in announcing.

We should propose the elimination not just of ICBM's with multiple warheads but most or all ballistic missiles, based on land and sea.

We should cut the gordian knot of difficult dismantlement by acting immediately to sequester all warheads to be eliminated.

We should act promptly to include Britain, France, and China in negotiations directed toward codification, under U.N. auspices, of a multilateral treaty stipulating limits and obligations for all nuclear states.

And we should announce our willingness to join in a comprehensive test ban treaty and a global ban on the production of weapons-grade fissile material.

As to the size and composition of the American and Russian arsenals, neither side should now hesitate to embrace the concept of minimum deterrence—that is, maintaining only the nuclear...
forces necessary to inflict a devastating retaliatory strike on any nation that might use weapons of mass destruction.

One of the saddest and costliest truths of the past half-century has been the systematic exaggeration of the utility of nuclear weapons. How else can one explain to a child the size of our current Armageddon arsenals?

American possession of a nuclear monopoly could not prevent the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe in the 1940's, and nuclear weapons proved of no avail through our long agony in the Korean and Vietnam wars.

In the Cuban missile crisis, we prevailed not due to our so-called nuclear superiority, but because we held the upper hand in conventional force in our own hemisphere.

The definitive demonstration of nuclear impotence was the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Veritably brimming with missiles and warheads, the Soviet Army could not prevent the total dissolution of the very nation that had generated the world's most extravagant nuclear arsenal.

Indeed, it was the grand distortion of priorities embodied in that arsenal, as much as the inherent inefficiencies of the Communist economic system, that hastened the break-up of the Soviet empire.

Weapons that were presumed to confer strength instead contributed to fatal national weakness.

Ultimately, nuclear arms have a single value: Deterrence. But, for both America and Russia, this legitimate function clearly requires far fewer weapons than the vast arsenals we have accumulated.

Many of our nuclear theologians will be quick to denounce the notion of only 500 nuclear warheads on each side as a capitulation to naive thinking.

But I am not prepared to concede that the capacity to create 500 Hiroshimas in a single day is inadequate for retaliation.

What, I might ask, would they have us do on the second day, if we had more?

The elimination of most or all ballistic missiles would support the move to minimum deterrence, depriving both sides of a lightning-strike offensive capability but depriving neither side of the ability to retaliate using advanced aircraft.

In the past, the major rationale for a very large number of warheads was the danger that ballistic missile attack could preempt many of our missiles and aircraft before launch or takeoff.
Sharply reducing the role of ballistic missiles would enable each side to be confident of its retaliatory capacity—and accomplish the aim of minimum deterrence—at even lower warhead levels.

Full elimination of ballistic missiles would almost surely require a multilateral treaty and global compliance.

But if the question is whether the United States would be better off in a world with no ballistic missiles capable of reaching our shores—the cost being the elimination of our own—surely the answer in principle is a resounding ‘Yes.’

The safe sequestering of Russian and American warheads in special repositories could speed the arms reduction process.

This isolation of nuclear warheads could be accomplished by designating special sites on Russian and American territory, sponsored by the United Nations and guarded by U.N. forces including troops from both Russia and the United States.

The creation of these neutral holding points for weapons slated for dismantlement would not mean endangering sensitive technology.

These sites could be designed to give the host country full control over access to its own weapons during the dismantlement process.

Nor would it mean acting on trust. U.N. inspectors would join Russian and American inspectors in monitoring the pace of dismantlement, and U.N. troops would join Russian and American troops in acting, in effect, to quarantine the warheads so that they could never be removed, at least not without a use of force by the host government constituting a blatant act of treaty abrogation that would signify a total breakdown in relations.

With the innovation of U.N.-sponsored neutral storage, we would eliminate any argument, from Moscow or our own Pentagon, that prompt, deep reductions are technically impossible; we would hasten by years the transfer into safe hands of vulnerable Soviet warheads; and we would more quickly empower ourselves to insist that all other nuclear states become parties to a multilateral regime of strict controls.

Unfortunately, such boldness seems a stranger to the Bush administration, which still rejects the idea of any agreement on warhead destruction.

Ebullient in cold war victory, the Bush Pentagon is so determined to deny Russian inspectors even a look at United States facilities that the American position now constitutes the major obstacle to an agreement on verified warhead dismantlement.

In the same vein, the administration insists, even now, on continued nuclear tests and continued production of the material of which nuclear weapons are made.
By traditional argument, testing helps to perfect the reliability and safety of our weapons. But at this juncture, what is our need for more reliable nuclear warheads?

Surely our safety lies not in maximizing the utility of our own arsenal but in minimizing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons in the hands of others.

Can anyone seriously argue that the United States would derive greater benefit from further nuclear testing than from seeing all other nations cease to do so?

As to fissile material, we have more than we know what to do with—a surplus that can only increase as weapons dismantlement proceeds.

Beyond the budgetary benefits, an American willingness to ban production would yield both valuable symbolism and the practical ability to challenge nations now on the edge of nuclear-weapons status to fulfill long-standing pledges to join in an enforceable global ban.

Achieving such agreement could begin with India, which has already pledged to join, and Pakistan, which has pledged to participate if India agrees.

Israel has made a similar pledge, as have most of the moderate Arab States.

Thus, simply by stating our readiness to forgo the production of fissile material for which we have no need, we could begin a diplomatic process of immense potential value.

The President of the United States should delay not a day in making two major announcements:

That America stands ready to join in a comprehensive test ban, and in a global ban on production of weapons-grade fissile material.

A demonstration of American leadership in sharply cutting our own arsenal, and forgoing further nuclear testing and further production of fissile material, would set the stage for a new nuclear era of cooperation and collective restraint, in which we could build on the notable achievements of recent years.

During the cold war, nonproliferation was deemed a second-order priority, and its institutions have been little known or appreciated.

But now, with the containment of proliferation as our top national security priority, we must raise the profile of these efforts and reallocate resources from the building of weapons to preventing their spread.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls, and the Australia group that has imposed curbs on the sale of chemical and biological technology.
These dry names represent potent purposes. They are the essential tools of a global strategy of containment.

Intensification of these regimes--backed by teams of inspectors and a will to impose sanctions against violators--constitutes our best defense against the appearance of a new Saddam Hussein or the nightmare of terrorist blackmail.

Erecting this defense will require multiplying our financial support for such institutions as the International Atomic Energy Agency,

whose inspectors we must regard as the front-line troops in a campaign of weapons containment as critical to our new era as was the containment of communism during the cold war.

But financial support is not enough. IAEA inspectors must be confident that the U.N. Security Council will take whatever action is necessary to enforce their inspection demands.

Most important, if containment fails, we must be prepared to use force to stop rogue nations like North Korea from presenting the world with a nuclear fait accompli.

The reality is that we can slow proliferation to a snail's pace if we stop irresponsible technology transfer, and fortunately nearly all suppliers are finally showing restraint.

The maverick is China, which has persisted in hawking highly sensitive weapons and technology to Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, and Pakistan--even while pledging otherwise.

While a nondemocratic China is unlikely to cooperate voluntarily in a strategy of containment, we have at hand the necessary lever to induce satisfactory Chinese behavior.

We may safely surmise that the Beijing government will not dissolve itself in response to a threat of economic sanctions.

But a targeted approach--tying continued Sino-American trade specifically to more responsible Chinese behavior in the sale of advanced weapons and weapons technology--would be a linkage that works.

This linkage would force Beijing to choose: between a third world arms market worth millions of dollars, and open trade with the United States from which China will enjoy as much as a $20 billion surplus this year.

Although we have convincing intelligence evidence that China's leaders fear, and would respond to, such leverage, President Bush has refused to challenge Beijing.

Until that policy is reversed, our strategy of containment will be vulnerable to dangerous leakage.
To buttress a new strategy of containment, we also need multilateral restraint in the conventional arms market.

Advanced technology has blurred old distinctions by rendering even so-called conventional weapons ever more lethal.

Recognizing this, Congress mandated the Bush administration in the aftermath of the gulf war to pursue negotiations toward a multilateral arms suppliers regime, an objective consistent with the President's rhetoric.

But what Congress cannot mandate is success, or even sincerity, in negotiations.

Talks among major suppliers--specifically, the U.N. Security Council's five permanent members--have thus far yielded no more than a trivial pledge to share information about sales already made, and a further demonstration of China's refusal to cooperate.

Meanwhile, what appeared after the gulf war as an opportunity to reduce transfers of armament to the Middle East has been converted by the international arms industry into an opportunity to sell even more.

The Bush administration itself is manifestly conflicted on conventional arms.

Directly amid American-sponsored talks on curtailing the sale of advanced conventional arms, the Pentagon began to subsidize the marketing of such weapons by U.S. industry.

In the past year alone, American arms sales to non-NATO countries totaled some $38 billion, as government-to-government sales nearly doubled from the previous year.

This schizophrenia is plainly incompatible with the coherent United States leadership necessary if the world is now to rein in the proliferation of arms.

On advanced conventional arms as well as weapons of mass destruction, our concept of a rigorous containment strategy has far exceeded the Bush administration's actual conduct of policy.

Although largely a matter of will, this deficiency is in part a matter of organization.

Combating proliferation has never held priority in American foreign policy, as it now must.

Accordingly, the responsibility to promote, as well as the power to thwart, a concerted policy is dispersed among various agencies.

In hope of rectifying this defect, I will this week introduce the Weapons Proliferation Containment Act--legislation to consolidate central authority in the executive branch in what will amount to a nonproliferation czar.
Having first established central coordination and authority within the U.S. Government, this legislation then gives teeth to our nonproliferation policy by mandating that the American representative in each major multilateral organization vote to deny assistance to any nation that has violated specified standards or prohibitions in the supply or acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and advanced conventional arms.

Our goal must be to imbue in American foreign policy—and to instill in the international community—a pervasive principle: that proliferation-supporting behavior by companies or nations is anathema, and subject to rigorous measures of detection and punishment.

Tomorrow, I shall describe another military dimension of America's new world order agenda: The need to organize more effectively to sustain an expanded commitment to collective military action—an idea first introduced to the world by Woodrow Wilson and rejected first by this Congress at the end of World War I, then put on hold by a cold war that made its implementation impossible, but now as a consequence of that cold war holds great promise for the future of the world.

And then, the final and most expansive part of our agenda: the launching of a worldwide economic-environmental revolution.

I thank my colleagues for listening. I thank my friend from Massachusetts, Senator Kerry, for waiting.

I yield the floor.

Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from Massachusetts is recognized to speak for up to 5 minutes.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to proceed in morning business for such time as I may need.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Hearing no objection, that will be the order.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I begin by congratulating my friend and colleague, the Senator from Delaware and colleague on the Foreign Relations Committee, for his very thoughtful analysis of a real new world order. The Senator has been leading the effort really to analyze the START agreement, and in his role as chairman of one of our subcommittees has long been watching and interested in the issue of an appropriate arms balance and a distribution of forces.
I think his statement is a very thoughtful one about the terrible inconsistency and almost hypocrisy of our current policy, at one time talking about arms proliferation but engaging in the very policies that undercut it.

He is absolutely correct in having laid on an agenda for arms limitation, as well as control, as well as nonproliferation, as well as for peacekeeping. I congratulate him on his thoughtful speech.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I thank my colleague for his comments. I appreciate them very much.

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