The special subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 429, House Office Building, Hon. Carroll Reece (chairman of the special subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Reece, Hays, Goodwin, and Pfost.

Also present: Rene A. Wormser, general counsel; Arnold T. Koch, associate counsel; Norman Dodd, research director; Kathryn Casey, legal analyst; and John Marshall, Jr., chief clerk to the special committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

Who is the next witness, Mr. Wormser?

Mr. WORMSER. Dr. Hobbs, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Hobbs, will you please stand and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give in this proceeding shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. Hobbs. I do.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, just in view of the statement you made on the opening day about all of the witnesses being sworn, I think it would be well that the record show that Dr. Briggs yesterday was not sworn.

The CHAIRMAN. Professor Briggs was sworn and I think the record will so show, or at least it should show.

Mr. HAYS. On discussing it last night, we thought he had not been. We started to swear him and we got off the track.

The CHAIRMAN. I have not looked at the record.

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Mr. HAYS. He was sworn.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I did swear him in. Thank you very much.

Mr. WORMSER, do you wish to make a preliminary statement of any kind?

Mr. WORMSER. Yes; I want to say that Dr. Hobbs will testify chiefly on the nature of social-science research. I think we may take it for granted, and I think the foundations will agree, that social-science research in this country now is financed virtually entirely by the foundations and the United States Government. There is very little privately financed social research.

Dr. Hobbs will analyze some of this research for methods and type and discuss some of the results of the type of research that is used.
STATEMENT OF DR. A. H. HOBBS, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF
SOCIOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

The Chairman. As I understand it, Professor Hobbs, you do not
have a prepared statement.

Dr. Hobbs. That is correct.

The Chairman. In view of the fact that you do not have a pre-
pared statement, the committee will be free to propound questions as
you go along.

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. When a witness has a prepared statement, we
ordinarily then defer questioning until the witness has concluded with
his prepared statement. But where that is not the case, we feel it is
better procedure to be questioned as you go along. You may proceed.

Mr. Goodwin. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire whether or not the
witness is available later in the event that we might feel after we have
seen the record that we want to interrogate him concerning the part of
his testimony which we had not caught when he gave his testimony?

The Chairman. I assume he could be made available, could he not?

Mr. Wormser. I think Dr. Hobbs is prepared to stay tomorrow if
we want him. I am sure he would be glad to come back if necessary.

May I ask you first to identify yourself with a short biographical
note?

Dr. Hobbs. I took undergraduate work at what was then Penn State
College. It is now Penn State University. I took graduate work
at the University of Pennsylvania and received a Ph. D. in 1941. I re-
ceived a Ph. D. in sociology there. I began teaching sociology and
social science in 1936 at the University of Pennsylvania, and except
for 3 years in the military service, I taught continuously.

Is that sufficient?

Mr. Wormser. What is your position now?

Dr. Hobbs. I am an assistant professor at the University of Penn-
sylvania.

Mr. Wormser. Of sociology?

Dr. Hobbs. That is correct.

Mr. Wormser. Dr. Hobbs, you have written quite a number of arti-
cles and several books. I am interested particularly in your most
recent book which is called Social Problems and Scientism. I think
you might launch into a discussion of “scientism” giving your expla-
nation of how you use that term.

Dr. Hobbs. All right, sir. There is, or at least there seems to be,
and I think most people would agree with this who have been involved
in the matter in teaching or studying, there is a good deal of confu-
sion about the term “science.” There is a tendency to designate as
science a number of things which are not science, or at least there is
serious question as to whether they are scientific or not. So I at-
tempted to analyze this problem by going to the books dealing with
scientific methods to find out in what way it could be analyzed and
interpreted.

By way of background, I would just like to mention a few things
which are usually included in scientific investigation.

The method of science is one which has been tremendously success-
ful in solving a variety of types of problems, but, as we all know, it
began in fields such as physics and chemistry and astronomy.
Mr. HAYS. Are those what you would term, Doctor, the exact sciences?

Dr. Hobbs. That term is frequently applied to them, although technically there would be some question if you strained the term "exact" even in those areas. Some of them are not exact.

Mr. HAYS. In other words, what you are saying is that there is no such thing as an exact science?

Dr. Hobbs. In absolute terms I think most scientists would agree with that.

This method involves, for one thing, controlled observation. By that is meant that if I express my opinion on something, my belief on how to raise children, you express your opinion, we can debate these opinions back and forth from now until kingdom come, and in no way that will necessarily reach agreement. That, of course, was the situation in philosophy for many centuries. But with the scientific method, they gradually learned to use this technique of controlled observation, a means whereby anybody, no matter what his feelings on the matter, no matter what his beliefs or prejudices, in observing the results, is compelled to agree as to them.

In order to use this technique of controlled observation, which is fundamental in scientific procedure, you have to reduce the things that you are studying to quantitative units—units which are quantitative, units which are not only quantitative, but which are homogeneous, and units which are stable. A quantitative unit is a thing in turn which can be measured in terms of weight, distance, velocity. In science as you know, they have gone a step further and developed instruments, ammeters, speedometers, scales, things of that type, by means of which these units can be measured with a sufficient degree of precision to justify the type of experiment which is at that time being done.

Congressman Hays, that is the general context of exactness or precision in science for the purpose of experiments. The measurements must be exact. But that does not mean exact in the sense of perfectability.

Mr. HAYS. What I am trying to get at is this: Is there any science in which after these experiments the conclusions which are arrived at can be termed "exact"?

Dr. Hobbs. The conclusions can be measured and in terms of the purposes for which the measurements are being made, they can be said to be exact. There will inevitably be some element of error which scientists always attempt to reduce to the least possible terms.

Mr. HAYS. I believe you said that you are now teaching sociology and social science?

Dr. Hobbs. I am teaching sociology; yes, sir.

Mr. HAYS. Is there such a thing as social science?

Dr. Hobbs. In the sense in which the term "science" is applied to the physical sciences, I think it is extremely questionable that the great bulk of the work in sociology, history, political science, could be designated as being scientific. In that sense, I would say very little.

Mr. HAYS. But that is a term that has become quite common, and is used rather generally to bulk all of the sciences dealing with the sociological aspects of civilization, is it not?

Dr. Hobbs. That is correct. The terms "social science" and "political science" and similar terms are very widely used. I think it would
be desirable for one thing, if the public were to understand that the
designation "science" in that context is somewhat different than the
designation in the context as applied to the usually called physical
sciences.

Mr. Hays. In other words, it was never intended to connotate an
exact science.

Dr. Hobbs. Unfortunately, in many of the writings that connota-
tion is not only present but it is emphasized. For example, you will
see books on social science—textbooks on sociology—coming out with
drawings of calipers on the advertising blurbs, test tubes on the cover,
to give the teachers the impression that this is science in the sense
that the term is used in physical science. Unfortunately, there is a
great deal of that, and it confuses not only the general public but
many of the people in the field who are not too familiar with scientific
methods themselves.

The Chairman. You have read the statement which Mr. Dodd made
to the committee?

Dr. Hobbs. I have not, sir.

The Chairman. You are not familiar with it, then?

Dr. Hobbs. I am not, sir.

The Chairman. He raised the question of some trouble arising
from the premature acceptance of the social sciences. You are not
ready to comment on that. If you are, I would be interested in hav-
ing you comment.

Dr. Hobbs. I would, sir. I do intend to comment after I have given
this background which I think is essential.

The Chairman. Very well; you may proceed.

Dr. Hobbs. As for reducing human behavior, particularly the
aspects of human behavior which are most significant in the relations-
ships between people and in civilized society, to attempt to reduce
those to quantitative units is extremely difficult, and for the most part
at the present time impossible.

With human beings there are some things which are quantitative;
that is, your bodily temperature could be called a quantitative thing,
which in turn can be measured with an instrument, the thermometer.
Similarly with your blood pressure, your corpuscle count, the propor-
tion between white and red, the number of hairs on your head, and
things like that, can be counted. Sometimes it is pretty easy to count
the number of hairs on your head. The other things, though, like
the sentiments—patriotism, love, bravery, cowardice, honesty, things
of that sort—have never been reduced to quantitative units. There
is still a large element of the qualitative in them. That is, if you say
you are patriotic, your patriotism cannot be measured in precise units
which will be agreed upon by all the observers.

Mr. Hays. Professor, I think we are agreed on that. Is there any
argument on that score?

Dr. Hobbs. The impression is given in many works, and I will cite
some of them, that that is not the case. It is a crucial and funda-
mental point which I want to give by way of background.

Mr. Hays. You mean you say that you can measure patriotism?

Dr. Hobbs. That is implied.

Mr. Hays. I was aware that there are people who think you can
measure patriotism, but it is always according to their standards.
Dr. Hobbs. Unfortunately, that is the same way with some who call themselves social scientists.
Mr. Hays. That has been true always.
Dr. Hobbs. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hays. As long as there have been human beings.
Dr. Hobbs. Yes.
Mr. Hays. Maybe they did not call it patriotism, but whatever it is.
Dr. Hobbs. Loyalty or whatever you call it. Then the other item, the matter of the stability of the units which are being studied, also, I think, is quite crucial. If you are studying electrons, if you are studying matter, or the behavior of matter, the method of study you employ, the amount of the time you spend on studying it, the attitude which you have while you are making the study, does not affect the object which is under study; that is, if you think electrons are nasty or unpleasant or things like that, that is not going to affect the behavior of electrons. But unfortunately, with human beings again, sometimes the very fact that a study is being made can change their behavior. That is always a possibility which you have to be very consciously aware of. An illustration of that of course would be the Kinsey report. The mere fact that you ask people questions in the rapid fire nonemotional manner which Professor Kinsey says he uses, would put a different aura on sexual behavior than might otherwise be present. It could change your attitude toward sex.

Similarly, if you are studying juvenile delinquents, and if your attitude in the study is that delinquency is caused by their environment, or caused by the fact that the mother was too harsh with the children in their youth, or overwhelmed them with affection, then there is always the possibility—and some investigators contend that this is a fact—the delinquents themselves become convinced that this is the case. They begin to blame their parents, their early environment, and the situation which you have attempted to study has been changed in the very process of making the study.

Mr. Hays. As I get it, then, you are saying in effect that there are dangers in studying hazards.
Dr. Hobbs. That is right.
Mr. Hays. But you would not advise that we give up studying juvenile delinquency?
Dr. Hobbs. Absolutely not. These things certainly need study.
The Chairman. Professor, since you referred to the Kinsey report, what do you consider the significance of the fact that the initial Kinsey study was financed by a foundation grant?
Dr. Hobbs. Sir, I intend to use the Kinsey report as an illustration of some of these pseudoscientific techniques, and as an illustration of the possible influence which this type of study may have. In that context, I would prefer to take it up that way.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Hays. You are saying that Dr. Kinsey is a pseudoscientist, is that right?
Dr. Hobbs. No, sir.
Mr. Hays. He has used the pseudoscientific approach.
Dr. Hobbs. I said that he has used techniques which are pseudoscientific.
Mr. Hays. I would not know anything about that. I am not acquainted with his books or techniques.
Dr. Hobbs. I am, sir, and I will explain something about them a little bit later.

So with the study of human behavior you have the difficulty that in many instances it is virtually impossible to reduce the type of behavior to a quantitative unit. There is always the hazard that the mere fact that you are studying the thing and the way in which you study that may change the very thing you are studying.

I will cite specific illustrations of that a little bit later.

The findings of the study can affect the type of behavior which is being studied. Again if you come out and say in your findings that sexual behavior of a wide variety is prevalent and so on, that in itself can—do not misunderstand me, I am not saying that studies should not be published because of this factor, but it should be recognized that the findings of a study can affect the type of behavior which is being studied.

Mr. Hays. To get the emphasis off sex and on something else that I am more interested in, say, juvenile delinquency, you would probably agree with me that the very fact that the newspapers constantly say or have been recently that juvenile delinquency is increasing, and it is becoming an ever-greater problem, might have a tendency to make some juveniles think about delinquency. But on the other hand, we cannot hide our heads in the sand and say it does not exist, can we?

Dr. Hobbs. I certainly believe that the facts in this case, those findings are from the uniform crime reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and they are factual findings, and they certainly should be publicized. But they are not publicized in the newspaper as being scientific findings. That is the extent of delinquency is not being published as being a scientific finding. If it were, then it could have a different effect.

Mr. Hays. I am inclined to agree with you that it could have an effect, and perhaps various effects. I think you would perhaps agree with my thinking that when you are dealing with juveniles or the subjects in Dr. Kinsey's books you are dealing with human beings, and there are just as many variations as the people you are dealing with; is that not right?

Dr. Hobbs. There are tremendous variables which have to be taken into consideration, which make the problem of a study of human beings an extremely difficult one.

Mr. Hays. In other words, if you approach a study of a thousand juveniles, you might get conceivably 1,000 different reactions to the same situation. The chances are that you would not, but it is possible that you could.

Dr. Hobbs. It is quite possible.

Mr. Hays. Just the same as every one of the thousand have different fingerprints.

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, sir. With this scientific method being developed, another thing you have to have is that even if you are able to reduce the things you are studying to quantitative, uniform, and stable units, then merely doing that does not constitute the scientific method. Merely counting things is not science. The philosopher of science, Alfred North Whitehead, said in effect, if we had merely counted things, we would have left science exactly in the state in which it was 1,000 years ago.
Unfortunately, also, in social science, you do get this tendency which is particularly pronounced now to rely, I would say, and many of the outstanding people in the field will agree with me, an overemphasis on the tendency merely to count. Again, do not misunderstand me. I do not say that none of that should be done. It is a matter of degree.

Mr. Goodwin. I do not understand, Doctor, what you mean by saying that the result of a count is not something exact. If you take a complete count of it you have the full picture, have you not?

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, sir, but to go back to Congressman Hays' question about juvenile delinquency, if you were merely going to count these delinquents and measure the lengths of their noses and the size and shape of their ears, and so on, you could make such measurements which might be exact to a high degree. You could make such measurements for a long, long time. I think you will agree you probably would not find out anything basic about delinquency.

Mr. Hays. You mean the size of their noses has nothing to do with it.

Dr. Hobbs. I would not venture to hazard a guess. I don't know.

I would say probably not.

Mr. Hays. I would be brave and guess that it would not.

The Chairman. But as I understand, you mean to say that it would not get at what might be the basic causes of juvenile delinquency.

Dr. Hobbs. I would be extremely doubtful, of course.

Mr. Hays. We would all agree on that, would we not?

Dr. Hobbs. In other words, mere accounting is not enough. Even if you can count with relative accuracy, you still have to have a hypothesis. A hypothesis is a statement as nearly as exact as you can make it, a statement of what you are going to try to prove, or what you are going to try to disprove, and then you make your controlled observations. Then you will find that the hypothesis is not valid or you find that it has been validated by your observations, by your inductions and by your deductions.

One test of verification is prediction. Even here you have to be extremely careful because sometimes what seems to be a prediction is merely a lucky guess. That is, if I predict the Yankees are going to win the pennant this year, they might win the pennant—I am a little bit afraid they will—but the fact that my prediction came true does not prove that I had worked it out scientifically. A prediction could be a lucky guess, it could be a coincidence, or it could be the result of factors other than the factors which you are investigating under your hypothesis.

Another common mistake is to confuse projection with prediction. I could predict that women will wash on Monday and iron on Tuesday. When I am doing that, I am not making a prediction, but I am assuming merely that the pattern of behavior which held true in the past will continue to hold true in the future. Many of the so-called
predictions of population growth are merely projections in this sense, rather than scientific predictions.

Of course, as you know, most of those projections themselves have been erroneous because the pattern of behavior does change.

Mr. Hays. That is one of the reasons, though, is it not, Professor, that women have always been interesting. It has always been unsafe to predict about them.

Dr. Hobbs. That, Congressman, is a situation which neither you nor I would like to change. Let us not make that too scientific.

Mr. Hays. I agree with you.

Dr. Hobbs. With the scientific method having been so successful, and then employed—

Mr. Wormser. Dr. Hobbs, may I interrupt to ask you, is not experiment an essential mechanism in ordinary natural science whereas it is unavailable in social sciences?

Dr. Hobbs. As a generalization that would be correct, yes. It is very much more difficult to set up conditions to conduct a controlled experiment in social science than it is in physical science, and the ability to set up those controlled experiments in physical science has been a keystone in the tremendous success of the physical sciences.

Mr. Koch. Do you say that in connection with juvenile delinquency some social scientists have actually measured noses or something similar?

Dr. Hobbs. No. I just used that as an extreme illustration.

With the tremendous success of physical science, particularly as the findings of physical science were translated by technologists into practical things, like steam engines, and automobiles, and so on, it is quite understandable that many people who have been studying and have been interested in human behavior, should apply the same method—and this is crucial—or should apply what they think is the same method, or what they can lead other people to believe is the same method. Throughout the history of social science you can see this correspondence between the attempts to apply the type of scientific method which is at that time successful in science to the study of human behavior.

Mrs. Post. Dr. Hobbs, you related a while ago about these habits of individuals, such as women washing on Monday and ironing on Tuesday. In what manner, now, do you feel that relates to the foundations, this study that we are making here?

Dr. Hobbs. I want to give this background to show the difference—and it is an essential difference—between science as it is used in the physical sciences, and science as it is used in the social sciences, which is the type of thing that is sponsored by the foundations.

Mr. Hays. Doctor, I have always been aware of that difference. Do you think that there is a general unawareness of it?

Dr. Hobbs. I believe that is quite common. I am sorry if I am taking too long.

Mr. Hays. No, take all the time you want.

Dr. Hobbs. I do want to give this background. Then I will give specific illustrations of the point you have in mind, where there is a definite effort to convince people that the two things are the same. I will bring that out.

Mr. Hays. There has always been a loose term—at least I have always been familiar with it—in which we differentiated between the
so-called, and I used the word "so-called" there, exact sciences and the social sciences. I have always understood that social sciences, if you want to use that term, or sociologists would be a better term, are groping their way along knowing they have no exact way to measure the thing they are studying.

Dr. Hobbs. That is, of course, the way with many. But unfortunately there are some, and this is particularly pronounced in textbooks, for example, where the impression is given, and sometimes the flat statement is made, that this is science, and that it is the same kind of science that exists in the study of physical phenomena.

Mr. Hays. Yes; but do you not think we are going to have to rely somewhat upon the intelligence of the people to differentiate? This committee or the Congress cannot legislate what people are going to think or what they are going to derive from certain statements in the newspapers. It might be desirable—I say very definitely it might be, I do not think it would be—but we cannot do it.

Dr. Hobbs. I would agree with you that the improvement, call it the reform, in this should come from within the fields, and not through legislation. That is, in the use of such terms as science. The people in the fields themselves should govern that, and should be more careful in their usage, which may happen. I don't know. But that is not the case now. The confusion is greater now than it was in the past. That is, the attempt to convince the readers of the textbooks, and trade books, is definitely there, and it is on the increase, rather than being on the decrease.

Mr. Hays. Yes; but do you not think any tendency on the part of the Congress to try to legislate about that might conceivably get you in the situation where you would cut off valuable exploration into the unknown?

Dr. Hobbs. I had no intent of suggesting that in any way. As a matter of fact, I explicitly stated otherwise.

Mr. Hays. I am not trying to put words in your mouth. I am trying to clarify in my mind and the people who read this hearing just what we are discussing here.

Dr. Hobbs. To legislate in that sense, to tell what words should be used, and how they should be used, would be extremely undesirable.

Mr. Hays. In other words, we could not any more define it than you can define it.

Dr. Hobbs. I think, sir, I can define it. But that does not mean that everybody should agree with me in any way.

Mr. Hays. In other words, it will be your definition.

Dr. Hobbs. That is correct. Of course, the definition is based on the interpretation of the outstanding philosophers of science. I make no claim that it is original with me, or unique with me. It is a common type of definition.

So in earlier days, the social scientists or what were then social philosophers, tried to apply the type of scientific technique which was successful at that time. The success in physical science has been in the area of mechanics. So the social philosophers attempted to describe human beings in terms of molecules and atoms and things like that and contend that human beings came into social groups because of factors of centripetal force. They dispersed and came in because of factors of electrical attraction. Looking back on that now, we would say it was very naive. As the techniques of physical science
change, the techniques of social science change along with them. That is understandable; they want to try to use the techniques which are being used in physical science, or want to try to use what seem to be the techniques used in physical science.

Unfortunately, however, many of these techniques—even though they may seem to be the same techniques as used in physical sciences—in their application to social studies or studies of social behavior, are different. It is further unfortunate that the difference is not made sufficiently clear to the readers and to the general public.

Mr. Hays. Right there, do you have any specific suggestions about what could be done about that?

Dr. Hobbs. I think it should be the burden and the positive responsibility of persons making the study and publishing the study. If they call it science, it should be their positive responsibility to point out the limitations, and not only point them out, but to emphasize them to avoid misleading the reader into the belief that it is science in the same sense that it is used in physical science. I think it should come from the individuals concerned, rather than from legislation.

Mr. Hays. I am inclined to agree with you, that is a desirable thing, but the specific thing I am getting at is; is there anything we can do about it, or is it just something that is desirable, that we would like it to happen, and if it does it is fine, and if it does not, that is all right, too?

Dr. Hobbs. Sir, what I am leading up to, and I am very sorry it takes this long but I think the background is essential, is studies which have been sponsored by the foundations which have done, and some of them in exaggerated form, the type of thing which you agree and I agree should be avoided if it is at all possible, and that is to give the impression that the social science in the same sort or virtually the same as physical science.

Mr. Hays. In other words, to avoid giving the impression that it is exact.

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, sir.

Mr. Hays. And probably prefacing the study by saying that these studies are made under certain conditions, and have arrived at certain conclusions but everybody should know they might not be exact, because we are dealing with human beings.

Dr. Hobbs. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Goodwin. How about a combination of physical science with mental or social? I am thinking about the lie detector. That apparently is an attempt to measure mechanically what is in a man’s mind.

Dr. Hobbs. As I understand it, sir, it is not so much an attempt to measure what is in his mind, but it is a measure of fluctuations in blood pressure.

Mr. Goodwin. Has not that some relation?

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, and to assume from those fluctuations whether he is mentally disturbed or concerned or not in a manner which could indicate that he was lying. But it rests on an assumption, and the assumption may be invalid in some cases. In using such devices, that is something you have to be careful about.

I would like to cite a number of these studies to emphasize the manner in which they can and apparently do influence important aspects of human behavior. One of these studies I would like to cite as an influence on moral behavior. Another one is as an influence on political
behavior. A third one is as an influence on military strategy and military policy and principles.

The first one, the one relating to morality, includes two volumes on sexual behavior. The first volume is entitled, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male, with the authors being Alfred C. Kinsey, Wardell B. Pomeroy, Clyde E. Martin, published in 1948. The second one, entitled, Sexual Behavior in the Human Female, the authors being Alfred C. Kinsey, Wardell B. Pomeroy, Clyde E. Martin, Paul H. Gebhart, published in 1953.

In the foreword of these books, it is stated that a grant was made to make these studies possible through the Committee for Research in Problems of Sex of the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, and that the Rockefeller Foundation made the grant.

Professor Kinsey, in connection with his first volume, stated or reiterated or emphasized that he was merely interested in finding the fact of human sexual behavior. However, in the book (and numerous reviewers, have pointed this out) Professor Kinsey departs from mere statement of fact of human sexual behavior, and includes numerous interpretations, interpretations which do not follow from the type of data which he collected.

Mrs. Pfoert. Dr. Hobbs, may I ask you, these books that you are relating here, they all have to do with donations that have been made by foundations in publishing the books. Is that the reason you are enumerating the particular books?

Dr. Hobbs. In this case, the grant was apparently made so that the study could be conducted. In the second case, the grant was made so that the study could be conducted. The book was published by a commercial publisher. Whether any grant was made for purposes of publication, I do not know.

Mr. Hays. Dr. Hobbs, I am sure that I am safe in assuming that you are implying that these Kinsey reports are not very valuable.

Dr. Hobbs. I do not mean to imply that, sir. A tremendous amount of work was involved in conducting these studies.

Mr. Hays. But you do more or less imply that the scientific approach was not very good.

Dr. Hobbs. There were numerous statistical fallacies involved in both Kinsey reports; yes, sir.

Mr. Hays. You had no connection with the Kinsey project in any way, have you?

Dr. Hobbs. No, sir. I have written articles relating to them for the American Journal of Psychiatry, but no connection.

Mr. Hays. You have no desire to promote the sale of the book?

Dr. Hobbs. Oh, no.

Mr. Hays. The reason I ask you that is that all the publicity about Kinsey has sort of died down and now we are giving it a new impetus here, and I suppose that will sell a few thousand more books.

Dr. Hobbs. I have no financial interest in that or in any of the publishing companies, sir.

Mrs. Proser. Dr. Hobbs, you mean to imply that tax-free funds were used for the Kinsey report?

Dr. Hobbs. Yes.

Mrs. Proser. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. As I understand, you are raising a question about the scientific approach which Dr. Kinsey made in conducting this research in the first place, and then some of his comments and conclusions which he wrote into his report, which did not necessarily arise from the basis of his research which he had made?

Dr. HOBBS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And which might have damaging effect on the psychology of the people, particularly the young people of the country.

Dr. HOBBS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And at the same time undertaking to give to the country the overall impression that his findings and his comments were based upon a scientific study which had been made, as the basis of a grant.

Dr. HOBBS. Yes, sir; a scientific study of the type by implication which you have in physics and chemistry, and, therefore, its conclusions cannot be challenged.

The CHAIRMAN. Enumerating in the preface that it was made by a grant from one of the foundations giving it further prestige, possibly, that it was of scientific value, and so forth.

Dr. HOBBS. That would be correct. I have a statement to that effect to show that very type of influence, which I will come to a little bit later.

Mr. HAYS. Dr. Hobbs, I would like to ask you this: Is there anything in the preface of the Kinsey volumes that says that this is not to be taken as a general pattern of behavior for the whole country, but just merely for the 5,000 or 3,000, or whatever number of people it was that he studied?

Dr. HOBBS. In the first volume—that is the volume on males—Kinsey employed a technique of projecting his sample, which in that case, if my memory serves me correctly, involved 5,300 males—a technique of projecting that sample of 5,300 to the entire male population of the United States. So the impression throughout the book was conveyed, and conveyed very strongly, that the findings—and not only the findings but the interpretation of the findings—applied to all of the males of the United States.

In the second volume Kinsey does not use that technique, because it was—I would guess the reason he does not use it—because it was criticized by statisticians and others, including myself.

Mr. HAYS. Then you think he has been amenable to criticism?

Dr. HOBBS. The only acknowledgment that I know of that Professor Kinsey has made to criticism—he may have made others than this, but this is the only one I know of—where at one time he said one of the reasons why people don't interpret me correctly is because they believe that the title of my book is "Sexual Behavior of the Human Male," when actually the title is "Sexual Behavior in the Human Male." I could never quite grasp any deep significance of that difference, although Professor Kinsey's point apparently was made that there is in the field of taxonomy, where he came from before he took up sex, that type of title is generally employed.

The CHAIRMAN. So far as the reaction among the public is concerned, I think there is a very wide feeling that his whole research and his publications are just a bunch of claptrap that are not doing
anybody any good. It might be all right as a basis for some scientific
study, but I think many people feel that more good would be derived
from them if it is kept in a laboratory, instead of published as a com-
mercial enterprise.

Mr. Hays. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, in view of your views—and
I share them to some extent—I think perhaps we ought to quit mer-
chandising claptrap and forget about talking about that here, because
that is exactly what we are doing. If this hearing does not give the
sales to Kinsey’s book a big shot in the arm, then I do not know what
I am talking about. As I say, I have not seen anything in this paper
about Kinsey for months and months. Now we start all over again,
and a lot of people are going to say Congress is investigating Kinsey;
let us go out and buy his books and see what it is all about.

The Chairman. If it is pertinent, it seems to me, Mr. Hays, that the
original study particularly was made possible and was advanced by
a grant from one of the foundations. How many other studies of
comparable nature so far as value is concerned were made possible
by grants from foundations remains to be seen. I do not understand
that the witness is going to belabor this subject.

Dr. Hobbs. No, sir.

Mr. Hays. I would like to say on that score that there undoubtedly
have been according to the number of foundations that we said there
were in the opening of these hearings, there have been literally tens
of thousands of grants.

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, sir.

Mr. Hays. I just do not think we ought to pick out the sex grant
and concentrate our energies on that. Let us just sort of go along
and get on with something else.

Dr. Hobbs. I am sorry I did not make that clear, perhaps. But
what I am referring to are grants which have had the most influence
on the public. You can say there were thousands of grants. The gen-
eral public never hears of the findings of, say, 99 percent of those
thousands. I wish to cite some which the general public does hear
of for which the grants have involved a great deal of money.

Mr. Hays. Doctor, right there, are not the findings of all these
grants published probably?

Dr. Hobbs. Many of them are, of course.

Mr. Hays. And if the public decides to look over this one, there
is not much we can do about it. We might say that is a bad character-
istic on the part of the public to be so curious about it, but there is
nothing this committee can do about it.

Mr. Womser. Mr. Chairman, may I interject one thing? Maybe
I am anticipating, but I think Dr. Hobbs will bring out that in the
case of the Kinsey report, which he deems, I believe, a mistaken piece
of work in one sense, was taken up by various elements in the public
and even made the basis for a demand for legislation that our legal
and social practices be changed. I think it has enormous importance
and impact in that connection.

Mr. Hays. Let me say to you, Mr. Womser, that knowing what
little I know about legislation, from having served in two different
legislative bodies, I would say that is a subject that most legislators
will shy far away from and I do not think you need to get too much
excited about it.
Mr. Goodwin. Is it not a fact, Doctor, if you know, that the sale of both of the Kinsey volumes is very disappointing?

Dr. Hoober. I do not know the sales figures.

In relation to evaluation in the Kinsey volumes, references to socially approved patterns of sexual behavior are frequently referred to as rationalization. That is, the socially approved patterns of sexual behavior throughout the Kinsey works are referred to in terms of ridicule, as being mere rationalization, and justifications for types of behavior which by implication are not the best or even the most desirable.

Socially condemned forms of sexual behavior and criminal forms of sexual behavior are usually in the Kinsey volumes referred to as normal, or normal in the human animal.

The presentation of moral codes, codes of sexual behavior, is such that they are contrasted with what Kinsey calls normal mammalian behavior, which could give the impression, and it gave the impression to a number of reviewers, that things which conform to the socially approved codes of sexual conduct are rationalizations, not quite right, while things which deviate from it, such as homosexuality, are normal, in a sense right.

Mr. Hays. I would like to get that a little straighter. As I say, I am working at a disadvantage never having read these volumes. You are saying now that Kinsey says homosexuality is normal?

Dr. Hoober. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Possibly I should reserve this observation when representatives of the foundations concerned are before the committee, but what disturbs me, professor, is why a foundation whose funds are made available by the people and the Government in foregoing taxes, or at least some 90 percent of the funds are made available, why the people foregoing the taxes which they otherwise would receive, which you and I make up, why a foundation should be making grants for a study of this nature. It may have sufficient scientific value to justify it, but it certainly is a project that I, as Mr. Hays indicates, that the Government itself would not undertake to make the funds available to sponsor the project. Then why should some agency whose funds are made available by the Government foregoing the taxes in turn sponsor a project that has at least such a great question and aura of mystery surrounding it?

Dr. Hoober. Sir, in respect to a grant for the first volume, I should say there should have been a good deal of skepticism, but I can see where the members of the foundations could feel—do not mistake me. Professor Kinsey is a very able man, he had a very good background in physical science, in biology, specifically in taxonomy, and he is an extremely hard worker.

The Chairman. If you will permit an interjection, all I have heard about Professor Kinsey is very favorable.

Dr. Hoober. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. As a professor and in his field, that he is very capable. The question is whether he roamed beyond his field when he projected himself into this study under the grants made by the foundation.

Mr. Hays. What you are saying, Mr. Chairman, is that he is an expert on wasps.

Dr. Hoober. A particular kind of wasp.
Mr. Hays. I want to go back to this business. I am frankly quite disturbed about this statement. I have always been under the impression that homosexuality was a disease. Now you say that Kinsey makes the flat statement that it is normal behavior.

Dr. Hobbs. In the context of the presentation he refers to human sexual normality in terms of the human animal, normal in other anthropoids. These are all quotes. Usual mammalian behavior, biologic normality. Perfectly natural and humanly inevitable. That last one, I think—I am not positive about this—specifically along with the others related to homosexuality.

Mr. Hays. As I follow you now, you are lifting a group of words and just mentioning them off, and saying that they were used through the book. What I want to know is, did he or did he not say homosexuality is normal? If he did, I think then we are on safe ground. If he did not, let us say that.

Dr. Hobbs. In the context of the presentation these terms were used more than 100 times. I am not picking on an occasional term. These terms were used over and over again in the first volume.

Mr. Hays. I am asking you a simple question. Did he or did he not—you can answer by either yes or no—did he or did he not say homosexuality is normal behavior?

Dr. Hobbs. I would have to get the volume and the exact reference.

Mr. Hays. I thought a moment ago that you made the statement that he said that. At least you left me with that impression.

Dr. Hobbs. If I said that it was a misinterpretation. The implication throughout the book in the context of normal mammalian behavior, and so on, the implication which is likely to be left in the minds of most readers is the homosexuality and other forms of socially condemned forms of sexual behavior are normal. Normal in the mammalian sense.

Mr. Hays. In other words, you are saying he left that implication but he did not say so flatly?

Dr. Hobbs. The statement may be in the book. I would not say definitely that it is, or is not.

Mr. Hays. I think it is bad if he left the implication, but I think it is a lot worse if he said so flatly.

Dr. Hobbs. I agree with you.

The Chairman. But the quotations which you have just read, professor, which are explanations which he gives in the book, certainly would agree the normality of such behavior.

Mr. Hays. Very definitely and repeatedly.

Mrs. Prosser. Dr. Hobbs, I understood that the purpose of the hearings of this committee was to investigate the donations and grants of tax-exempt foundations to un-American activities or subversive organization. I was wondering what bearing this Kinsey report has on this angle of our hearings.

Dr. Hobbs. My understanding—it may be incorrect—was that there was an interest in whether these grants result in studies and publications which in a significant way affect political activity or military activity or moral activity.

Mr. Wormser. May I interject, if I may, Mr. Chairman, to suggest to Mrs. Prosser that Dr. Hobbs hardly is in a position to testify what the investigation covers. I think the committee itself would have to determine that.
Mrs. Pfost. I can realize that, but we seem to have gotten over to the Kinsey report and have stayed on it for quite some time.

Mr. Hayes. Mr. Wormser, right there, you and I have had numerous conversations and we always wind up agreeing that this committee did not set out to investigate sex.

Mr. Wormser. There is no question about that.

Mr. Hayes. We are spending a lot of time on that. So we got sex in the back door. That is going to be good headlines.

Mr. Koch. Emphasized by questions.

Mr. Wormser. May I make this explanation. Professor Hobbs has written a book in which he has discussed what he called "sciicism." I still would like him to explain that word. The word relates to research and the type of writing in the social sciences which is financed widely by foundations and it has certain, according to Dr. Hobbs and his book, derogatory effects on our society. It seems to me that is a proper subject for investigation. The Kinsey report is one of the examples of a piece in one sense anyway, a mistaken investigation which has had derogatory effects.

The Chairman. My feeling would be, Mrs. Pfost, that the committee does have full authority to investigate the grants which any of the foundations may have made to determine what the effect of these grants may have been. However, I think your question is very appropriate in indicating that we ought not to let ourselves get too far on the byroad.

Mr. Goodwin. It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, we ought to let the doctor go ahead and develop his testimony. So far as I am concerned, I will keep in the background any interest I have in this matter.

The Chairman. If it is agreeable with the committee, I think it would be in the interest of good procedure to permit Dr. Hobbs to proceed with the development of his thesis until we feel abused.

Mr. Hayes. Just before he goes on, I am going to insist that we clear up this remark of the associate counsel, which I think he put in there deliberately to indicate I have an undue interest in this matter. As you know, I told you in the beginning that we better leave Kinsey clear out of this hearing one way or another, because I do not think this committee is competent to rule on Kinsey or the subject that he studied. I do not want any members of the staff to be trying to put me in a bad light. As a matter of fact, as far as that is concerned, I do not think any can, even if they try, but I am going to make it plain right here that I am not going to sit idly by and let it happen.

While I am on the subject, the record might as well show that there is no minority staff, that the minority is sitting here alone. If we try to protect anybody that we think is being persecuted, we are still alone, because the staff and the majority are all of the same opinion. I am trying to be openminded about the whole thing.

Mr. Goodwin. Mr. Chairman, I think the record will probably show that any buildup that has been given Mr. Kinsey this morning has been done by the committee.

The Chairman. I think possibly that Professor Hobbs would have been very restrained insofar as I am able to observe from what he said so far, and I do not think the development by the committee applies to any one member of the committee; it applies to all of us.
Mr. Wormser, Mr. Chairman, may I say something to Mr. Hays. I tried to make clear to him in person at a talk we had that insofar as I personally am concerned as counsel, I more than welcome his examination of witnesses. I am delighted to have him examine them as freely as he wishes. I am not on the committee; I am only counsel; but I want him to understand counsel's position.

The Chairman. You may proceed, Mr. Hobbs.

Dr. Hobbs. Thank you, sir. Perhaps this is not in context. I don't know. But what I am trying to illustrate is the manner in which studies can influence important aspects of human behavior. I don't mean to impugn Professor Kinsey's motives, nor the motives of the members of the foundations or anything of that type. I am merely saying that this can happen and this is an illustration of where it does happen.

For an illustration, in connection with the question of heterosexuality compared with homosexuality, Kinsey in the first volume has this statement:

It is only because society demands that there be a particular choice in the matter (of heterosexuality or homosexuality) and does not so often dictate one's choice of food or clothing.

He puts it in terms of it is just a custom which society demands.

In the second volume it is stressed, for example, that we object to adult molesters of children primarily because we have become conditioned against such adult molesters of children, and that the children who are molested become emotionally upset, primarily because of the old-fashioned attitudes of their parents about such practices, and the parents (the implication is) are the ones who do the real damage by making a fuss about it if a child is molested. Because the molester, and here I quote from Kinsey, "may have contributed favorably to their later sociosexual development." That is a molester of children may have actually, Kinsey contends, not only not harmed them, but may have contributed favorably to their later sociosexual development.

Especially emphasized in the second volume, the volume on females, is the supposed beneficial effects of premarital sexual experiences. Such experiences, Kinsey states:

provide an opportunity for the females to learn to adjust emotionally to various types of males.

That is on page 266 of the volume on females.

In addition, on page 327 he contends that premarital sexual experience may well contribute to the effectiveness of one's other nonsexual social relationships, and that many females—this is on page 115—will thus learn how to respond to sociosexual contacts.

On page 328, that it should contribute to the development of emotional capacities in a more effective way than if sexual experiences are acquired after marriage.

The avoidance of premarital sexual experience by females, according to Professor Kinsey, may lead to inhibitions which damage the capacity to respond, so much that these inhibitions may persist after years of marriage, "if, indeed, they are ever dissipated." That is from page 330.

So you get a continued emphasis on the desirability of females engaging in premarital sexual behavior. In both of these volumes
...there is a persistent emphasis, a persistent questioning of the traditional codes, and the laws relating to sexual behavior. Professor Kinsey may be correct or he may be incorrect, but when he gives the impression that the findings are scientific in the same sense as the findings in physical science, then the issue becomes not a matter of whether he as a person is correct or incorrect, but of the impression which is given to the public, which can be quite unfortunate.

As an illustration of this impression, there is a volume which came out this year called Sex Life of the American Woman and the Kinsey Report, which was edited by one Albert Ellis, and published in 1954. In this volume an attorney—shall I give his name; it is not particularly a flattering reference?

The CHAIRMAN. Unless there is something to be accomplished by it, I see no purpose to it.

Dr. Hobbs. I will omit these names, but if you want them I can supply them. An attorney writing in this volume says this:

It may sound strange to say that the most encouraging note about the new Kinsey report is its indication that more and more women are beginning to commit more and more sex crimes.

People get to think that this is a good thing if women commit more and more sex crimes.

Then from the same volume here are a series of statements from a prominent clergyman, and again I would prefer not to identify him, but can if you wish. He comes very, very close to comparing the Kinsey findings and the Kinsey study with religion.

Looking for truths, mathematical, historical, artistic, sexual, any and every kind of truth is a form of religious devotion. This questioning of the world is only one kind of worship, of course, but it is one to which we are enjoined. It is a devotional life involving laboratories and libraries, interviews, and the IBM.

This is by a clergyman, and it comes to be almost a religion or substitute for religion.

He says:

These (referring to Kinsey's findings) results are the facts with which the moralist will have to work and build.

Do you want the page numbers on these citations, if anybody wants to check them?

The CHAIRMAN. It would not hurt to give the page numbers.

Mr. Hobbs. The first reference was on page 79, and the second one on page 80. The reference by the attorney was on page 183.

Another one, also, by the clergyman:

Yet we cannot go back to the legalistic morality which has prevailed so long. That has really outlived its usefulness if the Kinsey books are right.

Here you get a man who is undoubtedly sincere, but unfortunately like many of us when we are in areas where we are not expert, quite gullible. Assuming this is published and labeled "science," therefore it must be right; even clergymen have to go along with it and change concepts of morality.

That legalistic conformism has outlived its usefulness by about 2,000 years, if the New Testament is right. It is an emeritus ethic, due at least for honorable retirement.

That is on pages 92 and 93.

Just prior to the publication of the first Kinsey volume, the one on males, there was an article in Harper's magazine presenting the
type of conclusion which Kinsey was going to bring out, written by one Albert Deutsch. He described the general type of Kinsey’s conclusions, that they were shocking, that they would change the laws, that they would change attitudes toward morality, and so on, and he had this statement in there, which I think is particularly pertinent to this inquiry:

So startling are its revelations, so contrary to what civilized man has been taught for generations, that they would be unbelievable but for the impressive weight of the scientific agencies backing the survey.

That is the unfortunate thing that you have involved here. I do not mean that the foundations meant it to be that way. I do not mean even that Professor Kinsey meant it to be that way. But unfortunately the public does get that impression—that this is something that is final and infallible, which you cannot and should not question. I think that is extremely unfortunate.

Mr. Wormser. Dr. Hobbs, would you take the time to give quickly 1 or 2 illustrations, starting at page 99 of your book, of reactions to the first Kinsey report? I think some of them are particularly important. There are 1 or 2 which resulted in advocacy of legislation to change sex laws. There is one from the Scientific Monthly on page 99. There is another from Professor McIver, and a third one from R. L. Dickinson.

Dr. Hobbs. Yes.

The Scientific Monthly is an impressive and deserved title for a sound and scholarly magazine. In the December 1948 issue a review of the Kinsey report appeared in this magazine. This review was written by a respected psychologist who did state some of the limitations inherent in the Kinsey sample, but then went on to minimize these limitations. He described the report as an outstanding achievement, which used basically sound methods, which led to trustworthy results. Not content to stop with description and assessment of the method, the reviewer did precisely what the Kinsey report seems designed to lead people to do, stating that it recorded “tremendous implications for scientists, legislators, physicians, and public officers.” He contended that the report “shows clearly that our current laws do not comply with the biologic facts of normal sexual behavior.”

In other words, the implication is that the laws should be changed to conform with biology. If you have a biological urge, the law should permit you to express that biological urge as it is demanding on you.

This review described the final result as “one of the most outstanding contributions of social and biological science to the welfare of millions.”

Then in another type of review, this was entitled, “About the Kinsey Report,” edited by Donald Porter Geddes and Enid Curie. Eleven experts contribute observations about the Kinsey report. These experts, and some of them of great renown, included psychiatry, professor of sociology, anthropology, law, psychology, economics, and anatomy. They react in similar fashion. Some of them simply do not know enough about scientific method and statistics to evaluate Kinsey’s report, and these accepted without qualifications. Others have a suspicion that it is unscientific, but say in effect that it doesn’t matter, the important thing is that it be publicized and serve as a basis for reform of sexual behavior and of laws which deal with violations of sexual mores.
Mr. Wormser. Dr. Hobbs, I do not think you need to take the time to do more. There are other similar citations in your book at pages 99 to, I believe, 102. I think you might here go to another subject.

Dr. Hobbs. The point I wanted to make here is that this is the type of thing which can, and, I think you will agree, does in some measure at least influence an important aspect of human behavior. It is something that we should be extremely careful about, careful to a degree which was not indicated in the publicizing of books such as the Kinsey report. I don't mean to put any onus on Professor Kinsey. He certainly worked hard, and sincerely, at it, and has an impressive collection of data. But the end result is quite unfortunate.

The second reference I would like to make is to a book written by Stuart Chase, called, The proper Study of Mankind published in 1948 by Harpers. Here is the publisher's blurb on it, which states under a title, “How This Book Came To Be Written,” and I quote from the publisher’s blurb:

The story of the origin and development of the proper study of mankind highlight its importance and suggests its quality. All his life Stuart Chase has been keenly interested in social problems as his many highly successful books bear witness. His growing anxiety about the state of the world and the dilemmas of the atomic age was challenged some 8 years ago when he was asked by Donald Young of the Social Science Research Council and Charles Dollard of the Carnegie Corp. to undertake the preparation of a study which would—

and this is in quotes—

“run a kind of chain and compass line across the whole front of the sciences devoted to human relations.”

Then further on it says:

It (the book) was planned and developed in consultation with dozens of social scientists in all parts of the country, and Messrs. Young and Dollard followed the project step by step to its completion.

So that here is an illustration of a book which was not only the result of a grant, but which directly involved members of the foundations, and which had their specific endorsement.

Mr. Hays. Dr. Hobbs, I have a couple of questions. I do not know how long you are going to be here, and I think it is important that we get them in. I do not know that this is any better place than perhaps later on or even earlier.

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, sir.

Mr. Hays. In view of the fact that there must be literally thousands of professors all over the country, I am interested in how you came to be here today. Did you approach the staff or did the staff approach you, or just how was the contact made?

Dr. Hobbs. As I remember the sequence, I believe it was Mr. Norman Dodd who wrote to me saying that he had read my book and was very much interested in it, and that he was going to or had ordered copies for the research group and then later on he wrote to me saying he would be in Philadelphia, and would I meet him and have dinner with him. I did. I believe it was at that time he asked or gave me a general outline of the type of thing that the committee was trying to do and asked me if I would care to contribute to it.

Mr. Hays. In other words, then, the staff approached you. You did not write in asking to testify?

Dr. Hobbs. No, no.

Mr. Hays. Have you ever worked on a foundation project?
Dr. Hobbs. I was with the Princeton office of population research in the early part of the war before I went into the service. I do not know frankly whether that was a foundation. It was working under the Department of State. I don't know whether grants were involved or not.

Mr. Hays. In other words, you were never directly involved in one where you got a grant?

Dr. Hobbs. I have received grants, yes, sir.

Mr. Hays. You have received grants?

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, sir. At the end of the war, the Social Science Research Council had what they call demobilization awards, which were for the purpose of enabling people who had been in the service to help them to get back into the swing of things, and in a sense at least sort of make up for lost time. Donald Young approached me and said in effect, "Why don't you try for one of these awards," and I did. The grant was the demobilization award for the summer of 1946 and the summer of 1947. It was in the amount of $1,000 for each of those summers so I could work on a book.

Mr. Hays. What foundation was that from?

Dr. Hobbs. The Social Science Research Council.

Mr. Hays. Have you ever applied to any of these foundations for a grant that has been turned down?

Dr. Hobbs. No.

Mr. Hays. You have never been turned down?

Dr. Hobbs. No, sir.

Mr. Hays. I want you to get the impression, and I hope you will, that any questions I may ask you are not unfriendly.

Dr. Hobbs. Surely.

Mr. Hays. I am just interested in some of the background here. Of course, I am sure you realize by this time that your appearing this morning and the testimony that you have given so far will get your name in a lot of papers and places where it has probably never been before.

Dr. Hobbs. I might say that my name has been in a lot of papers already.

Mr. Hays. I am sure it has.

Dr. Hobbs. Frankly, it does not matter too much.

Mr. Hays. It is going to be in all of them from this testimony today; let me put it that way. That fact would not have influenced you in your choice of this particular book to discuss?

Dr. Hobbs. No. Frankly, I am interested in the type of studies I make in teaching. To put it frankly, this is obviously an emotional strain and so on, and I am taking time off from my work.

Mr. Hays. I do not know whether you observed it or not, but I think this is interesting, and I think it is interesting to you. The last book you mentioned, what was the name of that?

Dr. Hobbs. If you want to, we will keep the title down.

Mr. Hays. No, I want the title of it.

Dr. Hobbs. It is "Social Problems in Scientism."

Mr. Hays. Not your book. Did you not just mention a book?

Dr. Hobbs. Stuart Chase, "The Proper Study of Mankind."

Mr. Hays. Did you observe that did not create much of a ripple among the reporters when you mentioned that book, but on the Kinsey book they all made notes.
Dr. Hobbs. I am sorry. We have to face it, sex is interesting—I am not sorry that it is that way; it is a fact.

Mr. Hays. I do not think you need to commit yourself about whether you are sorry or not. I certainly did not mean to make any inference. I just want to point out that this is the thing that is going to get the news. What I am getting at is, that did not influence you to use that particular one for an illustration?

Dr. Hobbs. No. You see, I had written two critical analyses of the Kinsey books for the American Journal of Psychiatry, and they did, when they were issued, get a lot of publicity, and so on. So that is the context in which they are significant, I think.

Mr. Hays. If what you say about the Kinsey Report is true, and I certainly have no reason to doubt your statements, I think it is unfortunate if we have encouraged the sale of it any. But since your book is critical of it, maybe you ought to mention the title of it again, and maybe we might encourage the sale of it a little.

The Chairman. I have grave doubts whether what he has said about the Kinsey Report today would promote the sale of it very much.

Mr. Hays. You would be surprised at the number of curious people that will want to go and read it.

The Chairman. You may go ahead.

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, sir. One question on this Proper Study of Man-kind would be why was a man like Stuart Chase selected. Again I do not mean to impugn Mr. Chase, because he is an excellent writer. He is a very good popular writer.

Mr. Hays. Right there now, I am interested. You say why was a man like Stuart Chase selected. Who is he? Give us a little background about him.

Dr. Hobbs. He has written numerous books which are listed on this blurb: The Tragedy of Waste; Your Money's Worth; Men and Machines; The Economy of Abundance; Rich Land, Poor Land; Idle Men, Idle Money; Where is the Money Coming From? I think that would still be up to date.

Mr. Hays. If he wrote Where is the Money Coming From? he plagiarized former Congressman Rich. He had a copyright on that.

Dr. Hobbs. There is another one more recent than this which I reviewed for one of the journals published after the war, "For This We Fought," and the usual line that we were fighting for economic gains, we were fighting for better housing and things like that. I had just come out of the service. I had not met anyone who was fighting for a better house or anything like that. So I wondered why a man like Stuart Chase, who has in his work definitely indicated his leanings toward collectivism and social planning and that sort of thing, why he was chosen.

Mr. Hays. In other words, you are saying he is a sort of leftwinger; is that it?

Dr. Hobbs. Sir, to answer that, may I cite from another book written by one of your colleagues, Congressman Shafer, this is the book called "The Turning of the Tides," written by Paul W. Shafer, Congressman Shafer, I understand, and one John Howland Snow, and there is a reference in there to Stuart Chase and several citations from his writings:

In 1921 the Intercollegiate Socialist Society was ready for the next organizational step, and this was signalized by a change of name. The 16-year-old ISS in that year became the League for Industrial Democracy.
The LID was a membership society organized for the specific purpose of "education for a new social order based on production for use and not for profit."

Under its new name, the original Intercollegiate Socialist Society continued under the joint direction of Harry W. Laidler and Norman Thomas. The league's first president was Robert Morse Lovett, a professor of literature at the University of Chicago, and an editor of the New Republic. Charles P. Steinmetz was a vice president, and Stuart Chase was treasurer. One of its lecturers was Paul R. Porter, later with the ECA in Greece. The field secretary was Paul Blanshard. In 1926 one of the directors was Louis Budenz—a man of whom you have heard.

Mr. Hays. A sort of eminently respectable repentant Communist.

Dr. Hobbs. Yes.

Mr. Hays. A professional witness, too, isn't he?

Dr. Hobbs. He has appeared testifying before committees. I have read some of the testimony.

Mr. Hays. I do not know whether he is one, but my good friend, Martin Dies, was saying the other day that he had a string of Communists that he could depend on any time, but television ruined all of them.

Dr. Hobbs. This book also refers to Stuart Chase, addressing the department of superintendents of the National Educational Association, at its Atlantic City meeting on February 25, 1935, and said:

If we have even a trace of liberalism in our natures, we must be prepared to see an increasing amount of collectivism, Government interference, centralization of economic control, social planning. Here again the relevant question is not how to get rid of Government interference, but how to apply it for the greatest good of the greatest number.

The citation is from the National Education Association, April 25, pages 107, 110.

In 1934 Stuart Chase declared that an abundance economy requires—

the scrapping of outworn political boundaries and of constitutional checks and balances where the issues involved are technical.

That also is from the National Education Association Journal of May 1934, page 147.

Mr. Hays. Are you a member of the National Education Association?

Dr. Hobbs. No, sir. The National Education Association is for elementary and secondary school teachers primarily. College teachers ordinarily would not belong to it. One question here is why was Stuart Chase chosen when his leanings were definitely known and why not pick some other person, or if you do pick Chase, and a case could be made for picking him by virtue of his extremely good writing talent, if you do pick him, then you would have to be very careful that he did not slant the material too much in ways that you would know he is likely to. You have these two members of the foundation, Donald Young and Charles Dollard, who presumably would tend to modify or eliminate any leaning which you might tend to find in the book. That did not happen.

Here, sir, I will go back to the question you raised earlier about giving the reader the impression that the physical sciences and the
social sciences are very much the same. Here is the type of thing you get in Stuart Chase.

What had the anthropologist, psychologist, sociologist to tell us about such problems that was in any way comparable to what the physicist and the medical men had to tell us about thermodynamics and filterable viruses, laws and principles and techniques which a man would rely on? So when it was suggested by Donald Young of the Social Science Research Council and Charles Dollard of the Carnegie Corp. that I run a kind of chain-and-compass line across the whole front of the sciences devoted to human relations, I was immediately interested in connection with the deep and fundamental quest for certainty which had troubled me for many years.

My first conferences were with Young and Dollard, who have followed the project step by step and given me invaluable help. Before accepting the assignment at all, I consulted Raymond Fosdick, who has planned and encouraged many studies in the application of science to human relations, and he urged me to attempt it.

Mr. Hays. Professor, to keep this thing clear, would you identify Young and Dollard a little more?

Dr. Hobbs. As identified in the book and advertising——

Mr. Hays. What foundations are they with?

Dr. Hobbs. As stated, Donald Young of the Social Science Research Council, and Charles Dollard of the Carnegie Corp.

Mr. Hays. As I get it so far, is this Stuart Chase accused of being a Communist or anything?

Dr. Hobbs. No, but his leanings. As I said, according to The Turning of the Tides, he was a member of the League for Industrial Democracy, which was Socialist, or at least quasi-Socialist.

Mr. Hays. Is that on the Attorney General's list or anything? I never heard of it.

Dr. Hobbs. I frankly do not know whether it is or not. I am not saying this as a matter of subversion, but a matter of definite leaning which was indicated in the background.

Mr. Hays. We cannot criticize a man for his leanings, can we?

Dr. Hobbs. No, sir.

Mr. Hays. A fellow might lean the other way, and as far as I am concerned, he has a perfect right to lean that way.

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, sir; but if the leanings are known, the question arises: Should the foundations lend their prestige and works to foster those leanings in the eyes of the public or at least the portion of the public which reads books of this kind?

Mr. Hays. Do you suppose that the intellectual outlook of the individual foundation member might have anything to do with that?

Dr. Hobbs. It readily could.

Mr. Hays. If you were a member of a board of directors of a foundation and somebody came to you with a request for a grant to promulgate the ideas of William McKinley, would you think that would be a worthy subject for a grant?

Dr. Hobbs. No, sir.

Mr. Hays. Why? He is a fellow statesman of mine.

Dr. Hobbs. William McKinley did not have the title of a social scientist.

Mr. Hays. He had a lot of ideas on social science.

Mr. Goodwin. He had a lot of ideas which are still pretty good, too.

Mr. Hays. I would not want to say that he did not have any ideas that were not pretty good. I think his philosophy of politics, and that of his manager, shall we say, to use a kind word, Mark Hanna, have
become pretty outdated. Even his principle of campaigning would not stand up in 1954. The front porch was good then. I wish you could campaign that way now. It would be better maybe for the candidate.

Mr. Goodwin. You can stop this colloquy, Doctor, if you will go forward.

Mr. Hays. Right there, I do not want you to arrogate to yourself any right to stop me from making a speech here, Mr. Goodwin.

Mr. Goodwin. All right, Doctor.

Dr. Hobbs. Then he goes on to say, after having these conferences with Young and Dollard, and after they had requested that he do this work, that he went to Washington to meet a group of social scientists who had been active in war work, who had influenced (and he cites examples), Comdr. Alexander Leighton talked of his experiences with Japanese Americans in the Arizona desert, and his work in Japan. Others outlined their work in selecting "cloak and dagger men," for the OSS. In manpower analysis, economic controls for inflation, the selection of officers for the Army. Samuel Stauffer described how he felt the pulse of 10 million GI's. Actually I may interject Chase said 10 million. In the volume on the American soldier which he refers to here, it was a half million rather than 10 million. I repeat the quote, "how he felt the pulse of 10 million GI's, via the Army studies of troop attitudes and opinion which he largely engineered."

Then he goes on to say that "I am grateful to J. Frederick Dewhurst, John Dollard, John Gardner, Pendleton Herring, Ralph Linton, H. A. Murray, Talcott Parsons, Don K. Price, and Paul Webbink for a reading of the manuscript, but I am, of course, responsible for the final draft."

This book, Chase says, is an attempt to explore the possibilities of applying the scientific method which has proved so successful in problems of matter and energy to problems of human relations. The methods in use by many statesmen today——

Mr. Hays. Dr. Hobbs, would you mind just holding up there a minute.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mrs. Prost. Mr. Chairman, I was going to ask you a question. Since we are this morning investigating authors and the effect that their publications have upon the public in general and it has been alleged that TV and radio have also been used for those purposes to a great extent, especially by such foundations as Facts Forum that is backed, it is alleged, by Mr. Hunt, down in Texas, I was wondering whether or not if such allegations are true, that we intend in these hearings to investigate those foundations also?

The Chairman. The preliminary study has been made of a great number of foundations to determine the general character of their operations and a considerable number of them will be called, and there is no indisposition on the part of the staff, so far as I know, for the chairman to have the representative of the Hunt Foundation appear before the committee. As a matter of fact, I had a telegram from the man who handles the Facts Forum programs stating that they would like to appear.

Mr. Hays. In that connection, we discussed yesterday, Mr. Wormser, about getting a series of their scripts of their radio program.

Mr. Koch. Yes, we are going to get them for you.
Mrs. Prost. I had not been brought up to date on this.

Mr. Hays. That was late yesterday afternoon, and I did not know whether the staff had done anything at all. I want to make it clear as long as they bring in people on their television show and make it perfectly clear this is John Doe and Richard Roe or somebody else and that what he says is his opinion, that is one thing; I have no objection to that.

There are a lot of programs that do that, and a lot of people that think they are all right, and some they think are not. That is America. The program I am interested in is where they purport to give both side of the thing themselves. One man says I will give you the pros and cons. The radio program is what I am particularly interested in, and those are the scripts I want to get hold of.

Mr. Wormser. You want to see the scripts before we bring them on.

Mr. Hays. Definitely.

The Chairman. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon in this same room.

(Thereupon at 11:55 a.m., a recess was taken until 2 p.m., the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

Professor Hobbs, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF DR. A. H. HOBBS, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA—Resumed

The Chairman. The oath that was administered earlier is continued.

Dr. Hobbs. I should like to go back and complete a quotation which I started this morning. Another quotation which I am quoting to illustrate—

The Chairman. Professor, will you please keep in mind that we do not have the amplifiers this afternoon?

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, sir.

This is another quotation which is designed to show the attempt to identify social science as being identical or at least very similar to physical science. I quote from Stuart Chase again:

This book is an attempt to explore the possibility of applying the scientific method which has proved so successful in problems of matter and energy to the problems of human relations. The methods in use by many leaders and statesmen today leave something to be desired. Are there any more dependable ways to promote well-being and survival?

The implication there is that through this scientific method you can supplant or at least add to the methods used by statesmen.

Another quotation to the same effect:

Social science might be defined on a high level as the application of the scientific method to the study of human relations. What do we know about those relations that is dependable? The "wisdom of the ages" obviously is not good enough as the state of the postwar world bears eloquent witness.

Another one to the same effect:

The scientific method does not tell us how things ought to behave but how they do behave. Clearly, there is no reason why the method should not be applied to the behavior of men as well as to the behavior of electrons.
All through this, if I may interject, giving the reader the impression that these two methods are the same. The quotation continues:

There are social experiments and physical experiments, and the scientific method can be used most advantageously in both.

I would like to interject again, there are social experiments and there are physical experiments, but I would like to point out in the physical experiments you are dealing with electrons and things of that type. With the social experiments you are dealing with human beings and it makes quite a different situation.

On the level we are discussing, there is no difference between social science and natural science. On this level, we define social science once more as the use of the scientific method to solve the questions of human relations. Science—and the word “science” is in quotes—goes with the method, not with the subject matter.

I wanted to establish that in Mr. Chase’s book, which was sponsored and in which he was assisted by members of the foundations, the definite implication was made repeatedly to give the readers the impression that there was no substantial difference between social science and natural science. As for the ideas in this book, I would say further that there is not a balanced presentation of ideas.

There is, for example, stress on cultural determinism. Cultural determinism is the notion which is fostered in much of social science that what you do, what you are, what you believe, is determined by the culture. The implication of that is that man is essentially a puppet of the culture. A further implication would be since he is a puppet he is to be given neither blame nor credit for what he does.

I cite these things to indicate how these ideas can spread out and have very significant implications.

Mr. Chase stresses the cultural concept throughout the book. I will just cite 1 or 2 instances of this:

Finally, the culture concept gives us hope that many of our problems can be solved. If people are bad by virtue of their “blood,” or their genes or their innate characters, there would not be much we could do about it, but if people are basically all right, and the problem lies primarily in an adjustment of culture patterns, or to culture patterns, perhaps a great deal can be done about it.

That is, you get the idea that by manipulating society, you can change not only the society, but change the people within the society. This is the concept of cultural determinism. It has been fostered primarily by a number of cultural anthropologists. The most influential book in this area is Ruth Benedict’s Patterns of Culture.

Mr. HAYS. Doctor, do you think there is no validity whatsoever in that theory?

Dr. HOMES. Sir, it is not a matter of there being no validity whatsoever. It is a matter of a theory of this type being presented to the public with the weight of the foundations behind it, as though it were the scientifically proved fact. In that context, it is not correct.

Mr. HAYS. But I am not so sure that anyone reading those paragraphs that you have read would get that implication. I don’t think that I would if I were directed into it. I mean, let’s use a more simple example: Say a couple with an infant were in the jungles of Africa, somewhere, and something happened and the father and mother were killed, and this child was brought up by an uncivilized tribe. It
would certainly react the same way the uncivilized tribe would, in
general, wouldn't it? I mean, it wouldn't react as a member of our
civilization.

Dr. Hobbs. Sir, we have had those examples in social-science text-
books for many, many years. Children purportedly—and these are
offered, too, as scientific evidence—purportedly raised by wolves, pur-
portedly raised by swine, and you may remember the Gazelle Boy.

Mr. HAYS. Let's not change my example.

Dr. Hobbs. Would the culture affect him?

Mr. HAYS. What was that?

Dr. Hobbs. Is the question, "Does the culture affect you?"

The answer is obviously, "Yes." The question is not, "Does the cul-
ture affect you?" however, the question is, "Does the culture determine
without you having any control over that determination, your behav-
ior, your attitudes, your ideals, your sentiments, your beliefs?". It is
the difference, sir, between the culture affecting you, which it certainly
does, that is obvious, and the question: "Does culture determine your
behavior?"

Mr. HAYS. In other words, we are talking about a degree.

Dr. Hobbs. A matter of degree; yes, sir.

Mr. HAYS. Well, I don't know whether we can ever determine any-
thing much there or not. As you said earlier, you might argue until
doomsday about the degree of it.

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, sir. But this is cultural determinism. The con-
text of the Chase book is cultural determinism, not cultural influence.

The CHAIRMAN. However, from the list of books which you read,
which have been sponsored by foundations and some members of the
foundation staffs had collaborated on the books, I rather gathered the
impression that possibly the preponderance of the books which had
been sponsored and carried by the foundations, were promulgating the
theory along the lines that you have advanced here.

Dr. Hobbs. The ones which have been most highly publicized and
pushed stronger than the others.

Now and again, you will find publications of the foundations on the
other side. But they are ones that are few—not necessarily few, but
so far as the public is concerned they do not come in contact with those.

Mr. HAYS. Going back to the chairman's statement, he said that of
all the books whose titles you have read—as I followed you very
intently, you have just discussed two books; is that correct?

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, sir. I have taken up two volumes of Kinsey and
this Chase book.

Mr. HAYS. Actually 2, volumes I and II of Kinsey, and I by
another author.

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAYS. And all two of them do what the chairman said.

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, sir. These ones that I have taken up, yes, sir.

I may have misunderstood your question.

The CHAIRMAN. I was thinking you had referred to another, that
you made a summary statement in the very beginning and referred to
some other books.

Dr. Hobbs. I will, yes, sir, refer to another book which was actually
four volumes.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. You may proceed.
Dr. Hobbs. This quotation continues:

Theoretically, a society could be completely made over in something like 15 years, the time it takes to inculcate a new culture into a rising crop of youngsters.

If I may interject again, you see it is stronger, merely, than cultural influence. It is the idea that you can take over society by changing the culture, change the entire society and the people in it.

Mr. Hays. Don't you think you can do that to a significant extent?

Dr. Hobbs. George Orwell in a book called 1984 described how it could be done.

Mr. Hays. Let's not talk about anything theoretical that he says could be done. Let's take the period from 1933 to 1945, we will say. That is only 12 years. A fellow by the name of Hitler pretty significantly changed the whole German concept of civilization, did he not, or did he?

Dr. Hobbs. It definitely was in that direction. But I would say a more nearly apt analogy even than the Hitler one would be the Russian one, where they have deliberately, apparently, used these techniques, these same techniques to change the minds, to brainwash, create the ideas and sentiments in their people.

Mr. Hays. I agree with you about the Russian one.

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, sir.

Mr. Hays. The reason I used Hitler was because he did a job in a lesser amount of time, even, than the Russians did. Prior to 1933 he was considered to be more or less a clown and a boob, and so on, whoever you happened to be talking to you heard, "He isn't going to amount to anything." And certainly by legal means, of course, legal German means, he became the head of the state. And almost overnight you had the Hitler Youth and all of those, and you had a militant concept built up there that Germany was to rule the world, and you had all of these youngsters brainwashed and believing it as the Russians are doing with theirs.

Dr. Hobbs. It definitely was in that direction. But I would say that the Russians, and now they passed it on to the Chinese, have developed these techniques to a much more effective level. It, again, is a matter of degree, but I think they developed them to a very highly effective level.

Mr. Hays. Well, I wouldn't want to argue that point with you. I don't know whether their techniques are more effective than Hitler's or not. To me, as far as I am personally concerned, and this predates this investigation by a good many years—as a matter of fact, I was a little bit unpopular back in the early 1940's, when I said that to me there was no difference between Stalin and Hitler and their philosophies except the difference, perhaps, in title. One of them called it National Socialism and the other called it communism. But their aims and ultimate objectives and ultimate conclusions were about identical. I mean, they did about the same things to the people who lived under them and to the people they conquered.

Dr. Hobbs. Personally, I feel that the Communists have more effective techniques. The techniques are along these social science lines, so called.

Mr. Hays. They have had a longer time to develop them.

Dr. Hobbs. They have done within their context pretty well.
The Chairman. But when you see a pattern or what appears to be a pattern developing, to develop the people along the same lines that gave this result in Russia, not only Russia and Germany, but a number of other countries can be cited, also, it gives cause for concern. I assume that is the basis of the concern which you are expressing—

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, sir; exactly.

The Chairman. Of what you fear is going on as a result of your observations that you have made.

Dr. Hobbs. It is definitely along those lines; yes, sir.

Mr. Hays. Are you connecting this book, then, definitely with the Communist concept of brainwashing and saying that is happening here?

Dr. Hobbs. In some of these techniques, particularly the psychoanalytic technique, there are disturbing similarities in the approach, which if you read for example a book by Edward Hunter, Brainwashing in Red China, you find a series of disturbing similarities between the situation—not the situation as it exists now—but the direction we seem to be going in.

Mr. Hays. Are you disturbed at all by the brainwashing that Secretary Stevens got for 14 days, and do you see any similarity to this thing?

Dr. Hobbs. I would say there is certainly a difference in the technique and the finesse.

Mr. Hays. I will go along with the finesse. But I can't say that I see much difference in the technique.

Dr. Hobbs (reading):

But such a theory assumes that parents, nurses, teachers, have all been reeducated themselves, ready for the inculcating task which, as Euclid used to say, is absurd. But it helps, I think, to know that the trouble does not all come from an erring and variant human nature; it comes mostly from culture patterns, built into the plastic human nervous system.

He goes on with the heading:

Prepare now for a surprising universal. Individual talent is too sporadic and unpredictable to be allowed any important part in the organization of society. Social systems which endure are built on the average person who can be trained to occupy any position adequately if not brilliantly.

All of this, of course, goes back to Pavlov's dog, which he conditioned and then described his theory of conditioned reflexes. Then it leads into John B. Watson's theories of behaviorism, which were popular in the 1920's, which lead mothers to raise their children on a stopwatch schedule, afraid to pick their babies up if they cried. This was the science of that time.

Mr. Hays. Doctor, right there I want to agree with you about that. I remember that era pretty well. And I suppose that had Congress been so unoccupied at that time that it did not have anything better to do, it could have investigated that thing in the 1920's, but we sort of outgrew it, didn't we? I mean, we got over it. I mean, I lived through it and you lived through it, I guess. I didn't mean that to be funny. I am assuming you are old enough to have lived through it.

Dr. Hobbs. Sure.

The Chairman. May I interject?

Mr. Hays. Surely, go ahead.

The Chairman. It isn't the mere fact that this occurs, if it does occur, that disturbs me, but it is the fact that the foundations, and
There are some 6 to 7,900 of them in the United States, with a good many billions of dollars, 90 percent of the income of which is there because the Government, the people who pay the taxes, have foregone taxes on that income. That is, in effect, Government money. And it isn't the fact that a large percentage of the income of these foundations might be used to promote a certain ideology or certain line of culture or certain line of thinking which leads to the result which you have discussed in your exchange with Congressman Hays, but if any considerable amount of the funds of the foundations accumulated as a result of the sacrifices of the people should be used to that end, that, to me, is disturbing. As I understand it, that is one of the purposes of the committee, to find out whether that is being done, and the extent to which it is being done.

To my mind it is a very, very serious question. At the rate which the foundations have multiplied in the last few years as a result of our tax, not only our tax structure but the size of our tax levies, it is only reasonable to assume, looking only a very short way into the future, that a very substantial part of the wealth of the United States is going to be found in these tax-exempt foundations. Therefore, the public has an increasingly great interest, not only in the mere establishment of the taxation, but more importantly in its responsibility to see that the money from the foundations is not used for a purpose that is violative of the principles of government in which we believe and in which the Government itself devotes its interests in maintaining.

That isn't a question, it is just more or less expatiating, I presume, giving the basis for my interest and concern in this question.

Mr. Hays. Is that the end of your statement?

The Chairman. That is the end for the time being. You may proceed if there are no other comments.

Mr. Hays. Let me say this, that of course the public has a right to know what is being done with this tax-exempt money, but it seems to me, to use an old saying that is extant in my section of the country, that maybe we should not try to make a mountain out of a molehill.

As I recall Mr. Dodd's testimony, and I could not find the exact quotation in a hurry so I hesitate to use a figure, but I think he said something like 80 percent—or at least in excess of that—of these foundations had done grand work and that 90 percent of them had devoted practically all of their resources to cancer research and to various things like that.

If you will permit me to digress here, one of the people in the world that I have never been very fond of is Mr. Bevan, the former Health Minister of Great Britain; but I never have forgotten a thing that he said to a member of a congressional committee who was querying him in London one time. I happened to be there not as a member of the committee but as a guest.

They were talking about the British health scheme, or he was, and this member from the Midwest said, "Well, Mr. Minister, are the British people thoroughly satisfied with this health scheme?" and Mr. Bevan very quickly replied, "Until such time as medical science is able to confer immortality upon mankind, they will never be satisfied with any health plan."

That illustrates what I am driving at. Until such time as human beings become perfect, if we accept the doctor's premise that this particular book is bad and money should never have been granted, that is
his opinion, and maybe that of many others. If it is a mistake, just say it is a mistake. You cannot expect these foundations not to make any mistakes, and you cannot expect them to channel all of their funds into projects which would be approved, shall we say, by the Chicago Tribune or somebody who believes along that line. There are liable to be differences about it.

Mrs. Prost. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Dr. Hobbs what he thinks the percentage of money coming from foundations that is going into the type of books that you are speaking about, in comparison to the other extreme.

Dr. Hobbs. I would not know.

Mrs. Prost. You have no idea?

Dr. Hobbs. No.

Mrs. Prost. In other words, you are simply basing your testimony entirely upon two or three books that have been furthered, that the research has been paid for, by the foundations, and you are centering your testimony entirely upon that?

Dr. Hobbs. Yes. But it is more, I think more important than that, in that these are the books, and these types of books are the ones which reach a much wider audience than the vast majority of works sponsored and published by the foundations, that these are in a sense the crucial ones, and these, with few, if any exceptions, these crucial ones, are all in the same general direction.

So it is not a matter of counting the number of publications, nor is it even a matter of finding the percentage of money spent on one or the other. The issue, as I am trying to frame it here, is in what areas is the public most widely and significantly influenced by foundation-supported work in the social sciences?

Mr. Hays. I was just going to ask you in view of the last statement, is there some reason why this type of books get wider circulation?

Dr. Hobbs. Well, to answer in terms of the Kinsey report, there is an obvious reason. Sex is interesting. The proper study of mankind, Stuart Chase's book—your question would be: "Why would this get more publicity and more circulation than most other studies?"

Well, Stuart Chase is an excellent writer and it was highly publicized as being backed by the foundations and so on. It was put in the area of a trade book rather than of a specific piece of research.

Mr. Hays. What is the title of your volume?

Dr. Hobbs. Social Problems and Scientism.

Mr. Hays. Social Problems and Scientism?

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, sir.

Mr. Hays. Now, suppose the average man walks into a bookstore, and I guess not many of them do any more since television, not as many perhaps as we would like to have, and he sees two books on the shelves, one of them is Social Problems and Scientism and the other is Sexual Behavior of the Human Male, and he happens to pick up the latter one. Do you attach any special significance to that?

Dr. Hobbs. I would say it would be most unusual if he would make the other choice.

Mr. Hays. I think that is a good answer. I think you and I are in perfect agreement.

In other words, if what you wanted to do primarily in your book—and I am not sure it wasn't, I am trying not to put you in a bad light—
if what you primarily wanted to do was to sell your book, you would have left that very forbidding word “scientism” off the end of it and found some other title, would you not?

Dr. Hobbs. If I wanted to popularize it?

Mr. Hays. Yes.

Dr. Hobbs. Of course I would have given it a popular title, something that sounded good.

Mr. Hays. And that might have more to do with reaching a wider audience than any other one thing, than the contents of it ever would, wouldn't it?

Dr. Hobbs. Of course, on some books the title has an appreciable influence on the sales, I would guess.

Mr. Hays. I wouldn't say I would approve of that, but I would think from what little knowledge I have of the book-selling business it is that they do deliberately set out to get eye-catching titles to sell the books.

Dr. Hobbs. I would think so.

Mr. Hays. And if the people are influenced by that and they don’t like the book, well they have made a bad investment.

The Chairman. I won’t want to take additional time, but in regard to the mountain and the molehill, we can do something about the molehills, but sometimes it becomes very difficult to do anything about the mountain. The illustration that you earlier gave, in Germany it was the molehill, was disregarded.

Mr. Hays. I don’t agree with that at all. I say it was a mountain.

The Chairman. But it was not so recognized.

Mr. Hays. I recognized it as such. Maybe I was alone, but I thought so.

The Chairman. But the people there did not. But where we see defects, it would seem to me that it would be our responsibility to cure them.

Mrs. Pfost, your observation was very pertinent, but down home on the farm we make a great deal of cider. And one thing that we are always very careful about is picking all the bad apples before they are run through the cider mill because there might be only a very small percentage of bad apples run through that taints and has a tendency to destroy the whole product. I think in the course of some of these studies, it isn’t the fact that the preponderance of the money is spent along certain lines, but it is that a sufficient amount is spent, and effectively so, so as to propagate a particular line of thinking that might be detrimental to the interests of our Government. But still we are just kind of discussing it among ourselves here, and I am willing to forego, after you make your observations.

Mr. Hays. I think it is interesting. Out home in the cider season they pick out the wormy apples if they have time, but if they get rushed, they throw them all in and people buy it just the same. But I just wonder if you are insinuating that this bad book, or at least we will call it that, that the professor is talking about, could taint his book. It couldn’t, could it?

The Chairman. I don’t think it could taint his book, but I could think where it might spoil it in such a way as to reduce the interest in a sound way.

Mr. Hays. Then we better investigate the publisher.

The Chairman. You may proceed.
Mr. HAYS. No, I have another question. I want to go back to the molehill and mountain deal. As I got your statement, you are saying 1 of 2 things: Either that nazism was a molehill or that the people did not recognize it for what it was. Which is it?
The CHAIRMAN. In the very beginning they did not recognize it for what it was, I think. They waited too long.
Mr. HAYS. Yes. Well, you and I are agreeing. And when they did recognize it for what it was, it had become a mountain then.
Mr. WORMSER. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest to Dr. Hobbs that I think he ought to make clear, which I believe is the fact, that he does not intend merely to discuss 3 or 4 books as the only books in this area which have any unpleasant connotation to him. What he is really doing is giving them as illustrations, perhaps particularly sharp illustrations, of the use of what he calls scientism and its promotion by foundations. Please answer this yourself, Dr. Hobbs, but isn't your main thesis that what you call scientism widely promoted by foundations and that in itself has a deleterious effect on society?
Dr. HOBBS. The thesis is not in the book in relation to the foundations specifically, but I would say that, speaking in general terms, the thing which I call scientism is promoted in an appreciable measure by the foundations. And scientism has been described as a point of view, an idea, that science can solve all of the problems of mankind, that it can take the place of traditions, beliefs, religion, and it is in the direction of that type of thing that so much of the material in the social sciences is pointed. I am not saying that we have reached that, or that many would come out blatantly and say that now that can or should be done. But it seems to me, and I may be wrong, but it does seem to me that we are going in that direction, and it is time that we might take a little stock of it.
Mr. HAYS. How many copies of this particular book do you suppose have ever been sold?
Dr. HOBBS. Which book is that?
Mr. HAYS. The one by Stuart Chase that you are quoting from.
Dr. HOBBS. I don't know the sales. It was widely reviewed and advertised, publicized extensively, but sales figures I don't have.
Mr. HAYS. Would you be remotely acquainted at all with the works of Mickey Spillane?
Dr. HOBBS. Yes, sir; I am.
Mr. HAYS. Do you think Stuart Chase or Mickey Spillane has done more damage to America?
Dr. HOBBS. That is in another area.
Mr. HAYS. Well, of course, any other book except this one would probably be in a little different area.
Dr. HOBBS. No; I am confining this to the influence of social science. Mr. Spillane, I think, does not pretend to be a social scientist.
Mr. HAYS. I don't know what he pretends to be; but I would say that he is having some sort of an effect on social science, at least on social behavior, and even perhaps a more serious effect than Chase is having, and I wouldn't be surprised that he has had as much effect or more than Kinsey, because I expect more people have read his books.
Dr. HOBBS. I expect they have.
Mr. HAYS. And even a far more vicious effect, in my mind, would be coming from some of these horror comic books that are widely distributed.

Dr. HOBBS. That may be. The context in which I place this, though, is in the influence of science or social science on these things. For example, a novel by Philip Wylie called Opus 21 came out, based in large measure on the Kinsey findings, and the theme, briefly, was in outline that the protagonist of the novel meets a girl who is sitting in a New York saloon, sitting there reading the Kinsey book. And the protagonist—

Mr. HAYS. That is definitely fiction, is it not?

Dr. HOBBS. Yes, sir. The protagonist tries to find out what is on her mind—

Mr. HAYS. I would say they had stupid characters in that book. I mean, you have painted a picture there. He wouldn't have to try to very hard, would he?

Dr. HOBBS. Then the theme develops that what happened was that she found out that her husband was homosexual, and she had left him because he was homosexual. Then throughout the remainder of the book this protagonist is explaining to her that science, in this case Kinsey, has proved that homosexuality is normal and that she is the abnormal one for leaving him. And finally the protagonist convinces her of this, so whereupon she forms a homosexual alliance herself and returns to her homosexual husband and presumably they live happily ever after. It is in this way that what starts out as being science or social science spreads out into popular literature.

Mr. HAYS. Would you mind telling me how you came to read that book?

Dr. HOBBS. I forget the exact circumstances. I read pretty widely. I read a lot of books.

Mr. HAYS. I was wondering if it was in connection with the research on Kinsey. I am not being a bit facetious when I say this—maybe I am too conservative and too archaic and too far behind the times, but I cannot imagine very many people wasting their time to read that kind of stuff.

Dr. HOBBS. If I may continue, the cultural deterministic theme is then tied in with the cultural lag, the cultural lag hypothesis, and briefly the cultural lag hypothesis is that the technology has advanced very greatly, but that our ideas, our beliefs, our traditions, have not kept pace with it. Therefore, there is a lag between the technological advance and the culture, and the implication is that the beliefs, ideas, sentiments and so on, about the family, the church, about government, should be brought up to date with the technology, which superficially sounds reasonable enough, except when you begin to analyze it it really settles down to being in the first place, a nonscientific notion, because two things being compared are not commensurable, that is, they have not been reduced to any common denominator by which you can measure the relative rates of change in between them.

Mr. HAYS. I hate to keep interrupting you here, but I can't help wondering about one thing, and I would like to know the answer, if there is any way of knowing it. We are spending a lot of time on the book of Mr. Chase, and I would like to know how widely that thing was printed and circulated.
If hardly anybody read it, it couldn't have had much influence. Mr. Wormser, is there any way we can get the distribution of that, how many thousands or hundreds or millions of copies of it there were?

Mr. Wormser. I can find out for you, sir.

Mr. Hays. People in this audience are probably all people who are interested in this, or they would not be here. I wonder if anyone in the room has read it besides Dr. Hobbs. I never heard of it until this morning.

The Chairman. In addition to the circulation of the book, am I right that earlier you referred to other publications that quoted excerpts, pertinent excerpts, from the book, in advancing certain thoughts?

Dr. Hobbs. I don't believe, sir, that I did relate to that, no, sir.

Mr. Hays. You might have mentioned book reviews, or reviews in say the New York Times book magazine, or something. Probably there was one, I suppose, was there not?

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, sir.

Mr. Hays. But unless you were specifically interested in either Mr. Chase or the subject, you probably wouldn't even read that.

Dr. Hobbs. Or the foundations, sir.

Mr. Hays. Yes.

Dr. Hobbs. Then this cultural lag notion has the implication that we should keep religion up to date, and patriotic sentiments, ideas about marriage and the family.

Well, if you do this, of course by implication to take an extreme illustration, then you would have to modify your religion every time there was a significant technological change with automobiles or airplanes, things of that sort, which would give you of course a great deal of lack of permanence.

The cultural lag theory has appeared in many if not most of the sociology textbooks with the implication that we should abandon the traditional forms of belief about the family and religion. Inescapably that tends to be the implication. The way Stuart Chase puts it:

The cultural concept dissolves old ideologies and eternal varities but gives us something more solid to stand on, or so it seems to me. Prediction takes shape, the door to the future opens, and light comes through. Not much yet, but enough to shrivel many intellectual quacks, oververbalized seers and theorists, whose theories cannot be verified.

At the very time he is talking about a theory which cannot be verified. Then I will just mention one thing that is stressed in Mr. Chase's book, and that is the belief is stressed that the polls, opinion polls, had been scientifically verified and that they could and should be used by the general public.

Mr. Hays. Doctor, right there a lot of people have tried to sell that idea before. I remember a magazine one time that had a wide circulation predicated on the belief that its poll was exact. I think the name of it was Literary Digest.

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, sir.

Mr. Hays. It died a very abrupt death after 1936.

Dr. Hobbs. The significance here, sir, is that this opinion and belief did not die. Because it still has the prestige of science to verify it.

Mr. Hays. You mean in the validity of polls?

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, sir.

Mr. Hays. I don't agree with that. I don't take too much stock of polls. I vividly remember the Gallup mistake in 1948.
He probably will make some more. I don't consider myself to be a superintelligent citizen. I think polls are maybe able to indicate a trend, but you couldn't rely on them as being absolutely factual and something you could never doubt for a minute and I don't think very many other people will.

Dr. Hobbs. The point I am trying to make, sir, is that with the prestige of science behind a thing like polling, you could get to the point where they would be substituted for elections and things like that. Mr. Chase cites examples of that tendency in a highly approving fashion. This was written just prior to the election results of 1948. Just suppose for a minute that we had accepted this so-called science and abandoned the election of 1948 and taken the word of the pollsters.

Mr. Hays. As long as you have skeptics like me, it would never do that. I refuse to accept the validity of the Gallup poll, and that is why I am here today. I came down here in the 1948 Dewey landslide.

Dr. Hobbs. Suppose it had been based on a poll instead of an election. The results might be quite different.

Mr. Hays. I think you are predicating something there on a foolish assumption. I don't think we will ever substitute polls for elections. At least, you will never get the politicians to agree.

Dr. Hobbs. Mr. Chase cites the desirability of this polling technique and illustrations of where it is being used by another social scientist, who also wrote a book along the same lines, George Lunberg—Can Science Save Us?—and cites Lunberg as using the polls in actual practice. He quotes here:

There is no limit to the future of the technique—
That is the polling technique—
on this front.

That is, measuring political attitudes and beliefs.

Mr. Hays. He apparently never heard about this fellow who ran for sheriff. Is that in your State, Mr. Reece? He said he shook 9,000 hands, kissed two hundred-and-some babies, traveled 9,000 miles and got only 243 votes. His poll didn't turn out so well. He thought he was going to win.

Dr. Hobbs. The difference in all of this is that these are presented as being scientific and the prestige of science is that there is more of a tendency to accept these than to accept other techniques. [Reading:]

Then, as the elections of 1948 changed the conclusions to be drawn from the foregoing two chapters, clearly Presidential polling is no exact science.

That is, the results have come out and conflicted with the results of especially the Gallup and Roper polls. So Mr. Chase had to back up, backpeddle quite a bit on this.

Mr. Hays. At least, we give him credit for admitting he was wrong.

Dr. Hobbs. He could do little else at that point. It was such a fiasco:

Does 1948 wrong prediction mean the downfall of the present elections as the downfall in 1936 caused the downfall of the Literary Digest? Does it mean as some critics declare that sampling theory itself is suspect and science can never be applied to human affairs? Certainly not—

He answers his own question—
One error or a hundred errors cannot invalidate the scientific method.
There you have a glimpse, a glimmer, of the type of, you might say, arrogance that this supposed scientific method, which, I repeat and emphasize, is not scientific, will and can, no matter what the errors are, no matter what the mistakes are, will be foisted, pushed on the public scene, whereas with the Literary Digest you gage it in the terms of commercial appeal, and after the failure in 1936, it folds up as a magazine. But this type of thing continues. It not only continues but it expands.

Mr. Hays. There was one difference between Dr. Gallup's mistake and the Literary Digest, wasn't there? Dr. Gallup made a slight mistake of a few percentage points, but they had Landon winning by 36 or 40 States, whereas he actually carried only 2.

Dr. Hobbs. His percentage figures are a matter of statistical manipulation. I could go into that in some detail. The actual error is appreciably greater than you would be led to believe by the statements of Dr. Gallup. But that would be a statistical matter which is not particularly germane. In this book, in summary, you have throughout it, among other things, this characteristic emphasis on cultural determinism, cultural relativity, the idea that if you find a primitive group which permits wife lending, then, by implication, that is all right for us, too, and emphasis on Kinsey throughout the book as having now discovered the scientific facts about sex, and the emphasis on cultural lag that we should jettison older beliefs and bring all our beliefs up to the latest advances in technology.

In one section in the book, you do get a balanced presentation. This is the section dealing with economics. Mr. Chase knows the field of economics much more, much better, than he knows these other fields. So when it came to economics, there he admitted that economics was not a science, and he cited, as I recall it, 155 erroneous, seriously erroneous, economic predictions to show that economics was not a science. My feeling in reading the book was this, that if Mr. Chase knew about his own field, and if he were relying as he says he was, and as the book indicates, if he were relying on these experts from the foundations for the other areas, why didn't they warn him of the limitations in these other fields, sociology, anthropology, and so on, in the same way in which he himself knew of the limitations in economics.

It was certainly their responsibility, it would seem to me, to have emphasized these limitations rather than to give Mr. Chase the impression, and through him many other people the impression, that these areas are really scientific in the sense in which the term applies in physical science. The next and final book which I want to cite is actually in four volumes. The title is The American Soldier, a subtitle is Studies in Social Psychology in World War Two. It was prepared and edited under the auspices of a special committee of the Social Science Research Council, published by the Princeton University Press in 1949 and 1950. I will give you some of the background of this.

In this, I want to cite it as an illustration of the influence of supposed social science on military policy at a high level and, furthermore, that this influence was, according to the book itself which, remember, was written by persons favorable to the effects which the social scientist brought about. Even in this type of presentation, there is a definite and repeated evidence that the military, with what turned out to be excellent reasons, struggled against this thing right
down the line, and the social scientists were able to overwhelm them, were able to incorporate their own ideas in a matter of highest military significance against the opposition of the military of the United States.

Mr. HAYS. What did they do against the will of the military?

Dr. Hobbs. Well, may I develop it? I will bring that out, what seems to me to be the crucial point here.

The Research Branch was officially established in October 1941, within what was known, successively, as the Morale Division, Special Services Division, and Information and Education Division. Here is one of the indications of the resistance of the military in purely military matters. Earlier efforts to set up such machinery within the Army had been blocked by a directive from the Secretary of War, which said:

Our Army must be a cohesive unit, with a definite purpose shared by all. Such an Army can be built only by the responsible effort of all of its members, commissioned and enlisted. An anonymous opinion, or criticism, good or bad, is destructive in its effect on a military organization, where accepted responsibility on the part of every individual is fundamental. It is therefore directed that because of their anonymous nature, polls will not be permitted among the personnel of the Army of the United States.

Mr. HAYS. Does that make it right because the Secretary said that?

Dr. Hobbs. No, sir. It does not make it wrong, either.

Mr. HAYS. One time he issued a letter that a soldier could not write a letter to his Congressman. But the Congress sort of changed his mind about that. I would say from my experience with the Army, it is very difficult to inculcate them with any idea. They resist anything in the way of change. They resisted the use of air power.

You will remember they made one man in this country die of a broken heart. Of course, he was right all along. The Navy right now is resisting the abandoning of battleships. Of course, they are nice ships, I have been on them and all of that, but they don't have much value any more in war. But they are still using them. The very fact that the Army resisted them does not mean much to me. I do not know what they resisted, but whatever it was that is their usual procedure.

Dr. Hobbs. May I please develop this point?

The full story of how the War Department changed from a position of flat opposition to such research to one in which it would use such research not only for internal planning but as justification to the American people for such a vital program as its demobilization system should someday make instructive reading.

That is a quote from volume 1 of the American Soldier. I would say it certainly should make interesting reading.

Many factors converge to make possible the establishment of the Research Branch, not the least of which was the character and personality of the new Director of the Morale Division, directly commissioned from civilian life, Brig. Gen. Frederick H. Osborne, later major general. He was a businessman who was also the author of two volumes on social science. In spite of General Osborne's personal prestige, his persuasive skill, which had served him so well in business, and his deep sincerity, there were times when even these assets might have availed little against occasional opposition at intermediate echelons, had not General Marshall unequivocally, supported the strange, new program.

Mr. HAYS. Doctor, I think before you start accusing General Marshall or anybody else——

Dr. Hobbs. I have accused General Marshall of nothing, sir, I have quoted from the book.
Mr. Hays. What is your strange new program? Is it fair to ask you that?

Dr. Hobbs. That is what they term it, not me.

Mr. Hays. What is it?

Dr. Hobbs. It was a program of taking opinion polls to determine military decisions.

Mr. Hays. Do you mean the last war was run on opinion polls?

Dr. Hobbs. It would have been run to a much greater degree——

Mr. Hays. I think Eisenhower ought to resign, then, because I think he got elected on the grounds that he ran the war. He made his reputation on that. If it was run on polls, then we have been under a lot of misapprehension.

Dr. Hobbs. I quote again from the book:

A major purpose of the research staff was to provide a basis of factual knowledge.

I will interject. When they say “factual knowledge,” they mean knowledge based upon opinion polls, which are much more fallacious than political polls, which involve merely the choice of a candidate.

Factual knowledge which would help the director of the Army Information and Education Division in his administrative and policy decisions. This purpose was abundantly fulfilled. Without research, we would have too often been working in the dark. With research, we knew our course and were able to defend it before Congress and the press. Further, we made a remarkable discovery. The Army gave little weight to our personal opinions, but when these opinions were supported by factual studies——

and, again, if I may interject, these are not factual studies, they are opinion studies——

the Army took them seriously——

and here, again, you get the influence which, in some cases, may be good, but in other cases could be very disastrous due to the aura of science which surrounds this type of investigation.

For the first time on such a scale, the attempt to direct human behavior was in part, at least, based on scientific evidence. If this method could be developed and more widely used, it might provide further impetus for a great advance in the social relations of man. To that hope, these volumes are dedicated.

The main thing, these polls went into many, many aspects of behavior in the military, but the one thing I would like to concentrate on is the point system of discharge, the system by means of which the military forces of the United States were demobilized at the end of World War II, demobilized in rapid, and in the perspective of history, chaotic fashion.

Mr. Hays. You know something right there, there was a cause for demobilization more than any poll, speech on the floor of this House, or numerous speeches, but I am thinking of one, in which a Member of Congress who now holds a very high position in the Armed Services Committee, who was not satisfied with getting the men demobilized by bringing them home on the Queen Mary, but he wanted to fly them home. That is in the Congressional Record. I am not going to drop his name into the hearings, I do not want to embarrass him. But most anybody could learn who it was. I say to you advisedly, sir, that speeches such as that had much more to do with demobilizing than any opinion polls, or private opinion polls, or Army opinion polls they took. The pressure of the American people back home was American democracy, and perhaps I might say that some Members of the Con-
gress yielded to that to the extent of doing a little "demagoging" on the subject, thinking that was a popular viewpoint. Maybe you and I think it is bad, but I don't think we are going to change it.

Dr. Hobbs. Exactly.

Mr. Hays. One other question right there. I am trying to be very friendly. I do not mean to embarrass you. You do not mean to infer, and I am afraid that maybe some might have gotten the inference from a question that I asked, you do not mean to infer that they took a poll on whether they should invade through the soft underbelly or across the channel, do you, or what day the invasion should go across, and so on?

Dr. Hobbs. Well, they admit that they were not able to do as many things as they wanted to do.

Mr. Hays. That you think they might have liked to do?

Dr. Hobbs. Well, I don't know.

Mr. Hays. You know that is a funny thing. In my limited experience with the Army, nobody ever asked me anything. They just told me. I might say, if I volunteered—I did once, and I got to dig latrines, so in all of my experience with it, they discouraged you from offering opinions.

Dr. Hobbs. Sir, there is an old Army precept that you violated when you volunteered.

Mr. Hays. I know. That was the first day. They asked for people who could operate a typewriter. I stepped forward and he said, "Well, if you can run a typewriter, you ought to be able to handle a pick."

The Chairman. You may proceed now.

Dr. Hobbs. Here is some more background of this point system of discharge:

In the course of a speech to the American people in 1944, President Roosevelt justified the Army's plans for demobilization at the end of the war on the grounds that the order of demobilization would be determined in terms of what the soldiers themselves wanted. The idea of a point system for demobilization had been conceived in the research branch and accepted by the War Department and the President. Representative samples of men throughout the world were queried and from their responses the variables of length of service, overseas duty, combat duty, and parenthood, emerged as most significant.

If I may interject, from these opinion polls, you can be very much misled about things like this, and in a matter so big, so important, it is extremely hazardous to use them, not that they don't have a use, or not that efforts should not be made to develop them as far as we can and so on, but as yet, certainly, it is very risky to use them in matters of this kind.

The final weights assigned to these variables yielded point scores which have a close correspondence with the wishes of the maximum number of soldiers, even if it did not exactly reproduce these wishes.

And then they go on to say that the point system established the order not the rate of demobilization, and that is a questionable contention, because when you have given and publicized a notion of this kind, here, again, is an illustration of where the fact that you make the study can change the situation which you are studying. If you give members of the armed services the notion that they are to be and should be consulted on vital military policy, then this fact in
itself can create dissatisfaction, unrest, of the very type of thing which the Secretary previously had anticipated.

Mr. Hays. Doctor, all of this is new to me, but did the foundations have anything to do with encouraging this point system in the Army? Did they get into this act in any way?

Dr. Hobbs. The people involved were people who were previously, and most of them still are, very heavy recipients of foundation funds, and the foundations, as I indicated, the Social Science Research Council, did get this material at the end of the war, got the material declassified by the War Department and worked on it and then it was published through the—the various volumes were published through a series of authors, with the senior author being Prof. Samuel A. Stouffer.

Mr. Hays. Are you challenging anything in there as to the validity of it? That is not a good way of phrasing. Are you challenging in your statement whether or not this did happen or did not happen? Are you challenging the theory behind it?

Dr. Hobbs. The theory. It did happen, as I am citing.

Mr. Hays. In other words, if the book says so and it happened, about the only connection the foundations have is that they made it possible for that book to be published, is that right?

Dr. Hobbs. Not only made it possible to be published, but the influence, what I am pointing out here—the influence of this type of social science, what it can have and does have in this context, in the military, even in a military sphere.

Mr. Hays. You do not think the point system was bad, do you?

Dr. Hobbs. I was in the service, too, and fortunately I had enough points to get out so at that time I thought it was good. Incidentally, I stayed in awhile longer but I was glad that under this I could have gotten out at an earlier date if I wanted to. But I made no pretense—

Mr. Hays. As I remember it, the decision was made that we were going to demobilize and we were going to discharge a certain number of men. Now, what we come to is to find out which ones we keep and which ones we let go.

Dr. Hobbs. That was not a military decision. The military decision was quite different.

Mr. Hays. Maybe the Congress made the decision, but somebody said you are going to discharge so many, right?

Dr. Hobbs. No, sir. The groups, the individuals, rather, who were discharged, and the nature of the entire demobilization program was, as I would like to point out, the result of this influence of social science rather than the result of military policy which opposed it.

Mr. Hays. Doctor, you do not mean to tell me that if it had not been for this little group of social scientists, that we would not have demobilized?

Dr. Hobbs. In the manner in which we did, we would not.

Mr. Hays. Never mind the manner.

Dr. Hobbs. I think that is of vital significance.

Mr. Hays. I think we are quibbling over something that is not very important. I say to you that the American people urged on by certain demagogic speeches said, "We are going to tear this Army down; bring the boys home." That is what they wanted. The military was
confronted with the situation, "We are going to bring them home, and the politicians are going to say or make us say which ones we are going to bring first." Is that not what happened?

Dr. HOBBS. Which ones we are going to bring home first was determined by the point system.

Mr. HAYS. I think that is all to the good.

Dr. HOBBS. You may change your opinion, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I was around here then, as I had been awhile before. I never felt any overwhelming demand from home for demobilization. I heard a lot about it since.

Mr. HAYS. I will refer you to a speech, and I will not mention his name, in which he said, "I don't want the boys sent home by ship; I think we ought to fly them home," and he is a good orator. You know who he is talking about.

The CHAIRMAN. I know who you are talking about.

Mr. HAYS. He said that, did he not? I was not here then, but I thought it was a good idea.

The CHAIRMAN. I never had any overwhelming demand from the folks back home.

Mr. HAYS. I do not know what you had, but my predecessor said that most of his mail consisted—and it was very heavy in letters from mothers, especially after V-E day—of when do we get the boys back.

Mr. WORMSER. May I again ask Dr. Hobbs to clarify something for Mr. Hays, namely, if I understand it correctly, that he is not discussing the desirability of demobilizing or not demobilizing. What he is discussing is essentially this, that instead of the military making the decisions to demobilize in such a way as to protect best the welfare of the United States, the decision was made under the influence of a group of social scientists, the decision on how the demobilization should take place, not the quantity but how, and that that decision might well have or it did fly in the face of military necessity. Is that correct, Dr. Hobbs?

Dr. HOBBS. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAYS. That is interesting and perhaps very true. I would like to hear more about it. In what way did it fly in the face of military necessity? Do you mean the fellows had been in for 6 years, they should have kept them because they knew more about it and let the boys who served only 90 days out, is that it?

Dr. Hobbs. May I describe that, please, from the book?

Mr. HAYS. Sure.

Dr. Hobbs. There were two schools of thought.

One school of thought which had particularly strong representation in Army Ground Forces tended to see the problem as one of preserving intact at all costs the combat fighting teams.

You see, they were thinking in military terms.

This meant discharging mainly service troops, limited servicemen, and soldiers not yet fully trained. Combat veterans, especially the experienced noncom's, were obviously the core of our magnificent fighting machine. Another school of thought, also arguing on the basis of military efficiency—

they say military efficiency here, but I don't know how they could justify it—

held that the men of longest service should be so disaffected by a policy which regarded the men who had made the least sacrifice that the morale of the combat teams would be as much endangered by retaining such men as by discharging some of them. Furthermore, they pointed out—
Mr. HAYS. Do you agree with that conclusion?

Dr. Hobbs. No, sir.

Mr. HAYS. You do not think the morale would have been affected at all?

Dr. Hobbs. It would have been affected some, but in relative terms of military strategy and policy, I do not think the effect would have been so great here as it would have been on the other side.

Mr. HAYS. Let me tell you something about that. I will give you the benefit of my experience. I was in Greece in 1949 with General Van Fleet for a few days. General Van Fleet went to Greece and took a disorganized, beaten, army, and in 2 years made man for man, I will say, one of the finest fighting forces the world has ever seen. But do you know what he told me his biggest problem was? They knew how to fight, but his biggest problem was morale because most of those men that he got a hold of had been in the Greek Army for 9 years, and their morale was shot to pieces because they had been fighting and lots of people back home had not been called upon to do anything more than run away from the Communists. And he said that that was his biggest problem. So that just is contrary to the theory that you say, is it not, it would not have affected morale?

Dr. Hobbs. I did not say, sir, that it would not have affected morale. The question here is which would have affected the military strength of the United States more, and that question, I would answer, the policy of the point system of discharge, in my opinion, which is certainly not a professional opinion, professional military opinion, in my opinion would have affected it more than the other.

Mr. HAYS. Doctor, I again want to say that you have a perfect right to your opinion, and it may very well be that your opinion is the correct one. I do not happen to agree with it. But that is one of the beautiful things about the democracy we have. Let me say further along that line, that it would have been probable in anything but a democracy, that the military would have been able to do whatever they wanted to do. But unfortunately, from their point of view, and I say this from my point of view fortunately, in a democracy, such as we have, even sometimes the will of the people can be made to have an influence on the military.

Dr. Hobbs. But, sir, this was not the will of the people.

Mr. HAYS. I disagree very vitally with you.

Dr. Hobbs. It may have been the will of the people that this happened, but the influencing factor, and this is what I am trying to stress, the influencing factor was not a balance such as it should be democratically, not a balance of conflicting opinions, but it was the influence of what was called social science.

Mr. HAYS. Well, I say to you that I was back in Ohio at that time, and it was the influence of the people back home. That is what it was. I do not think that they knew anything about social science or cared less, in the Army.

Dr. Hobbs. That is quite irrelevant.

Mr. HAYS. They just felt that the boys who had given the most or served the longest and who had been in there for the greatest length of time ought to come home first. Some who had not been and did not go, if they needed any more men, take them. That principle still applies today. We have pretty much of a rotation under the draft system, and I do not think you will disagree that that
is because the people want it that way. You know, the Army wanted universal military training, but they did not get it. Why didn't they get it? Because the Congress did not vote to give it to them. Why didn't the Congress vote to give it to them? Because a good many of them felt that if they did, they would not come back to Congress. It is just as simple as that. That is the way democracy makes itself felt.

Dr. Hobbs. On these issues, I am not pretending that I am right or you are wrong. That really is not involved.

Mr. Hays. I am only putting these in in order to show that there are two sides to it. I certainly want to say right here and now that there is a side that you are presenting, and it certainly can be a valid one. In other words, I am saying there is plenty of room for argument, but the only reason I am interrupting you is so that the record will not show that we sit here and concur in these views which may or may not be yours, even.

Dr. Hobbs. That is quite proper.

The Chairman. I am assuming that my silence will not be construed as agreeing with everything you have to say.

Mr. Hays. I cannot be responsible for anything that anybody construes about your silence. I would suggest that you just speak up. That is the way I do. Just because you think I am wrong, I will not get wrong.

The Chairman. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. You may proceed.

Mr. Hobbs. Thank you. The book referred to two schools of thought. It continues:

Proponents of the first point of view—

that is, the military—

had an additional argument which has a special plausibility. If discharges were to be made on the basis of entire units, the Army would not be opened to charges of favoritism to individuals. If an individual's record were taken into account, there was too much chance of a scandal, particularly if the Army yielded to political pressure to discharge certain individuals or certain categories of individuals without respect to military needs. It was admitted that the replacement system had operated so that a given unit was likely to contain personnel with a very wide range of service and that a unit discharge would give new replacements in demobilized outfits a head start in civilian life over the combat veterans in outfits retained. But this was advanced as the lesser of two evils.

Then they describe the fact that they took the polls, and one poll was taken and as a result of that first poll the criteria for discharge, the basis for the point system, included length of time in the Army, age, overseas service, and dependency. Combat service was not included in the first poll. But in the first poll, they had left a place where the soldiers could write in things which they believed should be included in a discharge system, and one of the things which was written in frequently was the thought that combat experience should be weighted into the point system.

After studying the data of the type summarized in the tables 1 and 2, General Osborne decided to put all of the influence of the Information and Education Division behind a system which would: (a) establish priorities on an individual not a unit basis; and (b) take into account the explicit preferences of the soldiers themselves insofar as the latter was consistent with military necessity. On the basis of soldier preferences, the Information and Educational Division
recommended a point system which would take into account combat, measured by length of time in the combat zone and by number of Purple Hearts awarded, the number of months of overseas service, the number of children, and the length of time in the Army. After lengthy discussions, the War Department accepted the outlines of this proposal, leaving to a future date the setting of the exact number of points for each category and the method of determining such a factor as combat service. This decision was announced to the public in September 1944.

And again, if I may interject, once you publicize a thing like this, you create a different situation than the one which existed before.

It was decided that the actual points to be assigned would not be announced until after the surrender of Germany. Between September 1944 and the defeat of Germany, there followed several months in which there was much argument in the special planning division as to the assignment of points. The four factors, longevity in the Army, overseas service, combat and parenthood, had been publicly announced, but it was thought still possible by opponents of the plan—

and this is another instance where you see persistently the military for reasons which they had but which they could not publicly reveal, sensed or knew that we were going to run into a situation in Europe with one of our then allies, that is, R-u-s-s-i-a.

Mr. HAYS. Would you repeat that statement?

Dr. HOBBS. The indications are that the military knew or at least it sensed that there was a good likelihood of running into trouble with Russia at the end of the German war, but, however, at that time, we were allies with Russia. They could not publicize this. They had to keep it quiet. Yet it turns out they were right. They could have been wrong, but it turns out they were quite correct. Here is another group which probably knew nothing of this very important military matter, and, knowing nothing, they still insist and push and get this type of thing adopted.

Mr. HAYS. I am very interested in that statement, because I am just wondering whether it is valid or not. I do not give the military the benefit of that much foresight. I will tell you why. The military made the agreement with the Russians about Berlin, and about all of the matters of the ways to get in Berlin and what have you. The military also made the agreements with the Russians about Vienna. You probably know that we have never had any trouble about Vienna but we have had a lot of trouble about Berlin, for the simple reason that the group of military men who made the rules down at Vienna made one set of rules and there was another set of rules made up at Berlin.

The Russians have taken every advantage, as the Communists always do, to harass, to blockade, to do everything they could within the rules. I have been in both places a number of times since the war. Every time I go to Berlin, I go by the sufferance of the Communists. But if you go to Vienna, it is very clearly outlined that from the airfield to Vienna, the road is American property. There is no such outline about the road from the American zone to Berlin. That seems to be Russian property.

Dr. HOBBS. That is correct.

Mr. HAYS. Maybe the boys down at Vienna had some indications they were going to have trouble with Russia, or maybe if they were smart enough to have them, to do something about them, but apparently the boys in Berlin, if they felt that way, didn’t take any precautions.

Dr. HOBBS. I guess the Russians considered Berlin for what it is, a much more important—
The Chairman. I do not think we ought to get into this question, but I am not sure that the military was the sole determining factor in the arrangements up around Berlin. I think that question might very well be left open.

Mr. Hays. I made a statement there and I am standing on it. I said that they made the ground rules. I don't say they made the decision that we would pull back from here or pull back from there, but they in conference with the Russian high command made the ground rules. You do not need to take my word for it, you can go back and get the history and get the pictures of them having their parties together.

I don't know who did the job down at Vienna, but those unsung heroes certainly did a lot better job than was done up north.

The Chairman. You may proceed.

Professor Hobbs, before you begin, if I may, how much time do you think would be required for you to complete your statement?

Mr. Hays. Without any interruption.

Dr. Hobbs. Without any interruptions, this material on the American soldier, maybe 15 minutes, and then there is another matter, a final matter which will come up which should take no longer than 5 or 10 minutes.

Mr. Wormser. I have a few questions I would like to ask, myself, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Would it be inconvenient for you to be here tomorrow?

Dr. Hobbs. No, sir. I have made arrangements in Philadelphia to be here on Thursday, so I could have gone back tonight but it would be no special hardship to stay over.

The Chairman. Why do we not run until 4 o'clock?

Mr. Hays. Let him finish with this subject.

Dr. Hobbs (reading):

It was thought still possible by opponents to the plan to obtain the benefit of claiming soldier endorsement and still manipulate the weights so that overseas service and combat service actually would count negligibly toward the total score. The Information and Education Division always recognizing that military necessity should come first—

Now, where they interject these matters of military necessity, and so on, I question that they really comprehended them in high degree, but that is a question—

held that either the final points must have the effect of approximating the priorities desired by the majority of soldiers or else the reasons why this wasn't possible in terms of military necessity should be frankly admitted by the Army.

In other words, they pressed the military group, and if they had as their reason the possibility of Russian aggression and encroachment into European territories, such as actually did happen, if the military had that in mind, they could not publicly announce it because Russia at that time was an ally. And from a standpoint of both military policy and from a standpoint of diplomatic policy, it was just something that they could not do. Yet this group pushed them into a position where they had to do it or accept this point system of discharge which the military consistently opposed.

To increase the combat credit, it was decided also to give five points for each decoration received, including the Purple Heart for wounds. This decision made at a time when it was thought that the Air Forces would be discharged on a
different basis from the rest of the Army, was to lead eventually to some feelings of injustice. When Air Forces were blanketed in under a uniform point system, the numerous decorations of flying personnel gave these men priorities which were particularly to be resented by veterans of ground combat.

There are two items there, one, that this is supposed to make particularly the ground combat men pleased and happy but it turns out that it makes them disgruntled and dissatisfied. The second is that when it is (probably in an unforeseen manner) applied to the Air Force, which was, of course, if you were to name at that stage and under those circumstances the one crucial unit of the military services, you would probably name the Air Force; when it was applied to them then it resulted in an extremely rapid, almost chaotic disbandment of the American Air Forces in Europe.

Among the combat veterans in the worldwide cross section there was a sharp difference of attitude as between Air Force veterans and ground force veterans. Among the former, whose point scores were inflated by numerous decorations, a third—that is, this resulted in a situation where one-third of the personnel of the Air Force was immediately entitled to discharge under the point system which, obviously, disrupted the military value of the Air Force—

among the Air Force there was one-third that had 85 points or over, while among the latter—that is the ground forces—

only one-ninth had 85 points or over. Incredible as it seemed at the time to many in the Information and Education Division, there was a strong sentiment within the War Department for eliminating combat credit entirely after V-J Day—

and again, as you learn throughout this, the military was attempting to preserve the power, the strategical military power of the United States, and in retrospect it certainly appears that they had good reasons for that decision. But again you get this group pushing them, preventing them from using military principles in a military situation, sacrificing such principles for what is called social science.

The research report quoted above played a part in the War Department's decision to leave the point system intact after V-J Day. It was felt that the capitulation of Japan was so near at hand that any recalculation of point scores should not be undertaken unless overwhelmingly sought by the men. This was a keen disappointment to some of the revisionists in the War Department who were working to reduce or eliminate overseas and combat credit. It was also a disappointment, though perhaps a lesser one, to the Information and Education Division, which would have preferred an increase in credit for overseas service, and an addition of the combat infantry badge to the elements counting for combat credit.

Mr. Wormser. I would like to be sure of the stenographer, to be sure that you are quoting from somebody else's work.

Dr. Hobs. I am quoting from volume II of American Soldier. That is another indication of the almost diametrically opposed viewpoints in this military situation, with the social scientist insisting on one thing and the military, for what turns out to have been eminently good reasons, insisting on another.

I quote again:

In the official history of ground forces the havoc played in one division in Europe by transfer out of its 85 point men after V-J Day is described in some detail. The facts in general were, however, that of all the men with combat
experience in ground units throughout the world, only 1 man in 9 had 85 points or more.

Now, again, here is an application of a statistic, in a context in which it cannot be applied safely. You say, or these people say, only 1 in 9. But if this 1 in 9 is a keyman, that might disrupt an entire squad. It might even disrupt an entire company. It might disrupt the crew of a heavy bomber, and things of that sort, which should certainly have been taken into consideration, but which could not be taken into consideration with this approach.

It is true that many of these were keymen, but it is also true that there were replacements with combat experience available who could have taken their places and, indeed, many more such men than any current estimates for the Pacific war required.

And the citation for that official history of the ground forces describing that havoc played in one division in Europe, the citation is “United States Army in World War II, the Army Ground Forces,” published in Washington 1947.

They conclude, and I will conclude this material on the American Soldier in this way: that is, volume II, which discusses the point system sums it up in this way:

There are “ifs” where history cannot definitively answer. In taking its calculated risks, the Army won its gamble.

Now, if I may interject here, it was not the Army, it was this group. The Army, the military insisted on quite another policy, and to say that the Army won its gamble is misleading and, you might add, one more such victory and we are undone. This turned out, in the retrospect of history, to have been an extremely costly political as well as military procedure.

One cannot say for certain what would have happened after V-J Day as well as before if there had not been an objective method of demobilization which the majority men regarded as fair in principle because “military efficiency” is not independent of “morale.” There are grounds for believing that the War Department chose collectively when it broke all precedent and went to the enlisted men for their opinions before promulgating its redeployment and demobilization policy.

That is the opinion of the authors of this volume.

Another and quite contrary opinion, I would say, could be at least equally justified. But the point that I wanted to stress all through is the way in which social science can and does encroach out and expand into areas not only of morality but of politics and in this instance military policy which was of the very highest order. Unfortunately, the situation is one in which, at the present time, and in the foreseeable future, we just—and I use “we” in the context of social scientists—we just don’t know enough to gamble with supposedly scientific methods in these areas. If mistakes are to be made, let them be made by people who are expert in the field, and of course they will make mistakes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now do you want to make your concluding statement, Professor? We will meet your wishes on that.

Dr. Hones. A question was raised before, I think, about is there any pressure exerted on scholars in connection with these things.

I would like to mention just this: There was another book that came out, titled “Studies in the Scope and Method of the American Soldier,” and in one of the reviews—this book contained a number of reviews about what was the greatest or seemed to be the greatest feat
of social science at the time—and in one of the reviews they referred to someone, a scholar, who had the temerity to question these findings and this is the type of pressure you get in this connection. I quote from this book:

The rivalrous role is enacted by social scientists whose interest in empirical research quantitatively reported is low. Since no reviewer has taken the view that better research of this type is available or in sight, the rivalrous posture involves a preference (stated or implied) for a search of a different type. When this preference is merely implied and no alternative specified, the result is a vigorous negativism which leads to the extreme attitude we have designated as diabolic.

Now if you will just imagine yourself, you are in this case, a young fellow getting started out, and you happen to tread on sacred soil, you just do a little bit of criticism against these groups who are so powerful. This is the type of thing that comes back at you. I continue with the quote:

Only one reviewer has approximated this extreme view in point, Nathan Glazer, who is—

please note these words—

who is a young man at the periphery of the profession and hence, perhaps, less heedful of its imperatives toward discretion.

In other words, “If you want to get in with us, watch your step and don’t criticize our work.”

That type of thing is certainly undesirable, unhealthy, in studies which are supposed to be openminded, where you are supposed to allow for these differences of opinion which, Congressman, as you rightly, I would say, place such high value on. When you get pressure of this type it isn’t a very good situation.

Mr. Hays. It seemed to me that you were rather critical of the foundations a little earlier for not directing this Mr. Chase, was it,

Dr. Hobbs. Advising him of the limitations particularly in the fields in which these men were supposed to be experts and in which he was not.

Mr. Hays. Would you consider it a salutary situation where if a foundation granted money to someone to write a book, to just let him go ahead and write it? It would seem to me they ought not to tell him one way or the other.

Dr. Hobbs. Yes, I agree with this, but the Chase incident was a completely different situation. He was requested, and as the quotation will show, two important members of the foundation requested him to write it. By his own statement they worked with him all through and, presumably, were for the purpose of giving him their best knowledge and advice and still they permitted him to make a series of very extreme, unwarranted statements, about the very matters in which these people were supposed to be experts.

Mr. Hays. I have an impression that his book did not sell very well.

Dr. Hobbs. I think that is not too vital a point one way or the other.

Mr. Hays. I just might feel, and I am just old-fashioned enough to think that maybe the reason it did not is because somebody asked him to write it. I always had the old-fashioned belief that if some-
one had an urge to write a book, and it came because he had the urge, that is when you got a good book.

Dr. Hobbs. I would agree with that principle.

Mr. WOrrsER. Mr. Chairman, Dr. Hobbs has some more material and I have a few questions which are rather important. I think we will have to carry over until tomorrow morning.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is agreeable. I think we are about to reach, as they say down home, quitting time.

As an additional observation with reference to the observation you made of what General Van Fleet said about morale, if you will pardon me for referring to it, I recall on the 9th of November 1918, when I got a message from the brigade commander, stating that it was reported that the morale of blank division was bad, and asking me to report on the morale of the third battalion, which I happened to be commanding as a lieutenant. This message is on record and my reply is on record down here in the War Department:

The morale of the men of the third battalion is good. They may not be a hundred percent efficient because of the arduous service they have been called upon to render during the past several days, but they are remarkably subservient to the will of their officers and are ready to perform any duty that may be required of them.

And that has been the experience I have had, in my limited way, in dealing with the American soldiers when they are confronted with an important duty, that I have always found them ready to perform it, whether they have been in the service 1 month, 1 year, or 2 years.

Mr. HAYS. Well, I think that is a valuable addition to my argument, that you didn't have to keep the men that had been there the longest.

The CHAIRMAN. We find it necessary to change our committee room for tomorrow. The committee will meet in room 1334, being the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee Room. That is in the New House Office Building.

I would appreciate the members of the press advising any of the others that you might come in contact with, who might be interested in the location.

Mr. HAYS. Do you have any plans to bring anyone else besides Dr. Hobbs tomorrow?

Mr. WOrrsER. Yes. Tom McNiece, the assistant research director, who will read another report which we are working our heads off to get ready for you at least by the time of the hearing.

Mr. HAYS. Why do you not keep your heads and let me finish asking Mr. Dodd some questions about his report before we get another one? It is immaterial to me, but I am ready.

The CHAIRMAN. I think my reaction to orderly procedure would be to let Mr. McNiece make his presentation and then any questions that you might want to ask of Mr. Dodd or Mr. McNiece could follow.

Mr. HAYS. It is immaterial to me, Mr. Chairman. I do not see what that has to do with orderly procedure. In the first place, we didn't get Mr. Dodd's statement the day he made it, and I have the notes made. I could have gone ahead yesterday except you said Dr. Briggs wanted to get back to New Hampshire. I do not want the thing to hang fire forever. But I don't care.
Mr. Wormser. We would just as soon have Mr. Dodd go on.
The Chairman. I am inclined to think Mr. McNiece has a statement to make and my reaction would be it would be best for him to make the statement and then we ought to have the rest of the period of the day for questioning. Mr. Dodd can come on first and then if we want to question Mr. McNiece we would proceed, if that is agreeable.

Mr. Hays. I have no objection except I understand I will be able to interrupt Mr. McNiece.
The Chairman. That is all right.
We will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m. Thursday, May 20, 1954.)