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## Remarks for Industry Symposium 2004

**Admiral E.P. Giambastiani**  
Portsmouth, Va.  
March 17, 2004



Thank you Barry Creighton for that kind introduction-and to NDIA for co-hosting this event. I want to also recognize [Brig. Gen. Jim Warner](#)-my director of plans and strategy-and to both NDIA and JFCOM team for setting up this 5th Annual Industry Symposium.

There are lots of friends here-and an impressive group of speakers that will offer a wide variety of important perspectives, like:

- Lt. Gen. Bill Wallace- former V Corps commander during Operation Iraqi Freedom
- Lt. Gen. Steve Boutelle-the Army's Chief Information Officer and lead for the Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness initiative.

This event is unique. We are linking operational challenges directly to you-our partners in industry, services, interagencies and multinational members. "Fratricide prevention" was a topic that my component commanders and combat development commands chose to bring to this industry symposium.

This means we need to establish new ways of transferring information-and intellectual capital. Until now, our relationship with the private sector has been essentially limited to formal contracts. In my view, this will not foster the exchange of ideas necessary to resolve the joint warfighting challenges facing us both today and tomorrow. We must engage with the private sector to improve joint force capabilities and allow you in industry to participate in parallel with JFCOM's transformational process.

My J8, [Air Force Brig. Gen. Buck Rogers](#), is the chair of

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the Joint Close Air Support Executive Steering Committee. This group addresses shortfalls and makes recommendations to resolve JCAS challenges.

Capabilities like the [Joint National Training Capability](#) can help assess combat ID systems and processes. We just completed our first JNTC exercise last month-bringing together the services to train in a joint environment at the operational level. We can begin to embed and assess combat ID capabilities in these exercises. We are already planning to do this in Roving Sands 05, a joint exercise.

In my NATO hat as the [Supreme Allied Command Transformation](#), I can also tell you that fratricide prevention is important. Sitting here is Admiral Sir Ian Forbes, the ACT deputy commander and a number of my ACT staff, including the head of my C2 + C2ISR Directorate Maj. Gen. Ruud Van Dam from the Dutch Air Force.

Our efforts in Coalition Combat ID Advanced Concepts Technical Demonstration" or [ACTD](#), is a big success story. We have a working group-comprised of warfighting experts from nine nations-developing the tactics, techniques and procedures for employment of technologies proposed under this Coalition CID ACTD.

So how can we better integrate [industry](#) and JFCOM? How can you parallel our process and participate with us on these initiatives? Brig. Gen. Jim Warner will brief our plan tomorrow afternoon. And as a reward for sticking around, we can all go golfing afterwards!

What I'd like to do now is to step back for a moment and share with you some insights on what we have learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom and, more importantly, on how we are acting on those lessons learned to develop new capabilities both in the United States and, with my hat as Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, in NATO.

"Joint transformation" is something that is still not well understood within the military-both in the United States and in NATO.

To help tell the story on what we mean by "joint transformation," I've brought just three slides. I should make clear that when I use the term "joint operations," I mean the BIG "J" in joint-which refers to a seamless integration of joint forces, interagencies and

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#### Recent Transformation News

[Joint Systems Integration Command Kicks off Joint Intelligence Operations – Command and Control program](#)

Joint Systems Integration Command computer labs are using the newest command and control systems from across the services, all working together to test their interoperability and usefulness to the warfighter as part of the Joint Intelligence Operations – Command and Control program.

- [Listen to the podcast](#)

multinational and coalition partners.

There are three observations we have learned from a U. S. perspective:

1. The U.S. DOES NOT send individual services to conduct major operations but instead deploys its military as a joint and coalition force.
2. The power of a coherently joint force is now greater than the sum of our separate service, interagency and coalition capabilities.
3. "Speed kills"-not just physical speed, but mental speed and situational awareness. It reduces decision and execution cycles, creates opportunities, denies an enemy options and speeds his collapse. You'll hear me come back to this point again and again.

Arriving at these insights-which are now taken almost as an article of faith with our forces overseas-was actually not all that easy. They had to be proven in conflict-and took a significant change in service culture to accept the message that the power of a joint force is far greater than that of any individual service.

## **OIF Joint Lessons Learned**

### **• Capabilities that performed well and need to be sustained**

- Joint Integration and Adaptive Planning
- Joint Force Synergy
- Special Operations and Special Operations-Conventional Integration

### **- Capabilities that need enhancement**

- Urban Operations
- Information Operations
- Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

### **+ Capabilities that fell short of expectations**

- Battle Damage Assessment
- Fratricide Prevention
- Deployment Planning and Execution Reserve Mobilization
- Coalition Information Sharing

This brings me to the [first slide](#).

These are our joint lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom. The insights and observations outlined here-which I will touch on shortly-are listed under three categories, sort of the "Good, the Not-so-Good and the Ugly." You can see "Fratricide Prevention" is one of the "Uglies."

To understand these insights require some context.

When I said earlier that the "joint lesson" wasn't simple to come by-what I was referring to was that we had never before stood up a lessons learned team expressly for the purpose of capturing insights and observations at the joint operational level of war. Our services have long experience in forming teams to capture service-specific lessons from operations, and the services do this exceptionally well.

But during Operation Iraqi Freedom, for the first time, we instituted a [lessons learned team](#) for the express purpose of gathering joint operational insights on a comprehensive scale, in real time, with a mandate to assist in operations and effect change.

Why did we do this? The simple reason is that our commanders realized that the key to harnessing the full power of jointness begins at the operational level of command and control. It is at that level-the level of the combatant commander, the joint task force commander and the air, land and sea component commanders-where the real work for seamlessly integrating service capabilities into a coherently joint and combined force takes place.

We examined how well service and special operations force warfighting systems and methods actually worked together as a coherent joint and combined team, including operations with other U.S. federal agencies and with our coalition partners.

This is why our joint lesson learned team was present in Iraq BEFORE, DURING and AFTER major combat operations. They remain there still. Our team had complete access to every facet of U.S. Central Command's Gen. Tommy Frank's operations and, in turn, they provided Gen. Franks and his staff with real time insights and observations that were actually used to help in their adaptive planning. In other words, because we had a dedicated joint lessons learned team embedded at the operational level they were able to reduce the overall reaction time our forces and assist in the precision of our actions. This ties directly back to the point I made earlier that "speed kills"-it's not just about weapon systems; but also about a persistent situational awareness.

This type of unfettered access and interplay is simply unprecedented and speaks to my earlier comment about how service cultures had changed to accept a new way of conducting business. From my experience in the Navy, the two biggest lies are when the

inspection team comes aboard and the ship's captain says, "welcome aboard," and then the inspection chief says, "we're here to help." This time around, Gen. Franks really welcomed our joint lessons learned team.

Getting back to the [first slide](#), let me touch on the significance of some of these lessons learned. I won't cover all of them just those that will help give you a better sense of why we are focused on Coherently Joint operations.

You can see under the first category of "Capabilities that performed well" that joint integration and adaptive planning tops the list. Joint force commanders today will tell you "it's not the plan, it's the planning." They understand that the ability to plan and adapt to changing circumstances and fleeting opportunities is the difference between success and failure on the modern battlespace. Many leaders of the past understood this-and it remains true today. Tom Franks and his staff practiced this and became masters of adaptive planning.

Essential to the power of adaptive planning and execution is an ability to conduct large scale, vertical and horizontal collaboration. Frankly, the required collaboration is on a scale that dwarfs any existing commercial application or the commercial world's understanding of collaboration. In today's collaborative information environment, every level of command-throughout the entire force and including coalition partners-is electronically linked to the combatant commander's decision-making process. This does not mean that everyone knows what is happening in the battlespace every time-but rather has a clear understanding for changes in commander's intent. They are acutely sensitive to nuances that occur and are highly adaptive to seizing opportunities as they arise or preventing mishaps before they occur.

We are also creating synergies with the closer integration of our special operating and conventional forces. In Desert Storm, for example, we had about 30 operational detachment teams of special forces working separate missions from the conventional force. In OIF, we deployed over 100 operational detachment teams. They were closely wedded to our conventional forces, and in many cases merged the combined capabilities of both ground and air forces.

The net result is that we not only had precision munitions launched from air and ground but also

“precision decision and execution ” to guide the integrated special forces and conventional campaign.

One general observation that seems to summarize this shift, which has been going on since Desert Storm is based on what we have come to see as the competing notions of overwhelming force versus overmatching power.

As an example, in Desert Storm, our military thinking was to field overwhelming forces to ensure victory. Certainly overwhelming forces also meant fielding well-trained and well-equipped forces, which is as important today as it was back then-but the emphasis was on numbers.

What our observations in Operation Iraqi Freedom tell us is that there is another approach to modern warfare-an approach that we like to characterize as the employment of overmatching power.

Under this construct, the emphasis is no longer just on numbers-which remain important-but rather on harnessing all the capabilities that our services bring to the battlespace in a coherently joint way; the point now is on the effectiveness of joint capabilities.

What I am suggesting to you is that advances in technologies, coupled with new operational warfighting concepts that are glued together by a new joint culture, are enabling a new level of coherent military operations that we have never seen or been able to achieve before.

The difference in approach is overmatching power-and it is based on the combined output of new ways of joint warfighting, greater integration of conventional and special operations forces, the use of old and emerging capabilities by new methods-and all integrated through new schemes of joint training.

## Attributes of a Transforming *J*oint Force

### The Operator's approach

Deconflict Service Forces



Stitch Service Seams



Integration of Service Capabilities



Effects-Based, Collaborative & Network Centric





## Supported/Supporting Relationships

This brings me to the [second slide](#)-it depicts some of the key attributes of a transforming joint force: There are three points I want to make here:

First: Joint transformation did not happen over night in the United States. We must not expect that it will happen as quickly or easily in NATO. The U.S. military underwent a painful process of progress through the four phases of "Deconflict-Coordinate-Integrate-Coherently Joint." And there is probably a 5th box after that.

We went from a period when our integration was so poor that in order to avoid killing each other we deconflicted our forces simply by saying "Army you go here; Navy you stay at sea; Air Force fly over there; and Marine Corps you land over there."

We now envision the future from an information age perspective where operations are conducted in a battlespace, not a battlefield. We are eliminating the artificial boundaries that were established to de-conflict service areas of responsibility and are transforming to a seamless battlespace to allow a coherently joint force to create effects throughout the depth of the battlespace-massing of effects when and where we choose versus the massing of personnel and equipment as dictated by geography and boundaries.

Second: We clearly recognize that we have a unique opportunity today-and in the near future-to develop powerful asymmetric capabilities if we can focus on developing the attributes described on the right side of the chart.


But we must first develop an adaptive, dynamic change process.

Third: The desired attributes on the right have application beyond just warfighting. Any organization that hopes to succeed today or in the future-whether military, governmental, commercial or even non-profit-must move to the right side of this chart. Microsoft has invited us to visit with them later this month because they, too, want to be a 4th Block organization.

We also must understand supported and supporting relationships.

At various times you may have to operate across the chart. But at all times-from peace through major combat operations to stability and, as today, peace support operations-you must be able to operate in a real-time collaborative environment and with network centric capabilities to achieve the asymmetric power we began to witness in OIF.

The "Big Question," of course, is how can we develop a process that produces the required capabilities in a comprehensive way?



This brings me to the [last slide](#).

This slide gives you a sense of the continuum of transformation. As you can see, the conditions that we want to establish are at the far right-a continuum of change leading to a condition where our joint and combined forces can conduct coherently joint and combined effects-based operations across the full range of military operations-where the scope, speed and richness of operational knowledge can quickly lead to precision decisions. And where our commanders share and collaborate on near real-time information adaptively to the point of synergy.

In short, we want to create "4th Block" capabilities that will enable us to achieve asymmetric advantages in knowledge, speed, precision, and lethality - advantages we began to glimpse in OIF.

Let me now turn to some of the initiatives we are instituting to move the joint force over to the right-and how ACT is working to establish similar processes and capabilities in NATO for the NRF.

I've listed just five of our initiatives on the bottom of the [slide](#) - again, to give you a sense of how we are connecting the "process and product" of joint transformation.

The first initiative-perhaps the most important-is to establish a common joint context where we can establish a commonly shared understanding of the future joint environment that all the services must operate in-as a coherently joint team.

In establishing this common joint context, we have actively partnered with each of the services to assist them in embedding a joint context in their wargames. We visited all the combatant commanders and service chiefs-and their staffs-to help us focus on producing a list of challenges affecting future joint operations that Joint Forces Command could work on. We took their insights, perspectives and recommendations as a mandate to produce 4th block capabilities. These inputs led to the development of the common joint context that we have embedded into service wargames.

The joint context allows services to examine for themselves how well their future capabilities can operate in a joint environment. This enables service to acquire capabilities that are "born joint." This process is a fundamental shift in the force development paradigm.

In May of 2003, for instance, I [co-hosted](#) with the U.S. Army chief of staff the first Ever joint/Army [wargame- Unified Quest 03](#) -that had an embedded common joint context.

We followed that event up with a similar co-hosted event with the U.S. Navy called [Unified Course 04](#) in October 2003. This year the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. John Jumper and I will co-host the joint/Air Force wargame called Unified Engagement, and then later we're planning a similar event the Marine Corps.

This is just one example of the “process” end of transformation.

On the “product” side, you can see that we have focused our efforts on moving the force to a joint operational training environment-and from a force based on attrition warfare to one that is designed and trained to conduct effect-based operations.

Concurrently, we've expanded our joint experimentation efforts to develop prototypes like the [standing joint force headquarters core element](#), which we are not only instituting within our combatant commands-but will soon incorporate this capability into DoD's senior CAPSTONE course. The SJFHQ capability will allow for the rapid stand up of an operational JTF because it can bring to a service headquarters an established, robust and persistent collaborative information environment.

Our services have done a marvelous job in launching the first wave of training transformation. This is when they established training complexes and ranges like the Navy's Top Gun, the Air Force's Air Warrior and Red Flag or the Army's National Training Center in the Mohave Desert, California.

Now the services are gangbusters in helping JFCOM take us to the next level. In a sense, this new training transformation is producing “born joint training” that seamlessly brings together a combination of live, virtual and constructive capabilities to create a common joint training environment. -without any additive requirements.

On my recent visit to the Army's Joint National Training Center, an Army major participating in the JNTC exercise summed up the value of this new capability best. He had fought with the 3rd Infantry Division in OIF and had participated in many training rotations. When I asked him what he thought was different about the JNTC exercise, he said: “Well, sir-the only time we ever get to play with all the 'toys' is in war. Now we get to play with everything in training.” That, to me, is the way we ought to train.

In summary, you can see that the “way ahead” must be aimed at developing and delivering new 4th Block capabilities.

We're very pleased that you are here-and your

continued participation and robust exchange of information is something that we will need to successfully move our collective organizations to the right.

Thank you again for your attention.

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U.S. Joint Forces Command 1562 Mitscher Ave. Suite 200 Norfolk, Va. 23551-2488 • 757-836-6555/DSN 836-6555