The special committee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to recess, in room 1301, New House Office Building, Hon. Carrol Reece (chairman of the special committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Reece, Goodwin, Hays, and Pfost.
Also Present: Rene A. Wormser, general counsel; Arnold T. Koch, associate counsel; Norman Dodd, research director; Kathryn Casey, legal analyst; John Marshall, chief clerk.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Wolcott is out of town; Mr. Goodwin had to stop by the Ways and Means Committee for a minute, but will be here in a very short time. I think we might as well proceed.

Would you be sworn, Dr. Rowe. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give in this proceeding shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. Rowe. I do.

TESTIMONY OF DAVID NELSON ROWE, YALE UNIVERSITY, NEW HAVEN, CONN.

Mr. Wormser. Would you state your name and address for the record?

Dr. Rowe. David Nelson Rowe, business address, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.; home address, Hamden, Conn. Do you want the street number, and so on?

Mr. Wormser. I think that is enough.

I have some notes of biographical material on Professor Rowe. Would you correct me if I make an error in reciting your accomplishments?

Dr. Rowe. Yes.

Mr. Wormser. Professor Rowe was born in China. He got an A. B. degree at Princeton, an M. A. at the University of Southern California, Ph. D. at Chicago. He was a fellow at the University of Chicago from 1933 to 1935; a fellow of the Rockefeller Foundation from 1937 to 1938. He held a postwar fellowship from the Rockefeller Foundation in 1948-49. He received an honorary M. A. degree from Yale University in 1950.

He lectured at Princeton from 1938 to 1943. He was successively assistant professor and associate professor and full professor at Yale
in Political Science. He has been research associate at the Institute of International Studies from 1943 to 1951, a director of the Staff Officers School for Asiatic Studies from 1945 to 1946; a director of undergraduate and graduate studies, from 1946 to 1948; director of graduate studies on Asia, 1949-51; associate in Government at Barnard College, Columbia, 1945-46; lecturer at the National War College in 1947-48 and 1950; member of the Yale Executive Committee on International Relations, 1950 to the present time. Doctor of studies on human resources, 1951-53.

Dr. Rowe. Pardon me; that is Director.

Mr. Wormser. Director. He taught summer school at the University of Chicago in 1935; at the University of Michigan in 1947. He was research analyst, Special Defense Group, Department of Justice, in 1941; Special Assistant to the Director of the Bureau of Research and Analysis, OSS, 1941-42.

Dr. Rowe. Pardon me; that is Bureau of Research and Analysis.


I have no record of your writings, Professor Rowe. Would you state those in summary?

Dr. Rowe. I don’t know that I can state them all, sir, but I will try to remember the chief items. The book published under the auspices of the Yale Institute of International Studies in 1944, entitled, “China Among the Powers”; a book of which I am coauthor, entitled “American Constitutional History,” which was published, I believe, in 1933. I may be a little off on that date. A book which I edited for the Yale Press, entitled, “Journey to the Missouri,” which was published in the summer of 1950.

Those are the chief works. Then there are probably 20 or so articles published in various journals which center about the two general fields. One is Far Eastern Affairs, and the other is Public Opinion and Propaganda Studies. Some of the studies on Far Eastern affairs are in the field of public opinion and propaganda, so I bring these two things together here.

Other studies in the Far Eastern field, and articles involve constitutional matters, matters of foreign policy, international relations, and so forth. I can provide the committee with a detailed list of all these publications if you are interested.

Mr. Wormser. I don’t think that is necessary. I think I can safely state, Mr. Chairman, that Professor Rowe is one of the country’s very outstanding experts on the Far East.

Mr. Hays. Mr. Wormser, just one further question at this point to further qualify Dr. Rowe.

Professor, you said you are in the Department of Political Science; is that right?

Dr. Rowe. That is correct.

Mr. Hays. Could you give me some idea; I assume that is divided into different phases. Just what are some of the courses that you conduct?
Dr. Rowe. My work in political science by now is limited entirely to a field we might call government and politics of the Far East. All of my teaching is comprehended within that field.

Mr. Hays. Thank you. That is what I wanted to know.

The Chairman. You have a very impressive record of accomplishments for a young man, Dr. Rowe.

Dr. Rowe. Thank you for both saying that it is a real accomplishment and also for using the word “young.” That is a very happy word these days.

The Chairman. Mr. Wormser, what is your desire as to the method of procedure?

Dr. Rowe. Before we go, may I make one insertion in my biography, which I think has relevance? It was mentioned that I had a fellowship from the Rockefeller Foundation in 1937–38, and other grants, at least one of which was mentioned, but I think it should be mentioned that from 1935 to 1937 I was a fellow in humanities at Harvard under a General Education Board fellowship. This was a 2-year business, and I think it is rather important to get that in the record also in the biography.

Mr. Wormser. Professor, in view of these associations with foundations, I think you might make clear to the committee initially your position about foundations. I understand from what you told me last night that you consider that your own career was somewhat built on foundation assistance.

Dr. Rowe. There is no question about that at all. I would like to make a rather forthright statement here that for me to repudiate foundations would be to repudiate myself. I am a product of foundation help. If you don’t mind my using a figure of speech, I am a graduate of the old foundation college. As a loyal alumnus I still reserve the right to criticize, and I think that as a loyal alumnus criticisms would probably be welcomed in the spirit in which they are given which I hope is a constructive one.

But my entire career in the Far Eastern field has been made possible by foundation assistance. This has to do with the efforts of foundations through various other organizations, but in my case always direct foundation help to fill up some of the big obvious loopholes in the American educational system.

One of these obviously 20 years ago was in the Far Eastern field. When I say this great deficit in American education existed 20 years ago, all you have to remember is that today the number of university centers in this country at which you can find full-scale programs of Far Eastern studies does not number over about 10 or a dozen. So we still have a long way to go.

This thing was kicked off—the initial impetus was provided by people in foundations and the Council of Learned Societies, and other organizations who in assessing American education decided that this was one of the great areas which ought to be provided for.

I can go on and talk about this experience at considerable length. I want to add only one more thing here, subject, of course, to any questions you have. At the outset this job was conceived by foundations in terms of a personnel training program. It always seemed to me that the foundations were on absolutely sound ground in thinking of the problem that way. I have somewhat different feelings about some of the activities of foundations today in which I feel they have
turned away from the fundamentals—some of them, at least—of personnel training to programs of sponsoring research.

Here is where the foundations, I think, have gotten into some of their most serious difficulties, and made what I at least consider to be some of their more serious errors.

Some of the foundations have started turning back to the old approach. The Ford people, for example, have initiated 2 or 3 years ago a very large program of personnel training for the purpose of feeding these people into the research and teaching and scholarly work that must be done in this field if we are ever to really understand the Far East and preserve our national interest in respect to it. But other foundations have decided to place the major emphasis upon sponsorship and promotion of research. Here I think is where some of the great problems arise.

I just wanted to make that clear at the outset.

Mr. Hays. Right there, Professor, could we just elaborate on that a little bit? You say that you think they made a mistake in concentrating on research.

Dr. Rowe. Could I correct that?

Mr. Hays. Yes.

Dr. Rowe. I don't say they made a mistake in concentrating in research, so much as I say that it is in respect to these research programs sponsored by and financed by the foundations that some of the biggest mistakes have been made.

Mr. Hays. Could you be specific and mention a couple?

Dr. Rowe. I would say that the big error of the foundations along this line has been to try to project into the universities what I term the so-called cooperative, or group method of research. This gets us onto rather technical grounds. Here I want to put in the parenthetical statement that, and that applies to all of my testimony, namely, that I am here giving expression to my own individual opinions. I don't speak for any organization. I certainly don't speak for my university, let alone for all of my colleagues in the university, among whom I am sure will be found many people who will disagree with much that I say.

Mr. Hays. That is an interesting statement. I don't want to interrupt your thought, but I would like to develop these things as we go and since you don't have a script, I believe you will agree that is about the only way we can do it. I am not interrupting you in any antagonistic fashion.

Dr. Rowe. Any way you want to conduct it.

Mr. Hays. In other words, at Yale University, where you are now situated, there is a great divergence of opinion on these fundamental matters.

Dr. Rowe. I am sure there must be.

Mr. Hays. It has not happened that the foundations or anybody else have been able to channel the thinking down one narrow channel.

Dr. Rowe. This has not happened, but that does not mean that efforts are not constantly being made. That is the point I wish to make.

Mr. Hays. I had an idea that you might make a point from having read some of your previous testimony. What I would like to get at is this. You say that an attempt has been made. Can you give us any specific examples?
Dr. Rowe. Yes; I definitely can. The effort to influence the content of area programs at Yale has been made by at least one foundation that I know of, namely, the Carnegie Corporation. I can't give you the precise date of this, but I would judge it was in about 1947. I think that isn't too much to say that this incident is rather typical of some types of foundation activity that are going on today. I don't pretend to know how constant they are or how general they are around the country.

This involved an effort on the part of the Carnegie Corporation through one of its representatives by the name of John Gardner, I believe, to influence the administration of Yale to eliminate the work we were doing in the far-eastern field and to concentrate our work on the southeast Asian field. This was a rather surprising suggestion. Yale has a long tradition of interest in the Far East. You may have heard of the organization known as Yale in China.

At the time this suggestion was made, we were spending a considerable sum of money each year on faculty salaries for teaching and research in the far-eastern field.

Mr. Hays. What year was this, sir?

Dr. Rowe. I think it was about 1947. I can't give you the precise date.

Mr. Hays. Just so we get some idea.

Dr. Rowe. Yes. This had to do with the desire on the part of Yale to develop and expand its work in the southeast Asian field, where again we had important work for a number of years. We have had some eminent people in the southeast Asian field for years in the past.

In this connection, the visit of Mr. Gardner to the university was undertaken, I believe, at that time the dean of Yale College was in charge of the whole foreign area program, and I was working directly under him as director of graduate and undergraduate studies as the biography indicated. We were rather shocked at Mr. Gardner's suggestion that we drop all our work on the Far East and concentrate on southeast Asia.

The dean questioned Mr. Gardner as to why this suggestion was being made. In the general conversation that followed—I got this second hand from the dean, because I was not present then—the philosophy of the foundations along this line was brought out. They look upon their funds or tend to look upon their funds as being expendable with the greatest possible economy. That is natural. They look upon the resources in these fields where the people are few and far between as scarce, which is correct, and they are interested in integrating and coordinating the study of these subjects in this country. Therefore, the suggestion that we cut out far-eastern studies seemed to be based on a notion on their part that no one university should attempt to cover too many different fields at one time.

The practical obstacles in the way of following the suggestion made by Mr. Gardner at that time were pretty clear. There were quite a few of the members of the staff on the far-eastern studies at that time who were already on permanent faculty tenure at Yale and could hardly have been moved around at the volition of the university, even if it had wanted to do it. The investment in library resources and other fixed items of that kind was very large. The suggestion that we just liquidate all this in order to concentrate on southeast Asian studies, even though it was accompanied by a suggestion that if this
kind of a policy was adopted, the Carnegie Corp. would be willing to subsidize pretty heavily the development of southeast Asian studies, was met by a flat refusal on the part of the university administration.

Subsequently the dean asked me to write the initial memorandum for submission to the Carnegie Corp. on the basis of which, without acceding to their suggestion that we eliminate far eastern studies from our curriculum, that we wanted to expand our southeast Asian studies with their funds.

They subsequently did give us a grant for this purpose, and they have given a second grant. I don't know precisely what the amounts were in either case.

The only reason for my giving you this incident in somewhat detail is to indicate what I consider to be a real tendency in foundations today—in some foundations, not all—to adopt a function of trying to rationalize higher education and research in this country along the lines of the greatest so-called efficiency. I used the word “so-called” there designedly, because in my view, the notion that educational and research and scholarly efficiency can be produced this way in a democratic society is unacceptable. It seems to me that in a democratic society we have to strive for the greatest possible variation and differentiation as between universities along these lines, and the suggestion that any one university should more or less monopolize one field or any few universities monopolize one field, and give the other fields to others to do likewise with, it is personally repugnant to me. It does not jibe with my notion of academic freedom in the kind of democratic society that I believe in.

Mr. HAYS. Professor, right there, research itself is oftentimes rather wasteful, isn't it? Just by the very components of research. You go up a lot of blind alleys at times before you come out with an ultimate project.

Dr. ROWE. You have to define there what you mean by wasteful.

Mr. HAYS. You don't always come out with a concrete result every time you make an attempt. You have to make some false starts, and you back up and go down another street, so to speak.

Dr. ROWE. This is in the nature of an experimental method and approach. You know one thing about research is that it is not always aimed at so-called concrete results. I don't feel it should.

Mr. HAYS. But it is aimed at producing something, a definition or a fact.

Dr. ROWE. That is one of the most difficult things to get agreement on, as to what the objectives of research should be. The easiest, quickest way to get massive results is to engage in fact-finding for fact-finding's sake, or the mass accumulation of facts for the sake of accumulating facts. This produces stuff that is big and heavy in your hand, but I don't think it is any more valuable, to put it mildly, than the kind of research that allows a scholar the time for reflection and contemplation, out of which come many of the ideas and thoughts which alone can make valid framework for analyzing the great masses of data that may be accumulated, many times by people who don't have much capacity for effective thinking or for theory or don't have much inclination for that kind of thing.

Mr. HAYS. I am inclined to agree with you. We are not in disagreement there. I will put it this way. The kind of research you approve
of is also the kind of research that perhaps would bring out a good many varied shades of opinion; would it not?

Dr. Rowe. In my field, which is the field of political science—and I don't like the term "political science," because there is not much science in it—

Mr. Hays. And very little relation to politics; wouldn't you agree?

Dr. Rowe. No, I wouldn't agree with that for a moment. I think it has a very high degree of relation to politics. Certainly the field I have something to do with has.

Mr. Hays. I will qualify that by saying practical politics.

Dr. Rowe. I am not a judge of practical politics. All I know is that in the field I specialize in, practically everything I deal with is so highly controversial, of course, I have to face all the time the fact that politics largely deals with opinions, and the so-called objective facts to which you can get agreement are relatively insignificant both in number and in meaning.

Mr. Hays. For instance, and I think this would have some direct relationship on what we are trying to develop here, there is a considerable difference of opinion right now apparently about what to do in Indochina. I believe you made recommendations on that previously; have you not?

Dr. Rowe. Two years ago, of course, as my testimony before the McCarran committee investigating the Institute of Pacific Relations shows, I anticipated the emergency in Indochina, and argued that any realistic and heavy intervention there by the Chinese Communists should be met first with an advance warning that if it took place we would meet such intervention with everything necessary, including our own forces, and second, that we should actively prepare for such intervention in advance to back up our threat or position on possible Chinese intervention.

Mr. Hays. You did predict, I believe, that if a cease-fire were obtained in Korea, that the conflict would immediately widen in Indochina or spread there.

Dr. Rowe. That is correct. That was 2 years ago March.

The Chairman. Would you permit an interruption? At the time the truce was signed in Korea, for my own satisfaction—not that I anticipate it would have a very wide effect—I put a statement in the record that would be the effect of it. What I can't understand is why any advised authority was not so impressed at the time.

Mr. Hays. Mr. Chairman, let me say that is one thing you and I must agree pretty thoroughly on because I am on record with almost identically the same statement. So Professor, you have here a very rare specimen in political science of you, the chairman and I agreeing.

Dr. Rowe. I don't know, Mr. Hays, whether I would agree that agreement is quite rare, but let us not argue that point.

Mr. Hays. It has been in this committee, I will put it that way.

Dr. Rowe. You have the advantage over me. I have not been here before.

Mr. Koch. May this be a new trend?

Mr. Wormser. May I ask you, Professor, whether that incident at Yale involved the Carnegie Corporation or the Carnegie Endowment?

Dr. Rowe. I think it was the corporation. I believe that is correct.
Mr. Wormser. May I go on?
Mr. Hays. Yes.
Mr. Wormser. As long as you are on that subject, Professor, I wonder if you would be willing to discuss the grant you mentioned to me last night. I think it was a quarter of a million dollars for a group study which seemed to be somewhat fallible.

Dr. Rowe. You are probably referring to the Rockefeller Foundation support of a group study at the University of Washington, at Seattle. I don't believe they ever made a single grant of $250,000, but I think the sum of their grants probably came to that much. This was a grant for the purpose of group research on the Taiping Rebellion, which was a rebellion which took place in China during the middle of the 19th century, about the same time as the Civil War was raging in this country. The importance of this rebellion can be seen from the fact that historians estimate that 20 million persons lost their lives either in the fighting as a result of disease, epidemics, destruction, and so forth, that raged up and down China from south to north during that period of 12 to 14 years, I think. The Taiping Rebellion has long interested historians, and it is worthy of a great deal of study. Here we get into a rather interesting conflict, it seems to me, between the attitudes of foundations on the scarcity of personnel and human resources in the far eastern field on the one hand, and their willingness to financially support a tremendously narrow focus of interest in research on the other hand.

There are a large number of highly controversial questions of method involved here. The question of how to conduct research. There is valid room for experimentation on these matters. But the least that can be said about the University of Washington project is that it was a rather drastic, in my view, experiment in the use of the so-called collective-research project, in which the individuals counted for a good deal less than the team. The team was put together and people blocked out areas of subject-matter, as I have understood it, and areas of data and evidence and worked on these, and their results were pooled in the shape of card files of detailed information on this episode in Chinese history, the idea being that out of this kind of a team pick and shovel approach, you get a lot of facts together, and out of these facts will be brought forth a series of monographic studies.

There is room for this kind of thing, but I always thought they went a little bit far with it, because I understood—and I beg to be corrected if I am wrong on this, I have never had any official connection with this project—I understood that they even integrated into their Taiping Rebellion studies the work of their doctoral candidates, so that people in Chinese history, for example, were brought in there and given support to write theses on some aspect of the Taiping Rebellion.

I thought that in view of the scarcity of human resources and the need for general training on Far Eastern matters, that this was focusing it down pretty firm. It is a wonderful project from the point of view of research. If you believe in gadgetry, this had all the gadgets you will ever want to find. If you believe that the best way to promote research is to pick out highly trained and able people and set them free in a general field, like Chinese studies, to follow their own interests wherever they may lead them, then you see this is the
very opposite of that kind of thing. It does achieve a certain kind of mechanical efficiency, it seems to me, at the expense of inhibiting the kind of thing that Mr. Hays was talking about, namely, the freedom of the individual to go down any number of blind alleys he wants to go down in the free pursuit of his curiosity, in the interests of honestly trying to come up with important things.

Mr. Hays. Professor, I believe you used the word “experiment” in connection with this study. This is rather a radical departure from the traditional method of research. Did you mean to say that this was an experiment with this new type to see how it worked out?

Dr. Rowe. I don’t know how they conceived of it from that point of view.

Mr. Hays. Did they comment on it themselves, as to what they thought its value had been? Did anyone at the University of Washington do that?

Dr. Rowe. They are not through with it.

Mr. Hays. They are still working on it?

Dr. Rowe. Yes. It is a monumental business.

Mr. Wormser. May I interject this question, Mr. Hays, which I think might illuminate the whole area. There has been testimony, Professor, to the effect that the foundations have overemphasized empiricism and that their research grants have been overwhelmingly directed toward empirical research. Is this perhaps an example of that approach?

Dr. Rowe. It certainly is an example of really massive attacks on evidence, by teams of people that emphasize the gathering of tremendous quantities of facts. Whether they propose after this to advance into the field of generalization and basic analysis on the basis of all this factual material is something that I have no knowledge of, and I think you would have to know the answer to that before you could comment justifiably on just what kind of research this is in the framework of your question.

Mr. Wormser. You think there has been such an overemphasis on empiricism?

Dr. Rowe. Are you talking generally?

Mr. Wormser. Yes.

Dr. Rowe. It would be very difficult for me to answer that question vis-a-vis all research sponsored by or supported by all foundations because I just don’t have the knowledge necessary to make that kind of a comment. Taking it outside of the field of foundation support, I do think in my own field for example, the general field of political science, there has been an overemphasis upon empirical research at the expense of theoretically oriented thinking and analysis. There is a tremendous emphasis upon the census type of thing in political science. Statistics are coming into greater and greater importance. Whereas, this is of course always a valid tool for research workers, the emphasis here tends to detract from the kind of fundamental thinking about great issues and about values which characterize the work of earlier students of politics in the United States, such as for instance, President Wilson, and people of that kind. Those studies, of course, were rooted in history and rooted in law. To the extent that political scientists have tried to divorce themselves from historical and legal study, and from historical and legal background in their study, they have tended to become very pointed fact-gatherers, census-takers and
the business of arguing about great issues has been played down to this extent.

Of course, it is much easier and much simpler for political scientists to justify their existence on the basis of a mass production of factual materials than it is for them to justify their existence as great thinkers, because fact-gatherers are a dime a dozen and people who can think are hard to find. This is a comment on the fallibility of human nature. After all, political scientists are human beings.

Mr. Hays. Professor, is what you are saying, in other words, that thinkers could not get the products of their thinking across because the people would not be able to comprehend and they cannot comprehend statistics?

Dr. Rowe. No; I don’t mean to imply that. I mean to say that ideas and concepts and values are far more important, it seems to me, than much of the indisputable, completely noncontroversial factual material that political scientists seem to occupy themselves with so much in the present day.

Mr. Hays. That leads me to a very interesting question, and that is this: In view of what you say—and I am inclined to agree with you that ideas have a great deal of value—what would be your comment on what seems to be a tendency in this country to hold a person responsible if they have an idea that does not work out? Something like in Russia, if you have a new idea there, and you try it out and it doesn’t work perfectly, you are liquidated. There seems to be a tendency here that you better not have any new ideas. If you do, they better work perfectly or you are in trouble. Do you see that at all?

Dr. Rowe. I don’t feel the pressure along that line as strongly as some of my colleagues seem to feel it, in spite of the fact that I have been in the minority in many of my own opinions. I feel this can be discussed in several different areas.

In the field of government, for example, I can express an opinion as an outsider who has never held public office. It has always seemed to me that in a democracy, anybody who is bold enough to take public office has got to have a thick skin. That is one of the attributes of people who are going to be a success in government in a democracy.

Mr. Hays. I think we can agree on that without any question.

Dr. Rowe. That refers to everybody. I am not only talking about legislative people. I am talking about policy making people and people in the State Department.

Mr. Hays. Cabinet officers.

Dr. Rowe. When they are complained about bitterly for having led us into error, they seem to feel that these complaints are unjustifiable. Maybe they are incorrect, but they are justifiable. The public has a right to kick anytime it feels like it.

In the academic and intellectual field, there is another possible area here. In the academic field, of course, we have what is known as academic tenure or faculty tenure. After they get permanent tenure in a university, providing they don’t stray off the beaten path too far from an ethical point of view, people can say almost anything they want. I have never felt that any of my colleagues should be afraid to express their opinions on any subject, as long as they stay within the bounds of good taste and ordinary common decency. Nobody in the world is going to be able to do anything to them. This is fact and
not fiction. It is not fancy. Their degree of security is put there to be exploited in this way.

Now, of course, some of the people that complain most bitterly about the invasion of academic privilege along that line are those who indulge themselves in invading it. What, for instance, is a professor to think when people with money come along and tell his university that what he is doing there is useless and ought to be liquidated, because it is being done much better some place else?

We hear a lot of the use of the word 'conformity' nowadays, that congressional investigations are trying to induce conformity. The inducement of conformity by the use of power is as old as the human race, and I doubt if it is going to be ended in a short time. But one of the purposes of having academic institutions which are on a private basis is to maximize the security of individuals who will refuse to knuckle under to the pressures of money or opinion or anything of that kind. This problem is always going to be with us, because anybody that has money wants to use it, and he wants to use it to advance what he considers to be his interests. In doing so, he is bound to come up against contrary opinions of people who don't have that much money and that much power and whose only security lies in our system, whereby academic personnel are given security in tenure, no matter what their opinions are within the framework of public acceptability and security, to say what they want and do what they please, without being integrated by anybody.

Mr. Wormser. Professor, this committee in some of the newspapers has been criticized in just that area. It has been said that it tended to promote conformity and exercise thought control or censorships. That of course is far from its intention.

I wonder if I gather from your remarks correctly you think that the foundations to some extent have tended to do just that?

Dr. Rowe. I would say that there are examples of foundations trying to engage in controlling the course of academic research and teaching by the use of their funds. As to whether this is a general tendency in all foundations, I would be very much surprised if that were so. But if this committee can illuminate any and all cases in which the power of foundations, which is immense, has been used in such a way as to impinge upon the complete freedom of the intellectual community to do what it wants in its own area, I should think it would be rendering a tremendous public service.

I am not prejudicing the result. I don't know whether you are going to prove any of this or not. But the investigation of this subject is to me not only highly justifiable, but it is highly desirable in an age when we are confronted all around in the environment in which we live with illustrations of how great power can be concentrated and used to prevent the normal amount of differentiation and variation from individual to individual, university to university and college to college. The totalitarian societies, of course, have none of this freedom in the intellectual field.

Mr. Hays. Right there, Professor, I agree with you that at any time this committee can point up any abuse, it should do so. But don't you think that the committee should also in its evaluation and summing up of this say—we had the figure yesterday of 26 instances, one of the staff members said, of the foundations having gone astray. There was
some disagreement about the number of grants, but it was somewhere between thirty and forty thousand. Don't you think the committee ought to point out that in using the figure 40,000, which I think is probably correct, that in 39,974 cases, there has been no fault found?

Dr. Rowe. It seems to me that comes out of the statistics. It seems to me also, however, that if you are really interested in this subject of possible misuse of foundation funds, you have to concentrate very heavily on studying the total net effect of the 40 cases. You can't just say that the comparison is 40 out of 40,000. This is a use of statistics that I would think would be rather unsound. What you have to do is to try to study the total impact of the cases where they did go wrong. With every indication, it seems to me, that you are not interested in being destructive. You are interested in a constructive, helpful analysis. If it takes an investigation of this kind just to publicize the times and places and cases when foundations have gone astray—and it would not have been done otherwise—then I think everything you do, even if you find only 40 cases, is justified.

Mr. Hays. You said earlier in your testimony that you are more or less a product of foundations yourself.

Dr. Rowe. That is right.

Mr. Hays. Do you suppose it would be possible to find somebody who thinks that in producing the kind of thing that you represent that the foundations have made a mistake?

Dr. Rowe. I am positive you can find people like that.

Mr. Hays. You see, the ground we are on here in setting ourselves up to decide what mistakes the foundations have made and what they are.

Dr. Rowe. I see you have a difficult task. I see that the so-called purely statistical approach to this task is not going to get you any place.

Mr. Hays. And being fallible, our conclusions, even if unanimous, might be subject to some revision.

Dr. Rowe. I am sure the Supreme Court is even criticized for its unanimous decisions as we all know. But any time such criticism ends in this country, then I take it there won't have been any congressional committees for some time in the past.

Mr. Hays. Let me say to you I am not advocating the ceasing of criticism or differences of opinion. As a matter of fact, that is what I like more than anything. I have enjoyed being on this committee because of the differences of opinion. But I don't want this committee or any committee of Congress to set itself up to say that there shall be no differences of opinion.

Dr. Rowe. My knowledge of congressional committees, of course, is very limited, but I have not had brought to my attention yet—you may be able to tell me some—cases where committees of Congress have set themselves up as the final law of the land. I do find a great deal of criticism of congressional investigations among my colleagues on the ground that these investigations are undesirable. Some of them say they are going so far as to infringe completely upon the power of the executive. There are many objections to them. But it seems to me that the control in this case is very obvious and very clear. If these committees are committees of Congress, they are in the final analysis subject to political control. They are subject to the control of the public. If the public makes up its mind that Congress is making mistakes, it may take a good deal of time for this to develop and have
its effect, but I have no doubt about what the ultimate outcome
would be.

The Chairman. Any reference to this statistical data raises some
question in my mind whether we may not be falling into the error
of empirical research. As I understand it, 39 cases to which he
referred—

Mr. Hays. Twenty-six.

The Chairman. The cases to which he referred were just a few of
the many grantees about whom some question has arisen as a result
of studies that were made. These were the Communists who had
received grants. That did not indicate at all, that over the course
of history, there might not have been others among the 40,000 that
were questionable. The committee did not try to make that finding
and avoided the error of which my colleague speaks. Neither did it
take into consideration questionable grants that had been made to
organizations where the overall effect might have been subject to
question. I understand that was included by Mr. McNiece, the staff
member that presented it yesterday, simply to make a side reference
to the fact that the committee found grants had been made to 40
Communists, and even one of them might have caused—I am not
saying that it did—but the effect of the grant in one case might have
been very far-reaching.

I was impressed by one thing that you said earlier, if you will just
permit this observation, that one of the purposes we hope will flow
from the work of this committee when the criticisms are finally eval-
uated, is to call these things to the attention of the foundations them-
selves in the hope that the foundations will correct any errors that
might have been made.

Dr. Rowe. Yes. Could I comment on that briefly, and make a few
other comments that are connected with this? I am fully in agree-
ment with the notion that—picking a figure out of the air—2 or 3
grants that are made to wrong people can have a tremendous effect
in undoing much of the good that is made by the rest of the 40,000.
Again it is not a matter of every grant being equal in significance.
You can’t evaluate them in terms of how many dollars were involved.
A small grant made to a person in a critical position where he is
going to make a wrong move, and implement the matter, can negate
hundreds and thousands of grants made to people who are out on the
fringes, the outskirts of positions of power and influence where the
impact of everything they do that may be good will not be directly
felt in policy areas.

Another interesting feature of that is that grants to organizations,
it seems to me, have to be very carefully taken into account when
you are talking about the total number of grants. I don’t quite under-
stand here whether the grants to organizations were included in this
total figure.

The Chairman. They were not. These are grants to individuals.

Dr. Rowe. Of the grants to organizations I can only give you the
best example that I know of. Those that involved, for instance, the
Institute of Pacific Relations. I don’t know what the sum total of the
money was. It came from Rockefeller and Carnegie and from private
contributions.

Mr. Wormser. I believe it was something over $3 million.
Dr. Rowe. $3 million. The grants to the Institute of Pacific Relations, it seems to me, helped to implement a lot of people who did not, in my opinion, have the best interests of the United States at heart.

Here I want to talk about another item. It seems to me we make a mistake in talking about identifying Communists as grantees on the one hand, non-Communists as grantees on the other hand. In much of the activity that has to do with identification of Communist activity in the United States, it has seemed to me that we are going off on the wrong track when we limit ourselves to efforts to identify overt Communists, or let us say organizational Communists, people who carry a card or who can be positively identified as members of an organization subject to organized discipline. For every one of those that you fail to identify, and it seems to me we even fail to identify most of those, there are a thousand people who could not possibly be identified as such, because they have never had any kind of organizational affiliation, but among those people are many people who advance the interests of world communism, in spite of the fact that they are not subject to discipline and do not belong to any organization.

So here again I think your categories, statistically, have to be refined somewhat. Here, of course, you get into this area of opinion. What constitutes an individual who is attempting to advance the interests of world communism?

This is a very controversial subject, but if we are ever to deal with the problem of Communist influence in this country, or ever to deal with the problem of preserving our security against the world Communist conspiracy, this is the critical area. The people who can be trailed and tagged by the FBI are a very, very small minority. They occupy a very powerful position and a potentially important one, but the people who do the important work are unidentifiable, and if I were planning to infiltrate the United States, I would see to it that they were unidentifiable.

Here it seems to me you have to set up an entirely different category than the two categories of Communists on the one side, and other people on the other side.

Mr. Hays. Right there, I will give you a specific example of something that occurred yesterday. On my desk came a newsletter. It made the flat statement that if the President were to ask Congress for permission to use troops if he found it necessary in Indochina, he would not get 25 votes. Would you say those people were advancing the cause of world communism?

Dr. Rowe. The people that refuse to send troops to Indochina?

Mr. Hays. Either they or the people who put out the letter.

Dr. Rowe. In my opinion I would say that the combating of world communism today demands western intervention in much stronger force, and if this means giving United States troops, so be it.

The Chairman. If I may be permitted to make one observation, I didn't see the newsletter, because it didn't come to my desk, though I think I know the one to which Mr. Hays might be referring. I think it represents the expression of somebody that does not know anything about what the situation is up here on the Hill.

Mr. Hays. Would you want to make a prediction, Mr. Chairman, that the President could get the permission of Congress to send troops
if he asked for it? We might make a prediction here, and the future events might prove one of us to be right or wrong.

The Chairman. I am not going to make a prediction.

Mr. Hays. I didn't think you would.

The Chairman. I think, as the situation develops, the people and the Members of the Congress on both sides of the aisle are going to have great confidence in any recommendation the President makes when all the facts are assembled, and the conditions are known, for the security of the United States. We can't predict what might happen until the President gets in a position of making a statement.

Mr. Hays. That is a very noble statement, but when you analyze it, it says nothing.

The Chairman. There can't be anything said until the President decides.

Mr. Hays. The doctor said something very definite. As far as he has a right to say it, and he may be right——

The Chairman. I think there cannot be anything very definite to say on that until the President is ready to make a recommendation and give his reason for such a recommendation. When that is done, my own feeling is that his recommendation will carry great weight on both sides of the aisle.

Mr. Hays. I understood that he had done a little checking here and he found he was not in a very good position up here. I heard that in the cloakroom.

Going back to this IPR, professor, would you tell us when you were in that organization and when you left it?

Dr. Rowe. I left it in early 1950. I believe I joined it about 1939 or 1940. Let me see. I think the precise year I joined it is to be found in my testimony before the McCarran committee.

Mr. Hays. Approximately.

Dr. Rowe. It is around 1939.

Mr. Hays. You left in 1950?

Dr. Rowe. Yes, that is right.

Mr. Hays. Do you have any information as to whether or not any foundation contributed anything to that organization after 1950?

Dr. Rowe. I understood that the Rockefeller Foundation was still contributing money to the IPR after 1950. I believe that all foundations have cut their help off from the IPR as of last fall, which is 1953.

Mr. Hays. I have some figures here, and they were furnished to me. I can't vouch for their authenticity. Perhaps you can help. I have here that from 1926 to 1943, this organization was given a total of $1,429,878; 1944–45, $36,000; 1946, $258,000, and the years 1947 to and including 1950, $160,481; and that final grant was made in an effort to salvage the IPR under the leadership of Dr. Lyman Wilbur, former president of Stanford University; and applications for further grants in 1950 and subsequently have been refused.

Dr. Rowe. Is this speaking for all foundations?

Mr. Hays. This is the Rockefeller Foundation.

Dr. Rowe. Of course, you have to take Carnegie into account, as they contributed to it. I can't confirm those figures one way or another.

The Chairman. At any rate, the great damage that the IPR had done, if it did do damage, was accomplished prior to 1950, would you not say?
Dr. Rowe. I would say that certainly a great deal of damage was accomplished prior to the beginning of the Korean war in the summer of 1950.

The Chairman. Insofar as the studies and the activities of those associated with the IPR were responsible or had influence in connection with the policies that resulted in strengthening the position of the Communists in China immediately following the World War, they accomplished possibly the greatest damage that was experienced in any period.

Dr. Rowe. I would say the most important efforts along this line were during the Pacific war, and during the period after the Pacific war from 1946—let me see—1945, when it ended, through 1948, because by that time the policy had become stabilized, it seems to me, as a policy of no more help to prevent a Communist-Chinese takeover in China. It seemed to me that the general weight of the Institute of Pacific Relations was thrown on that side of the scale, both during and immediately after the Pacific war.

Mr. Hays. Doctor, didn’t you hold some sort of rather executive position in that?

Dr. Rowe. I never held an executive position in the IPR.

Mr. Hays. You were on the board of trustees?

Dr. Rowe. I was on the board of trustees from 1947 to 1950, when I resigned.

Mr. Hays. Is there any significance—I am not going to debate with you the fact that I think the IPR, too, did damage—but is there any significance to the fact that when you retired, or approximately the time you left it, that the Rockefeller money was cut off?

Dr. Rowe. I don’t know what the significance is. Maybe they had come to the same conclusion I had by that time. It is possible, but I can’t prove it one way or another.

Mr. Hays. Did you communicate your beliefs about it any time prior to the time you left it to any of these people who were financing it?

Dr. Rowe. I can’t give you the precise date, but I did have one conversation with a foundation executive—this was Mr. Roger Evans, who was then and still is in the Social Science Division of the Rockefeller Foundation which were giving money to the IPR—in which I told him of my fears and suspicions regarding the IPR, and regarding the uses to which the money was being put. I can’t date that conversation. I don’t know whether it was before I got out or after I got out. But I did very definitely indicate to him my view of the nature of the organization, and the extent to which I thought important posts in the organization’s executive personnel had been taken over by people who were highly sympathetic to the Communist point of view. Whether this influenced him in any direct way or the foundation in any direct way, I could not possibly prove one way or another. But I did make my views known.

I was not the only one. Professor George Taylor of the University of Washington, and Dr. Karl Wittfogel, who was both at Washington and Columbia then, spoke out in this way. This was during the period which I believe you characterized as a period of trying to salvage or save the IPR under the leadership of new people. But you see, in this connection, the board of trustees of the IPR had very little control over the day-to-day operation. I don’t know whether this
is characteristic of all boards or all organizations, but I felt, and I testified previously to this effect, that the IPR was essentially controlled by a very small group of people who were sometimes an official executive committee, or otherwise an informal one, who ran things pretty much as they would and who commented to the foundation's own personnel and problems of the kind I was talking to Evans about in exactly the opposite way.

Now, at this point I want to emphasize that nobody ever brought out on this matter the facts and conclusions that were brought out by the McCarran committee, and I don't think they ever would have been brought out without the McCarran committee's investigation. If I ever saw a case where a committee of Congress was justified and necessary and desirable, and where its results were good, I think this is one case.

Mr. Hays. Now, Professor, I will agree with that generally speaking that the thing needed investigation, but all of us, I think, will admit that hindsight is better than foresight. I am interested in this. When you resigned from the IPR in 1950, if I had been there and apparently knew as much about it as you indicate you know now, I would have resigned with a good deal of publicity and a blast at them, and said, "Look, I think this thing stinks, and I am getting out." How did you do it?

Dr. Rowe. I got out with a letter which was probably altogether too polite. I am ready to admit this.

Mr. Hays. Understand, I am not trying to pillory you.

Dr. Rowe. Your question, you see, is a very significant and very important one.

Mr. Hays. Yes.

Dr. Rowe. It has to do with the business of how you can produce a maximum effect along lines of issues, and still produce at the same time a viable degree of personal security. This is definitely involved. I am not talking about physical security. I am talking about the position in the profession of anybody who would come out at that time, unsupported by anybody else practically, and openly accuse these people of the things which they have been accused of since, by me as well as others, and under the protection of a congressional committee. I would not have dared to do it otherwise.

In commenting that way, I think I am giving an accurate indication of the extent of the power and influence of the organization without which it could not have done as much damage as it did.

Mr. Hays. I won't criticize you for that, Professor, but you have inadvertently made a very telling point that I was trying to make yesterday when I was questioning someone, if there is such a fear among the teachers and the professors, the executives of our school system, about speaking out. You have just now testified definitely there was, because your future security was at stake, isn't that right?

Dr. Rowe. Yes, that is right. I am pointing out another thing which I think needs to be emphasized, namely, that congressional investigations do not always infringe upon personal security. In many cases they add to it and protect it. That is why I commented that the McCarran committee investigation gave an opportunity for all of this to be brought out by people who could do it under conditions which they could not have enjoyed without the privilege of that forum to talk before. Don't get me wrong. I am not implying that the re-
suits of this kind of testimony are always happy for people who testify. You still can be made to feel all kinds of difficulties, and reprisals can always be taken against you because of your opinions, but I think the time has come for a little balance to be restored, as to who it is who infringes on other people's freedom of opinion.

I read in the papers that the congressional committees are the only ones that are doing it, whereas, we all know it is an age-old practice, and will be going on long after these particular committees are out of existence. I want to redress the balance a little and put in a plea for the idea that a congressional committee properly conducted is a preserver of individual security, and not an infringer thereupon.

Mr. Wormser. Professor, you were not worried about what Yale University would do to you. You were worrying about libel suits.

Dr. Rowe. Yes, that was definitely the case. I suppose I went too far along that line when I talked to Mr. Evans in private, because some of the things I told Mr. Evans, if uttered publicly, could easily have brought on suits for libel, because I mentioned names.

The Chairman. It would have been impossible for the IPR story to have been unfolded in all of its completeness insofar as it has been unfolded except by a congressional committee.

Dr. Rowe. Or some investigation of similar nature.

The Chairman. That is right.

Dr. Rowe. That is right.

The Chairman. And insofar as there may be similar, although less far-reaching, evils existing, which are surrounded by foundation grants, it seems to me that it is very difficult for those things to be developed and uncovered except by congressional committees. That was what was in the mind of the chairman in proposing a further study. I was about to ask you a question which you answered, that is, whether the members of the board of the IPR, many of whom or some of whom were good men—and I think many of whom were—

Dr. Rowe. I would say most were.

The Chairman. Most were good and well meaning men, but they were not in a position to devote the time necessary to understand the details of all the ramifications of the activities of the IPR. Then we all have one human weakness, which is a tendency to have confidence in those who are thrown in close contact with us until our suspicions are violently aroused in some way. As I saw the danger there and in other organizations, it is the designing individuals, those who are undesirable, insinuate, not necessarily themselves, but their fellow travelers—using that in a very broad sense—into positions of influence for the very purpose of adopting policies and promulgating policies under the authority of the board.

Although, as the figures read off here indicate, a very small, relatively very, very small part of foundation grants went to the IPR, it is a striking example of an instance where the relative grants were so small and only constitute a flyspeck, have had a great influence in bringing us to this present perilous position which has developed in the Far East and is threatening the security and the freedom of the whole world.

Dr. Rowe. That is right. I would like to add this regarding the IPR and regarding the problem of Far Eastern policy. You remember some of my earlier remarks about the state of Far Eastern studies in the United States 20 or 30 years ago, how I said there was practically none of it; how some of the foundations started to finance the
building up and training of personnel. It seems to me this kind of thing has to be taken into account in evaluating foundation grants, namely, that the area of ignorance in the United States about Far Eastern matters was so great that here was the strategic place in which to strike at the security of the United States by people interested in imperilling our security and fostering the aims of world communism. They would naturally not pick the area in which we have the greatest intellectual capacities and in which we have the greatest capacities for defense. They would pick the area of greatest public ignorance, with the greatest difficulty of defending against the tactics of their attack, and so these people naturally poured into Far Eastern studies and exploited this area as the area in which they could promote the interests of world communism most successfully in the general ignorance and blindness of the American people.

So that it is not only quantitative evaluation that counts; it is not only the numbers of grants or the amounts of grants; it is the areas in which the grants are given that are significant. Here, you see, it seems to me, it takes a great deal of subject matter know-how—quite apart from dollars and cents—people and their affiliations or lack thereof, to evaluate the impact on this country of any given foundation grant, I don’t care whether it is $50 or $5 million. It is a qualitative matter, not a quantitative matter. Here is where judgment comes in and where the greatest possibility of disagreements and controversies lies. But where it seems to me if you are going to do an evaluating job on foundation activities you are going to have to make up your mind with the best help you can find just what the meaning of the grants was.

The Chairman. I am not sure about the year, but up until the late forties, the IPR had an excellent standing, did it not? I am not sure what year it was, but perhaps up to the mid-forties.

Dr. Rowe. The IPR had excellent standing in educational circles, in governmental circles, and intellectual circles up until the late forties. That is an accurate statement.

The Chairman. We can well understand how those in the administration placed great confidence in the recommendations of the representatives and the findings of the IPR.

Dr. Rowe. That is correct.

The Chairman. And the advice of the individuals associated with the IPR.

Dr. Rowe. That is right, because they were known all over the country. Remember, they were one part of an international organization. They were known all over the country as the outstanding center in the United States for Far Eastern research and study.

The Chairman. Now we know that some of the keymen on the working and operating levels, who developed the policies that were finally promulgated, were following the line of the Communists.

Dr. Rowe. That is correct.

Mr. Hays. I am interested right there in this kind of what seems to me a lame excuse that you spread over this board of trustees. I happen to be a member of the board of directors of a financial institution, and I feel sure if we were lax enough to let the financial institution go bankrupt that somebody would hold us responsible. Nobody would come in and say the board of directors are nice guys, but
they are too busy to know what happens to this $2 million. Who were these—

Dr. Rowe. Would you like me to comment on that statement?

Mr. Hays. I would like you to comment on it, and name the board of trustees who were too busy to know what is going on.

The Chairman. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Dr. Rowe. Would you allow me to comment on this problem and try to make a differentiation between the kind of thing you have sketched and the situation here, and the kind of problem we were up against in the IPR?

Mr. Hays. I want you to do that, and that is exactly what I am trying to bring out. I want you to bring out your opinions about all of these things, and I am not trying to hamper you in any questions I ask you. It is merely to clear up something I think I might not be clear on.

Dr. Rowe. I understand that perfectly well. I would have the greatest respect for the ability of either of you gentlemen or others that I know to read a bank balance sheet and to tell the difference between red ink and black ink. As you say, that is your business. You are on the board of directors; you have to know. But I would like to know whether you would have equal confidence in your ability at all times as a member of a board of directors to be able to point the finger at the fellow that is putting his fingers on the till. You can't do that, so you bond these people. You bond them against losses, and you protect yourself, and the bank, and you have a system for doing that.

You don't have a system like that in the intellectual world. You try to work one up and I will be the first to adopt it. I will say this. You are never going to be able to spot such people, who operate down in the levels an organization, from away up high where the directors sit, because they don't know what the people are doing, they can't possibly supervise them directly. This is left to the executive people. If the executive people know what they are doing—I testified before the McCarran committee that I was present once at a board of directors' meeting of the IPR at which they were discussing the appointment of a new executive secretary, and I had to sit there in the board and hear the executive committee members refuse to divulge the names of the candidates they were thinking about in the presence of the board of directors, and they got away with it.

Mr. Hays. What did you do about that?

Dr. Rowe. What could I do. I was practically a minority of one. The board upheld their decision not to do this. It was not too long after that as I remember it that I resigned from the board. They had a monopoly and they were bringing people like me in for purposes of setting up a front, and I hope, giving a different kind of coloring to the membership of the board.

Mr. Wormser. How often did that board meet, Professor?

Dr. Rowe. The last meeting I attended the members from California were not present. There was a member there from Oregon.
Mr. Koch. But was the membership of the board spread over the United States?

Dr. Rowe. Yes, it was, and those people could not always attend.

The Chairman. You touched on a rather important thing, and I don't know to what extent this committee can develop the information. I, for one, have been curious, and in saying this I am not criticizing the foundation that happens to be involved, because I think it might have happened to any foundation or foundations, and I am not criticizing anybody at the top; but I would be interested in knowing how the appointment of Alger Hiss originated. Not how it was finally made, but, in the first instance, who became interested in it. I would just like to see it followed on through until the board did approve it. I don't know whether there is any way of getting at it or not.

Dr. Rowe. Are you referring to his appointment, I believe, as a member of the board?

The Chairman. No; as president of Carnegie Endowment.

Dr. Rowe. I don't know anything about that, sir.

The Chairman. No; I am not asking you. I just think it would be an important case study.

Dr. Rowe. Yes.

Mr. Hays. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt, I would suggest that perhaps the best person to subpoena in to testify about that would be Mr. John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State. He perhaps could tell us if you want to pursue the inquiry. I would go along with you.

The Chairman. I have no idea that Mr. Dulles is in a position to have that information. As Dr. Rowe indicated in the case to which he referred, the basic work was done well in advance and the preparation was made, and it finally came to a head when it got to the board.

Mr. Hays. I understood he proposed him.

Doctor, I want to pursue this a little further and again let me say I am not trying to point the finger at you in the way you resigned. You did resign and you said in your testimony “At the time of my resignation, I pled too many organizations and too many things to do and got out on that basis.” I am concerned, in view of the criticism of foundations for the lack of ability on the part of the board of trustees of any foundation to not make a grant that is not right, because we are saying here that the trustees of the IPR were too busy to know what is going on. I don’t think that is right. I don’t think a man ought to take a job on the board of trustees like that unless he is going to sacrifice the time necessary to have at least a fundamental idea of what the organization is doing.

Dr. Rowe. I would have been perfectly willing to sacrifice the time necessary to get full information and participate in policy decisions. One of the things that motivated me was the fact that you could spend the time—I could—but you could not get the facts and information or get in the inside circles. I submit to you that taking 3 years to find that out in an organization of the complexity of the IPR was not an unconscionably long period of time.

Mr. Hays. I am not criticizing.

Dr. Rowe. That is the period of time I was a member of the board. I reached my conclusion with deliberation. I did not want to get right out at the end of the very first or second year. I want to make another thing clear. I got out of the IPR before any of the public attention was focused on the thing. This was prior to the first Latti-
more investigation, for instance, when the attention began to be
focused on the IPR. That is all I can say about it. I don't believe I
am a member of any boards of that kind at the present time. I have
evenough to keep myself busy.

Mr. HAYs. I was not trying to imply that I had any idea of criticism
of you as a trustee.

Dr. Rowe. It is perfectly all right and a justifiable observation.

Mr. HAYs. I do say as two people who look at a problem we might
have different ways of doing things. I am not going to put myself in
the position of saying that from your viewpoint, knowing your life,
you had done the wrong thing. I would have done it differently,
perhaps with disastrous results; I don’t know. Suffice it to say, you
say you did get out in 1950. If I were to criticize at all, my only
criticism would be that it seems to me you got out in such a way that
you didn’t call enough attention to the thing, and perhaps ought to
call it as we look on the complexity of it now.

Dr. Rowe. You probably will be willing to admit that there was
an effort made subsequently to make up for omissions of this kind
on my part.

Mr. HAYs. Yes.

Mr. Wormser. I would like to develop a variety of this same sub-
ject, Mr. Hays. I think I can express the Professor’s opinion from
my discussion last night, but I would like him to develop it, that the
IPR incident illustrates what may be a weakness in foundation oper-
ation in view of the fact that trustees cannot themselves adequately
handle the fiduciary duty of these responsibilities for the trust funds.
They have the tendency to use other organizations to which they vir-
tually turn over that responsibility.

In the case of the IPR, they invested heavily in that organization as
a research group, and so forth. I think the Professor’s opinion is,
and I would like him to state it himself, that it would be far better
if foundations wanting that kind of research turned to the universi-
ties and colleges and made them the grants instead. I think he has an
idea that there would be far greater protection both in the mechanism
of universities and selection of executive personnel.

Would you develop that, Professor?

Dr. Rowe. Yes, sir. There has, of course, been a mixed method on
the part of IPR. You get a very interesting carrying down the line
of the funds and the projects. Foundations will give funds to organi-
zations like IPR. Some of this money for research purposes will be
directly handled by the IPR. Young people, scholars, will be brought
into the organization to do specific jobs for the organization. How-
ever, they will also go to universities and ask universities as they did
once in our case to provide, so to speak, hospitality for one of the men
that they want to have perform a research function under guidance
and direction, subsidized by IPR, which money from Rockefeller
Foundation in this case. Then they will do other things. For in-
estance, the IPR organization will give money to the university per-
sonnel themselves directly for either research or publication purposes.
So there are all kinds of ways and manners of doing this. I would
submit that in much of this procedure the choice of personnel, the
passing on their qualifications, the framing of projects, and the guid-
ance of the researchers in the process of carrying out projects, is not
adequately provided for by these organizations, such as the Institute
of Pacific Relations was and still is today.
In the case of universities, where appointments are made, the universities' faculties are people of long standing, they may be good, bad, or indifferent, but the organization and the procedures of appointment and approval thereof are sufficiently complex and involve sufficient safeguards to cut the errors down considerably below the errors that are possible and probable without these forms of supervision and sanction.

It seems to me that the foundations in giving funds to organizations such as the Institute of Pacific Relations are in general on rather weaker ground than if they give funds to established organizations for research purposes in which the criteria for the appointment of people, for their promotions, for their advancements and things of that kind have been worked out over a long period of time.

The informality of the arrangements in the IPR was one of the things that I have always wondered at. To make it possible for so few people to have so much power and influence in determining who got funds for what purpose and determining what kind of projects they worked on and how these projects were supervised seemed to me to be very lax. Of course, toward the end the money that IPR got was heavily given to publications. They would subsidize the publication of works that were produced by research workers in universities and other such organizations, as well as their own people. This seemed to me to be getting away a little bit from the evils of the previous system in which they were directly involved in the research function. But it still put a tremendous lot of power in the hands of a very few people, since they went all over the United States, looking over the products of research in the far eastern field, and deciding which of these they would subsidize and which they would not.

This is not to say for a moment that the foundations have not given funds directly to universities. Of course they have. I suppose they have given far more funds for research purposes directly to universities than to organizations such as the IPR. But it seems to me, and you can, of course, consider the source here—I am a member of a university community—it seems to me logical to say that in those communities you get better safeguards as to quality and personnel than you can get in any such organization as the Institute of Pacific Relations, set up to a heavy extent for research purposes outside of academic communities.

Mr. Hays. Could I interrogate you for just a minute on that subject? Do you have any people working under your direction who are working on foundation grants, fellowships, or anything of the kind?

Dr. Rowe. We would have to define a little more clearly before I answer it. I will define it as I go along in answering. If I don't cover what you are after, you can check me. I have no research personnel working under my direction on foundation grants.

Mr. Hays. Are there any at Yale working under somebody's direction? There have been in the past, have there not?

Mr. Rowe. We had, for instance, from the Rockefeller Foundation at one time a young Chinese who had finished his doctor's degree at the University of Pittsburgh, James T. C. Liu, who was given a Rockefeller grant through the university. That is, the money was put in the hands of the treasurer of Yale to be paid to him to work under the supervision of a committee of the faculty of which I was chairman, and two other faculty members were members, to work this thesis...
up into an enlarged study for publication purposes. Is that the kind of thing you are thinking of? I have none of this at the present time.

Mr. Hays. You had a fellowship yourself from Rockefeller?

Dr. Rowe. Yes.

Mr. Hays. Where did you use that? Was it at some university?

Dr. Rowe. I had a fellowship for 2 years from the General Education Board, as a General Education Board fellow in humanities at Harvard, for the study of Japanese and Chinese language and literature for 2 years.

Mr. Hays. Do they give such fellowships in the field of sociology and political science?

Dr. Rowe. I suppose they do. But I don't know that they do that.

Mr. Hays. What I am getting at is this: Suppose they do give one similar to yours and give a number of them, and, as you say, there certainly would be more chance of supervising them at a university, and I am in agreement completely with you; here is the question I want to get at: They give these grants and 1 or 2 people that they give them to, sometimes subsequently 10 or 15 years later turn out what is commonly known as left wingers or fellow travelers; would you say that the foundation ought to be held accountable for those people? How could they tell in advance?

Dr. Rowe. It is a risk you take, of course. I should think that here you get back to your bank. Any bank is going to make some bad loans.

Mr. Hays. That is right.

Dr. Rowe. The question of whether the man in charge of the operation of the bank is a good man to have there is something that can only be developed on this basis over a period of time, I suppose.

Mr. Hays. In other words, if they hold their bad loans.

Dr. Rowe. Down to a percentage.

Mr. Hays. Or in the case of a foundation their bad grants to a minimum; we can't expect them to be perfect, can we?

Dr. Rowe. That is perfectly clear.

Mr. Hays. We can point out their mistakes, but we should not say we should never have made them. That is too much to expect.

Dr. Rowe. I would judge so. Of course, you are going to find some people in the United States that will tell you it was a mistake they gave me one.

Mr. Hays. I think we brought that out before. I am not going to take that position.

Dr. Rowe. I was not pushing you on this.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Hays. I am wondering about Chiang Kai-shek.

Dr. Rowe. I don't believe if you scrutinize all my writings and listened to all my lectures at Yale for the last 5 years you have ever heard me say that.

Mr. Hays. All right, that is good.

Dr. Rowe. If you will allow me to go on from this a little bit, I will develop this.

Mr. Hays. Sure.

Dr. Rowe. I have never been an advocate of allowing Chiang Kai-shek to fight communism by himself. I am interested in our helping him fight communism, and I think with United States help that is another matter. The question of who is helping who is always subject to evaluation.
Mr. HAYS. Could you give us any idea of about how much help it would take to have Chiang do anything at this point?

Dr. Rowe. I don't think there is any possibility as of the present time of the forces on Formosa making a successful invasion of the mainland without massive allied help. I think this is impossible.

Mr. HAYS. The reason I brought it up—and it is a matter of water over the dam, I really don't care much about it—but in the last campaign my opponent made the charge that I, among others, had by just being in Congress apparently restrained Chiang from doing anything, and if he got down here he was going to turn him loose, and things were going to happen. I have always had the opinion that to do that he would have had to have "massive," and I would like to put that word in quotes for emphasis, help from us in order to win any kind of victory in China.

Dr. Rowe. You mean going back from Formosa?

Mr. HAYS. Yes, or staying there when he was there.

Dr. Rowe. Staying in China?

Mr. HAYS. Yes.

Dr. Rowe. There I disagree with you flatly. I am on record on that. You can find this in writing in my articles. I am on record as believing that the time to resist the expansion of communism in China and its takeover was in 1947 at the time when we had seemingly decided in our Government that we were going to cry "a plague on both your houses." At that point, as my testimony before the McCarran Committee indicated, it was perfectly possible in my opinion for the United States with a minor investment of men, money and material, compared to what we have put into Korea since then, to have prevented the Chinese Communist takeover on the mainland. This opinion of mine was confirmed by conversation with the ranking American general in China in 1948, when he told me that with 10,000 American personnel—and this again is all in the record of the McCarran committee testimony—he could see to it that all of the equipment that Chiang could ever use to prevent the Communists from coming down into China could be made effective in its use. The amount of money required would have been piddling compared to what we have spent in Korea in a war we would not have had to fight if we had intervened in 1947. This is again—

Mr. Goodwin. Mr. Chairman, have I come into the wrong hearing?

Mr. HAYS. This has some connection. It got in by the back door of the IPR.

Doctor, let me say this, and there is no use debating this question, because in the first place, we are fighting a hypothetical war which didn't happen, and in the second place, I believe you might even agree with me that frequently generals make statements that subsequently prove that they were a little off base.

I remember very definitely the morning the Korean thing started; I was walking right across the street here with two other members of the House, and making the statement we are in a war, and they said, "No, we are not in a war. They are just going to send in the Navy and Air Force."

Dr. Rowe. That is what they said at first.

Mr. HAYS. I made a small wager with them that the ground troops would be in before 10 days passed because the Air Force is a fine
force, and I have had some experience with them, but they have once
or twice or maybe three times bitten off more than they could chew.
The Air Force alone up to now has not been able to win a war. It
did not win the one in Korea, a little narrow peninsula. If this gen-
eral said what he could have done with 10,000 troops is one thing,
and doing it is something else.

Dr. Rowe. That is perfectly clear. I only cited the general's
opinion.

Mr. Hays. I understand that.

Dr. Rowe. I am of course no general either, amateur or professional.
It is worthy to mention what he was talking about when he talked
of 10,000 men. He was not talking about a coherent combat unit of
10,000 men, or anything like that. He was talking about what Gen-
eral Wedemeyer did in China during the Pacific war, when he put 1
and 2 men at a time into the Chinese Army down at the company
level with the purpose of seeing to it, as I say, that the weapons of
war that the United States distributed were efficiently used, and with
a minimum of wastage and misuse. That is what General Barr was
talking about in our conversation.

The Chairman. Do you have any other questions?

Mr. Wormser. Yes; I do. I would like to get on another subject,
which one of your previous remarks introduced. We were discussing
the undesirability perhaps of using intermediate organizations like
IPR. Would your comments apply also, and perhaps you might
discuss this general area, to what we have referred to at times as
clearing house organizations? We have talked about a certain inter-
locking or close relationship between the foundations and interme-
diate organizations, like the Social Science Research Council, and the
American Learned Societies. I would like you to comment on that,
Professor, as well as whether you think the resulting concentration
of power through this interlock is a desirable thing or not.

Dr. Rowe. I suppose the proof of it is in what comes out of it. My
feeling is that here is another very clear evidence of the difficulty for
the foundations in making policy regarding the expenditure of their
funds. The Social Science Research Council handles social science
matters. They will give a large lump sum of money to these people.
Then the Social Science Research Council has to set up the operations
of screening of applications, screening of candidates, supervision of
operations and evaluation of results and all that. This costs the foun-
dations something, because part of the money they put in has to go
for these administrative purposes. But the foundation doesn't want
to do it itself. The Social Science Research Council being supposedly
a specialized agency simply, it seems to me, relieves the foundation
of this to the extent that the foundation gives large sums of money to
the Social Science Research Council.

What the council does is the responsibility of the foundation, it
seems to me, to a very great extent. There is no use trying to blink
at that fact in any way, shape, or form. I suppose there is no ideal
solution to the problem of the application of expertness to the super-
vision of the expenditure of money by big foundations. This is why
some foundations go in for rather narrow kinds of specialization.
They will do one kind of thing and not another. The General Edu-
cation Board is an example of what I am talking about, because their
work has been rather narrowly oriented, certainly during the last
decade or two. But the big foundations in general spread themselves over the landscape.

The Ford Foundation is the latest and greatest. The Ford Foundation is even going in for general public education, although I understand this emphasis is decreasing some in the last year or two. But when they first began they were very much interested in general adult education through all kinds of media, radio, conferences, great book seminars all over the country. We had 2 or 3 of them in our immediate area in Connecticut, all financed by the Ford Foundation.

The job of running an extension course for universities is a big job. When you start doing this all over the United States, I should think it would be almost impossible to supervise it adequately. If I am right about the tendency in recent years, it might be that this is a conclusion they have reached on the matter, if they are cutting down. I would not know what has guided their policy along this line.

There is inevitably going to be this problem, that as knowledge and as research become more specialized and more technical, and the problem of deciding what you want to do researchwise becomes more difficult, the foundations that have big money to spend are just up against a tremendous policy problem. How do they operate, and how can they possibly guarantee the maximum effectiveness and efficiency in their operations in the light of the objectives which they profess and which underly their whole activity?

Mr. Wormser. Does it impress you as socially desirable that the large foundations should concentrate a certain large part of their operations in the social sciences in one group or association of groups, like the Social Science Research Council, the American Learned Societies, and others?

Dr. Rowe. I suppose the theory behind this is that these organizations, like the Social Science Research Council, are truly representative of social science all over the United States. I suppose that is the only possible theoretical justification for this kind of policy. I don't know.

Mr. Wormser. The question we have, Professor, in that connection is whether that type of concentration, even though it might be efficient mechanically, is desirable insofar as it militates against the competitive factor, which is sort of intrinsic in our society.

Dr. Rowe. There is no question but what an organization like the Social Science Research Council has a tremendous amount of power. This power which it exerts, it exerts very heavily on educational institutions and their personnel, because when you get down to it, who is it that does research in social science? It is educational institutions, because they have the faculties in the various fields, like political science, economics, anthropology, sociology, geography and so on. That is where the people are. To understand the importance of this function, all you have to realize is that advancement and promotion and survival in the academic field depend upon research and the results and the publication thereof. Here you have, you see, outside organizations influencing the course of the careers of personnel in universities through their control of funds which can liberate these people from teaching duties, for example, and making it possible for them to publish more than their competitors.

This, therefore, means that there is a tremendous responsibility here to apportion their awards in a just way—in such a way as takes into
account the differences of approach and the differences of opinion in these fields; the theoretical differences from one school to another. The possibility exists that at all times in any of these organizations that the people in charge thereof become convinced that there is one way to do a job in the social science field, and that only this way will get their support.

If and when that time comes—I don’t know whether it is here or ever will come—then you will have a combination in restraint of trade within the limits of public acceptability that may have very deleterious effects upon our intellectual community.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wormser, it is now noon. It is evident or it appears evident that we will be unable to complete with Dr. Rowe before the noon recess. How long do you estimate it will take?

Mr. WORMSER. I have only one further subject that he could testify on. If we take 10 or 15 minutes he will be through. He would like to finish this morning, if he can.

Dr. Rowe. I would not like to limit the committee in any way. I would stay this afternoon if you wish.

Mr. HAYS. Doctor, we have been spending a good many hours this morning, and we have no desire to drag it into the afternoon if we can finish shortly. I would like to finish if we can.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, then.

Mr. WORMSER. As an extension of just what you have been talking about, Professor, is it your opinion that there has been a result already from the power of these foundations to control or affect research, particularly in their associations together in some sort of what you might loosely call an interlock, and the use of these intermediate organizations? Has that resulted in some sort of political slanting in your opinion? I want to be a little more precise than that, and refer to the term which has been used quite frequently in social science literature of “social engineering.” There seems to be a tendency to develop a caste of social scientists who apparently deem themselves qualified to tell people what is good for them, and to engineer changes in our social status. Would you comment on that?

Dr. Rowe. Here, of course, you are getting into a problem of what is the cause and what is the effect. I am not quite clear as to whether the activities of the foundations along this line are the result of the development of social science in the United States over the last 40 or 50 years, or whether the development of social science in the United States over the last 40 or 50 years along such lines has been primarily the result or even heavily the result of foundation initiative.

I would be inclined to the former of these two views, but I don’t think you can completely disentangle these two things. I think that the development of the social sciences in this country in the last 40 or 50 years has been very heavily influenced, in my opinion, by ideas imported from abroad, which have been connected with, if not originated in, socialistic mentality, and to say this is to simply say that it is normal in social science to accept today a great deal of economic determinism, to accept a great deal of emphasis upon empirical research over and against basic thinking and the advancement of theory, and to accept a lot of ideas about the position of the social scientist in the society that seem to me rather alien to the American tradition.

It must be, I think, kept in mind that the theory of social engineering is closely related to the notion of the elite which we find dominant.
in Marxism, the notion that a few people are those who hold the tradition and who have the expertness and that these people can engineer the people as a whole into a better way of living, whether they like it or want it or not. It is their duty to lead them forcibly so to speak in this direction.

That is all tied up with the conviction of the Marxists that they seem to have, rather that they do have, a perfect social science. This is one of the main tenets of Marxism, that they have a social science which is perfect; it not only explains all the past history, but it will lead to the complete victory of the socialist state on a worldwide basis.

I am not maintaining that my colleagues are all dyed in the wool along this line, but there is such a thing as infection. I think some of these ideas have infected us, and have gotten over into a much more influential place in our thinking than many of us understand or realize. The complete respectability of some of the basic ideas I have been talking about in the framework of American intellectual life can be seen when you ask yourself the question, “When I was in college, what was I taught about the economic interpretation of history, the frontier interpretation of American history, the economic basis of the American Constitution, and things of this kind?”

This is the entering wedge for the economic analysis of social problems which is related to economic determinism, which is the very heart and soul of the Marxist ideology. When we reflect on the extent to which these ideas have become accepted in the American intellectual community, I think we ought to be a bit alarmed, and be a bit hesitant about the direction in which we are going.

For my own purposes, I would much rather complicate the analysis of social phenomena by insisting that at all times there are at least three different kinds of components that have to be taken into account. There is not only the basic economic thing. We all recognize its importance. But there are what I call political factors. These have to do with the fundamental presuppositions people have about the values that they consider important and desirable. These can be just as well related to abstract and to absolute truth, which we are all trying to search for in our own way, as they can be to economic formation and predetermination, if I make myself clear. Along with this you have to take into account the power element in the military field. If you throw all these things in together, I think it rather tends to scramble the analysis and reduce it from its stark simplicity, as it is embodied in the doctrines of communism, into something which is much harder to handle and much more difficult and complicated, but is a good deal closer to the truth.

I make this rather long statement only because the subject is extremely complicated. I know I can’t discuss it adequately here, and I don’t pretend to try, but I am trying to introduce a few of the things which give me the feeling that in our academic community as a whole we have gone down the road in the direction of the dominance of an intellectual elite. We have gone down the road in the direction of economic determination of everything, throwing abstract values out of the window.

Mr. Wormser. Moral relativism.

Dr. Rowe. Moral relativism is implicit. It is not important whether it is right or wrong in abstract terms. It is only when it works and who works and things of that kind. This is the evil of the sin of
social science in this country which can only be redressed by adequate emphasis on humanistic studies, and even there you have to be extremely careful about how you do it in order to get the maximum effect out of it.

Maybe I am getting too far here into educational theory and getting away from your question.

Mr. HAYS. Could I ask a question?

Mr. WORMSER. Please, yes.

Mr. HAYS. You talk about a social-science elite. If you wanted a doctor, you would want an expert.

Dr. Rowe. Sure.

Mr. HAYS. A lawyer, you would want a good one.

Dr. Rowe. Who is it that says who the expert is in the medical field? The first thing the doctor comes up against is a board of examiners set up by the State or by some public authority without which he cannot even get a license to practice, let alone get any patients.

Mr. HAYS. How do you get to be a political science professor?

Dr. Rowe. That is the point I am trying to make. There are no such supervisions or checks. Maybe it would be more dangerous to have them than not to have them. But we have at least to face up to the problems raised by the fact that the intellectual community, the academic community, for example, insists on an absolute minimum of public sanctions as far as their work is concerned. This leads us into these areas that I have been talking about.

Mr. WORMSER. That is all.

Mr. HAYS. I have one further question back on the IPR again. I asked for the names of the trustees and we got off on some other subject. I will ask you specifically, was Senator Ferguson one of them at one time?

Dr. Rowe. I could not say. I don't recognize his name as being a member of the board. But I could not swear to it.

Mr. HAYS. Could you supply me with the names of the members of the IPR board for 1950 or 1949 or some given year?

The CHAIRMAN. If it is just as agreeable, the staff can do that.

Mr. WORMSER. I am sure we have it.

Dr. Rowe. That would be easy to work up, I should think. That would be no problem.

Mr. HAYS. We can put it in the record at this point.

(The list referred to follows:)

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Heaton L. Wrenn, attorney, Anderson, Wrenn & Jenks, Honolulu.
Louise L. Wright, director, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

The Chairman. The committee will stand adjourned until Tuesday morning at 10 o'clock in this same room.
(Thereupon, at 12:15 p.m., a recess was taken until Tuesday, June 8, 1954, at 10 a.m.)