TAX-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1952

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE TAX-EXEMPT
FOUNDATIONS AND COMPARABLE ORGANIZATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The select committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:10 a.m., in
room 1301, New House Office Building, Hon. Aime J. Forand
presiding.

Present: Representatives Forand (presiding), O'Toole, and
Simpson.

Also present: Harold M. Keele, counsel to the committee.

Mr. Forand. The committee will be in order.

Mr. Keele. Will you call your first witness, please?

Mr. Kohlberg, will you take a seat, please?

Mr. Kohlberg, will you state for the record your name and your
place of residence?

STATEMENT OF ALFRED KOHLBERG, DIRECTOR OF THE AMERICAN CHINESE POLICY ASSOCIATION AND OFFICER OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH LEAGUE AGAINST COMMUNISM

Mr. Kohlberg. My name is Alfred Kohlberg. I reside at 84 Del-
wood Road, Bronxville, Westchester County, N.Y.

Mr. Keele. Mr. Kohlberg, you are an officer, a trustee, or member
of a number of nonprofit corporations, are you not?

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keele. Or associations. Will you tell us something of your
membership in those organizations?

Mr. Kohlberg. At the present time I am a director of the American
China Policy Association. I am an officer of the American Jewish
League Against Communism. That may be all the nonprofit ones at
the present time.

In the past I have been a member of others, including the
Institute of Pacific Relations, the American Bureau for Medical Aid
to China, the Foreign Policy Association, and possibly others I don't
recall at the moment.

Mr. Forand. Did I understand you to say you were a member of the
Pacific Institute at one time?

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes; I was a member and also a member of their
finance committee.

Mr. Keele. Are you presently a member of that organization?

Mr. Kohlberg. No; I resigned in 1947 after they voted not to in-
vestigate my charges.
Mr. Keele. Will you tell us something of that incident, namely the making of charges against the IPR, and particularly as that relates to the Rockefeller Foundation?

Mr. Kohlberg. I had been a member of that Institute of Pacific Relations since 1928, but like most businessmen of no greater brain capacity than myself, I seldom read anything they put out, and didn't really know what they were doing, although I was on the finance committee, but I was in China on a mission in 1943, and there discovered some strange things going on, and when I came back, I made it my business over a period of about 6 months in 1944 to read all their publications on China for the past 7 years, and also to read the publications on the same subject in the Communist, a monthly magazine of the Communist Party, and the New Masses, a weekly magazine of the Communist Party, and I discovered a strange similarity of line and a strange shifting of line pro and anti Chiang Kai-shek at certain periods.

I made a study, prepared a study of their material and other Communist material which are published and sent to Mr. Carter, the head of the institute, and copies to the trustees and others that I was acquainted with that were members and included in that, and because of that, the Rockefeller Foundation vice president, Mr. Willetts, got in touch with me or I with him — I have forgotten now which — and I sent him copies of that material, and then called on him by appointment and went further into the matter verbally with him and with a Mr. Evans, apparently his assistant.

A little bit later in the summer of 1945, Mr. Willetts proposed that the institute and I get together and agree on a committee of three impartial persons to hear my charges and evidence, and hear the institute's side, and make a report to the institute and to the Rockefeller Foundation.

Much of our discussion of this was over the telephone as I was spending the month of July 1945 at a resort on the Jersey coast. But some of it was in writing.

I have looked up the parts of it that were in writing, and have them here, and they have helped to refresh my memory as to what occurred. What occurred was that Mr. Willetts and I and apparently the institute to whom he was talking but I was not, agreed on the names of three persons to form this committee, and agreed tentatively on the terms of reference.

Mr. Keele. May I interrupt you a moment, Mr. Kohlberg. Now that was with reference to the charges which you had made directly to the IPR, is that correct?

Mr. Kohlberg. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keele. You had submitted a letter and, as I recall it, some 80 pages of documents consisting primarily of clippings from the publications of the IPR and parallel clippings or cuttings from the New Masses and other Communist papers, is that right?

Mr. Kohlberg. That is correct.

Mr. Keele. And you drew attention of the IPR through your letter to the parallelism both of the line taken and of the shifts made between the Communist publications and the IPR publications. Is that substantially the situation?

Mr. Kohlberg. That is correct.
Mr. Keele. And then in talking with Mr. Willetts it was proposed that three independent persons, that is persons independent of the IPR or of the Rockefeller Foundation, be named to examine into and investigate those charges. Is that the situation?

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes.

Mr. Keele. All right. Now will you go ahead from there?

Mr. Kohlberg. I thought at that time that we had come to an agreement that there would be such a committee. As a matter of fact, I have a memorandum here from Mr. Willetts in which he puts down the terms of reference and the methods of procedure. He says this:

The following statement represents an attempt to set down the points of agreement with respect to an impartial committee of inquiry to hear and examine the charges made by Alfred Kohlberg against the Pacific and American councils of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

This statement covers my tentative understanding of the points of agreement as to the charges, terms of reference, and methods of procedure as reached in conversations with Alfred Kohlberg on the one hand and with Raymond Deneb, of the IPR, on the other.

Joe H. Willetts.

Shall I read you the rest of this, sir?

Mr. Keele. I think you better.

Mr. Kohlberg. The next is headed “Charges”:

Mr. Kohlberg charges an anti-Chungking pro-Communist bias in the IPR’s attitude toward China as evidenced by:

1. Distorted and inaccurate articles on China and the Chinese Government appearing in the publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Mr. Kohlberg charges that this attitude has changed from time to time to correspond with attitudes reflected by articles appearing in Communist publications such as the New Masses, the Communist, and the Daily Worker.

2. Membership of staff writers on China of the Institute of Pacific Relations, both American and Pacific councils, at some time in the last 8 years in Communist or Communist-front organizations or employment by them.

Terms of reference: The committee of inquiry is charged with responsibility for examining the charges of bias in the publications of IPR and rendering an opinion thereon.

Method of procedure: It is agreed by both parties that:

1. The membership of the committee of inquiry shall consist of three persons mutually agreed to by both parties.

2. The inquiry shall embrace both the Pacific and American councils.

3. The committee of inquiry shall be free to determine its own procedure and secure for evidence as it sees fit and to decide also what testimony is relevant.

4. The hearings shall not be public.

5. Each party to the dispute shall within reasonable limits be free to bring such assistants and advisers to the hearings as he may wish. The committee of inquiry shall determine what constitutes reasonable limits.

6. Each party to the dispute binds himself and his organization to keep the proceedings secret, and specifically to give no report of the proceedings to the press.

7. A complete transcript of the proceedings shall be made, and one copy each furnished to Mr. Kohlberg and the IPR. Other copy or copies shall be the property of the committee of inquiry.

8. Each party shall limit its presentation of testimony to 2 days’ time.

9. Mr. Kohlberg agrees to drop his court suit against the IPR and not again to revive it in case the committee of inquiry comes into being and reports.

10. The expenses of the committee of inquiry shall be provided equally by the two parties to the issue.

11. A copy of the report to the committee of inquiry shall go to each member of the American council.

That is the end of that.

Mr. Keele. What is the date of that, Mr. Kohlberg?
Mr. Kohlberg. It doesn't bear a date, but the letters show, I believe, that it was during the month of July. No, I have a covering letter I find dated July 26, 1945.

Mr. Keele. That was some months after you had written to the IPR in November of 1944, was it not?

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keele. And submitted your charges and your documents in support of them; is that correct?

Mr. Kohlberg. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keele. Now mention is made there of a lawsuit. Will you tell us something of that lawsuit?

Mr. Kohlberg. The lawsuit was an action brought by me against the Institute of Pacific Relations to seek to obtain from them the list of my fellow members of the Institute. That suit was not successful. I did not get the names of my fellow members.

Mr. Keele. Now what happened after you received this communication from Mr. Willetts?

Mr. Kohlberg. Within a few days after that—I might say that we had come to what I thought was agreement on the three members of the inquiry committee, but a few days later—either late July or early August, he called me on the telephone and said that Mr. Carter of the institute had asked him to withdraw as a mediator in this matter and to leave it to him, Mr. Carter, who would take it up with me directly and proceed from there.

Mr. Carter did not take it up with me directly, and no further attempts were made to carry out this tentative agreement.

Mr. Keele. Now for what reason if you know did Mr. Willetts evince interest in having these charges investigated?

Mr. Kohlberg. He was interested because the Rockefeller Foundation, almost from the inception of the IPR, had supplied roughly half its budget year after year, and therefore was very much interested in what it was doing.

Mr. Keele. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Willetts other than the discussion you have just told us about over the telephone, his withdrawal as a mediator?

Mr. Kohlberg. No. He seemed very anxious at that point to get out of it, thinking apparently that Mr. Carter would carry on and we would complete this understanding.

I find here a letter to Mr. Willetts from me dated September 11, 1945, which apparently covers that conversation that I remember. It says:

DEAR MR. WILLETTS: I desire to take this occasion to thank you for the time and effort spent in attempting to arrange for an impartial hearing of the charges. I have preferred against the management of the Institute of Pacific Relations. In our future relations with the nations of the Pacific Basin, the Institute should play an important part.

As I understood you over the telephone yesterday, the Institute will take up directly with me the question of a hearing on my charges and have asked you to withdraw from a part in such arrangements. As I understood it, I will hear from the Institute in due course.

Your fairness, impartiality, and patience I hope will bring about a satisfactory investigation which will result in strengthening the Institute as an organ of international good will.

I might add that, of course, my objective at all times has been to clean out the Communists and strengthen the Institute in its work.
Mr. Forand. For my benefit will you clear up who is this Mr. Willetts and what are his connections?
Mr. Kohlberg. Mr. Joseph H. Willetts was vice president of the Rockefeller Foundation.
Mr. Forand. At the time?
Mr. Kohlberg. At the time. I think still is as far as I know.
Mr. Forand. Now the next question I want to clear up, is that document that appeared to be a sort of an agreement upon the operation of this committee—who drew up that document?
Mr. Kohlberg. Mr. Willetts.
Mr. Forand. Mr. Willetts drew it up?
Mr. Kohlberg. Yes. He sent it to me and I understood that he sent a carbon copy to the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Mr. Forand. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Keele. Was any investigation ever made into the charges which you preferred against the IPR, by the IPR itself?
Mr. Kohlberg. Never.
Mr. Keele. What was done, Mr. Kohlberg?
Mr. Kohlberg. Finally by court order in that action I brought for the membership list, it was agreed that they would send out a statement by me to the membership and hold a special meeting, at which a resolution for investigation was introduced by me.
That meeting was held, the resolution was introduced and it was voted down by a very heavy vote, and there was no investigation, and as far as I know, to this day there never has been an investigation by them.
Mr. Keele. That is by the IPR itself?
Mr. Kohlberg. By the IPR itself. I resigned after that meeting.
Mr. Keele. They have been investigated, I believe.
Mr. Kohlberg. Well, they have been investigated by the Internal Security Committee of the Senate.
Mr. Forand. Now all this was brought about as a result of your mission to China that you referred to?
Mr. Kohlberg. No, only my part of it came as a result of that. I had nothing to do with the later investigation.
Mr. Forand. For the benefit of all of us, will you tell us whether this mission was a Government mission, a private mission, or just what it was. Just leaving it in the record as a mission to China may leave that open to question.
Mr. Kohlberg. Yes. Well, at that time I was chairman of the executive committee of the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China, which was dispensing about $2,000,000 a year for medical aid in China during the war, and we heard stories of incompetence and worse, and I went out there to check on the spot. That was the purpose of my mission.
Mr. Keele. What was the nature of that board or group that was doing that? Was it a governmental agency or was it a private agency?
Mr. Kohlberg. No, it was a private agency, and at that time in 1943 it was one of the member agencies of United China Relief.
Mr. Keele. Did you ever have an occasion to discuss with any of the representatives of the Rockefeller Foundation the dropping of these charges against the IPR?
Mr. Keele. Perhaps that is not a correct statement. I will withdraw that question.
Did you ever discuss further with Mr. Willetts or anyone else the investigation of these charges against the IPR after the time that you heard from Mr. Willetts and he said he was withdrawing from it?

Mr. Kohlberg. Well, no, I recall no further discussion, but I find that I wrote him in April 1947 and that he replied to that letter by telephone. I have a notation made at the time I took his telephone message. That was in 1947, and I believe it is the only communication I have had with him since 1945.

Mr. Keele. And did that refer to the IPR matter?

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes.

Mr. Keele. What was the nature of the communication between you at that time?

Mr. Kohlberg. Well, I wrote him about a statement made by the Institute of Pacific Relations, and I quoted that statement, and the statement said:

If Alfred Kohlberg's charges were true, it is difficult to believe that the Rockefeller Foundation would have recently described it as the most important single source of independent studies on the Pacific area and the Far East.

I said:

I am writing to ask whether the quotation from you is correct, and if so, the date of this statement by you and whether they had your permission to use this statement.

There is more to the letter, but that is the important part. Oh, no, I also quoted another statement that the IPR made which read:

If Alfred Kohlberg's charges were true, it is not likely that the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations would have materially increased their annual grants amounting to many thousands of dollars for the support of the Institute this year.

You see, that was in 1947. And he telephoned me on April 23 and said that the quotation from the letter of the Honolulu branch of the institute was from page 180 of the annual report of 1943. You see, they had called it a recent statement in 1947.

Mr. Keele. In other words, the IPR was trying to argue, as I understand by that quotation, that if there were any truth in your charges, the Rockefeller Foundation would not be making grants to it.

Mr. Kohlberg. That was their argument; yes, sir.

Mr. Keele. And Mr. Willetts brought it to your attention that that statement they had taken from a 1926 report?

Mr. Kohlberg. No, 1943.

Mr. Keele. I beg your pardon.

Mr. Kohlberg. 1943 report. And then he went on to say:

The annual grant to the IPR had not been increased as stated by the IPR but in fact was being decreased over the next 5 years.

And that they had arranged with the IPR for such a decrease to take effect in this way: For 3 years at the existing rate, for 2 years at a decreased rate, and then to cease completely, and that the IPR had not asked permission to use the statements which they did use.

Mr. Keele. Did they give any reason for the program of reduced and terminal support for the IPR by the Rockefeller Foundation?

Mr. Kohlberg. Well, trusting my memory, I think he said that they felt that after a considerable length of time institutions of that sort should get along on their own, and that that was their reason.

Mr. Keele. Have you anything else to add to this situation that we have been talking about here with reference to the IPR?
Mr. Kohlberg. Well, I have given you, sir, the copies of the letters, public letters that I sent out in those 2 years from '44 to '47 when the election was held, and all of those were sent to the Rockefeller Foundation by Mr. Willetts, but I want to call attention here to something which was sent out early in 1945 and is among those papers I have given you, but this is the original photostat of it.

This is a list of officers and writers for the Institute of Pacific Relations, and along here is a list of Communist fronts, and down here, where the lines cross, I have an X showing the connections with Communist fronts of each of these officers. And the names on this list are T. A. Bisson, Edward C. Carter, Frederick Vanderbilt Field, and in parentheses after his name I have "Communist Party member."

Y. Y. Hsu, and in parentheses after his name I have "Editor of the New York Chinese-language Communist Daily and leader of the Chinese Communists in the U. S. A."

Philip J. Jaffe, and after his name I have "Communist Party member."

Owen Lattimore, Harriet L. Moore, and after her name I have "Communist Party member." Maxwell S. Stewart, and after his name I have "Communist Party member."

Mr. O'Toole. May I interrupt the witness at that point? I did not hear you say whether or not you had a notation after Mr. Lattimore's name.

Mr. Kohlberg. No notation. I am reading all the notations there are, sir.

Edgar Snow, and then Anna Louise Strong, and after her name I have "Communist Party member."

Now I might say that I do not believe that Owen Lattimore was a member of the Communist Party. I did not believe it then and I do not think so now.

Mr. O'Toole. I do not know. I was merely interested whether you had a notation of any kind. I thought maybe you had overlooked it.

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes. Well, I call attention to this because it was introduced in the Supreme Court of the State of New York in a hearing on my suit for membership list, and the attorney for the institute said that if this was published, he charged it was libelous and said if it was published it would lead to at least a dozen libel actions.

I thereafter did publish it and there were no libel actions brought and a copy of it was sent to Mr. Willetts. I think that covers all I had to do with the Rockefeller Foundation.

Mr. Keele. I take it your efforts in this connection were to draw attention not only to the membership of the IPR but to the Rockefeller Foundation, of your belief that the IPR was becoming an instrumentality of Soviet propaganda?

Mr. Kohlberg. That is correct, and unless it were changed and cleaned, that it would be a factor in leading to disaster in the Pacific. Those were my statements at the time.

Mr. Keele. Now I believe you had some communications with members of the board of trustees of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace with reference to the nomination and intended election of Alger Hiss as president of that organization; is that correct?

Mr. Kohlberg. Well, that is not quite correct, sir.

Mr. Keele. Will you correct it for me and state the facts?
Mr. Kohlberg. Yes, sir. I happened to be slightly acquainted with Mr. John Foster Dulles, and with Maj. Gen. David P. Barrows, who lives in Berkeley, Calif., who is also a trustee of the Carnegie Endowment, and in December 1946 I learned that Mr. Hiss had been elected president of the Carnegie Endowment. At that time I was publishing a magazine called Plain Talk, the editor of which was Isaac Don Levine.

Isaac Don Levine happens to be the man who took Whittaker Chambers to Adolph Berle in September 1939 when Chambers confessed, made that long confession to Adolph Berle, and I knew in general the story of the Chambers’ confession from Levine. In fact, we had discussed the possibility of publishing it in 1946, but having no documentation to support Chambers’ story, we felt it was unsuitable for publication.

But when I saw that Mr. Hiss had been elected president of the Carnegie Endowment, I felt that, knowing what I did, I was under some obligation to warn Mr. Dulles about it. So I wrote him a letter, and the letter is dated December 31, 1946. Shall I read you that letter, sir?

Mr. Keele. We would like you to, please.

Mr. Kohlberg. It is addressed to Mr. John Foster Dulles at his office, 48 Wall Street:

DEAR MR. DULLES: I am informed Mr. Alger Hiss has been appointed the new head of the Carnegie Endowment, and that you are a trustee of same. When in San Francisco on my way to China last October, I had dinner with Gen. and Mrs. David P. Barrows, also a trustee of the endowment. General Barrows at that time had hoped to attend the December meeting, but ill health prevented his coming east. He has written me:

“I have information of the utmost importance which I cannot put in writing but can tell you about in a few minutes’ discussion, and would be pleased to call at your early convenience.”

I am sending copy of this letter to my friend, General Barrows, and hope that you may find time to receive me.

Very sincerely yours.

P. S.—Under separate cover I am mailing you a copy of blueprint for world conquest containing Communist documents which I supplied to you in galley-proof form last summer.

Mr. Keele. Do you have any answer to that letter?

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes. You see, this letter was dated December 31, 1946, and on the first business day of 1947, either the 2d or 3d of January, I have forgotten which, Mr. Dulles called me up and asked me if I could come down to his office, and I went down there in the late afternoon and I asked him who had recommended Mr. Hiss to his board of directors, and he said he had. This rather surprised me and I said:

“But haven’t you ever heard anything about him, Mr. Dulles?”

And he said: “Oh, yes; several people told me he was a sort of fellow traveler, but they had no first-hand proof, and I do not condemn a man without first-hand proof.”

So I said: “I know of first-hand proof. Would you be interested?”

And he said: “I very certainly would.”

I said: “Well, I will have to look into it a little farther and I will contact you again.”

So immediately thereafter I got in touch with Mr. Levine and asked him if it would be possible to get Mr. Chambers, whom I did not know, to go down and talk privately to Mr. Dulles, and he said it
might be possible though he doubted it after all those years, and then he went into great detail about the meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle and what had happened thereafter, and he said, he described Chambers to me in not too complimentary a way as far as his outward impression went, and said:

"Now suppose we could get him to go down and he would tell his story and he has no proof other than his own word, no documents, and then Mr. Dulles spoke to Mr. Hiss as he properly should. Who do you think he would believe?"

Oh, no. He said: "Who would you believe in those circumstances?"

And he described Mr. Hiss, whom I didn't know. Well I said: "I think I would believe Mr. Hiss under those circumstances."

Well, then he said: "Do you think it is any use trying to get Chambers to go down and talk to Mr. Dulles?"

And I said: "No, I don't think so."

So I wrote Mr. Dulles and I see quite a bit of time went by. I wrote him on February 24. I can't recall exactly why so much time went by, unless Mr. Levine or I was out of town in the meantime. It might have been.

Mr. Keele. February 24, 1947.

Mr. Kohlberg. 1947, or it may be he contacted Mr. Chambers. I have forgotten why there was so much delay before I wrote Mr. Dulles, but what I wrote him was this, on February 24:

DEAR Mr. Dulles: With reference to the matter about which I called on you some time ago, I have gone into this quite thoroughly and find that the information, while first-hand, is uncorroborated except I am informed by the files of the FBI.

In view of the fact that these files are not available for reference, I could not and do not believe that you could accept the available evidence uncorroborated as definitive. I am therefore dropping the matter.

Very sincerely yours.

To which Mr. Dulles replied:

Thanks for your letter of February 24.

Sincerely yours.

Mr. O'Toole. At any time in your conversations with Mr. Dulles relative to Mr. Hiss, did Mr. Dulles call to your attention that he had personally recommended Mr. Hiss to the Carnegie Endowment?

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes. That was the first question I asked him, sir, and he answered he was the one who had made the recommendation.

Now, then, later I heard that Mr. Dulles had told Mr. Hiss of my call, but I got it from a source that I could not consider entirely reliable, so I wrote Mr. Dulles, and I think maybe I would like to say at this point that Mr. Dulles is a man I have found to be of the utmost frankness and complete honesty in this whole matter. So I wrote him on May 19, 1947:

DEAR Mr. Dulles: Sometime ago I called on you to tell you that I had learned of a man who claimed to have information about Mr. Alger Hiss. After investigating it further, I wrote you that what this man claimed to know I could not believe and did not think you would believe without corroboration, and so I thought the matter should be considered as idle rumor.

I have since been informed that you told Mr. Hiss of my call and the sum and substance of our conversation. I have no objection to this, as I did not speak to you in confidence, but wondered whether you would care to advise me whether the report that comes to me is correct. I desired to check this only as a means of testing the veracity of the person who has brought me the report.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely.
To which Mr. Dulles answered on May 21, 2 days later:

DEAR MR. KOHLBERG: I have your letter of May 19. I told Mr. Hiss that I thought in all frankness he ought to know that I had heard from two or three quarters that he was inclined to be communistic in his thinking. I am quite positive I never mentioned your name to him or our particular conversation.

Sincerely yours.

This was all that occurred in that year.

Mr. Keele. Mr. Kohlberg, you made reference to having dinner with General Barrows and that had been in the preceding October, I believe.

Mr. Kohlberg. November.

Mr. Keele. That was November of 1946 before Hiss' election as president of the Carnegie Endowment in December of 1946?

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes.

Mr. Keele. Now, did you discuss Hiss with Mr. Barrows or General Barrows?

Mr. Kohlberg. No. He asked me if I knew Alger Hiss, and because I only had the story at second hand, I said I had heard of him, and I didn't really know much about him. But then I didn't know, he didn't tell me he was to be elected president of the Carnegie Endowment you see. I don't know what his interest was. It was only when I got back to New York I learned this, and then saw it as just not an idle question.

Mr. Keele. Did you talk with Mr. Chapin?

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes.

Mr. Keele. In San Francisco at the time of this visit in November of 1946?

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes. Well, that is what I think I told you the other day, but after checking my notes, I think I talked to Mr. Chapin the following year he asked me about it and not at that time, sir.

Mr. Keele. And Chapin was at that time and is, I believe, or was at that time anyway, a trustee of the Carnegie Endowment; was he not?

Mr. Kohlberg. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keele. So that you did not talk to him prior to talking with Mr. Dulles about this?

Mr. Kohlberg. No; I was mistaken in telling you that the other day.

Mr. Simpson. Mr. Kohlberg, do you have any criticism of Mr. Dulles' activities in connection with the Hiss matter?

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes, sir. I would criticize Mr. Dulles, but not Mr. Dulles particularly, but I would criticize the vast majority of the trustees of these large funds, and I have seen other cases.

I bring up these two because these institutions have been here, who delegate most of their duties to the staff.

And while we all realize that they are very busy men, that the affairs of these foundations are very vast in scope, I criticize them for a lack of understanding of the damage that can be done to the country when these institutions get infiltrated or when institutions they are aiding get infiltrated by Communists.

That has been the reaction—the trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations, for example, which has now been found by the Senate committee to be considered an organ of the Communist Party of the United States, by the Communist Party, the majority of those trustees
are men of unquestioned integrity, and although charges were brought
to their attention—what is it? Eight years ago?—they have never
yet investigated it on their own.

In other words, I think they all suffer from the same failing that
most Americans have suffered from, and that is the only extent to
which I would criticize Mr. Dulles in this matter, an unwillingness
to take the trouble to go into the matter.

Mr. Simpson. Well, I gather you read the letters and you agree the
information you had under the circumstances would not persuade you
with respect to Mr. Hiss' undesirability at the time Mr. Dulles recommen-
ded him.

Mr. Kohlberg. No, sir. I was being quite technical in what I said
in that letter. Mr. Dulles, you will recall, told me he had been told
by others that Mr. Hiss was a sort of fellow traveler, as he put it.

As a matter of fact, in my letter, if you will recall, that I read, I
said "uncorroborated except by the FBI." Now, I don't have access
to the FBI, but I think Mr. Dulles might.

Mr. Simpson. Now wait; you think he might have had?

Mr. Kohlberg. I think he might have had. He was a delegate to
the U. N. and he might have had through the State Department.

Mr. Simpson. We have had some testimony that such information
is not available to the public for private purposes, at any rate.

Mr. Kohlberg. It is not available to the public. I might go on
then with the story, because I don't—

Mr. Keele. The story goes on somewhat. Go ahead.

Mr. Forand. Mr. O'Toole has a question.

Mr. O'Toole. Does the witness know of his own knowledge whether
or not Mr. Dulles and Mr. Hiss were ever associated together while
they were both in Government employ?

Mr. Kohlberg. No.

Mr. O'Toole. I am merely asking whether Mr. Dulles had a fair
opportunity to know much about Mr. Hiss.

Mr. Kohlberg. No; I don't know that. But in February 1948—
that is, a little over a year later—Representative Walter Judd called
me up on the phone from Washington and told me he had a letter
from Mr. Dulles which he read to me over the telephone, and the
letter said that he knew that Judd was a friend of mine and told him
the story of my visit and my letter quite correctly, and then asked
Judd if he thought he could find out from me what the first-hand
evidence was to which I referred and which I said that without cor-

Mr. Forand. Mr. O'Toole has a question.

And so I said to Congressman Judd that I was leaving for China
that very evening it so happened, but that I would not tell Mr. Dulles
any more because the story was all in the FBI and I thought he could
get it there, and that it wasn't of my knowledge but merely the story
I had second-hand anyway, but I didn't want to give him the name
of the witness because at that time Chambers was a senior editor of
Time and I didn't want his name spread around.

So, when I got back from China a little over a month later, I saw
Dr. Judd and asked him if he had passed my message to Mr. Dulles,
and he said he had, and he said the matter had so aroused his curiosity
that he had looked into it and he had got the story, and that was in
the month of not later than April 1948, some months before the Hiss-
Chambers confrontation which occurred in August of 1948.
Mr. O'Toole. Would you have drawn an inference from the Judd letter that Mr. Dulles had a suspicion that Mr. Hiss' Americanism might be questioned?

Mr. Kohlberg. Well, I think Mr. Dulles by that time, February 1948, knew that Mr. Hiss had been called before the grand jury about something or other. As a matter of fact, that had been in the papers in New York. He may not have known just what it was.

Mr. O'Toole. Does the witness know the date of Mr. Hiss' resignation, offered resignation, to the Carnegie Endowment?

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes; that was either in August or after August 1948.

Mr. O'Toole. And that was also the time that Mr. Dulles had written to Representative Judd?

Mr. Kohlberg. After the time he had written to Representative Judd. He wrote to Congressman Judd in February 1948.

Mr. O'Toole. There was some question in April in Mr. Dulles' mind as to Hiss' Americanism. Yet in August he refused to accept that resignation.

Mr. Keele. If I may interject, it is my recollection, but it is only a recollection, and we would have to look at the record to verify this, that Hiss tendered a resignation on or about May 9 of that year, 1948.

Mr. O'Toole. What date, Mr. Keele?

Mr. Keele. To my recollection it was May 9.

Mr. O'Toole. But it was still after this Judd letter?

Mr. Keele. That's right. I think the date was May. Again, I say that is just memory from listening to the testimony.

Mr. Forand. Proceed, Mr. Keele.

Mr. Keele. Mr. Kohlberg, you have told us of an instance where there was an abuse, if that is the term for it, of foundation money, or shall we say an abuse of the privilege extended foundations through tax exemption, and I refer to an incident which you told us concerning Columbia University. Will you tell us that situation?

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes. During the war I made a gift of $2,500 to Columbia University with the understanding that it was to be used to bring a Chinese medical officer to the United States; no, to bring the daughter of a Chinese medical officer to the United States.

She had TB of the spine, and this medical officer was without funds, as were most Chinese Government people who were honest, and the money was given to Columbia, and Columbia then turned it over to this fund and paid the expenses of this daughter and, I think, other expenses in connection therewith.

Mr. Keele. All right. Did you disclose to Columbia University or to representatives of Columbia University the purpose of your gift?

Mr. Kohlberg. No, sir. I had nothing to do with Columbia University. The friends of this officer came to me and asked if I would do it. That way I could get tax exemption and help out this man, and I said, "You fix it up and I'll do it," and they fixed it up.

Mr. Keele. In other words, you could not have made the gift, as I understand it, and taken a tax deduction for the gift if you had made it directly to the Chinese officer or his daughter; is that right?

Mr. Kohlberg. That is correct.

Mr. Keele. But, by making the gift to Columbia University, you were able to claim a tax deduction to the extent of that gift; is that correct?
Mr. Kohlberg. That is correct.
Mr. Keele. And it was arranged that that money would be funneled into the hands of the Chinese officer's daughter or the Chinese officer for the use of his daughter?
Mr. Kohlberg. Yes; to the Chinese officer.
Mr. Keele. And it had nothing to do with an educational project or anything of that kind. It was merely a device whereby the daughter was brought to this country for treatment; is that a correct statement of it?
Mr. Kohlberg. That is correct, although I don't know what it may show in Columbia records. The man in question was an outstanding medical officer who had been the head of a department at PUMC, the Rockefeller Foundation Institute in Peking. He was a very unusual man, and it may be that Columbia thought that what was useful in the cause of medicine in general, because of the man being an outstanding, a world-known figure in medicine. So, there may have been the other side. I have told you about it merely because, as far as I knew, that was all there was to it.
Mr. Keele. But the proposal was made to you?
Mr. Kohlberg. Yes.
Mr. Keele. By others, that by this method the girl could be brought to the United States for treatment, and without the gift being a non-deductible gift.
Mr. Kohlberg. That is correct. You see, as I say, I have been connected with several nonprofit corporations. One of those I am now with has tax deduction and one has not.
I think there is something lacking in the law, because the decision is left up to an official in the Treasury. I don't even know what official.
It seems to me that people who know somebody, as happened with one of these, get tax deduction, and the other didn't know anybody and didn't get it. They are very similar, and it seems to me that the qualifications for tax deduction should be written in the law more definitely than they are, and less left to the decision of an individual.
For instance, I have noticed lately that Communist-front organizations that are put on the Attorney General's list have their tax-deduction privilege taken away; but, you see, how did they ever get on there in the first place?
Mr. Keele. Well, how can you avoid the necessity for a decision to be made by someone, Mr. Kohlberg, as to whether or not the tax exemption should be granted?
Mr. Kohlberg. Well, I think that is correct, but I think the law should be more specific and leave less to the official.
I know that something has to be left to the decision of somebody, but I think the law could be tightened up. I have here a lot of clippings from the Washington Star of 1947 of an incident here.
A Mrs. Shura Lewis, the gentleman here may remember, spoke in a high school, Western High School. She was sent by Mrs. Alexander Lewis.
She was a Russian-born wife of a former clerk in our Embassy in Moscow, who was sent around by the IPR as a speaker, and it says here:

Thirty-five Western High School students staged a brief anti-Red strike.
Now, here is a very strange thing. Thirty-five students in the high school realized they were getting Red propaganda from the IPR, and the trustees of the IPR and the trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Foundation and Endowment didn’t recognize it.

Now, I don’t agree that the students are much more intelligent than the distinguished citizens who sit on the boards of these institutions. I think the trouble is that these distinguished citizens don’t know what is being done with the money that they give out, and even high-school students could get it.

You may remember this particular incident. I have the first clipping here, dated May 7, 1947.

Here is another one, dated May 8. Somebody gave the students some kind of award for their service for walking out. I don’t know who it was. I didn’t read the article.

Now, here is a statement in the New York Times of December 29, 1950, which says:

The American Historical Association, opening its annual convention here today—
that is, in Chicago—

was told that the United States has been on the wrong side of the Asian revolution this far. This speaker was Prof. Robert C. North, of Hoover Institute and Library, Stanford University.

Now, that was more than a month after the Chinese Communists had come into the Korean war against us, and this Professor North, whom I know, and who makes this statement that we have been on the wrong side of the Asian revolution that far, was selected to make a survey for the Ford Foundation last year. He and a Mr. Harold R. Isaacs traveled around the United States making this survey, and the Ford Foundation has now announced a gift of, I think, $250,000 to the Council of Learned Societies to carry on the recommendations of these two gentlemen who have this kind of opinion, and I am sure that Mr. Ford and Mr. Hoffman and others would turn over in their graves if they knew all these things, but they don’t know it; that is, those that are in their graves.

These were just chance clippings I found since I talked to you the other day. Here is one of May 3, 1945, in the New York Times, referring to a speech by Mr. Raymond B. Fosdick before the Women’s Action Committee for Victory and Lasting Peace. That was, I think, just before VE-day. It says:

Mr. Raymond Fosdick, president of the Rockefeller Foundation, warned 300 members representing 38 States that the growing distrust of Russia menaced the future of world peace.

Now, I am bringing these names up because these gentlemen are beyond question in their loyalty and patriotism, you see; but somebody has twisted their mental processes.

They paid out millions of dollars for so-called research in foreign policy, and it seems that the result of that research has come back and twisted their mental processes so that Mr. Fosdick warns that “The growing distrust of Russia menaces the future of world peace,” prior to VE-day.

Of course, if we had had just a little distrust of Russia at that time, we might not have turned over eastern Europe and China to them. There was a lack of distrust that was a great menace at the time, but
he was so twisted by what these so-called researchers had put over, not only on the public but on him, that he said that.

And then here is an invitation. It reads:

The officers and trustees of the American Institute of Pacific Relations request the pleasure of your company at a dinner in honor of the new chairman, Mr. Gerard Swope, the 12th of January at 7 o’clock, the Century Room, Commodore Hotel, New York City; Mr. Clayton Lane, chairman. Speaker, the Honorable Dean Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary of State.

This was Thursday, January 12, 1950. That is nearly 6 years after my first study was put out. They still didn’t realize there was anything wrong with the IPR.

Here we can go to Mr. Grayson Kirk, who was a trustee of the IPR and of various others of these and a most distinguished educator. In April 1950, just before the Korean war, a speech in Columbus, Ohio, says [New York Times] :

Urging a moratorium on talk of the inevitability of war with the Soviet, Dr. Grayson Kirk, provost of Columbia University, said here today that such fatalism could well close the avenues to adjustment and agreement.

Well, I think it is probably not useful to go into more of this, except to say that what has happened is that the infiltration of pro-Communists and Communists into the staffs, both of the foundations to some extent and the institutions that have subsidized, has completely twisted the mental processes of the country so that we have come from unconditional victory to near disaster in a very brief period.

I think it is probably not useful to go into any other that I have here. That is my opinion, sir.

And that continues right down to the present date. Yesterday I spoke in New York to the American Asiatic Association, which, I think, is possibly the oldest of the Far East organizations. It was organized in 1898, and I told of the infiltration into the Institute of Pacific Relations, into the Foreign Policy Association, which is less infiltrated, of course, and into the Council of Foreign Relations, which is very little infiltrated but is infiltrated.

And there were present there trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations, of the Council on Foreign Relations, and they were completely unbelieving, which was what I expected; and, when I urged them to do their own investigating and not wait 1, 2, 3, or 4 years until Congress got around to it, they didn’t think that made sense either.

They didn’t think it was necessary to investigate, because there were such nice and such good Americans on their boards, and they didn’t believe that the Institute of Pacific Relations, one of them said, had been infiltrated, the Senate committee to the contrary notwithstanding.

Mr. Keele. And they gave as their reasons their confidence in the trustees; is that right?

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes; in their fellow trustees and in the kind of people who came and spoke at their meetings, and they mentioned the kind of people who spoke there and that none of them had come to speak at their meetings, or did in the past.

Mr. Keele. Did they say whether or not they had examined the evidence submitted to the McCarran committee?

Mr. Kohlberg. I didn’t ask them, but nobody said they had. But I had a reprint there which I gave out of the conclusions of the McCarran committee. They took copies of that. I doubt that any of
them had ever seen any of it. They had probably seen something in
the papers about it, but I doubt that they had ever seen any of the
documents.

Mr. Keele. Have you seen other instances which in your opinion
indicated a diversion of funds of foundations, either through their
own grants or through grants made by operating agencies through
which they give the grants, a diversion of those funds into Communist-
front organizations or organizations which were interested in present-
ing favorably the Communist line of thinking?

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes. I have seen some of that. I couldn’t say how
extensive it is because I haven’t made a study of that, but there are
numerous instances of it in this Institute of Pacific Relations report—
not the report but the volumes of testimony.

I have run across them again and again in those volumes. That is
14 volumes, and really somebody has to retire to sit down to read them,
but there is a mass of material in there.

Mr. Keele. What about organizations such as the American Coun-
cil of Learned Societies, the Social Science Research Council, or
organizations such as those organizations, Mr. Kohlberg, which we
call here operating agencies to whom grants are made by the great
foundations, and then who in turn allocate the funds to various pro-
jects or individuals?

Mr. Kohlberg. Well, those two that you mentioned—the American
Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Coun-
cil—are constantly turning up as the givers of subsidies or fellowships
to people who are appearing in the news.

I noticed this morning’s paper mentions one of the first grants to
Mr. Owen Lattimore back somewhere in the 1930’s was in the Social
Science Research Council to make some study of Mongolians or Man-
churians; I have forgotten which. I read that in the Washington
Post this morning coming down.

That occurs again and again. As I say, it runs all through these
McCarran hearings, but I am not well enough informed to be able
to say how widespread it is.

I did notice, on the letterhead of a publication of the Council of
Learned Societies which I received some time ago, there were about 12
names of the committee on publications, and I recognized more than
half of them as well-known leftists. I couldn’t say “Communists”
because I don’t have that inside information.

I might say that when I was in Formosa in 1949 Chiang Kai-shek
explained to me at some length through the interpreter that commu-
nism had made very little inroads with the Chinese peasant or the
Chinese workers. He said the great inroads out here were made with
the Chinese intellectuals.

So, I told him of course I knew that, having been out there a lot,
and then I told him that the same thing was true in America; that
the Communist infiltration was in intellectual circles, and that even in
labor-union circles, where there was some, it was very largely at the
level of the staffs who might be considered the intellectual leaders of
the movement.

He was very surprised to learn that; but, because that is so, these
various organizations that have to take staffs of people who are in-
tellectuals are always in danger of infiltration. And then when they
shut their eyes to it, as most of them do, they make it that much easier for our enemies to infiltrate them.

Mr. Keele. Mr. Kohlberg, you have some views I think on foundations, such things as the amount that could be left to them by will percentagewise, the question of perpetuity, and other questions relative to foundations. I wonder if you would give the committee the benefit of your views on those matters.

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes, sir. It would be my opinion that it would be of advantage to limit the gift by will to not more than 20 percent, which is the amount that can be given in any one year out of income, and that amounts given during lifetime I think are limited to 20 percent of annual income.

And I do not believe any foundation should be set up in perpetuity. Money cannot be left by will to a family that way. I am not certain, but I believe it can be left in trust only to two lives in being and then to go to the heirs of those outright.

And I think limitations should be put on it. I know there are cases—maybe they are the exception—where foundations have a lot of money, one of them of course in New York being the well-known Sailors’ Snug Harbor, where I think they could only find about seven retired sailing-ship masters to benefit from it. They have a staff—I don’t know how many; 30 or 40 I think—to take care of the investments, and they can’t change it because the courts won’t permit them.

I think, of the whole theory of funds left for foundations for good work, that the good work should go on, but the restrictions should be tightened and the period of their existence cut down, and the amount that could be left to them limited, because in some of these today I have noticed it is hard to tell whether the foundation is set up by the man who passes away in order to do good or to save taxes—it is pretty hard to tell—and still retain control of whatever business it might be, or avoid its being sacrificed on the auction block.

I think that the laws should be gone over and the whole control of these organizations tightened up.

Mr. Keele. Mr. Kohlberg, it has been suggested here by Mr. Alfred Sloan that after the next 15 years, shall we say, under existing tax structures, there will be no further number, to any appreciable extent anyway, of foundations set up by large private fortunes, and that there will be no further tendencies of course—I am speaking only of that, but there may be exceptions—there will be no great fortunes such as have been accumulated in the past when the tax structure was different.

Now, then, if there is not to be perpetuity in these foundations, and if Mr. Sloan is correct, and that after a few years there will be no more great foundations, where is the money going to come from for carrying on the work that the foundations do, if they are limited in perpetuity?

Mr. Kohlberg. Well, Mr. Sloan knows more about that than I do, but I could point to a few places where the money would come from. No. 1 would be from oil where there is special tax exemptions that permit the building of vast fortunes, which Mr. Sloan may have overlooked.

Mr. Forand. Are you referring to the depreciation allowance?

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes.
Mr. SIMPSON. I don't like to interrupt, but do you mean that the oilmen could be expected to create foundations, or do you mean that Government should take the money in taxes?

Mr. KOHLBERG. No; I don't know anything about taxes. I mean that large fortunes can still be accumulated in certain ways and fields, one being oil.

Another field is this: As you may know, Mr. Keele, a great deal of business today, especially the sale of real estate and of businesses, is done on the basis of a tax study first and the business deal afterward, so that a great many of these deals are done in the form of capital gain, and thereby large fortunes can still be accumulated, in spite of the very high income-tax rate.

Now, Mr. Sloan may be more correct than I, but I would think that there will still be large fortunes, and I think that Americans who have that ability to accumulate them will still find ways to do it and are still doing it in fact.

I do not think that would be a good reason, the expectation of that happening in 15 years would be a good reason, for doing nothing to tighten up the regulations that cover these foundations.

Mr. KEELE. Do you favor the foundation idea, Mr. Kohlberg, as such now? I am talking about the idea of large foundations dedicated to philanthropic educational work.

Mr. KOHLBERG. I think they have done a vast amount of good. I have seen it all over the world as well as here. I have seen it particularly in China, but elsewise also. The work of the Rockefeller Foundation in China is simply tremendous and fine.

I am not talking against the foundations. I think they have done a wonderful work. I think there have been some fringe evils that have come in somehow or other and which could be corrected.

Mr. KEELE. And I take it you think that that lies primarily in the field of infiltration of staffs rather than of trustees of foundations?

Mr. KOHLBERG. Oh, yes. It is very largely at the staff level, maybe entirely, but the trustees—really you can't get around on these boards very much without seeing it—the trustees are very busy men. Some of them are trustees of several institutions, and, while a great many of them may try to have a complete and over-all knowledge of what is going on, they can't be aware of the details.

The staffs do that work, and the decisions and recommendations come from there, and in most cases are adopted by the board.

Mr. KEELE. Now, you made the point that you didn't feel that a testamentary gift to a foundation should be more than 20 percent of the estate, the same basis for instance as annual-income deductions?

Mr. KOHLBERG. Yes.

Mr. KEELE. Does it follow, from that, that you feel that there should be some limitation on the size of any one foundation?

Mr. KOHLBERG. I haven't thought about that, but I see no reason to limit the size. I think, if you limited the percentage, that would very largely take care of itself.

Mr. KEELE. Yes; but I was wondering the basis for your suggestion that it be limited to 20 percent, whether that was taxwise you were thinking of it or to limit the size of foundations.

Mr. KOHLBERG. No; I was thinking of it mostly from a tax angle, that the large fortunes, as long as everybody else by inheritance has to leave a certain amount to the Government, the tax amount, I think
the large fortunes or the smaller ones should not escape part of it by this means, as some of them have been doing.

Mr. Keele. In other words, that on the long view of it, you feel that it is better that the taxing authorities, that is the Government, get its proportionate share than that a foundation be set up by tax-exempt fund more than to the extent of 20 percent?

Mr. Kohlberg. I am not a great enthusiast for the tax authorities, sir, but I think it should be fair, and I don't think it has worked out fairly this way, and I do think there should be a limit, and there should be a limit in time even more.

No trust should be permitted to be set up in perpetuity, I think. I know this. I know about one now that is in process. It is, I think, quite a large one. I don't know the amount, but set up by a man who was nationally known, a foundation set up. I don't know whether there were tax reasons or not.

They are having a great deal of difficulty with board of trustees because the tax authorities are trying to suggest to them who should go on the board of trustees. I think that is an evil if it is true.

Mr. Keele. How would the taxing authorities have anything to indicate to organizations such as that who should or should not be on the board?

Mr. Kohlberg. This I am testifying to as hearsay from one of the trustees. The tax authorities tell them they can't have so many men from the immediate family, and there must be more people who represent the public, and they have made suggestions. That is the story I get.

Mr. Simpson. Mr. Kohlberg, do you have any information regarding influence that Government may have ever had on foundations for the disposition of their money?

Mr. Kohlberg. No; I have no knowledge of that, sir.

Mr. Keele. I have no further questions.

Mr. Simpson. I am interested in that suggestion taxwise. Of course we start by knowing that the foundations can't exist and do the amount of work they do now, unless there is a tax preference given.

Mr. Kohlberg. That is correct.

Mr. Simpson. I gather from your testimony that you say there is an area where we need foundations, and I assume you reached that conclusion in the way I have, that foundations do work in areas where Government can't do it, and consequently instead of taking the money in taxes, Government lets, in the final analysis, the trustees disburse that money and go into these fields which are termed "hazardous" and "risk areas."

Now if we limit the creation of foundations, we will leave that area with no group to operate in. When you talk about limiting the present tax concessions, it seems to me you are cutting down on the foundation idea.

Mr. Kohlberg. Well, I believe, sir, that some of these foundations have so much money that they have a devil of a time getting rid of it each year. No. 1.

And No. 2, there is one field that I think they shouldn't be allowed to touch, and that is the field of governmental policy, domestic or foreign.

Now, let's take an authorization like the Council on Foreign Relation, made up of outstanding citizens. They have large funds from
certain of the foundations running into millions of dollars over a long period of years.

I think that if the men who belonged to that had put up their own money to make what studies they made or write what histories they wrote, they would have been much more careful about them.

And I further feel, from having read some of their material, that they have been infiltrated at the staff level. I spoke of that to one of the trustees of the council yesterday at that luncheon I told you about.

I called his attention to a particular document. They publish a book each year called American Foreign Policy, 1948, another one in 1950, running six or eight hundred pages, and I called his attention to a statement particularly in the 1950 book in which it said—and I remembered this because it concerned me—it said in there that McCarthyism and the China lobby were one of the prime causes that brought the Chinese Communists into the Korean war late in 1950, and I asked this gentleman where he could find evidence for that, objective evidence or scholarly evidence for that statement in their book, other than in the Daily Worker, so his answer to me was, “Well, nobody read that book anyway.”

Which is true of the trustees, I believe, but students in colleges, the book goes all over, it is subsidized by either Carnegie or Rockefeller, I’ve forgotten which, and it is sent all over the country, and it is in libraries, and my grandchildren will probably read that same day.

I don’t think they belong in that field at all. I think that is no field for foundations. I think the men who want to make the studies, like me or anybody else, can put up their own money and do their own study and probably come out with better results.

Mr. Simpson. You would limit by law the areas into which foundations—

Mr. Kohlberg. I would scratch off some of these fringe areas where most of the difficulties have turned up.

Mr. Simpson. Such as anything affecting foreign countries?

Mr. Kohlberg. No; I would say any studies of governmental policy. I think our Government is founded on the basis that the average American is sufficiently intelligent to make his own decisions. We do it every 4 years. And I don’t think that tax-exempt money should get into that field at all. It has been misused.

Mr. Simpson. What about areas where the foundation seeks to influence Government policy?

Mr. Kohlberg. That is still worse. Certainly, they should be scratched out of that.

Mr. Simpson. Well, being specific with respect to money from the foundations being spent abroad to rehabilitate the peoples and to make friends, would you call that influencing the public, Government policy?

Mr. Kohlberg. Well, no; not necessarily.

Mr. Simpson. Would you permit that?

Mr. Kohlberg. If it was relief work, certainly.

Mr. Simpson. If it was educational work, would you permit that?

Mr. Kohlberg. If it was truly educational work, yes; given to educational institutions.

Mr. Simpson. If it is done, for example, by the foundation itself, in Mexico, for instance?
Mr. Kohlberg. I don't know enough about that to know. Where they do it directly, I don't know of those cases.

Mr. Simpson. What about the creation of hospitals and so on in other countries?

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes.

Mr. Simpson. Certainly that is to influence the public.

Mr. Kohlberg. No. If it is properly done, it isn't done for that reason.

Mr. Simpson. Well, it has the effect certainly of making we hope a friendly feeling between this country and the other countries.

Mr. Kohlberg. I think it would have that effect, although it is not a very important factor in the work.

Mr. Simpson. I am trying to suggest it is awfully hard to legislatively lay a line wherein you wouldn't let a foundation operate.

Mr. Kohlberg. I would simply say I think you could provide that none of the moneys of these foundations be given for studies or investigations or support of organizations that are investigating or studying governmental policy. I think they don't belong in that field.

Mr. Simpson. Mr. Kohlberg, I am sorry I was delayed when you started and you might have it in the record now, but would you tell me what is your business, your occupation or profession?

Mr. Kohlberg. Well, I was an importer of Chinese and Japanese textiles beginning in 1915. I actually retired from business in 1943.

I haven't been active in business since then, though I still have an interest in the business. I haven't been on the payroll, because the business is now in the process of slow liquidation due to the fact that we have done no business with China since 1930, and our business with Japan is not very active.

Mr. Simpson. But you were an importer.

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes; I was an importer all those years from 1915 on.

Mr. Simpson. Largely from the Far East?

Mr. Kohlberg. Entirely.

Mr. Keele. Mr. Kohlberg also, Mr. Simpson, told something of his interest in nonprofit corporations. I think you might just, for Mr. Simpson's benefit, repeat your other interests.

Mr. Simpson. If it is in the record that won't be necessary.

Mr. Keele. All right, it is in the record.

Mr. Forand. Mr. Kohlberg, you aroused another thought in me a few moments ago when you referred to that book having a passage relative to McCarthyism and the China lobby.

Now I have heard it said numerous times, in fact I have read it in the papers, where reference was made to you as being the China lobby. Do you have anything to say on that?

Mr. Kohlberg. Well, that is what I said. I said because it referred to me, called it the China lobby, but the China lobby has been identified by various people.

Mr. Forand. The point I am making is that you were referred to as the China lobby.

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes. Not in that book.

Mr. Forand. No; but I have heard it said, and that is what aroused the thought in my mind.

Mr. Kohlberg. I go around now saying I am the China lobby, to avoid arguing about the matter, although of course I am not registered as a lobbyist or a foreign agent, never have been, and never have
had any connection with the Government of China, but I now say I am the China lobby, and I am beginning to take a certain amount of pride in it, sir.

Mr. Forand. Thank you.

Mr. Keele. Mr. Kohlberg, you were talking about the American Council of Foreign Relations. Do you know how that happened to be established or came to be established?

Mr. Kohlberg. No; I don't. I know a little bit about it.

I was invited to join it about 6 years ago, but at that time Owen Lattimore was its chairman of the Far East committee, and the friend who asked me to join I thanked but told him I had enough controversy in my life, and I didn’t want to go down there hunting for more, so I didn’t join it.

Mr. Keele. The reason I asked that, I have been told during this investigation by someone whom I consider to be well-informed on the subject—and I do not know whether it was here at the witness chair or in conference—that the Council on Foreign Relations was formed at the instance of the State Department.

Mr. Kohlberg. I don’t know that, sir.

Mr. Keele. And that the reason that they wanted the Council of Foreign Relations formed was to afford a forum for discussion of foreign issues which the State Department did not properly feel it could enter into.

Mr. Kohlberg. Yes.

Mr. Keele. And that they felt that that was an adjunct in a way, I suppose, of Government function.

In other words, the promulgating of ideas relative to foreign policy, so that it would receive some discussion, and yet the State Department could not be charged with having a part in it. Whether that is correct or not I don’t know. I thought you might have heard it, but if that is the case, then actually that organization came into being at the behest of Government.

Mr. Kohlberg. I don’t know that, but I know that is the way it operates. But whether it started that way or not I don’t know.

Mr. Keele. I have no further questions.

Mr. Forand. That is all the committee wants to ask of you. We thank you, Mr. Kohlberg, for your contribution to the committee.

Mr. Kohlberg. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. Forand. We will recess until 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., a recess was taken until 1:30 p.m., the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 1:50 p.m.)

Present: Representatives Forand (presiding), O'Toole, and Simpson.

Mr. Forand. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Keele. I would like the record to show that by resolution of the majority of the committee the chairman was authorized to designate a subcommittee and that, pursuant to that resolution, the chairman has authorized a subcommittee consisting of Mr. Forand, Mr. O'Toole, Mr. Simpson, with Mr. Forand acting as chairman.

We would like now to hear Mr. Bogolepov, please.
Mr. Forand. Mr. Keele, will you offer the resolution, the two documents, for printing in the record?

Mr. Keele. That is right; we will submit those, and they will be included.

(The documents referred to follow:)

**Resolution**

The committee to whom was referred House Resolution 561 to provide for a "full and complete investigation and study of educational and philanthropic foundations and other comparable organizations which are exempt from Federal income taxation to determine which such foundations and organizations are using their resources for purposes other than the purposes for which they were established, and especially to determine which such foundations and organizations are using their resources for un-American and subversive activities or for purposes not in the interest or tradition of the United States," does hereby resolve:

That the chairman is authorized to appoint such subcommittee as he shall deem necessary from time to time for the conduct of the committee hearings.

E. E. Cox.
Aime J. Forand.
Donald L. O'Toole.
Richard M. Simpson.

Date: December 17, 1932.

Being duly authorized by resolution of the committee, dated December 17, 1932, I, Eugene E. Cox, do hereby appoint the following members of the committee to sit as a subcommittee for the conduct of committee business on call:

Alme J. Forand.
Donald L. O'Toole.
Richard M. Simpson.

Mr. Forand is designated chairman.

Date: December 17, 1932.

Mr. Keele. Mr. Bogolepov, will you stand and be sworn, first, with the Bible. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Bogolepov. I do.

**Testimony of Igor Bogolepov**

Mr. Keele. Mr. Bogolepov, will you state your name for the record and the spelling of it, please, for the reporter.

Mr. Bogolepov. My first name is Igor, I-g-o-r, and my last name is Bogolepov, B-o-g-o-l-e-p-o-v.

Mr. Keele. How long have you been in this country, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. Bogolepov. Since last April.

Mr. Keele. Where were you born?

Mr. Bogolepov. I was born in Siberia in 1904.

Mr. Keele. Did you ever hold any office under the Soviet Government or with the Soviet Government?

Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, I did.

Mr. Keele. What was the office or offices, and during what period of time?

Mr. Bogolepov. Well, after graduation from the University of Petrograd in 1923, I served the Soviet Foreign Office, in the Soviet
Foreign Office, and I was with this organization, with some interruption for the Red army missions inside and outside, until 1941.

Mr. Keele. Do I understand from that that you joined the Foreign Office after your graduation?

Mr. Bogolepov. That is right.

Mr. Keele. From the university in 1923, and you were with the Foreign Office, with periods of interruption for service in the Army, until 1941; is that right?

Mr. Bogolepov. That is right, yes.

In 1941 I was sent to the Baltic countries, which were annexed by the Soviet Union at that time, and I became a member of the Soviet Government for annexed Baltic countries, and in this, my capacity, I stayed until the beginning of war with Germany, I mean until summer of 1941.

When the war against the Germans started—when the war started in summer of 1941, I joined again the Red army, and in 1942, together with other Soviet officers and generals, we escaped through the front lines to the Germans in order to organize the overthrow of the Soviet Government with the help of the Germans, which proved to be a false expectation.

Mr. Keele. Will you raise your voice just a little bit, and speak a little louder, please.

Mr. Bogolepov. All right.

Mr. Keele. All right.

Now, what rank did you have in the Soviet army or Russian Army at that time?

Mr. Bogolepov. I was colonel of General Staff.

Mr. Keele. And had you done other periods of duty with the army before the period of 1941?

Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, several times.

Mr. Keele. What had you done on those occasions; what had been your—

Mr. Bogolepov. For example, in 1937 I was sent, together with other officers and generals of the regular Red army to Spain to help the Spanish Loyalists fight against Franco.

Mr. Keele. You entered the army, I believe, as a subordinate. With what rank did you enter the army?

Mr. Bogolepov. Entered the army?

Mr. Keele. When you first went in or were drafted, as it may have been?

Mr. Bogolepov. Oh, yes; I was a noncommissioned officer, first.

Mr. Keele. And you gradually worked up to a colonel?

Mr. Bogolepov. That is right, sir.

Mr. Keele. All right.

You surrendered with a major part of an army, did you not, that went over to the Germans during the war?

Mr. Bogolepov. That is right.

Mr. Keele. Then what did you do?

Mr. Bogolepov. Then, after spending some time in Gestapo jail, when I was under investigation, I was assigned to carry out the radio propaganda in Russian against the Soviet Union. The Germans gave me a radio station at my disposal, and for about 1 year I was doing propaganda business until the time when I was obliged to break
with the Germans because of their policy which, as I discovered, was not anti-Bolshevik, but anti-Russian.

Since 1943 to the end of the war I was living as a private person in Germany, just doing my living by working at the German farm until the Americans came in.

Mr. Keele. Then what happened after that? Just tell us by steps how you finally came to America.

Mr. Bogolepov. Because of the Yalta agreement, which required that every Russian Communist or anti-Communist alike, who was in Western Europe should be returned back, I had to go in hiding from the Americans, and I got out of my hiding only in 1947. Then I told to the authorities of the army of occupation in Germany, the American army of occupation, my story, and so I start my employment with the United States Intelligence in Germany, until the time when in last April of 1951 I was summoned to come to this country under the subpoena of the United States Senate.

Mr. Keele. You testified at some length before the McCarran committee, did you not?

Mr. Bogolepov. That is right, sir.

Mr. Keele. All right.

What degrees, if any, do you have from Russian universities?

Mr. Bogolepov. In 1937 I got a degree of doctor of philosophy.

Mr. Keele. From what university?

Mr. Bogolepov. From Academy of Science of Soviet Union.

Mr. Keele. What was your work in the Soviet Foreign Office?

Mr. Bogolepov. In the Foreign Office I was mostly concerned with legal matters, international law, League of Nations, disarmament, security, and the last positions before my transfer to the Baltic was the counselor of the Foreign Office.

We have had two counselors, one for political affairs, and the second for legal affairs. I was for legal affairs.

Mr. Keele. Will you just tell us a bit more about that. As a counselor, what were your duties, and what rank did that place you within the Foreign Office, and who were your superiors at that time?

Mr. Bogolepov. Well, my superior was the Foreign Minister. I was directly under him, and if you take, as a foreign minister or commissar, as he was called at that time, he has deputies, which were four in all. I held the fifth position in the Foreign Office.

Mr. Keele. Who was the Commissar for Foreign Affairs at that time?

Mr. Bogolepov. I worked first under Litvinov, then under Molotov for a while.

Mr. Keele. Under Litvinov and under Molotov?

Mr. Bogolepov. That is right.

Mr. Keele. Now, aside from your work in the Foreign Office, you were at Geneva, Switzerland, from time to time, were you not?

Mr. Bogolepov. That is right.

Mr. Keele. On what missions were you there, on what work?

Mr. Bogolepov. I attended international conferences connected with disarmament, and economic and social problems, and for a while I have been working inside the League of Nations as a delegate from the Soviet Union, in the same way as some Soviet Russians are working now in United Nations in New York.
Mr. Keele. When did you first become aware, Mr. Bogolepow, of the American foundations, such as the Rockefeller and Carnegie groups? When did you first learn of them or hear of them?

Mr. Bogolepow. I can't give you a precise date, of course. It was approximately in the end of 1920 when, in the library of our Foreign Office, I got the publications of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace relating to the investigation of the origin of World War I. There were many volumes, which I studied with interest, and such was the first time I heard the name of Carnegie Endowment.

After this, while in Geneva, and in Moscow also, I read a lot of other publications which were published directly by this organization or through its assistance with other American universities and scientific societies. But this was to say a more scientific interest of mine, and only later in approximately 1935, 1936, I became informed about the existence of these foundations ex officio.

Starting with this time, in correspondence with the Soviet Embassy in Washington, which I read in my capacity as counselor, and Vice Deputy Director of League of Nations Division of the Foreign Office in Moscow, more than often I saw mentioned the name of Carnegie Endowment, and Rockefeller Foundation, in the reports, as I said, of our Embassy in Washington.

Mr. Keele. Do you recall in what connection the Carnegie and Rockefeller organizations were mentioned in those dispatches?

Mr. Bogolepow. I have to explain that one of the operations of the Soviet Foreign Office in the middle of 1930 became the organization of infiltration into the western public life in all strata of the western public opinion in order to influence this opinion in the way favorable for the Soviet Union and its aims.

We started this operation in the middle of 1930 in connection with a speech which Stalin called in one secret session of the Communist organizations, Russian and foreign, in Moscow, which was never published, and in this speech Stalin revised one of the most basic conceptions of Marxism.

As you, of course, know, Karl Marx preached that the words “Communist revolution” would be made by the hands of the workers of the western countries. It proved to be completely false, and so Stalin told the ranking Communists—among these Communists were the whole Soviet diplomats who were summoned to come to Moscow for this conference—that “We have to revise the wrong conception of Marx,” and briefly he recommended this way of thinking: that the revolution in the Western Europe, in the Western World, can be made evidently not with the hands of proletarians, who proved to be rather indifferent to the Communist conception and ideas, but through the brains of western intellectuals who, as we discovered, were very much sympathetic with the Communist ideas, and with the whole construction and conception of socialism in the Soviet Union.

This revision, practical revision, of Marxism didn't mean, of course, that Stalin called to cast away the Marxist idea of the Communist conquest of the whole world. It was only an indication that the Communists have to use now another way for achieving their aims, another kind of people; and if I can use an example of our times and connected with this country, as you remember several days ago only—it was during the investigation of one of the numerous crimes in New
York, connected with this business of—I have forgotten the proper name—I mean the investigation of crime with the discharge of the ships coming to New York, the water front—that is right—

Mr. Keele. The water front?

Mr. Bogolepow. The water-front investigation—I mean the incident when the Soviet ship came with furs to unload in this country, there were American workers who wanted not to unload this ship, and it was the American bourgeoisie and capitalists—whatever the name would be—which behind the backs of the American workers in a legal way, still helped the Soviets to discharge this cargo in furs in this country. It is a good illustration as to the correctness of what Stalin had observed, and it is a good illustration that the Soviet tactics of emphasis not on the workers but on the intellectuals had given its roots.

After this indication, after this declaration of Stalin, the whole operation in the Foreign Office of the Comintern in this field, was leaning over the infiltration of the western brains rather than inside of the western workers.

In connection with this speech, there are a lot of special indications and directives down to the various branches of the Soviet Foreign Office, and the man who became later ambassador in this country, Soviet Ambassador to this country, Oumansky, he was put in charge of the preparation of the operation infiltration as a good worker.

First, we started with the foreign correspondents in Moscow, the correspondents of foreign newspapers in Moscow, including the Americans, which were used as a media, a channel for cabling to the Western World, to their magazines and papers and other organizations, the awareness of the facts and events which were favorable to Soviet policy, and corresponded with the special aims and interests of the Soviet Union.

Then, after this first essay became successful, the operation was widened, was enlarged, and when Oumansky came to this country as Soviet Ambassador he was put in charge of infiltration of American newspaper publishing housing, scientific organizations, and the administration with the people who were favorable to the Soviet Union.

So, started this big operation which results we still see every day until now.

While reading reports of the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet Ambassador from Washington, more than once I met the name of Carnegie Endowment and of Rockefeller Foundation, and this is my answer to your question when I first met this knowledge ex officio.

Mr. Keele. Do you recall in what connection or in what meaning the names of the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations were mentioned?

Mr. Bogolepow. Each Soviet Ambassador abroad is supposed to send the reports, regular reports, to the Foreign Office, and monthly reports, quarterly and yearly reports about his activities, and I read about this foundation, these foundations, mostly in the report of Soviet Ambassador in Washington, when he said what kind of people he or his officials met from these foundations in this period of time, what kind of assignment they gave to these people or through other people to these foundations or to these foundations through American universities or publishing houses, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. He gave the names of the people whom he met, and the people whom his agents met, and unfortunately I can't give you any name because I
didn’t pay any attention to his name, and it was such a big amount of names that really I became confused. I just registered in my memory the fact that with every year the number of mentions of these foundations became more and more numerous, and the people involved in this machination of the Soviet Embassy in this country became also greater and greater. It was an impression that Oumansky started just with a small snowball, and this snowball within a year became greater and greater and greater.

Mr. Keele. Do I understand that you mean to say that in connection with the reports that Oumansky made, the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, that he mentioned the names of people whom he or his officials or agents had contacted, who had some connection with the Rockefeller or the Carnegie Foundations, and that he reported what they had said with reference to publications or projects or other ideas favorable to the Soviet Union; is that correct?

Mr. Bogolepow. That is right, or I can even specify, in my testimony before McCarran committee this spring I told on the question of Senator Ferguson that the majority of subversive operations in the field of infiltration of ideas, and which were favorable for the Soviet Union, the money which was paid for such service rendered was not Soviet money but American money.

Mr. Keele. How did they manage to get American money for the propagation of ideas favorable to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Bogolepow. That is, I guess, the reason why they were—became interested in the foundations, for foundations have the money, and they put their people in these foundations or connected the people who were sympathetic to communism in these foundations, and they got the money for the right man outside these foundations, and in some universities, like in Columbia or in Yale or in Stanford, which are known to me, mostly infested by Soviet sympathizers, and so the Soviet Embassy itself was not obligated to spend much money.

Mr. Keele. You have mentioned the names of three American universities, Columbia, Yale, and Stanford.

Mr. Bogolepow. That is right.

Mr. Keele. Did those names appear also in those dispatches, the names of those universities?

Mr. Bogolepow. Yes, sir; more than often.

Mr. Keele. Do you recall any other universities whose names appeared in those dispatches or reports?

Mr. Bogolepow. Possibly, but it is difficult now for me to remember.

Mr. Keele. It does not occur to you now?

Mr. Bogolepow. Certainly; they are not only exceptions; I am sorry to say, it was a general rule.

Mr. Keele. Those names appeared frequently; is that what you are saying?

Mr. Bogolepow. Frequently; that is right; yes.

Mr. Keele. In other words, that was not an occasional reference, but you recall the names of those three universities appeared frequently.

Mr. Bogolepow. That is in my recollection of it now.

Mr. Keele. Was there a time on occasion when you yourself were offered assistance by one of these foundations?

Mr. Bogolepow. Yes, sir. It was one time in 1928 or beginning of 1929 when I was in Geneva as a secretary general of one of the Soviet
delegations, of one of the international conferences held in Geneva under the auspices of the League of Nations. I attended a lunch given by a lot of foreign lawyers in the field of international law, and then some of my foreign acquaintances introduced me to a man—I don't remember his name, unfortunately—who asked me whether I am interested to come to Paris and to get a fellowship in a Paris organization of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Before this came to talk, I told him that I read a lot of publications of this endowment and I appreciate the big and valuable work done by this endowment in the field of—it started at the origin of World War I, et cetera, et cetera, and evidently in answer of my interest and appreciation he asked myself perhaps I would be interested. I said, "Yes;" and to say the truth I have completely forgotten the whole conversation.

When I came back to Moscow, perhaps in 2 or 3 months, in my office came an official invitation from Carnegie Endowment proposing me to come to Paris and to get a fellowship for 1 year's work in the field of international law. I was extremely glad to get away from the Soviet Union, of course, at least for 1 year, and, on the second hand, I was interested in the international law and the possibility of studying it in this organization, so I immediately answered, saying, "Thank you and in due time I will inform you whether it is possible for me or not to accept your invitation"; and I reported the whole business to my superiors, to Foreign Commissar Latvinov.

They discussed it evidently in some quarters, this proposal; I did not know anything about it, and then I was informed that I had to write a letter to Carnegie Endowment in Paris thanking them for kind invitation and saying that my duties make it impossible for to leave Moscow right now, but I would recommend warmly a friend of mine, the employee of the same Foreign Office, a certain Mr. Hershelman.

Mr. Keele. Let me get the spelling of that name.
Mr. Booolepov. H-e-r-s-h-e-l-m-a-n. I don't remember his first name.

I knew this Hershelman, and I met him in the Foreign Office, but, as a matter of fact, he was not an employee of the Foreign Office but of the Soviet Political Intelligence, which is known now under the name of MGB, the secret police, and with the foreign administration of this MGB, which is in charge of the Soviet spy activity abroad.

So this man was assigned with this mission of going to Paris and to study international law with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

From the reports which I later saw from our Ambassador in Paris, this mission of Hershelman was again in connection with the same operation infiltration which I reported to you when I had spoken about the American matters.

I have to specify that in Europe, France, an infiltration into the French intellectual circles, universities, scientific societies, and foreign administration was one of the most important tasks which the Soviet Government, the Communist government, put before itself, so there were two major points of application of all efforts of infiltration and, as I call it, ideological sabotage: The first one was America, and in Europe it was France.
So they sent in France their most experienced people in order to promote the ideas which were favorable to the Soviet Union and to put in the French brains the wrong conceptions about the Soviet Union, its policies, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

Mr. Forand. What year was that?

Mr. Bogolepov. It was 1928 to 1930. You are asking, sir, about Hershelman's activities; is that right?

Mr. Forand. That is correct.

Mr. Keele. Why did they select America and France as the two countries on which they would concentrate their ablest men, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. Bogolepov. Before they selected France, the main effort of the Soviet subversive operation was in Germany and, as you remember, before Hitler came to power, Germany was on the verge of becoming a Communist country; only in the very late moments, in the last moment, Hitler and his Nazis just pulled the rug from under the feet of Communists in Germany, and the Nazi terror, and physical extermination of German Communists and intellectuals which are connected with German communism, and it made Germany a lost thing for the Soviet cause. So they turned their attention to France and to England, but especially big efforts for infiltration were made in France. Evidently the reason was that France was more ripe for this kind of business.

Mr. Keele. Did you finish your answer, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. Bogolepov. I would like to add just one detail. When I was speaking about Hershelman, I would like to ask you to take into consideration that maybe he was in Paris not under his name of Hershelman. It is not known to me, and I guess that it is of importance that, perhaps, he was doing his activities in Paris under another name.

Mr. Keele. Do you know whether the man though got the scholarship or not?

Mr. Bogolepov. No, sir; I don't know. I met Hershelman after he came from Paris in the middle of the thirties in Moscow. He told me something about his studies in this endowment in Paris, but I do not remember quite exactly—it was of no importance. Certainly he didn't tell me anything about his mission which was covered by his so-called scientific activities in Paris.

Mr. Keele. The point is you do not know whether he received his scholarship under the name of Hershelman?

Mr. Bogolepov. I don't know, sir.

Mr. Keele. You knew him and knew him as Hershelman, but you do not know whether that was the name under which he proceeded under that scholarship?

Mr. Bogolepov. I believe that still he called his real name because after a graduation from this Paris endowment he came for a short time to Moscow just in order to get a high assignment in the League of Nations. It was a time in 1934 when the Soviet Union was admitted to the League of Nations, and Hershelman became Deputy Secretary General of the League of Nations, and in this connection he was organizing the same business inside the Geneva organization, putting the Soviet agents and Soviet sympathizers in all important positions inside the League of Nations.

Mr. Keele. Do you recall whether or not Mr. Gromyko was in the Soviet Embassy in Washington at the time that these dispatches to which you have testified were being sent?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, certainly. It was in 1939 and 1940.

Mr. Keele. Was Gromyko instrumental in making contacts with the people that the Soviet Union wished to interest in their ideas? Did the reports so indicate that Gromyko was the man handling that?

Mr. Bogolepov. You see, we have to take into consideration the difference in atmosphere in those days in this country and the present days.

In 1939 and 1940, at the time, which was your question, it was not necessary to be very careful with all these subversive operations. Mostly the contacts were made in the receptions in the Soviet Embassy, which were attended by several hundreds of Americans usually.

Now, as you know, they come to the Soviet Embassy in Washington only two, three, or four, with official duty of the State Department. But at that time, at the time of Gromyko and Oumansky, there were always several hundred Americans, and nobody saw anything bad in these visits, and these receptions were mostly used for contacting the people for carrying cut the infiltration of the pro-Communist and pro-Soviet ideas into American public opinion.

So, in other words, everybody in the Soviet Embassy was, in one way or another way, connected with this business, but it wasn't necessary at that time to make such a careful distinction who was to make a subversive contact and who has to be just a career diplomat like it is today when the times are not so favorable for the Soviet subversive activities as they were before.

Mr. Keele. At the time that Herschelman's name was submitted to the Carnegie Foundation, Carnegie Endowment, did you write the letter in which you recommended Herschelman's name when you declined to become a fellow or to receive the scholarship? Did you name Herschelman?

Mr. Bogolepov. No; I did it through the Paris Embassy. They got the order that was for them to say that "Mr. Bogolepov can't take your kind—accept your kind invitation, but he recommends such and such a man," and there was no trouble. Herschelman left Moscow pretty soon after I was obliged to decline my own invitation.

Mr. Keele. Do you know of your own knowledge whether or not the name submitted was that of Herschelman or was another name submitted?

Mr. Bogolepov. No, sir; that I don't know. If I have written letter myself certainly I should, I would have known the name. But with this business, delicate business, you know, they never trust people to approach directly. They mostly use the organization like embassy to inform that.

Mr. Keele. In other words, you did not actually write the letter; it was written through the Soviet Embassy in Paris?

Mr. Bogolepov. That is right; in Paris.

Mr. Keele. Has the Soviet Government been instrumental in getting fellowships for Latin-American students of their choosing from the foundations?

Mr. Bogolepov. Yes.

Mr. Keele. Will you tell us a bit about that and how they work in that respect.

Mr. Bogolepov. In some of the top-secret letters we received in Moscow from Soviet Embassy in Washington, I remember reading the report about the assignment which was given to the Soviet Em-
bassy in Washington to use its influence with foundations I mentioned before in order to get into this country, I mean the United States, some members of the Communist parties of some Latin-American countries which otherwise were unable to get American visas. The list of the students was forwarded to Soviet Embassy, evidently—I don't know quite well how the operation was done—evidently through the Comintern people—perhaps through American Communist Party or through the Soviet representative in South American countries—
I don't know how it was done, but anyhow the Soviet Embassy was in charge to try to influence the American Government, through the foundations, to give fellowships to the people from Latin America, which were members of the local Communist Party and, of course, trained Soviet agents. That is known to me from our secret files how this operation was—

Mr. Keele. That was part of it, I take it, the program which was worked out—

Mr. Bogolepov. That is right; yes.

Mr. Keele (continuing). Which was worked out in Moscow?

Mr. Bogolepov. That is right.

Mr. Keele. Did you have any opportunities other than the one invitation to become a fellow or receive a scholarship? Did you receive any other opportunities to talk to or talk with or address societies, American societies or societies that had branches in America?

Mr. Bogolepov. During my work for the Soviet Government, you mean?

Mr. Keele. Yes; during that time.

Mr. Bogolepov. Yes. For example, I was working on a project connected with the German reparations and allied debts, and I know that one of the reputed American scientific organizations in Washington was also working in the same field. It was the Brookings Institution, so I have written a letter in my capacity of a member of the Soviet Foreign Office asking them for giving me the documents they have, and I immediately received in a very polite form and very promptly all I need, a bunch of documents and papers. They were not, of course, any secret documents, I would tell you, that were sent. There was official publications, a result of the American research of the problem.

All I want to say is that in my capacity as a member of the Soviet Foreign Office I always meet a very kind and receptive answer from the American organizations which I addressed from time to time. That is just one example.

After I was able to desert the Soviet cause, and when I came to the west after the end of the war, I make myself some efforts to contact the same organizations, Carnegie Endowment, and Rockefeller, and Brookings, and Guggenheim, and a lot of others, whom I have written in rather naive mood that now I am not under duress and pressure, now I am again myself, without an obligation to the cause which was always strange to me, I would like to have the opportunity to help with the knowledge I have about the Soviet Union, its subversive activities, real aims, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

I started to make my applications and appeals in 1946, 1947, writing the letters. The result was always negative. The reason was different.

Sometimes they thought it would be only for the American citizens, sometimes they have no funds, sometimes they simply did not answer,
but with all these various reasons the result was one and the same—I was always rejected, and this difference of treatment of the same person certainly astonished me very much.

When I was a member of an organization which was hostile to this country and to the western world, in general, I was always welcomed, assisted, helped.

When I come to the western world with intention to act as ally, as a friend, I was always rejected. It is my impression that I had to pierce not one iron curtain when I escaped from the Soviet Union but actually two iron curtains, and I am still piercing through this iron curtain which exists even in this country around some of the American organizations.

Mr. Keele. To what do you attribute that, Mr. Bogolepov? I am talking now about the resistance that you find to any attempts to work with the same organizations which invited you to work with them at the time when you were with the Soviet Government? What is the cause for that or the reason?

Mr. Bogolepov. What is the cause? I am much afraid that what is happening now with me and with hundreds of other Russian refugees from the Soviet Union is just a kind of revenge for the work which I have done myself when I was with the Soviet Government.

Mr. Keele. Revenge on the part of whom? I mean, who is taking out this revenge?

Mr. Bogolepov. So to say, I am hit by myself, for while working for the Soviet Government I was obliged against my will—I as obliged to help the infiltration of the pro-Communist and pro-Soviet ideas in the brains of the western people, and when I come here myself I just meet the results of this work. What I didn’t know, what amazed me—

Mr. Keele. May I interrupt you for a moment? You mean by that, as I understand it, that having helped carry out the plan of infiltration when you were with the Soviet Government, and that plan having succeeded, to some extent, now when you come here and try to work with those organizations you are met by the resistance from those who have infiltrated through your previous efforts?

Mr. Bogolepov. That is right; that is exactly what I meant, yes.

I would like to act—

Mr. Simpson. On that point, you mean the people who wrote you the letters were the ones who had infiltrated?

Mr. Bogolepov. I beg your pardon?

Mr. Simpson. You mean the people who wrote you and refused to meet with you?

Mr. Bogolepov. Yes.

Mr. Simpson (continuing). Are they the ones that you say had infiltrated?

Mr. Bogolepov. It is my guess; I have no other explanation.

Mr. Simpson. Well, who were those people that wrote the letters and would not meet with you?

Mr. Bogolepov. The people whom I have written to in these organizations.

Mr. Simpson. Are you talking about the heads of the foundations in this country?

Mr. Bogolepov. I sent simply my letters; I didn’t know any by name, you know.
Mr. Simpson. Do you have the letters?
Mr. Bogolepov. The letters?
Mr. Simpson. Yes.
Mr. Bogolepov. What do you mean do I have letters?
Mr. Simpson. You said they wrote to you.
Mr. Bogolepov. Oh, yes,
Mr. Simpson. And made excuses why they could not meet you.
Mr. Bogolepov. I have these letters until last fall.
Mr. Simpson. To whom did you write?
Mr. Bogolepov. I write simply Carnegie Endowment, Rockefeller Foundation.
Mr. Keele. Would you explain one point? You said you had letters from them, replies from the Carnegie Foundation, Carnegie Endowment, and others.
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right.
Mr. Keele. And you said you had those letters until last fall; is that right?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right, sir.
Mr. Keele. Will you explain why you haven't them now or what happened to the letters?
Mr. Bogolepov. Last fall I was in Paris, and I have executive session of Senate Committee for Internal Security in Paris.
Mr. Keele. The McCarran committee?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right, the McCarran committee, and when I come back to the place of my living in Germany I discovered that my apartment was searched by some people who extracted the most important correspondence and papers I had; they disappeared. All my correspondence with McCarran committee before I came to this country, and my correspondence with the foundations and some other letters with American intelligence, with the Attorney General in this country, the FBI, they also were disappeared. That is the reason why I was obliged to say that I had this correspondence, but I have not it right now.
Mr. Forand. Do you mean by that that you were living in Germany at the time that you were summoned to Paris to appear before the Security Committee?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right, sir.
Mr. Forand. And while you were in Paris somebody entered your apartment in Germany and rifled your files and picked from your files those important letters that we are talking about?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right; yes.
Mr. Keele. However, the copies of those letters, your letters to the foundations and their copies of their reply, are presumably in the possession of the foundations to which you wrote?
Mr. Bogolepov. I presume; yes. Only you have to look, the letters are signed not by my proper name but by name of Ivar, and the last name is Nyman. That is the name under which I was living until I came to this country.
Mr. Keele. Mr. Bogolepov, did you make it clear to the foundations that you were the same person with whom they had communicated prior to that time, I mean when you were in the Soviet Government?
Mr. Bogolepov. In my first letters I didn't do it because of the danger of such revelations, especially inasmuch as I was informed
that we have Soviet agents inside these organizations. But in my last
letters written, say, 1950, I already was quite informative.
Mr. Keene. And you revealed the fact that you had been with the
Soviet Government, in those latter letters?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right; yes.
Mr. Keene. What foundations did you write to? The reason I ask
this is so that we may check with those foundations.
Mr. Bogolepov. I have written to New York, to Carnegie Endow-
ment, and Rockefeller Foundation; I have written also a letter to
Guggenheim Foundation or Fund, and to some of the universities in
this country.
Mr. Keene. Do you remember what universities?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, I remember. Columbia, the Russian Institute
of Columbia—
Mr. Keene. The Russian Institute of Columbia, yes?
Mr. Bogolepov. And the Russian Institute of Harvard University.
Mr. Keene. The Russian Institute of Harvard University?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right. Then, the Hoover Center or School
in Stanford, the Hoover Library, I guess—the Hoover Library.
Mr. Keene. The Hoover Library?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keene. At Stanford?
Mr. Bogolepov. At Stanford; yes.
Mr. Keene. Have you made any other efforts to get in touch with
the foundations since writing those letters, I mean, have you called
upon them, gone to see them personally?
Mr. Bogolepov. No; I couldn’t before I came to this country.
Mr. Keene. Since you have come to this country?
Mr. Bogolepov. No; I didn’t. It was not, in my opinion opportune.
Mr. Forand. When did you come to this country?
Mr. Bogolepov. In April 1952, this year.
Mr. Forand. Thank you.
Mr. Simpson. If you misled the foundations when you were working
for the Soviet, and got them to give fellowships to your favorites, why
would you think they would trust you now when you want to come to
them with another story? Why would they welcome you with open
arms after having misled them as a part of your duty as a Soviet
representative?
Mr. Bogolepov. Would you please repeat your question once more?
Mr. Simpson. Why do you think these foundations which you had
misled—
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes.
Mr. Simpson (continuing). When you were working for the Soviet
Government should now welcome you with open arms on your state-
ment that you have changed your position?
Mr. Bogolepov. Well, I think that they have at least to make a proof
of sincerity of my change. If they were really interested that it what
they should do.
On the other side, even if they didn’t trust me or were confused about
my personality, at least they could accept the information which I
wanted to put into their hands, but they turned down not only me
personally but they turned down any cooperation with me. They
even didn’t want to receive any information, any facts from me.
Mr. Simpson. Do you state that these people who turned you down are individuals who have infiltrated into the foundations?

Mr. Bogolepov. I can't say that, sir; I don't know.

Mr. Simpson. All right; thank you.

Mr. Bogolepov. I have only general impression; I am thinking logically, and thinking logically, I believe that the reason of my turning down was that in this foundations still were people who disliked me being an anti-Communist, while they liked me being a Communist, but I can't say anything about any person; I simply don't know.

Mr. Forand. You are of the opinion then that some of those who have infiltrated the foundation knew of your application to the foundation for some assistance or some cooperation, and used their influence to have you turned down; is that the idea?

Mr. Bogolepov. That is possibly it; yes.

Mr. Keefe. Do you know whether other persons situated similarly to yourself, that is, those who have been in Soviet service and have escaped, have had a similar experience?

Mr. Bogolepov. Yes. It is my impression that in the Western World, especially in the years immediately after the end of the war, it was a general trend and favorable to the Russian anti-Communist. I am not—the story of mine I told you is not an exception; it is a general rule. I could quote you not one but hundreds of cases of Russians from the Soviet Union holding various—who were holding various positions with the Soviet Government, Red Army, et cetera, et cetera, and who wanted to establish a cooperation with the Western organizations, and just got held over in the same kind of iron curtain I mentioned to you in my own case.

Mr. Forand. You mean by that that there were other refugees in the same classification as you are who have sought to help the American Government through these various institutions but they are running up against a roadblock?

Mr. Bogolepov. That is what I mean exactly. The majority of them are still in Germany, still in the most horrible material conditions and of life, and completely frustrated. They are not only rejected in their cooperation, they even are rejected a decent way of life, and this almost 10 years after they left the Soviet Union.

Mr. Keefe. Didn't I understand you to say at one time, Mr. Bogolepov, when you were speaking with me, that it was particularly hard for those with intellectual training or formal training who had gotten away from the Soviets to get over here, but that the manual workers had no difficulty in coming here?

Mr. Bogolepov. That is what I exactly mean. The whole program of UNRRA, IRO, and other refugee organizations was to help to come to this country those people who was not of very great help to this country. The manual workers, the farmers, the people who will clean up the streets, they were admitted pretty easily to this country, but it is my impression that the whole program of bringing the so-called DP's to this country was organized in such a way so as not to allow to come to this country the intellectuals from the Soviet Union who might be of greater assistance to this Nation with their knowledge of the proceedings and methods and ways of subversive activity and politics of the Soviet Union.
I would even say that, perhaps, the majority of the most valuable people—I mean valuable from the point of view of their understanding of the Communist doctrine—are still in Germany, still in the face of being rejected for their application for immigration, whereas you brought to this country the hundreds of thousands of men and women who are helping you only with their hands and not with their brains.

By saying so I would not, of course, have any objections about the humanitarian, the big humanitarian American action in bringing unhappy people who are refugees from Eastern Europe to this country. I only want to say that behind the UNRRA and IRO operations here there was people whose aim was not to permit to come into this country men who, like me, would assist your investigations, your struggle for purging this country from the Communist infiltration.

Mr. Simpson. In what way would recognition by a foundation help the individual get into this country, if at all?

Mr. Bogolepov. It was more than easy. If a man, a DP, could have an invitation from a foundation, a fellowship or, let us say, through a foundation a fellowship from some American university, it was a matter of a couple of weeks coming into this country, because according to the immigration law he would be a nonquota immigrant, and it was really a business of coming to this country in a couple of weeks in this case.

Mr. Simpson. Would that include an individual who had been refused admittance on the part of the military authorities in Germany who had been refused permission to leave Germany?

Mr. Bogolepov. You mean because of security risks?

Mr. Simpson. Yes.

Mr. Bogolepov. Perhaps, in this case it would be more difficult, but not everybody has such a rich past as I have. There were a lot of people, professors from the Russian universities, who are still in universities, who weren’t even members of the Communist Party, and who are still rejected admission to this country.

Mr. Simpson. Yes. I am thinking of them, and so they are, perhaps, for the reason that they want to enter into this country, working on the foundations to secure recognition there?

Mr. Bogolepov. Yes. I remember in this connection the words which Soviet Foreign Minister Vishinsky pronounced in 1945 on the First Assembly of the United Nations, while requesting the repatriation of the refugee DP’s back to the Soviet Union, he said that the Soviet Union can’t admit that a refugee from the countries now under Communist domination could go into the western world and to disseminate their anti-Communist ideas. He said, “We have to stop it; we can’t admit it.” These words were said in 1945 and, as you see, they were not mere words, they were put into practice.

Mr. Forand. Might it be that the reason why it is more difficult for the intellectuals than the so-called peasants to come into this country is the suspicion that because they are intellectual, because they know more of what was going on, that they might be used for subversive purposes, and are just posing as people anxious to come to this country to get away from the Soviet domination? Do you think that might have something to do with the reason why it is so difficult for them to come through?
Mr. Bogolepov. Certainly, sir, and I wouldn't deny that such approach would be only reasonable. What I want to point out is that this reasonable approach was exaggerated by the people who have malicious intention to bar the Russian anti-Communist coming into this country and to help American people to fight communism.

Mr. Forand. Would you suspect that in those organizations that had the say as to who would come and who would not come that it is possible that there has been infiltration there, and the Communist hand is at work?

Mr. Bogolepov. I have not only suspicion, I know that they have infiltrated, I mean UNRRA, IRO, and other international and American organizations which are working on refuge projects in Germany.

Mr. Forand. And for that reason they want to keep out America those whom they think might be helpful to America?

Mr. Bogolepov. That is right.

Mr. Forand. Thank you.

Mr. Keele. Have they made any effort to force you to leave this country, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. Bogolepov. I beg your pardon?

Mr. Keele. Has any effort been made—

Mr. Bogolepov. Yes.

Mr. Keele (continuing). To get you out of this country, to get you out of America?

Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keele. What is the nature of those efforts, and so far as you know who made them?

Mr. Bogolepov. That is a very embarrassing question.

Mr. Keele. All right.

Are there certain questions on security reasons that you would prefer not to answer here?

Mr. Bogolepov. I would appreciate it very much if you wouldn't insist on me answering the question.

Mr. Keele. I think, in view of the investigation we have made, that there are certain areas about which Mr. Bogolepov ought not to be pressed, and it is recommended to the committee that we not force the issue on that.

Mr. Forand. All right.

Mr. Bogolepov. Thank you.

Mr. Forand. We thank you, sir, for the information you have given the committee.

The committee will now recess until 10 o'clock Monday morning.

(Whereupon, at 3 p.m. the committee recessed to reconvene Monday, December 22, 1952.)