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POLICIES ON IMMIGRATION AND THE SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS In the European Community

Experts' report drawn up on behalf of the Commission of the European Communities

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INTRODUCTION

1. Article 8a of the EEC Treaty, which was incorporated into the Treaty of Rome by Article 13 of the Single European Act, defines the internal market as an "area without frontiers in which the free movement of ..., persons, ... is ensured".

A political declaration by the Governments of the Member States, made at the time of adoption of the Single European Act, stipulates that: "In order to promote the free movement of persons, the Member States shall cooperate, without prejudice to the powers of the Community, in particular as regards the entry, movement and residence of nationals of third countries."

The freedom of movement principle thus poses the question not only of what common system should be applied at the Community's external frontiers but also of what effects national policies towards resident immigrants may have on the Community's economic and social cohesion.

2. These concerns led the European Council of 8 and 9 December 1989 to request "that an inventory of national positions on immigration be established, to provide a basis for discussion of the matter within the Council".

To facilitate the task, the European Council's request was divided into two areas: the first entailed examination of questions relating to the entry and movement of citizens from third countries, whilst the second area related to the integration of these same people who had been admitted into the territories of the Member States.

This report is concerned mainly with the second question, viz. Member States' policies for the integration of non-EC nationals.

3. In this connection the Commission asked a group of experts¹⁾ chaired by Mr F. Braun and comprising Messrs. R. Böhning, J. Fernandez Cordon, A. Golini, W. Hyde and P.L. Remy to analyse current national policies in the following fields: - entry policy; - Member States' practices with regard to immigrants' residence and, in particular, the reuniting of families; - immigrants' access to employment; - education, housing, social benefits, civic and social rights; - dialogue between immigrants and the authorities; - repatriation facilities.
4. The group visited all the capital cities in order to meet not only politicians and administrators but also businessmen, trade unionists and immigrants' organizations. The frank and open discussions were a great help in drawing up this report.

1) see Annex II

The experts also had talks with the Coordinators' Group on the Free Movement of Persons and with both sides of Industry at Community level, represented by UNICE and the ETUC.

They are extremely grateful to everyone who contributed towards the preparation of the report by giving their expert knowledge and by making documents available.

5. Whilst the aim of this report has been to identify points of convergence and divergence between national policies without passing judgement on them, the various fields of investigation have nevertheless prompted the group to draw up a number of conclusions which may be helpful to the Member States and the Community bodies in their future decision-making.

As regards the social and legal situation of third country immigrants in the Member States, readers' attention is drawn to the Commission's report drawn up at the request of the European Council in Hannover on 27 and 28 June 1988.¹⁾

6. Finally, the experts stress that they have given a wide interpretation to the terms "immigration" and "immigrant". They have been concerned with all third country nationals living in the Member States, with the exception of those who are tourists or students, irrespective of whether they envisage returning at some future date to their own countries, e.g. on retirement, or remaining permanently. The report deals with those lawfully present, with the position of "illegal immigrants", and with those who, having entered as immigrants, subsequently acquired the citizenship of the Member State in which they were living.

Moreover, in considering the social integration of immigrants and their families, the report is concerned with immigrants themselves and with their children and grandchildren. When referring to "children", the report includes both children born outside the Member State who joined or accompanied a parent, and those born within the Member State. Thus the scope of the report does not exclude those children who acquired either at birth or later the citizenship of the Member State in which they were born. The term "second generation immigrants" is often used to describe children born to immigrants within a Member State. Objections can be made to that term, but it is used on occasion for reasons of convenience and brevity.

1) SEC(89) final of 22 June 1989

PART ONE

The context of migration and tension factors affecting migration

I. Old and new immigration

7. Large-scale transfers of people, both internal and external, have always been a feature of life in Europe. It has become a veritable crossroads of migratory flows which have made their mark on its history and have been closely linked, in modern times, to its relations with the new world and the colonies. The successive waves of immigrants and their descendants are an essential element in the fabric of European society, in the same way that European emigrants have made their own considerable contribution to the new world.
8. One of the positive aspects of immigration is that migrants are tenacious and flexible people who, in order to improve their lot, are prepared to uproot themselves, face the drawbacks and risks of travelling and settling into a new place, work hard in difficult conditions, learn a new language and take on different cultures and environments.
9. During the last thirty years in particular, the time-lags between cycles of population development and cycles of economic development in the countries which now make up the European Community gave rise first and foremost to significant migratory flows within Europe, due to a shortage of labour in the Centre and North and a surplus of labour in the South. Subsequently, the unsatisfied demand for labour in central Europe attracted immigrants from countries outside the present Community (including large numbers from Yugoslavia and Turkey). Immigration, which was initially motivated by a desire to find work and was regarded as a phenomenon of short or medium-term duration, has changed dramatically with the reunification of families and the arrival of refugees and asylum seekers. Moreover, links with former colonies have helped to establish large-scale migratory flows of a specific type, affecting mainly France and the United Kingdom. Immigration has thus become a more or less permanent or long-term phenomenon giving rise, among other things, to second and third generations of "immigrants" and creating new prospects, demands and problems which have to a certain extent overwhelmed the host societies as a result of their being slow or poorly equipped to deal with the situation.
10. Over recent years, the Community's southern Member States, which have long been countries of emigration, have become places of destination to a greater or lesser extent for legal or illegal immigration. Up to now, this has almost always involved workers not accompanied by their families. Once families begin to be reunited, a number of new problems can be expected to crop up, especially as very little seems to have been done in those countries so far to meet the challenge. Should they wish, these countries could call on the experience of the more established countries of immigration in this respect.

11. The demands of the labour market in the countries of destination and the entry rules laid down by the countries themselves (including provisions for family reunification) have largely regulated immigration, the volume and duration of immigration flows thus depending almost exclusively on the attractions of the European countries of immigration (pull factors). However, migratory flows have, over the last few years, also been determined to a certain extent by the labour markets of the countries of origin, which have exported some of the manpower that could not be employed locally (push factors); in such cases, the immigrants have resorted to various ruses (passing themselves off as students, tourists or refugees) or have taken advantage of delays and unreadiness on the part of the institutions, authorities and policy-makers in some of the countries of new immigration, whose borders are, as in the case of Italy and Greece for example, particularly permeable for structural reasons.
12. Despite the declared policy (especially on the part of the Member States of central Europe) of severely restricting the entry of foreign workers, immigration - whether authorized in accordance with the rules or simply tolerated - continues to permeate the entire European Community, with varying numbers of new arrivals, resulting primarily from family reunification and refugees and, to a lesser extent, from economic demand, with particular emphasis on the pull exerted by the underground economy. No matter what position the Member States adopt on the admission of new immigrants, there is inevitably going to be a certain flow of newcomers.
13. The political events in Eastern Europe and the resulting liberalization of movements of people have added a further dimension, not only in terms of the effect on the labour market of some Member States, but also by generating more and more applicants from the countries of Eastern Europe.

The immigrant population

14. The full integration of immigrants cannot be achieved in a single generation, and we believe we reflect both the realities of the situation and the concerns of the Governments of Member States in adopting for the purposes of this report the wide definition of "immigrant" given in para 6 above. As a consequence, it is not possible to give precise figures of the number of immigrants with whom the report is concerned.

Of a total population of 327 million in the Member States of the European Community (not taking into account the recent unification of Germany), foreigners account for some 12 800 000 or 4% of the total. This figure, though, includes Community citizens exercising their right to freedom of movement.

Thus, if we consider only those who are third-country nationals and lawfully reside on Community territory, and who are not citizens of a Member State, the foreign population can be put at some 7 900 000 - 4 300 000 men and 3 600 000 women - i.e. 2.4% of the total population.

These figures, however, exclude all those immigrants and their children who have already acquired the citizenship of a Member State. Thus, for example, the ethnic minority population of the United Kingdom, the majority of whom are British citizens, is about 4.5% of the total population, although only 1.8% of the population are non-Community nationals.

It would be wrong, though, to think that the problems of full integration concern only the non-Community nationals and not a large number of those who have already acquired citizenship of one of the Member States.

15. The total of 7 900 000 third-country nationals living in the Community includes some 1 800 000 who come from a country of the industrialized world (United States, Canada, Japan, EFTA countries, etc.). The majority of them do not regard themselves as intending to settle in Europe, nor are they seen as "immigrants" by the public at large.

They pose no integration problems needing a specific policy, and are not, generally speaking, a real concern of the Member States. Consequently, the remainder of our report is not concerned with them.

Looking only at the population of third-country nationals, the figures given in Annex I show that the majority come from Mediterranean countries (mainly Yugoslavia, Turkey, Morocco and Algeria). This bears witness to the ongoing, significant transfers of people within the Mediterranean economic and social area and the importance of the southern shores of the Mediterranean for the Community.

16. The same figures show that the majority of non-Community nationals live in three countries, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. As long-standing countries of immigration these three Member States also have the greatest number of second and third generation "immigrants" who, as we have already made clear, are of concern to us even though they are not "immigrants" in the strict sense of the word and may already possess the nationality of the country in which they live.
17. The breakdown by age and sex of the Member States' populations is quite different from that of the immigrants; the latter include vast numbers of young people with very few middle-aged or elderly people; there are also marked imbalances between the sexes, with a preponderance of male or females according to the immigrants' country of origin. The demographic differences between immigrants and the rest of the population may, together with cultural differences, constitute a further barrier to the process of integration.

18. The highly uneven geographical distribution of the immigrant population, which is concentrated above all in certain urban areas, is one of the greatest problems in terms of gaining the acceptance of the general public and finding the best solution to the question of integration. Measures to encourage a more uniform geographical distribution of immigrants may, besides preventing the formation of ghettos, facilitate the acceptance of immigrants by the local population.
19. The entire complex of problems connected with the integration of immigrants highlights the need for coherent, non-discriminatory, bold policies on the residence, education, vocational training, housing and working environment of immigrants who have already arrived. We take the view that our society cannot afford to squander, even partially, the human resources which are an intrinsic part of the Europe in which we now live.

Some immigrants choose to return to their own country, for example when they reach retirement age. This poses a general problem of eligibility for and transfer of pension rights.

20. Despite some Member States' official aid programmes to persons wishing to return to their own country, the number actually availing themselves of the opportunity is fairly low, which gives reason to believe that, particularly in the not so recent past, immigrants and their families came to the Community to stay. Although the situation is by no means consistent from country to country and over different periods of time, this phenomenon is nevertheless of some importance in terms of how we view current problems and future prospects for integration.
21. We cannot refer to the integration of immigrants already established without also considering the new inflows of migrant workers, family members, asylum seekers and illegal or clandestine immigrants, since the rate and volume of arrival of such people undoubtedly affect the integration process.

II. Tension factors affecting migration and future prospects

22. If we look back at what has happened in Europe in recent years to labour market trends and immigration flows, a gulf can be clearly distinguished between the problem as a whole (as formulated and discussed by policy-makers, public opinion and the media in the various countries and at Community level), actual or potential policies, and the turn that events have actually taken. In other words, political thinking, economic thinking and demographic and social developments are not always in step in terms of substance or timing.

23. Notwithstanding the political will to close the door to new immigrants, an "economic demand" has built up in a number of European countries in recent years, which has attracted labour to a greater or lesser extent, legitimately and clandestinely, openly and by the back door. Clandestine immigration is in itself a factor of instability and uncertainty, making it harder for bona fide immigrants to integrate and adversely affecting working conditions for all.
24. Although employers have implicitly (in their actual conduct) or explicitly (in the meetings held with the Group of Experts) stressed that - at present and for the foreseeable future - only demand for highly skilled staff is unsatisfied, they have admitted that there have been manpower shortages in a number of sectors which, with the pragmatism typical of employers, they have sought to overcome wherever labour was available and at the lowest possible cost. Highly skilled workers are needed primarily in a few areas of industry; the others are recruited for the remaining sectors, particularly the services sector and for temporary and seasonal work. In a number of cases the underground economy and clandestine immigration have fuelled each other, disturbing the labour market as a whole.
25. A first "migration-related tension factor" can thus be traced to the requirements of the labour market, its rules and the mismatch, in many European countries, between labour supply and demand both from the point of view of quantity and, perhaps above all, from the point of view of quality, and this despite the existence of an underused labour force in the Community.

Bearing in mind the high rates of unemployment among young people in almost all countries and the number of people currently not on the job market but who could be working (especially women), it is fair to say that Europe currently has a widely underused labour force and that this situation is likely to persist, at least in the short to medium term.

26. It should be emphasized that, beyond any other consideration, failure to match adequately supply and demand on the labour markets of the individual countries and of the Community as a whole will tend to strengthen the pull factors constituting a magnet for new immigration. At the same time, the more efficient the domestic labour market (where unemployment is brought down to just the frictional rate), the easier will be the acceptance of foreign workers by the population and the simpler the immigrants' integration.

27. A second "migration-related tension factor" is to be found in a socio-political context, where families are allowed to reunite, a certain number of refugees and asylum seekers are admitted and processes of political and economic development, along with production and employment rationalization, are promoted in a number of countries, particularly in Eastern Europe.

Great importance will attach not only to the decisions taken in the latter area by national governments as regards admitting further immigrants but also to the consequent political consultations to be held at Community level (concerning recognition of the right to asylum, visas and quotas) as there can be no doubt that decisions taken by one Member State will affect all the others either directly or indirectly.

28. A third "migration-related tension factor" can be traced to the demographic and social imbalances between the EC and vast areas of the rest of the world, starting from the nearest geographical regions such as Eastern Europe and the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Although it may not be possible to determine a direct, clear-cut, mechanical relationship between socio-demographic imbalances and international migration, these imbalances will probably come to play a more important role than in the past for various reasons:

- i) they are increasing rapidly (cf. the footnote to paragraph 29);
- ii) they are increasingly noticeable and noted. The media, particularly television, have an enormous and increasingly strong impact; western television is normally received both in Eastern Europe and on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, providing an easy, direct and constant means of comparing standards of living in the West and the other regions. The telephone is an equally important means of passing on information directly to those who have stayed at home, thus creating a "migratory chain" of a kind which, although it operated in the past too, did so through different channels and over a much longer timescale;
- iii) they relate to people who can now become aware more easily and fully of their human rights and their own expectations for occupational and social advancement; they are knocking at the Community's door in order to achieve such advancement (this phenomenon has more than doubled since the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe);
- iv) transport is no longer any problem; it has become far easier, cheaper, more frequent and safer than in the past and accordingly encourages people to move from place to place at very limited cost and much more rapidly;
- v) in a number of Community countries the volume of air, sea and land traffic has become so intense that it is now objectively much more difficult than in other countries to check arrivals and transit.

29. Immigrants have come to Europe from many parts of the developing world - including the Indian Sub-continent, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Nigeria, etc. - and much of what is said above has a wider application. It is nevertheless worth looking more particularly to the demographic and labour market aspects of the Community of 12 and the 14 countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. The table of anticipated changes between 1990 and 2000 shows very marked differences (1).

Of the expected population increase in Europe and the Mediterranean between 1990 and 2000, 95% will be located on the southern shores of the Mediterranean and 5% in the European Community. There is virtually no uncertainty about this outlook: in 1990 the proportion of persons under 15 out of the total population is about 18.5% in the EC against 37.5% in the southern Mediterranean, with obvious repercussions on the birthrate and the rate of newcomers to the labour market.

(1)

Population and labour force: situation in 1990
and expected increase
during the years 1990-2000 (in millions)

	EC			Southern Mediterranean (a)		
	Value 1990	Increase million %		Value 1990	Increase million %	
Population						
- total	340.5	+ 2.4	+ 0.7	245.0	+ 49.6	+ 20.2
- in major cities (b)	40.6	+ 1.8	+ 4.3	30.4	+ 11.7	+ 38.5
Labour force						
- total	153.3	+ 1.5	+ 1.0	82.4	+ 22.4	+ 27.2
- non-agricultural	144.1	+ 4.6	+ 3.2	51.1	+ 21.7	+ 42.4

(a) - Yugoslavia, Albania, Malta, Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco.

(b) - The capitals, with the exception of Germany (East Berlin + West Berlin) and Morocco (Casablanca).

Sources: - total population: UN forecasts, 1989 (low variant)
- population in major cities: UN forecasts, 1989
- labour force: UN + ILO forecasts, 1988.

30. The average annual increase in the labour force in the non-agricultural sectors is estimated at 460 000 for the Community as a whole and 2 170 000 for the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Turkey and Egypt alone would need to create 880 000 new jobs each year for ten years to cope with the additional supply of labour.
31. It therefore needs to be stressed, beyond any other consideration, that the smaller the labour force that the southern Mediterranean (and more generally the southern world) can absorb, the stronger will be the social tensions, the political pressures and the drive to push out additional new emigrants, who will be bound to turn to Europe as their preferred destination, whether through lawful migration, back-door entry or clandestine migration.

Furthermore, we must bear in mind that political situations adverse to emigration could be created in the southern Mediterranean, for example by the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in certain countries; on the other hand, such growth might well, in the short term, stimulate the departure of those groups of people who neither appreciate nor accept religious fundamentalism and, in the long term, add to demographic growth.

32. Demographic pressure from poor countries remains without doubt one of the major problems of our times and its consequences extend far beyond the scope of migration. Neither an increase in influx nor the complete opening of frontiers can be regarded as remedies for excessive population growth.

The basic overall solution, albeit long-term, will lie in an expansion, in terms of both volume and quality, of forms of development cooperation with these countries and concerted assistance in any programmes they may have to control demographic growth. The common management of migratory flows in the short to medium term may also be considered as one of the components of an overall cooperation policy.

III. The Introduction of the Single European Market: expectations, prospects, problems

33. The immediate and most significant effects of the forthcoming entry into force of the single market should include a speeding up of the processes of economic, social and also political integration and inter-action between peoples and States.

The changes in rules and regulations and the new European status, expressed through the single market, constitute a formidable pull factor in psychological and behavioural terms, leading directly and indirectly to substantial innovations in many fields and under many aspects.

At all events, this integration and inter-action could provide the driving force to develop further the mobility of persons, both occupational and geographical, which is already substantial and on the increase, in every country; the "Market" will enhance the social and demographic processes which are already well established in western societies. Ensuring genuine occupational and geographical mobility could therefore turn out to be one of the Community's major problems resulting from the single market.

34. In giving rise to fresh, intense awareness of the actual circumstances and unity of the "new" Europe, the single market fuels (and this has also been heard at some of our meetings) expectations within the European Community for greater equity and improved living and working conditions for people on the margins, both nationals and immigrants. The European spirit and Community action is counted on to encourage the various national governments to greater and above all more effective commitment to reducing the drawbacks and inequalities experienced by the poor, the marginalized and immigrants. This could also raise the expectations of the currently underused European labour force for a more rapid and appropriate integration or re-integration into the productive sphere.
35. Expectations outside the European Community are also on the increase, both in Eastern Europe and the southern Mediterranean as evidenced by requests for accession to the Community, both immediately and in the future. The Community is admired not only for its political and economic potential, but also as a community of peoples with a great tradition and cultural force who heed the problems of the rest of the world. Third countries look to the Community for hope and confidence in more rapid growth and a less uncertain emergence from backwardness and economic underdevelopment.
36. In the context of the EC in 1993, over and above any political decision that may be taken about freedom of movement for non-Community nationals (those who have not yet acquired citizenship, of course), provision must be made for an increase in their mobility related to opportunities in employment and in vocational and social advancement, which may arise in various Member States. In so far as internal frontiers are abolished by the single market, the conduct or the problems (e.g. permeable frontiers) of an individual Member State as regards immigration will also become a matter for all the Member States.

PART TWO

Integration issues and elements of integration policy

1. Integration issues

Integration or what else ?

37. In theory at least, countries can choose between leaving the immigrants to themselves and integrating or assimilating them. Western European countries are densely populated societies crammed into limited living spaces where foreigners are perceived not as newcomers who will somehow find their niche but as unwelcome additions who will compete for scarce jobs and housing. On the other hand, immigrant workers are part of Western economies, to which they make an important contribution. If today's immigrants were left to fend for themselves they would continue to occupy the bottom rungs of society permanently and without the chance of leaving them or even being replaced by subsequent waves of immigrants. The larger surrounding society turns hostile, develops rejection and stigmatization mechanisms and resorts to uncivilized policing, thus reinforcing the vicious circle of exclusion breeding marginality.

The immigrants in contemporary Western Europe are of different ethnic composition than their host societies and they are sizeable in numbers or will become sizeable sooner or later. The interplay of numerical importance and foreign origin - even where the children of immigrants are naturalized citizens - does not permit European countries to regard with equanimity a situation which fosters social tensions, which nurtures festering ethnic conflicts and which saps democratic traditions and freedoms.

38. The alternative to neglect is integration. Integration is inescapable as a policy if we are setting out to defuse the tensions inherent in the immigration of generally poor, inadequately equipped and ethnically different people. Whatever precise meaning may be attached to this term in a particular context, its general meaning is clear: be one of us socially, economically and, at least in a rudimentary sense, politically.

We therefore conceive of integration like the many policy-makers, academics and representatives of immigrants who have weighed up its implications and alternatives, that is to say as a process which prevents or counteracts the social marginalization of immigrants. Understood in this way, integration leaves aside the somewhat heated but sterile debate on assimilation versus multiculturalism. Social integration is necessary even where assimilationist policies are pursued. Social integration is also necessary under a multicultural, intercultural or ethnic minority perspective.

39. Integration derives its social legitimation from Western Europe's fundamental value of solidarity with the poor. It derives its political legitimation from our humanitarian tenet of equality of treatment. It derives its economic justification from the benefits societies reap from members who are fully productive. Migrants are enterprising people, as are their offspring. The mobilization of their labour force potential would, in certain cases, enable our countries to satisfy labour demand without recourse to non-nationals abroad. Incidentally, integration policies effectively pursued will tend to reduce the underground economy.

Lest it be unclear, we believe that integration policies have to be comprehensive in the sense that they cannot be confined only to people who have lived five, ten or more years in our societies. They have to be aimed as well at those new entrants - be they workers, family members or refugees - who are admitted without limit of time or who, if subject to limited-time permits, can reasonably be expected to become long-term residents.

40. Integration must not take the same form for all, if only because the receiving countries are not the same in social terms. The aim of integration must be to eliminate legal, cultural, language and other obstacles so as to enable immigrants to live in the same way as those people in the host country to which they feel most akin in social terms.
41. The social situation of immigrants is such that they will benefit from the general integration policies aimed at the most disadvantaged sections of society. These policies would, however, need to be supplemented by specific measures taking account of the particular characteristics of immigrants. For instance, improved housing for immigrants will normally be part and parcel of general rehabilitation measures (unless special funds are available). By contrast, language teaching will almost always require special measures for foreigners. To facilitate the immigrants' children's transition from school to work, it may be necessary in one country but not in another to design special measures for that target group.

What is the situation today ?

42. Both labour immigrants and the growing number of settled refugees occupy the bottom rungs of our societies, individual exceptions notwithstanding. They constitute disadvantaged populations or, more precisely, populations at risk. They are constantly at the risk of unemployment, of having to accept the worst housing, of encountering disproportionate difficulties at school and in formal training situations, in short of being down-and-out and remaining so.

From the mid-1950s to the early 1970s the first generation of immigrants found work when it entered the labour market because it was recruited to that end, it had a roof over its head and was prepared to accept conditions it was accustomed to. At the time when family reunification became widespread, the first generation was disproportionately hit by unemployment, which dramatically affected its chances on the private housing market. When in the 1970s and early 1980s children joined their parents or were born into overcrowded dwellings in dilapidated inner-city areas or high-rise flats, their education suffered where it was not rendered perfunctory for linguistic or cultural reasons, especially in the case of girls. In the last few years, the second and third generations of immigrants have performed better at school, although not by any means as well as their local peers. But these youngsters face enormous problems of transition from school to work because there are few jobs waiting for them, they are not as well equipped as their former schoolmates to pick up apprenticeships and training opportunities or to convince employers that they are as qualified or dependable as national youngsters. They may face direct discrimination or recruitment procedures that are, in practice, discriminatory. They therefore have to make do with what is available - the least well paid jobs, the least stable jobs, jobs in traditional sectors of immigrant employment rather than in promising future-oriented branches or occupations, in other words, jobs that perpetuate their bottom rung position in the labour market, in the housing market and at school. Of course, individuals can and do break out of this vicious circle, others - especially from among the refugee population - get ensnared in it. At any rate, the pattern is set: the children and grandchildren of immigrants constitute an under-class in economic and social terms; and this pattern will not change unless integration policies are more imaginative and vigorous.

43. What distinguishes the children and grandchildren of Europe's former labour immigrants from their parents is that they no longer acquiesce. They know better and they want to do better. If societies do not open up their opportunities to them, these youngsters will eventually revolt, first as individuals, then as street gangs and finally as ethnic groups.
44. Whereas the above description of the perpetuation of immigrant's bottom rung position relates basically to the EC Member States north of the Alps, the Mediterranean countries in which the phenomenon of immigration is still relatively new must be aware that they are at the beginning of a recurrence of the same pattern and that their foundations are more shaky because (i) their first generation of immigrants do not have an assured steady job upon arrival, (ii) a larger proportion of them gets absorbed in the underground economy than north of the Alps, and (iii) their systems of apprenticeship and vocational training or retraining are, in some regions, not yet up to the standards of advanced industrial societies.

II. Elements of integration policy

45. Against that background, the rest of this part of our report sets out some of the essential components of any integration policy. We are conscious that national conditions and traditions will give particular shape and content to what is done in each Member State and we have not gone into detail or attempted to evaluate existing policies and practices. We have sought, instead, to draw out some fundamental concepts which we believe to be of general applicability in contemporary Western European societies.

(a) Control over immigration

46. Member States' external borders have to be controlled effectively if their integration policies are to succeed. National populations will more readily accept the settlement of immigrants if they have the feeling that the inflow of non-nationals is under control. Fortunately, the Community's Member States are well advanced in respect of border control. While not every country has the same command over its frontiers as, for example, the UK, all are agreed that it is a necessary component of their immigration and integration policies. The Convention of 15 June 1990 determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum and the determination of Member States to adopt Conventions on external borders and visas are exemplifications of their joint determination and achievements, which we can only endorse but need not elaborate upon.

47. Control over immigration does not mean, however, that it can or should be brought to an end. Dependent family members of immigrants and political refugees will still be admitted and some newcomers will be needed by the labour market. Our countries are open societies that cannot afford - either economically or politically and perhaps not even demographically - to withdraw into themselves. Nor can Western Europe police its borders or check its workplaces like a police state: any attempt to do so would sooner or later affect the freedom and liberties of its citizens.

Nevertheless, an effective border control (and a good labour inspectorate) should substantially reduce the inflow of new illegal immigrants, thereby reducing the human and political costs that flow from the expulsion of immigrants found without documents or the requisite residence or work permits.

The fact that in some Member States sizeable numbers of immigrants survive precariously by irregular employment in the underground economy is not conducive to their integration in society nor to the integration of the immigrants who are in a regular situation but tarred with the same brush. Means of reducing their number should form part of an integration policy.

(b) Security of stay

48. Integration concerns both sides, the host society and the immigrants, whether they be workers, family members or refugees. If the immigrants do not want to integrate, policies aimed at them will fail. The desire to integrate depends crucially on whether immigrants feel secure in respect of their residence status. Immigrants who fear that they can be removed from their host society's territory on social or economic grounds or because of some misdemeanour will, at best, be hesitant or half-hearted in their integration efforts. Living in uncertainty is not conducive to investing years of language or vocational training, one's savings, emotions or loyalties in the host society or to looking for a marriage partner there. The duration of the changeover period from temporary to permanent residence status has in Western Europe tended to shorten rather than to lengthen, which is a movement in the right direction.
49. Permanent residence status is a necessary element of integration policy. European countries do not accord such status upon entry and it is not necessary that they do so. Nor is such a status, or the expectation of security of stay, appropriate for seasonal workers or workers forming part of labour-supplying firms or who move, as project-tied workers, with managers of their enterprises to install equipment or build a factory other than their own. But (i) where workers are admitted for more than transitory employment, (ii) where family members are permitted to accompany or join them, (iii) where children are born to such immigrants and (iv) where the status of illegally present persons is regularized, there must be a reasonable expectation that they can stay for good after some qualifying period or that they can stay in the event of the breadwinner's death, divorce or legal separation from spouse and children.
50. The desirable change from temporary to permanent residence status must mean exactly what it says, and it must signal the acceptance of the foreigner as a member of the society with unrestricted social and economic rights, including for example the right of access to non-sensitive jobs in the public sector and the right of enjoyment of social security benefits on terms of effective equality of treatment. Those we met drew our attention to continuing irritants in some Member States' laws and practices where separate permits are required for residence and economic activity. This incurs overlap of bureaucratic procedures and insecurity for the immigrant. Overlap is costly and unnecessary, whilst insecurity runs counter to the goal of integration.
51. However, a number of Member States have taken steps to give immigrants a good degree of security of stay by granting them a long-term residence permit. The changeover period from temporary to permanent residence status should be rather briefer than the qualifying period required for naturalization and the two should not appear to be alternatives. To accord security of stay is to signal to the immigrant that, for all practical purposes, he can make his home where he is; to grant nationality is to accept him as a fully-fledged member of society with unrestricted political rights.

52. Children or grandchildren of immigrants who do not adopt the nationality of the country in which they live should be able to enjoy security of status in their own right when they are above compulsory school age. By the same token, foreign wives of established immigrants or nationals should enjoy permanent residence rights after only the shortest possible probationary period.
53. Every State has a right to expel a non-citizen. But the existence of that right, and fears - often exaggerated fears - on how it is exercised, can create a sense of insecurity, even where appeals procedures exist (which are not thought to be effective everywhere). It assists integration if it is known that immigrants who are lawfully resident and have lived for a long time in a Member State will not be expelled except for very serious offences.

(c) Employment, business, work

54. We have established that employment is an essential ingredient of integration in all the Member States. High unemployment amongst immigrants goes hand in hand with integration problems; and this is, unfortunately, not an aspect which affects only some areas and some immigrant communities. In a number of countries it has been noted that the downward trend in unemployment over the past few years has not applied to foreign nationals or has been far less in evidence as far as they are concerned.

Promotion opportunities at work can contribute massively towards integration, since they provide the immigrant with an objective, recognition and additional resources (particularly in terms of money and skills). However, in terms of equality of education and preparation for jobs, we often see a form of undeclared discrimination in a promotion policy which works to the disadvantage of immigrants. It has also become clear to us that such opportunities have diminished in direct proportion to the increasing level of modernization which is often accompanied by technological progress, the growth of skilled jobs and the - sometimes excessive - reaction of looking for fresh abilities outside the business, with an accompanying parallel reduction in the flow of entrants who, in the past, had "naturally" replaced the promoted immigrants. Nowadays, immigrants are concentrated in service jobs (cleaning, hotels etc.) where there are few opportunities for vocational development and a high level of job insecurity.

It must not be forgotten, in this connection, that the easier it is for employers to take on legal or clandestine immigrant labour, the more likely it is that conditions of work and pay will continue to be less than satisfactory, thus perpetuating these obstacles to integration.

55. At all events, employment in the Member States is largely in the private sector, and the authorities have limited powers of direct intervention in this area. Such intervention may take the form - as in some Member States - of anti-discriminatory legislation relating both to work (including selection for promotion) and to recruitment. The Group has nevertheless noted that such legislation does not automatically prevent discriminatory behaviour and that, in this field too, integration is dependent on heightening awareness and changing attitudes.
56. The role of the authorities in encouraging vocational training appears to be more fundamental. Such action has been essential in the Member States in the context of the great change in job content which occurred in the 1980s. In all Member States, immigrants enjoy the same access as nationals both to training and to allowances payable in the event of job loss. In reality, however, they often suffer from the handicap of having received less initial training than nationals, and also from the difficulties stemming from inadequate knowledge of the language. Moreover, they are concentrated in sectors and jobs where the level of vocational training is traditionally low. Other than the learning of the national language, there do not appear to be many specific vocational training programmes for immigrants in the Member States. Large numbers of immigrants participate in schemes designed to retrain and find employment for the very poorly qualified or "marginal" sections of the population.
57. The State is also an employer and the Group noted the differing situations in terms of access to public employment for third-country nationals. The restrictions are undoubtedly discriminatory in nature, although their importance has to be judged in terms of the significance of the public sector in the economy as a whole.

More generally, it is true to say that the world of work has traditionally been a source of integration, but there may be reason to believe that this role is now diminishing, if only because the workplace no longer plays such a central part in people's lives.

58. This report stresses problems facing immigrants intending to remain in Member States either for long periods or indefinitely. However, some attention has to be devoted to the employment, housing, integration, health and social security problems facing immigrants with short-term fixed contracts, seasonal workers and self-employed itinerant traders. After all, these problems concern not only the persons themselves, but have a general negative impact on the integration situation for all immigrants.

(d) Education

59. After an uncertain start in the 1960s, the education of migrant workers' children was given relatively high priority both in the Community's activities and in a majority of Member States during the 1970s and early 1980s⁽¹⁾. But many of these initiatives were never meant to be anything other than temporary measures, designed to meet needs which were themselves seen as temporary. In the last two years or so, however, a continuously growing number of Member States seem to have realized that the challenges related to the presence of immigrant children in the schools of the European Community are far from being solved. Fresh approaches are being sought, and new funds are being channelled into this area. It is increasingly realized that the continuing underachievement of large sections of the immigrant groups has potentially disruptive social consequences. Also, the realization is growing that more effective strategies are required to tap fully the intellectual potential of the immigrant communities, so as to meet the future demands of the labour market.
60. Clearly, the single most important issue is that of continuing underachievement and failure at school. Although the picture varies a great deal - both between Member States and different immigrant communities - there can be no doubt that the overall aim of equality of opportunity has not been achieved in a comprehensive way: in Member States with a selective education system, these students tend to be overrepresented in selective schools and colleges, whereas in other Member States, they would be oriented towards the lower streams. They tend to finish their education earlier, to obtain lower qualifications in final examinations and to drop out from education more frequently. Everywhere, they are overrepresented in special education. This latter specific situation seems to be related to delayed family reunification or to lack of continuity of attendance (movements between schools of the country of origin and the country of immigration).
61. Full mastery of the language of the host country continues to be the most important prerequisite for academic achievement in the education system of the host country, and hence for integration. What has changed over time is the type of provision which is seen as the most promising route to success. In the sixties and early seventies, the emphasis tended to be put on separate provision to meet the specific needs of children who had little or no knowledge of the language of the host country, and often such special provision was extended to last several years. The disadvantages of such an approach are that:

(1) This was reflected in the adoption of Directive 77/486/EEC (OJ L 199/32 of 6.8.1977), the selection of this area as one of the priority themes under the action programme of 9.2.1976 (OJ C 38 of 19.2.1976) and last but not least the fact that some Member States invested considerable sums in national initiatives to help schools and teachers to cater for the most pressing needs of children from migrant backgrounds.

- separate provision tends to exclude immigrant children from entire strands of the learning experience of their peers, both in strictly academic and wider social terms, and hence to obstruct their integration;
- the more subtle language learning needs of immigrant children (a "must" for a better position in working life) extend well beyond what can be achieved during a limited period of special provision in the early years of their education.

Also, the growing spread of immigrant children across our schools makes the setting up of special provision even more difficult, whereas on the other hand it does lead schools to see the existence of special language learning needs as somewhat less unusual, which should consequently be taken on board by the mainstream system. This has led to a growing tendency to seek the earliest possible integration of children into the mainstream, while at the same time catering for their special language learning needs by offering extra language support, either in the mainstream class or during extra periods of support teaching.

62. For some countries, the teaching and learning of the mother tongue and culture of the country of origin of immigrant children was originally aimed also at facilitating their possible reintegration into the education system of the country of origin. Time has shown that return migration does not take place to the extent which was expected, and consequently there has been a change in emphasis in the aims of such mother tongue teaching.

Firstly, there is a rapidly growing body of scientific evidence suggesting that adequate development of the immigrant pupils' home language contributes positively and strongly to their acquiring personal self-confidence, social assuredness and even a better command of the language of the host country.

Secondly, the learning in school of the pupils' home language is increasingly seen as valuable in itself, for their individual cognitive development, for their ability to find employment in certain sectors of the labour market where such "rare" language skills are much sought after, and for their ability to maintain social links within their respective immigrant communities. The development of such teaching also corresponds to the need to diversify the teaching of modern languages.

Consequently, there is a growing number of Member States who are seeking ways to encourage this teaching, to include it in the range of modern languages on offer and to make such teaching available to the children of nationals of the host country. Some Member States have achieved considerable progress in this field. This has also paved the way for a number of interesting experiments aimed at making progress towards bilingual education.

63. The need to broaden the horizon of teaching in disciplines such as history and geography, so as to make them more relevant to the experience and motivation of pupils from immigrant backgrounds, has started attempts to develop a new teaching approach under the label of intercultural education. Most significantly, it aims at enabling pupils to examine issues and problems from a variety of - potentially conflicting - perspectives, including those of their peers from other cultural backgrounds. Inasmuch as such approaches to teaching foster mutual understanding and tolerance, they contribute to pupils developing a better understanding and deeper respect for fundamental human rights, and to preventing the emergence of racist prejudice and attitudes. Although still experimental, the intercultural approach is emerging as the single most coherent and comprehensive strategy for the educational integration of immigrants, while at the same time providing a conceptual and policy-making framework for the growing number of educational exchanges in the Community. This involves continuous consultation in a participatory approach of both national and foreign populations, by having parents from various communities discuss what education their children should have and in which language.
64. The need for facilities for education, and in particular for learning the language of the host country, is not confined to those of school age. The policy of family reunification means that many immigrants will continue to enter Member States as adolescents or adults; they include those coming for marriage to immigrants already settled in the Community. Such immigrants will not readily take advantage of the conventional forms of "adult education". Some Member States have encouraged the use of voluntary workers to teach the language of the host country to small groups of immigrants. Without practical help of this kind many immigrant women who do not go out to work will have little contact with people outside their own families and communities. This hampers not only their own integration but also that of their children who may have no knowledge of the language of the host country when they first enter school.
65. The development of comprehensive strategies for the integration of immigrants places new demands also on the training of teachers. Some Member States are now concentrating on ensuring that all newly qualified teachers are prepared for service in schools with immigrant pupils.

Simultaneously, the numbers of third and second-generation immigrants in the teaching profession are growing, and some Member States have adopted policies to actively attract young people from ethnic minorities or from immigrant backgrounds to the teaching force. It is reasonable to expect that such teachers may offer convincing examples of academic success to their pupils, while at the same time displaying a degree of empathy which indigenous teachers may find it more difficult to develop. Some Member States also make special efforts to recruit and train mother tongue teachers from this group.

66. In conclusion, we stress that, from an educational point of view, the distinction between third-country and Community nationals is not relevant. The irrelevance of the distinction is best demonstrated by the fact that such special needs and potentials as may exist, most notably in the area of language education, would not disappear if children (or their parents) acquired the nationality of the host country. At the same time, it would be unadvisable indeed to exclude children from third-country backgrounds from having access to specific educational provision for children from Community backgrounds, such as for the acquisition of the language of the host country. Finally, it is obvious that the very concept of integration does not allow for the setting up of different kinds of provision⁽¹⁾.

Cultural pluralism is now increasingly seen as a permanent aspect of the modernization of our societies, and broadly based policy responses need to be implemented which are capable of:

- fully tapping the intellectual potential of the immigrant communities;
 - preparing all students to take advantage of the potential benefits of such pluralism and to contribute to the development of society without denying their linguistic and cultural heritage;
 - preventing the social crises which are part of the present processes of modernization from developing socially disruptive consequences;
 - strengthening the social basis of democracy and preventing the spread of xenophobia and racism.
67. We are convinced that the key to enabling the social integration of immigrants (as indeed of all disadvantaged persons) to take place is for Member States to make an adequate response to the educational challenge, and that the most promising strategy for the educational integration of immigrants continues to be improved education for all children in the European Community, and gearing it to the social and cultural changes we are witnessing.

(1) This point of view is also reflected in the declaration added to the minutes of the Council meeting of 25.7.1977, when the Council adopted Directive 77/486/EEC on the education of the children of migrant workers. In this declaration, the Council reaffirmed its political will to ensure that the measures to be taken by all Member States in compliance with this Directive would equally meet the needs of children of nationals of other Member States, of children from third country backgrounds and of other children not covered by this Directive.

(e) Housing

68. Housing conditions are a reflection not only of the general situation obtaining in the geographical region where foreigners are located but also of complex social mechanisms which, in some places (particularly in urban areas), give rise to a weakening of the social fabric and lead to the exclusion of those who are deficient in various respects (lack of general education or vocational training, low income or unemployment, difficulties in cohabiting with other ethnic or cultural groups, social tensions, instability and other negative factors). Considerably more than half of the foreign nationals are concentrated in urban conglomerations. Towns and cities thus bear the brunt of the integration process or, to put it another way, are faced with growing anarchy in social terms and social decline culminating in racist and xenophobic excesses.

In this context, areas of towns and cities are subject to processes of change and segregation which are partly outside the control of public policies, whether of central or local government.

69. The question of housing therefore assumes key significance in the integration process, since it is inextricably bound up with family reunification, residence, school, work, mobility, leisure, relations with neighbours and harmony of the urban fabric.

The concentration of immigrants which we have found in some towns and cities is due not only to the housing market and inadequate integration structures - in particular, immediate reception facilities of a high standard - but also to links of solidarity within each group of foreigners and differences in family structures. But rather than being the cause of the dilapidation of some districts where the immigrant population has found accommodation, migrants are more likely to be the catalyst which brings general shortcomings to light.

70. Opinions vary as to integration policy with regard to housing, both amongst decision-makers and amongst representatives of immigrants' organizations whom we have met.

There are two conflicting arguments to be considered: on the one hand, the desire for a voluntary policy of integrating foreigners more widely throughout society - or, at any rate, providing young people of the second generation with the opportunity to leave districts populated mainly by immigrants - and, on the other, the acceptance of the existence of concentrations, which are in fact in some cases preferred by the immigrants themselves who find it easier to live together in this way (centres of worship, specialist shops, places of safety and advice, continued use of the mother tongue).

Although there are as yet no signs of an unequivocal resolution of these two arguments, one thing is beyond dispute: the dilapidation of urban districts inhabited by immigrants and disadvantaged nationals of the host country, the concentration of the foreign population in buildings in practice reserved for them and the permanent nature of shanty-town occupancy are an obstacle to integration, encouraging instability and segregation. Both overt and indirect policies conducted recently by Member States lend credence to this.

71. Housing is one of the elements which has recently come to the fore in the integration mechanisms of most States.

However, the implementation of these policies raises problems of a financial nature and in terms of priorities.

The actions of the national authorities differ according to the significance of three factors: whether the arrival of immigrants is a long-standing tradition or a recent phenomenon, the potential of the private or subsidized housing stock and the degree of responsibility of regional and/or local authorities in the management of public housing and in the planning of the housing environment. Moreover, the attitude of the local authority towards housing may affect the immigrant's security of stay and his access to such housing.

72. All the Member States offer financial inducements to improve the housing environment and have rules which are almost always non-discriminatory in terms of access to ownership or rental of housing in the private and subsidized sectors. Since the situation in practice is somewhat different, the principle of non-discrimination in terms of renting, ownership and financial support should be given particular prominence not only in the drafting of housing policies, but also in action and information programmes, and in the adaptation of laws governing the bodies responsible for subsidized housing and the allocation of such housing, in the interest of maintaining a reasonable social balance.
73. We have found that the main points on which the Member States' policies are based are generally consistent with the objective of improving the housing environment:

- taking account of the immigrant population in renovation and integration programmes for the most disadvantaged districts of towns and cities: architects and local authorities have a huge responsibility in this respect and need to take a bold line, bearing in mind that such a policy may work to their disadvantage at election time (pressure of poorly informed public opinion and fear of competition from the foreigner);

- responding to discriminatory practices in the public and private sectors by laws, financial inducements and sustained information campaigns directed at the immigrant population to facilitate their access to loans, subsidies and rented housing; experience has shown that those who are at the greatest disadvantage need help most in this respect, particularly from mutual aid associations;
- setting up national and Community initiatives (technical and financial support for innovative actions) directed at crisis districts, with the participation of target groups, with the aim of renovating or restoring the housing environment without ejecting the weakest groups; construction of low-cost housing for all, access to which should be based on need without discrimination of any kind.

(f) Civic and political rights - Acquisition of citizenship

74. This section of our report considers ways in which immigrants may help shape the development of the societies in which they live, and thus become more integrated within them.
75. All Member States recognize the right of immigrants to form their own associations; they are many and varied, often with a religious background. They help newcomers feel more secure, provide practical help and, from the point of view of eventual integration, are important in enabling newcomers to learn from those who arrived before them what one of those we met called "the rules of the game" in an unfamiliar country. Knowledge of those rules helps newcomers in their dealings with officialdom. For their part, officials of central and local government in many Member States have recognized that they need to take trouble to see that they are meeting the legitimate needs of immigrants. To give an obvious example, leaflets about the health services from which immigrants can benefit must be available in their own language.
76. More generally, our work has brought out that there is an inescapable need, in the integration process, for some form of participation in the management of everyday affairs, to ensure that foreign residents can play an increasingly active role in local life and local decision-making. The opportunity to voice opinions and to receive advice is a prerequisite of successful integration. Those to whom such means are available are less likely to remain on the margins of society.
77. The central or local government authorities in most of the Member States have set up facilities for dialogue. These may be in the form of ad hoc administrative structures, advisory bodies on which immigrants are represented and even representation in the State's consultative committees.

Consultation at local government level was judged by some of those we spoke to as being of substantial practical importance where it dealt with essential elements in everyday life (e.g. housing, schools, transport, cultural and sporting facilities, etc). "Discretionary" consultations or contact which is limited to discussion about carnivals and similar events have generally been a source of frustration and disinterest on the part of the immigrant population and do nothing to further the cause of integration.

78. In a plural and democratic society, power and influence do not belong only to agencies of Government, but are exercised in many other ways. We are encouraged by evidence of the extent to which immigrants and members of ethnic minorities are taking part in the work of trade unions, works councils, chambers of commerce and other bodies and are thus making their contribution alongside that of members of the majority populations to the communities in which they live and work.
79. Political authority is nevertheless central. Immigrants and their children who have the citizenship of the country in which they are living (whether acquired at birth or by naturalization) have, by definition, the right to vote and to stand for election. Some have become members of national Parliaments, and others of local councils. Such people serve two important purposes. They can represent the views and needs of their own communities. Their election demonstrates that members of ethnic minorities and immigrant groups can seize the opportunities available to the citizens of democratic countries. It has been suggested that third country nationals legally resident in Member States should have the right to vote in elections for local authorities. This possibility is seen as a supplement to, and in no way a substitute for, the development of other ways, such as we have mentioned above, in which immigrants can bring their wishes and particular problems to the notice of those whose decisions affect their everyday lives.
80. In those everyday lives what matters is not the citizenship of an immigrant but in general terms, as we emphasized above, his security of stay. Social security and other benefits do not depend on the acquisition of citizenship. Leaving aside the symbolic and psychological importance of citizenship - which we do not underestimate - the acquisition of citizenship brings two practical benefits. First, the citizen is free to return to his country after however lengthy an absence abroad. Second, the person who becomes a citizen of one Member State, whether by birth, by marriage or by naturalization, thereby acquires all the rights of a Community citizen under the Treaty of Rome, including the right to look for and take work anywhere in the Community.

81. The laws governing naturalization and citizenship vary greatly, reflecting different historical and philosophical concepts of citizenship: In Member States whose laws are based on jus soli rather than jus sanguinis, citizenship is acquired at birth, irrespective of the parents' citizenship. We have asked ourselves, and asked those we met, two questions. Do more restrictive policies towards the acquisition of citizenship hinder integration of third country nationals, and does the acceptance of dual nationality assist integration? We were not surprised that these questions did not receive clear answers.

In particular, it was argued, on the one hand, that to offer naturalization after a relatively short period of lawful residence was to assist what was in practice a gradual process of integration, and, on the other, that naturalization should be seen as the culmination, and in one sense as the reward, of the process of integration. We ourselves do not wish to come down on one side or the other of that argument. We are, however, conscious, in this context, as in others, of the crucial position of the children of immigrants who have been born and/or educated within a Member State and whose home is within Europe. We believe that it cannot be in the national interest of a country for an important part of its population to remain indefinitely, from generation to generation, with the legal status of aliens and not citizens.

82. We believe that too restrictive a policy on naturalization is not in the interests of Member States themselves. We hope that in those Member States in which the children of immigrants do not acquire citizenship of the host country at birth, or have the right to do so at a given age, means will be considered to enable them to do so through naturalization on terms that are likely to be acceptable.
83. This raises the question of dual nationality to which the policies not only of Member States but of the third countries from which immigrants come are relevant. This is a complex area of international law and we make no claim to have made a careful study of it. It is, however, one on which we judge that opinions may be changing, and may now be different from those that led some Member States to support the terms of the Council of Europe Convention on the subject. We hope that it will be helpful to make some comments from the point of view of our concern with the integration of immigrants.
84. Clearly, the refusal to allow dual nationality can be an obstacle to the acquisition of the citizenship of the country in which an immigrant is living. It seems likely that a greater number of long-term immigrants, and in particular their children, would wish to acquire the nationality of their country of residence if they were permitted to retain their former nationality, thus satisfying their desire for dual identity as shown by their continued adherence to their original cultural heritage. A possible interim solution, which may avoid some of the disadvantages of dual nationality, might lie in the setting up of a system of "dormant" nationality which would apply only to those living in the country of their choice: only one nationality would be effective at a given time, but the second would automatically come into effect under specific circumstances (e.g. if the person returned to the other country).

(g) The role of the law

85. Adherence to the rule of law is one of the fundamental values of European States. In all Member States immigrants and members of ethnic minorities have the protection of the law and of the different means available under different legal systems for upholding human rights. Immigrants have been able to take their cases to the European Court of Human Rights.

There is another side to the same coin. The law reflects some of the fundamental values of contemporary Europe. Immigrants who have the protection of the law must themselves recognize its supremacy and the concepts of equality before the law, equality between the sexes, tolerance and an acceptance of pluralism within the country in which they are living.

86. There are some extreme instances of racism and xenophobia which involve the perpetration of criminal acts which can be punished through the criminal courts. We have not examined the way in which Member States are meeting their obligations under the Declaration against Racism and Xenophobia, important though that is to the integration of immigrants. Is there a further role for the law?
87. One common thread running through earlier sections of our report is the need to make opportunities available to immigrants and their children - opportunities, for example, in education or access to housing - and to remove the obstacles to their taking such opportunities. Discrimination is a major obstacle. Systematic studies carried out in a number of Member States (including a recent study by the International Labour Office) have shown that discrimination against migrant workers is pervasive and widespread. There is evidence also of discrimination by some public officials, by estate agents and by many others.
88. As part, but only part, of the means of tackling discrimination, which may be indirect and informal, some Member States have not only made discrimination illegal, but have provided legal machinery by which individuals can pursue complaints, and also by which formal investigations can be carried out which may lead to action against the organisations shown to have discriminated on grounds of race or national origin. It was strongly put to us that such machinery should be extended. On the other hand, some Member States see objections in principle and practice to such proposals. While recognising that systems developed in one Member State cannot just be transplanted to another with a very different legal tradition, we hope that Member States will consider more systematic ways of using the law to combat discrimination as part of a wider exchange of information about their experience with the integration of members of ethnic minorities.

(h) Public statements and public opinion

89. We have already emphasized that the integration of immigrants is hampered by what happens to them in areas such as work, school and housing, which are matters for the policy-makers. The picture would be incomplete if one did not take into account what is said by the various interested parties with regard to immigrants and the attitudes of the population towards them, which are often based less on objective factors than on irrational reactions. We have been left in no doubt, from our visits to the various countries, that such considerations invariably help to fashion the integration mechanisms employed by the authorities and may, in some cases, play a decisive role.

90. The political sphere

There can be no denying that the question of immigration has become a political hot potato in several Member States, although there are, in this context, considerable differences between them. The traditional countries of large-scale immigration (and even the new immigration countries) have witnessed the emergence of political options which have turned the focus firmly on immigration. Political trends based on past ideology have found fresh acceptance in the rejection, practically wholesale, of immigration. The prospect of deriving electoral gain from these trends leads to immigration assuming great, even inordinate, importance in the general political debate. Having become a major factor in politicians' calculations, the question of immigrants may well be subject to political logic rather than the technical logic of identifying and solving problems; this may, without doubt, be regarded as an additional obstacle to integration.

91. The media

The political significance of immigration combined with a tendency on the part of the media to highlight particular situations means that the media are tending to pay increasing attention to the question of immigration and neglecting the contribution made by immigrants to the European economies.

The situation has to some extent been aggravated, in humanitarian terms, by publicizing cases of deportation or expulsion, which does not help to enlighten the public on what is already a difficult subject. Simplifying matters, or concentrating on a particular case for which a solution may easily be found but which cannot be generalized, may tend to distort the problem. This is especially true of countries with a recent history of immigration.

A further tendency in this particular field is to lump together immigration and racism. The media tend more and more to associate demonstrations of racism with the presence of immigrants, even where they affect nationals of long standing, as is the case with anti-semitism and anti-black feelings. News items are sometimes given a racist tinge rather than being reported in purely social terms. If an intruder kills a pensioner, this becomes a racist crime if the intruder is an immigrant.

92. The voice of the immigrants
Immigrants are rarely given the opportunity to express their views. Their principal concern is to be able to forge a life for themselves in the host country and, rather than seek assistance, they prefer to be left in peace. The desire to obtain a position in society, in other words to integrate, goes hand in hand with the wish for their difference to be respected. Pronouncements may become more strident where awareness of the difference becomes overwhelming, as is the case with certain Islamic fundamentalists, for example.
93. Attitudes of the authorities
The physical appearance of immigrants and their lack of knowledge about the customs of the country make them particularly visible; this, combined with the prejudices of certain members of the civil authorities and the police force, may create the kind of climate of mistrust and even mutual hostility which is often cited by representatives of immigrants' associations or non-governmental immigrant aid bodies. Measures based on the strictest equality between immigrants and nationals may, in practice, have only limited chances of success because of behaviour of this type. The situation becomes even more serious when nationals of foreign origin, or the offspring of immigrants, are also subjected to discriminatory treatment. Some of the people we spoke to thought that, if public servants were specially trained to deal with immigrants, and if officials were to show greater sensitivity with regard to matters concerning immigrants, a lot of the problems could be avoided and the amount of social tension reduced.
94. Attitudes to immigrant workers
Generally speaking, there is no legal discrimination (except in "sensitive" jobs), although some of the people with whom we talked cited numerous cases of discrimination in practice, both in terms of recruitment and dismissal. Rather than view such instances as evidence of racism or xenophobia, they have to be seen in terms of the widespread perception of immigrants as casual workers, even where they are, in fact, permanent residents. Solidarity between workers, one of the major features of the workers' movement which all trade unions rely on, becomes fragile in the face of certain differences. Fear of unfair competition, fuelled by certain business practices, finds expression particularly in attitudes towards new arrivals rather than towards immigrants who have been there along time.
95. Collective attitudes
Xenophobia, and possibly racism, appear to surface nowadays in specific events, the more serious of which become public knowledge, as well as in a collective feeling of mistrust towards foreigners. This mistrust feeds on alarmist pronouncements about the danger of an "invasion", which become all the more credible when coupled with equally alarmist pronouncements on the demographic weakness of Europe. These are well-worn clichés whose roots are more likely to be found in subconscious fears than in objective realities. They may, nevertheless, affect some specific, important elements of the integration of immigrants, such as access to housing or schooling.

The persistence of certain distinctive features in immigrants of successive generations, skin colour or cultural characteristics, despite their being socially integrated, may exacerbate tensions in this context, even in countries with a well-organized entry control system. Perception of the foreigner, the "other person", is not necessarily linked to nationality, but may have more to do with cultural and religious factors and their conspicuousness, as illustrated by the opinion poll on racism and xenophobia carried out by the Commission in collaboration with the European Parliament at the end of 1988. Distinctions are also made between immigrants in terms of how long they have been in the country and in terms of their socio-cultural proximity. This tends to lend weight to the belief that there is a problem with the presumed inability of some foreigners to integrate, in contrast to the successful integration of others. The fault is thus seen to lie with the immigrant who finds it hard to integrate and may consequently be regarded as undesirable.

(i) Islam

96. One third of all immigrants in Western Europe are muslims, two thirds in the case of non-EC nationals. Different strands of the Islamic region are involved (shilite, sunni, allewite, etc.) and different nationalities (in the main Algerians, Bangladeshis, Moroccans, Pakistanis, Tunisians, Turks and Yugoslavs). Some of these strands are more "traditional" - as we would put it - than others.

In principle, all that we have said in our report about the integration of immigrants applies to these large muslim communities as to others. Integration respects the other's culture in terms of religion and of language, while enabling him to partake in the social, economic and institutional structures of the host society.

97. It follows from what was said above that central and local government needs to promote the participation of the muslim communities in the political process and in the decision-making that affects them.

This is not a straightforward task, partly because the position of the religious or political leader within the Islamic tradition is very different from that in our secular democratic society with its representative bodies. It is often necessary for dialogue to take place with a variety of different people among the various muslim communities.

In some countries, the authorities disown this question, pointing to the principle of religious liberty. In others, there is a strong desire for the Islamic communities to be represented and for an institutionalized dialogue with them. The practical arrangements, though, are not always easy, with the external manifestations of Islamic identity (e.g. mosques and specifically Islamic events) tending to be factors of division and intolerance.

The example of the United Kingdom, where muslim representatives are now found on local councils, shows that participation is valuable, but also that it is not sufficient by itself.

As we have argued above, education and training provide one of the keys to integration, and we include the education of the national as well as the immigrant population. Education and learning are a two-way process, and it needs to be said - firmly but with sensitivity - that integration involves mutual respect and understanding.

98. Our visits confirmed that it can be difficult to translate general principles into practice. For example, in the field of education, particularly of young muslim women, there are difficulties arising from the interaction between very different traditions and beliefs, and the way forward is by no means yet clear. We ourselves have no simple solutions to offer, but we are convinced that politicians and those who form opinions in our countries must take the lead, because if they do not lead in the direction of integration and tolerance they implicitly lead in the direction of segregation.

PART THREE

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

99. All the Community countries (except Ireland) have now become countries of immigration. The question of integration is therefore relevant to each of them. There is no alternative. Voluntary return is, and is likely to remain, insignificant. Forced repatriation is not envisaged by any country for migrants whose situation is regular. Policies of "laisser-faire" and marginalization do not appear to be viable in our democratic societies.

In this context, the option of integration is unavoidable for all the Member States. It denotes the need to offer migrants and their descendants the opportunity to live "normally" in the host country.

It entails providing migrants with sufficient resources (knowledge of the local language, housing, education, vocational training etc.) to enable them gradually to attain "parity" with the national population. This approach seems now to be widely favoured in the Community countries. It should be applicable not only to migrants lawfully present and their descendants but also to fresh inflows likely to be limited in number but no less real, stemming mainly from family reunification and applications for refugee status.

This is by no means a recent phenomenon. Several Community countries have a long history of integration. Our Group came across numerous examples of successful integration drawn from the distant and more recent past.

Nevertheless, there was no indication in any of the countries (with the exception of Ireland where the matter does not appear to be relevant) that the question of integration was seen as no longer being a problem. In some countries it is at the very heart of political debate.

100. In characterizing the Member States' integration policies, it is necessary first of all to consider the difficulties surrounding the objective. The first of these, without doubt of fundamental significance, appears to us to lie in the fact that immigration confronts us with the problems of our own society.

Immigration involving the poor, which is the most extensive type and poses the greatest number of integration problems is, for our society, the tangible expression of the difficulties and contradictions of the North-South relationship. It brings into the countries of Western Europe large numbers of people with few resources - mainly in terms of finance and training - who are removed from their native surroundings and confronted with the systems of competition and movement which characterize competitive western societies.

There is no magic solution to this situation, which could last as long as there are North-South problems. Any integration policy will therefore be difficult and slow to take effect, require significant resources and be fraught with set-backs.

The problems take on an extra dimension in view of the fact that policies and, to a greater extent, what is said about them are sometimes based on presuppositions which bear little resemblance to reality.

For instance, some countries have taken the view that immigration is merely a passing phenomenon for them. This has led them to underestimate the resources needed for an integration policy. Others believe that such a policy applies to a fixed "stock" at a given moment which is being gradually absorbed. This comforting vision does not correspond to reality, owing to the continuing inflow of entrants and to the fact that the children of migrants - regardless of their nationality - pose problems of integration which are all the more pressing because their links with their country of origin are not the same as those of their parents.

101. Moreover, it is wrong to expect too much of employment policies. Whilst the possibility of gaining access to the labour market appears to remain a necessary condition of integration, it is not enough. Also, although advancement at work may be a major factor in the integration process, the opportunities actually available are nowadays limited, particularly for migrants; it cannot therefore constitute the sole basis of integration policies.
102. In no Member State of the Community is integration policy in the hands of one single entity. The State, local bodies at different levels and associations share the various responsibilities and initiatives. The absence of a single voice, and the difficulties in achieving consistency are the greater the larger the number of actors involved. The allocation of subsidized housing, which often entails the involvement of the State, district authorities and specialist bodies, is a good example.

In wider terms, immigration engenders a sense of the irrational, involving fear of difference and of foreigners. There may be a temptation - in some countries, but not in all - for politicians to exploit this. Such an approach can only harm the effectiveness of integration policies, which depend also on changing people's attitudes.

103. These difficulties must not be allowed to obscure the rewards, for each Member State and the Community, of successful integration policies.

The stakes are even higher in the context of the implementation of the single market on 1 January 1993, which is likely to bring about greater mobility of people in Europe and to promote integration of Member States' activities and citizens. It could also increase further the interest of third countries in the Community's policies and practices.

The primary concern of each State, and Europe as a whole, must be to demonstrate and defend democratic values and solidarity. The challenge facing us is this: how can we ensure the preservation of human rights, while immigration confronts our societies with the pressures and tensions of the world? How can we maintain systems of social protection and social guarantees in the face of growing numbers of impoverished people from all parts of the world?

104. The construction of Europe is also directly affected, in both political and economic terms.

If integration policies at national level fail, this will stimulate the reawakening or development of sentiments based on "fear of the foreigner", which can only harm the relationships between peoples of the Member States in which such feelings are allowed to surface.

Additionally, a policy perceived as discriminating against immigrants from third countries could arouse reactions elsewhere which would tarnish Europe's image and promote the growth of tension, especially in the Mediterranean region.

Finally, too much diversity in the opportunities for integration could generate pressure at certain borders and cause movement of immigrants within the Community, particularly if freedom of movement were extended to migrants; although that is merely a hypothesis, it cannot be discounted.

105. We feel it prudent to emphasize, in this regard, that imposing severe restrictions on the free movement of third-country migrants may be discriminatory in the sense of too great a discrepancy between the rights of nationals and of foreigners, especially those who have been resident for some time.

What we are faced with, therefore, is the problem of how to avoid controls based on 'appearance', with the attendant discrimination and inefficiency. How can we overcome the difficulties likely to be faced by groups of Europeans wishing to move around freely: a company which has obtained a market in another Member State, or a school class conducting an exchange with another European establishment?

106. In a wider sense, the question of integration will turn the spotlight on the Community's policies insofar as they are aimed specifically at nationals of the Member States. Any limiting of aid and research programmes, of which there are a great many, to nationals of Member States could have a discriminatory effect running counter to the aim of integration. We have been unable either to carry out a detailed analysis of this aspect or to assess the actual impact on integration, but it cannot be left out of the reckoning.

These questions assume greater importance in view of the fact that nationality rights vary greatly from one Community country to another. The Group has noted that this diversity is attributable to national historical and cultural traditions and will not hinder current attempts to achieve consistency between Member States' integration policies. It goes without saying that a rethink would be necessary if the effect of policies varied greatly according to whether one was a national of a Community Member State or a third country.

107. In view of the fact that integration problems affect the construction of Europe and European policies in many areas are not neutral from the point of view of integration, we recommend increased cooperation between States in this field. This course of action appears all the more viable since the European countries, regardless of their historical and geographical differences, appear to be faced nowadays with similar problems, both actual and potential, from the point of view of integration of migrants:

- continued pressure on entry;
- increasing cultural differences between country of origin and host country;
- concentration in certain districts ("ghettoization");
- unemployment, marginalization of a section of the foreign population;
- integration problems of the second generation;
- awareness of national public opinion.

There are more areas of agreement than disagreement with regard to the type of action which they can take or are already taking, particularly in terms of bringing about change.

Member States are likely to suffer less soul-searching and to be more effective if they are able to see their own problems in better perspective and take the heat out of them by comparison with and reference to those of other countries. Cooperation may help a country to overcome its particular anguish over immigration by viewing the matter in a wider context and drawing on the experience of others.

108. In the light of the above, we consider it appropriate to make the following proposals, without prejudging the institutional forms of cooperation.

We have selected five areas for consideration:

1. Improve the information on immigration in Europe

109. There is considerable disparity in the level of information on immigration in Europe. Apart from a handful of experts, few people in any one country are aware of the situation and the initiatives taken in others. To take the heat out of the debate and also to give it added substance, great importance will attach to the collection and, especially, dissemination of data on the immigration situation in the various Community countries, the policies conducted and their effects, with public opinion playing a significant role in this connection.

This aspect of collecting and disseminating data should also relate to the history of immigration and integration. For some countries this is by no means a new phenomenon, although the events of the past, concerning mainly intra-European immigration, have largely disappeared from the collective memory. Historical parallels are never exact, but it is worth remarking, for instance, that the current and prospective immigration from Eastern to Western Europe is not unprecedented. The inflow of immigrants from the East has arrived too recently for us to have felt able to deal specifically with their integration in this report, but we draw attention to the number of citizens of Member States who are the children of immigrants from Eastern Europe who settled in the West in the aftermath of war.

Finally, and as a matter of priority, we feel it essential for this information to emphasize the migrants' contribution to their European host countries and their economies, a factor which is often underestimated.

2. Devise a set of basic principles on the integration of migrants

110. This would be somewhat similar to the social charter and is justified by the need to continue and develop integration policies in the various Member States. It would appear to be feasible in the light of the similarity of Member States' problems and actions. It would make it easier to achieve the desired consistency, but would not stand in the way of local initiatives in accordance with these fundamental principles.
111. These principles should, to some extent, clarify the fundamental rights of individuals, setting out requirements both for the content of policies and for the immigrants themselves. They would be concerned mainly with freedom of expression, freedom to come and go, non-discrimination on racial or religious grounds, equal rights for men and women, children's rights and observance of defendants' rights, etc. They would thus reflect the freedoms over which Europe has fought and which form part of its heritage.

They should also present the various elements of integration policy by highlighting the broad lines on which there is agreement, concerning such matters as training in its various forms, housing and culture, etc.

They could, in particular, stress the particular significance of the second generation.

They could also help to focus attention on areas where specific measures in respect of migrants are required (for example learning the national language) and those which are more a matter for general action in respect of vulnerable groups in society.

This would undoubtedly provide each country with an opportunity to gain insight into the reasoning behind the actions of the other countries, to discover areas of convergence, to bring differences into the open and perhaps even to reach agreement.

3. Promote exchanges and consultation on the social aspects of integration

112. The problems of immigration in Europe cannot be understood purely in terms of influx. The objective of integration is a shared one and requires a number of varied policies, particularly in the fields of housing, education, training and culture. We believe that regular exchanges of information between the Member States on policies in these fields and their effects may facilitate integration and avoid the adverse effects which are likely to arise from excessive disparities.

4. Build up a clear overall picture of movements

113. Movements of migrants from third countries or between Community countries affect integration. A massive influx into a geographical region populated by foreigners may generate insoluble problems of housing, relationships, living conditions and therefore integration. On the other hand, it is unrealistic to expect the flow to be stopped dead, apart from which the requisite policing measures may generate fear within the country and tensions with third countries and their nationals, and may also impose constraints on integration.
114. There is no ideal level or optimum balance between these two considerations. There is, however, a measure of interdependence between the Community countries. A concerted effort by Member States may help to give a clearer picture, especially if there is an accompanying process of evaluation of the effects of such movements, which would act as an antidote both to simplistic pronouncements and the worries of the general public.

5. Take the problem of integration into account in common policies, particularly those relating to third countries

115. The Community conducts active policies vis-à-vis countries of emigration, in particular Africa and the Mediterranean region, and will no doubt do so in the future with the countries of Eastern Europe. These policies fail to take sufficient account at present of immigration and integration questions.

Without having gone into the matter in detail, we believe that the countries of the Community should give some thought to how these policies could contribute towards integration, either directly by promoting bilateral relationships between regions of the Community and third countries, or indirectly by taking into account the potential contribution and the effect of such action on the increasing movements of migrants.

116. In this regard, we feel it is appropriate to point out that relationships between the rich countries of the "North" and the growing populations of the countries of the "South" pose a major problem for the future stability of our world. The proposed solutions far exceed the study's terms of reference. We wish therefore to restrict ourselves to two points, which are self-evident but are no less important, relating directly to the integration of immigrants and future immigration trends:
117. It is, firstly, inconceivable that emigration from countries of the "South" to the Community could be on such a scale as to absorb their population growth. The people of the Member States would, in any case, not accept such an influx, either from the political or the economic point of view. Other measures will have to be considered. Secondly, the population growth in the countries of the "South" will inevitably put greater pressure on immigration control in the Member States. There is no doubt that new migrants will enter the Community legally for economic or, more likely, political reasons. Others will be illegal immigrants.
118. Because the Community is prosperous and can look back on a long democratic tradition, immigration will continue and immigrants will have to be integrated. Because the Community is prosperous and democratic, it can call on certain resources, including the requisite solidarity and will to come up with the right response. This will must be based on adherence to collectively held principles and on a wide variety of individual and collective initiatives and attitudes. We have seen encouraging signs of how integration can be achieved; we have also realized the extent of the difficulty in finding a solution to something which brings us up against the problems of our societies. We hope that this report will help the Member States and the Community institutions to pursue and intensify their efforts to bring about the social integration of immigrants.

ANNEX 1

STATISTICAL ANNEX


The statistics used in the Annex do not come from the same source and the resulting tables are not directly comparable; the figures therefore have to be treated with caution.

A significant improvement in the definitions, the data collection methods and the way in which they are published would be highly desirable.

These tables relate only to legally resident immigrants who do not possess the nationality of the country where they live, whereas in our report we extend our considerations beyond the legal concept of citizenship to cover the "ethnic minorities" as they are referred to in some Member States and the second and third generation descendants who possess the nationality of the country where they live.


Consequently noticeable differences may exist between the official data, varying according to source (where they are available,) and other unofficial data which often include immigrants in an irregular situation.

AGE PIRAMID OF EXTRA-EC FOREIGNERS (1988) EUR12




SOURCE: EUROSTAT

AGE PIRAMID OF TOTAL POPULATION (1988) EUR12




SOURCE: EUROSTAT

COMPOSITION OF EXTRA-EC FOREIGN RESIDENTS (1988) EUR12



Source: Eurostat

COMPOSITION OF EXTRA-EC FOREIGN EMPLOYEES (1988) EUR12



Source: Eu. stat

COMPOSITION % OF RESIDENT POPULATION IN THE 12 MEMBER STATES
BY BROAD NATIONALITY BREAKDOWN 1988

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE	NON EC FOREIGNERS %	EC FOREIGNERS %	NATIONALS %	TOTAL %
BELGIUM	3.3	5.4	91.3	100
DENMARK	2.1	0.5	97.3	100
FRG	5.2	2.1	92.7	100
GREECE	1.1	1.1	97.8	100
SPAIN	0.4	0.5	99.1	100
FRANCE	3.8	2.8	93.4	100
ITALY	0.6	0.2	99.3	100
IRELAND	0.5	1.9	97.7	100
LUXEMBOURG	1.9	23.9	74.2	100
NETHERLANDS	3.0	1.1	96.0	100
PORTUGAL	0.7	0.2	99.1	100
UNITED KINGDOM	1.8	1.3	96.9	100
TOTAL	2.5	1.5	96.1	100

Source Demographic Yearbook 1990

NON-NATIONALS OF THE 12 MEMBER STATES (1988) (ABSOLUTE FIGURES)

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE

NATIONALS of:	B	DK	D	GR	E*	'PR**	IRL	I	L**	NL	P	UK*	TOTAL
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES	97726	39427	2570654	31072	23044	290800		42340	3828	192503	1984	120000	3422178
of which:													
YUGOSLAVIA	4865	8799	579073	1675	269	64420		10414	1501	11717	52		682785
TURKEY	78433	24423	1523678	3036	240	123540		1807	147	167325	22	16000	1938651
	162585	5259	136749	15906	18543	1537820		65504	674	149309	40253	95000	2227552
AFRICAN COUNTRIES													
of which:													
ALGERIA	10092	307	5069	177		79520		1341		616	24		813546
MOROCCO	126095	2461	52069	219	11152	431120		17174		130094	47		770431
TURISTIA	5581	224	21628	262		189400		1807		2594	13		221509
TOT MACHREB	141768	2992	78766	658	11152	1416440		20322		133304	84		1805486
OTHER COUNTRIES	61503	64616	505844	61082	98837	229580		209335	2765	53054	26253	804000	2116869
of which:													
USA	11021	4323	79604	21432	15744	17740		17012	694	10400	6055	127000	311025
CANADA	1371	899	7413	1621	1436	4980		2505	85	2536	2095	28000	52941
TOTAL NON EC FOREIGNERS	321814	109302	3213247	108860	140474	2102200	17100	317179	7217	434946	69157	1019000	7860446

Source: demographic statistics 1990
1997

** Census of population (France 1982, Luxembourg 1981)

FOREIGN EMPLOYEES IN THE MEMBER STATES (1988)

NATIONALITY	TOTAL	B*	DK	D*	GR*	E	F*	IRL*	I	L	NL	P	UK
TOTAL FOREIGN EMPLOYEES	4052652	176612	47180	1557114	24946		1130700	19900		64100	176000		820900
of which : TOTAL EC	1772069	129756	13489	483489	6635		569000	16100		60700	85000	9700	398200
TOTAL NON EC	2280583	46856	33691	1073625	18311		561700	3800		3400	91000	25500	422700
of which:													
Turkey	609432	9927	7300	511563	2903		37800			39	33000		6900
Yugoslavia	329614	1697	3590	284161	180		30500			886	5000		3600
Maghreb	409008	20342	841	24361	40		334500			124	24000		4800
of which:													
Algeria	170127	1586	113	1785	12		163100			31	0		3500
Morocco	183856	17223	632	14928	19		126700			54	23000		1300
Tunisia	55025	1533	96	7648	9		44700			39	1000		

* 1987

SOURCE REG 311/76

ANNEX II

List of experts responsible for the report:

- Mr F. Braun, Special Adviser to President J. Delors
- Mr R. Böhning, Head of the Department of International Migration for
Employment (ILO)
- Mr J.A. Fernandez Cordon, Director of the Institute of Demography (Madrid)
- Mr A. Golini, Director of the National Institute of Population Research
(IRP - Rome)
- Mr W. Hyde, former Head of the Home Office Immigration and Nationality
Department (London)
- Mr P.L. Remy, Director of the National Agency for the Improvement of
Working Conditions (ANACT - France)