George Tenet

Setting the Stage for Misdirection to the Middle East



George Tenet

Swearing-in Ceremony - 1997 - Note the "very special people" he identifies. 


David Boren

Memorial to a suicide-bomber.

September 11, 2001 - Boren names Bin Laden & Iraq


John Deutch

Pardoned by Clinton



Transformation = Privatization

(Senate - May 02, 1990)  [Page: S5546]

"We need to realign our foreign policy to advance our national economic interests."

Al Gore - "Reinventing Government" - turn over to private corporations

Coup d'etat

9/11 Pretext


Al Gore & Anthony Lake
"Vice President Al Gore, supported by national security adviser Anthony Lake but working outside normal bureaucratic channels had approached the president directly with the idea of hosting the summit... The result was the Miami summit of December 1994.... The summit launched the Free Trade Area of the Americas..." [aka North American Union] R. Feinberg, "Summitry in the Americas", IIE, 1997

Incremental Steps to the North American Union


Sandy 'Burglar' Berger



George Tenet

The misdirection towards the Middle East for the 9-11 false flag operation was set up by George Tenet and the CIA in the late 1990's.  The Osama Bin Boogey Man legend was built by a special division of the CIA created for that purpose.  According to testimony given to the 9-11 Commission:   "The CIA definitely had a lucky break when a former associate of bin Laden walked into a U.S. embassy abroad and provided an abundance of information about the organization."

They spent several years doing nothing but building the legend and the paper case against Osama to make him bigger than life.  According to testimony, Tenet "gave personal attention to the Bin Laden threat".  

Tenet Background - Excerpts from linked articles

"He started as an aide to a lobbying group for solar power. He then worked for a long time on Capitol Hill, mainly for moderate Democrats. The most important mentor in his career was David Boren, a conservative Democrat from Oklahoma who chaired the Senate Intelligence Committee during a period where Tenet was his chief staffer. It was through Boren's mentorship that Tenet moved from the Senate to the Clinton National Security Council [NSC], where he was in charge of intelligence, budgeting and decision-making at a level that put him right at the heart of the bureaucratic process that is the intelligence community in D.C. For several years, completely out of the limelight, he worked at the NSC at the heart of this culture.

In the mid-90s, at the beginning of Clinton's second term, the CIA leadership imploded, and Clinton sent Tenet out there as deputy director, because he was the only person who could be confirmed."

There was a sort of euphoria that the Bush administration was going to be a strong backer of the CIA. They had kept on Mr. [George] Tenet [as director of the CIA], which was surprising given the fact that he was a Democratic operative for most of his career. Certainly Mr. Tenet had reshaped the CIA during his tenure from being an organization that certainly served the president, but also served the rest of the U.S. government, whether it was the Department of Agriculture or the State Department or DoD [Department of Defense]. He had reshaped the CIA. The president was our main reason for existence in the sense that he was what Mr. Tenet called the "first customer."

"Under Mr. Tenet, he was a very big one for pushing forward younger officers, and the danger of that, of course, is obvious to everyone: You send people to brief senior-level people, they have less experience, they're not able to draw on a long track record of working the same issue for a long time, and they've very conscious of living in Washington, in a very expensive environment, and really needing to be promoted. Those type of people are much more pliable in terms of feeling the pressure from a person like the vice president or the president.

Part of the problem is the agency's a very young organization now. We've lost a lot of people through retirement. When Mr. Tenet first came in, they ran a program that they called the "early-out" program, trying to get people to retire. They thought they would lose a lot of the deadwood. What happened was they lost a lot of their mid-grade managerial-type people who had a lot of years before them and who were very good people.

As a whole, the agency's very young and very inexperienced. Mr. Tenet liked to be associated with younger people and younger officers who were -- and this is only my opinion -- more likely to produce the kind of analysis that he wanted to have produced.

At his confirmation hearing in June 1995, Tenet also had cited four other personal priorities for his tenure at the agency: providing "actionable" intelligence that cannot be obtained elsewhere, implementing the "reengineering" of the intelligence community, revitalizing its troubled Directorate of Operations, or clandestine service, and upgrading its counterintelligence capabilities.

JIM LEHRER: We go first tonight to the CIA story, President Clinton's nomination of George Tenet to be director of Central Intelligence. Tenet is the current deputy director. His nomination follows the withdrawal yesterday of Anthony Lake. Tenet is 44 years old, a former congressional staffer who served as staff director of the Senate Intelligence Committee. He was the staff director of intelligence on the National Security Council at the beginning of the Clinton administration. He became deputy CIA director in July 1995. President Clinton made the Tenet announcement late this afternoon at the White House.

GEORGE TENET, CIA Director-Designate: Mr. President, thank you very much. I just would like to take a moment just to read a brief statement. I'm deeply honored that you've nominated me to be director of Central Intelligence. In many ways, Mr. President and Mr. Vice President, it's a bittersweet moment for me. I had hoped to serve with my good friend, Tony Lake, as his deputy. And as you said yesterday, he has made an enormous contribution to our country.

Tenet's nomination culminates a swift rise through the ranks of Washington staff jobs, beginning as an energy association employee and a legislative assistant to the late Sen. John Heinz (R-Pa.), and progressing to staff director of the Senate intelligence committee and then senior intelligence adviser on the National Security Council staff.

At the White House, Tenet was a principal author of PDD-35, a classified presidential directive that set out new priorities for the intelligence community, including providing support to military operations; stopping counterterrorism, counternarcotics and organized crime; and penetrating radical countries in the Middle East and elsewhere.

"He wrote the intelligence priorities and then went to the agency to see that they were implemented," a White House official said.

"We are at war," Tenet stated in that memo. "I want no resources or people spared in this effort." But what kind of war was this? A phony war, if you count the actual number of CIA analysts devoted full-time to studying bin Laden's terrorist network: three, with two others added in the months before 9/11. (A CIA spokesman later contended that these numbers were wrong, that there were actually nine analysts devoted to bin Laden-still hardly a warlike effort.)

On September 11, 2001, Tenet was having breakfast at the Hay-Adams Hotel near the White House with his mentor, former Oklahoma Democratic senator David Boren. One of Tenet's security guards brought him the news: "A plane has gone into the World Trade Center, Mr. Director." Tenet said: "Was it an attack? It sounds like an attack." Tenet jumped in his limousine to dash over to CIA headquarters. Before leaving, Tenet told Boren: "This is bin Laden. His fingerprints are all over it." This comment showed a) that Tenet was aware of the danger of an attack on the U.S. by bin Laden but also b) that the CIA viewed itself as helpless to predict-and thus to help prevent- such an attack.

Which is completely unacceptable, because it is precisely to avoid such disasters that we have an intelligence establishment. Tenet himself is an important part of the problem. He backed into the position of CIA director in 1997 after President Clinton's first choice, Anthony Lake, was forced to withdraw. His first intelligence experience was as staff director for the Senate Intelligence Committee from 1988 to 1993, a job he lost when the Senate went Republican. He quickly found refuge as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for intelligence programs on the White House National Security Council staff, a key policymaking position for intelligence issues. In 1995, Tenet became deputy director of Central Intelligence, the No. 2 official in the community.

As deputy director, Tenet was involved in covering up the security violations of then-director John Deutch. In December 1996, Deutch left the agency; in early 1997, CIA security investigators discovered highly classified documents on Deutch's Macintosh computers. Deutch, it turned out, had a habit of typing his notes into an unsecured laptop computer after secret briefings in the Pentagon. He would then e-mail copies of the notes to himself at home, using his America Online account, and retrieve them on a home computer. Some of the most important secrets were compromised by the practice, which exposed such secrets to interception by foreign spies. "We know that foreign intelligence services routinely monitor the Internet for just such material," a senior Pentagon official said. "And AOL is a major target."

The CIA undertook an investigation of Deutch-but later reprimanded six current and former officials for mishandling the probe: "The principal shortcoming in the Deutch matter was that normal Agency procedures for handling and reporting a serious security incident were not followed. Among other things, a crimes report should have been submitted sooner to the Department of Justice." And the reason for this delayed notification was pure politics: Had they told DoJ sooner, a special prosecutor would have had to be appointed to deal with the case. The delay staved off such an inquiry. Tenet managed to escape punishment even though-as the official in charge of overseeing the security probe-he should have been held accountable. Tenet was, however, faulted by the CIA inspector general for "not involving himself more forcefully in the Deutch matter in order to ensure a proper resolution of it."

Other problems have burgeoned. One CIA analyst told me that he was harassed by CIA managers "for writing analyses that did not jibe with Clinton foreign policy." Another senior intelligence official says: "The agency under Tenet is the most politically attuned CIA in my memory.

Woodward quotes a conversation Barbara Bush had with former senator David Boren, an old family friend, in which she says that she and her husband are "worried" about Iraq -- with the former president "losing sleep over it." Boren asks why the father did not talk to the son.

Side Note:  [ During George H.W. Bush's administration, he sent Robert Zoellick to help the COMMUNIST Chinese set up APEC. and APEC - partnered with Mexico is pushing the NAFTA Supercorridor using NAFTA Chapter 11 which Carla Hills put in the NAFTA agreement when she negotiated NAFTA during Bush's administration]   

"As an Under Secretary of State, Ambassador Zoellick assisted in the formation and early years of APEC."

Bushwhacked and Shanghai'd

April Fool's Day Revisited

Boren then recommended Tenet to President-elect Bill Clinton in 1992, urging that he be appointed to head the administration's transition team on intelligence. The following year, Tenet was named National Security Council staff director for intelligence, responsible for coordinating all intelligence matters for the White House, including covert action. In 1995, Clinton named him deputy CIA director, and two years after that, he appointed him director of central intelligence (DCI), charged with heading the CIA and the vast U.S. intelligence community.

In early 2001, Boren called President-elect Bush, praising Tenet as nonpartisan and urging him to keep him on as CIA director. Ask your father, he suggested. When the younger Bush did, the former President George H.W. Bush said, "From what I hear, he's a good fellow," one of the highest accolades in the Bush family lexicon. Tenet, who has a keen nose for cultivating political alliances, had helped the senior Bush push through the controversial nomination of Robert Gates as CIA director in 1991, and later led the effort to rename CIA headquarters for Bush, himself a former DCI.

The former president also told his son, the most important thing you'll do as president every day is get your intelligence briefing.

In retrospect, it is evident that the new Bush administration failed to devote sufficient attention to the threat of international terrorism after it came into office. Bush admitted as much to Bob Woodward of the Washington Post. One nagging question concerns just how much President Bush was told about al Qaeda's threat to attack the U.S. homeland in the days and weeks prior to 9/11.

CIA Director Tenet and his patron, former Senator David Boren, convinced Woodward that Tenet had been warning anyone who would listen in Washington about the threat from al Qaeda. But Tenet is a seasoned and skilled manipulator of the media and has been waging a persistent campaign to protect his reputation from blame for the 9/11 intelligence failure.

Tenet's success in that campaign is evident in Woodward's book, Bush at War. Woodward wrote that Tenet and his director of operations, also a Clinton appointee, had warned Bush before he took office about bin Laden's "immediate" and "tremendous" threat. Woodward charged that, nine months into the new administration, "they did not have a plan in place to do something about somebody the CIA director said is an immediate and tremendous threat."

It is significant that Ross, who has slavishly followed the FBI's lead in the fruitless and heavy-handed pursuit of Steven Hatfill in the anthrax letters case, went against the FBI bureaucracy in this matter. Ross noted that, on December 6, U.S. Customs agents, as part of their own investigation, conducted a midnight search of Ptech, a Boston-area company believed to be secretly owned and controlled by al-Kadi. The computer firm's clients include the Naval Air Systems Command, NATO, Congress, and the Department of Energy, which handles security for nuclear weapons and material. Experts told ABC News that Ptech had easy access to the computer systems of those agencies and institutions.

PTECH - Government contracts


On May 30, 2002, FBI Special Agent Robert Wright appeared with Judicial Watch Chairman Larry Klayman at a Washington news conference and tearfully apologized for the bureau's inaction before 9/11. One of Wright's investigations led to the seizure in June 1998 of $1.4 million in terrorist funds linked to a Saudi businessman. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration designated the businessman, Yassim al-Kadi, as a financial supporter of Osama bin Laden.

Klayman said that if Wright's investigation had been pursued, "the money to fund terrorist operations, such as 9/11, would have been cut off." He said "these monies were moving through some powerful U.S. banks," affected "some very powerful interests in the U.S.," and that resistance to taking the investigation forward stemmed from conflicts of interest because top officials were "tight" with Saudi Arabia. Klayman said FBI officials had to be nervous "when the rich and powerful in Washington, D.C. are doing business with some of these entities" that could be coming under investigation. Klayman said that when he went to the Justice Department after 9/11 offering Wright's expertise, he was told by Michael Chertoff, head of the Criminal Division, that they were not interested in conspiracy theories.

Deutch, a brilliant but prickly scientist from MIT, succeeded Woolsey but made few significant changes at the CIA, either. Then after a failed attempt by Clinton to place his national security adviser Anthony Lake in the CIA's top spot, the president settled on Tenet, who had served as Deutch's deputy and before that as Boren's top aide on the Senate Intelligence Committee.

The failure to vet Gates now may come back to haunt Tenet as the policies and personnel pushed by Gates continue to dominate the CIA's analytical division, as CIA morale sags further and its reputation as an intelligence agency deteriorates more. Because the Boren-Tenet inquiry gave Gates a pass on the "politicization" charges, along with almost everything else, the intellectual corruption of the Casey-Gates era at CIA still is not widely understood.    October 11, 2000

Tenet has had, by Washington standards, a meteoric rise. A former staffer on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and a member of the National Security Council during Clinton's first term, he came to the CIA as a deputy to agency Director John Deutch in 1995 and became acting director after Deutch quit in 1996. Clinton appointed Tenet only after Lake, the president's national security adviser, fell victim to Republican opposition on Capitol Hill.

Tenet's nonpartisanship smoothed Senate confirmation. Former senator David Boren, D-Okla., who plucked Tenet from the chorus in 1989 and made him the intelligence committee director over more senior staffers, says he still does not know whether Tenet is a Democrat or Republican.

Also, though attrition rates are low compared with the private sector - 4% a year vs. 15%, according to Tenet - retention is a major concern, especially considering that by the year 2005, up to 40% of the workforce will have been at the CIA for five years or less.

"My problem is Cisco's problem, is General Motors' problem, is Martin Marietta's problem, is a dot-com problem," Tenet said. "We can't give you stock options and make you rich, but the psychic income here is terrific. Young people here are given more responsibility and greater access to big issues than anyplace else.",9171,986114,00.html?iid=chix-sphere

Because, his boosters say, Tenet's rise was fueled by smarts, loyalty, a taste for truth telling, and a commitment to reform that somehow didn't cost him the respect of the CIA. In 1987 he was a 34-year-old Senate intelligence-committee staff member when chairman David Boren chose him to be the new staff director. Boren put him in charge of auditing clandestine CIA programs. Tenet, says Boren, forced the agency to shut down two major covert operations after his staff found that case officers opposed U.S. policy goals and possibly allowed informants to siphon funds. Since his boss John Deutch resigned last December, Tenet has run the CIA--but not without incident. Last month Tenet said the agency did not know prior to 1995 that an Iraqi weapons dump blown up by U.S. troops in the Gulf War may have contained chemical weapons. Last week Tenet acknowledged the agency had sketchy information as early as 1986. Now that Lake, Clinton's first choice to replace Deutch, has been chased from the theater, Tenet the understudy is onstage. Already, critics are waiting to coach him their lines: rein in the CIA's hard-core culture; implement ethics courses for officers; create "honest spies." Soon, he will have to brave the reviews.


The plight of the CIA analysts in the 1980s also received little attention in Washington amid the triumphalism of the early 1990s. The story did surface briefly in 1991 during Gates’s confirmation hearings to become President George H.W. Bush’s CIA director. Then, a group of CIA analysts braved the administration’s wrath by protesting the “politicization of intelligence.”

Led by Soviet specialist Melvyn Goodman, the dissidents fingered Gates as the key “politicization” culprit. Their testimony added to doubts about Gates, who was already under a cloud for his dubious testimony on the Iran-contra scandal and allegations that he had played a role in another covert scheme to assist Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. But the elder George Bush lined up solid Republican backing and enough accommodating Democrats – particularly Sen. David Boren, the Senate Intelligence Committee chairman – to push Gates through.

Boren’s key staff aide who limited the investigation of Gates was George Tenet, whose behind-the-scenes maneuvering on Gates’s behalf won the personal appreciation of the senior George Bush. Those political chits would serve Tenet well a decade later when the younger George Bush protected Tenet as his own CIA director, even after the intelligence failure of Sept. 11, 2001, and later embarrassing revelations about faulty intelligence on Iraq’s WMD.

Tenet's job was to provide targets. Says one former CIA official, "He thought it was the key mission of the agency and wanted to be very involved in the decision-making and was." The intelligence on Afghanistan was excellent. Satellite imagery had shown that bin Laden was operating out of training camps in Khost, near the Pakistan border. But the target in Africa was more difficult. If Tenet had presented what the intelligence community actually knew of Al Qaeda at that time, he might have had to acknowledge that he didn't have a sure target to propose. But Tenet was unwilling to disappoint the White House. So, in addition to training camps in Afghanistan, he proposed a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, Sudan, called Al Shifa. Tenet claimed that the factory was known to be producing empta, a chemical compound that is an ingredient in the deadly nerve gas VX, and that its owners were linked to Al Qaeda.

With these complaints swirling around, the State Department's INR conducted a study of the Al Shifa attack. According to an intelligence official who was involved, INR "came up with the politically embarrassing conclusion that there was weak evidence." INR was particularly critical of the claim that the plant was producing VX or its precursor chemicals. Faced with these cascading doubts about the intelligence he had provided, Tenet upped the ante. At a closed Senate meeting on September 1, 1998, Tenet claimed that the CIA had now uncovered links between the plant's new owner and Al Qaeda. But, when the U.S. Treasury froze Idris's U.S. bank accounts, the plant owner sued. Required in court to show evidence of Idris's links to bin Laden, the Treasury Department backed off and unfroze his accounts.

Tenet, who was also under attack from Republicans for allegedly allowing Chinese subversion at U.S. weapons labs, steadily gave way to the political pressure, ultimately agreeing to Republican demands for a new NIE on the missile threat and assigning the task to Robert Walpole, the national intelligence officer for strategic and nuclear programs. Since coming to the CIA from State, Walpole--an earthy, motorcycle-riding, Mormon bishop with a fierce intellect--had become Tenet's all-purpose troubleshooter, taking on such delicate tasks as the Chinese-subversion inquiry. Once handed the missile defense dossier, Walpole wasted no time smoothing ruffled feathers. Within weeks of the Korean launch, Walpole heaped praise on the Rumsfeld commission in a speech to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Then, in early 1999, he convened a group of analysts from the CIA, INR, DIA, National Security Agency, Air Force intelligence, and Department of Energy (DOE) to draft a new NIE.

But, during the week after the September 11 attacks, Tenet became indispensable. Since becoming the director in 1997, Tenet had been holding daily meetings with the agency's Counterterrorism Center to plot a course of action against bin Laden and his organization. When the attacks came, he was ready. While the Pentagon admitted to the president that it had no war plan for carrying the battle to Al Qaeda, Tenet produced one practically off the shelf. Says one former CIA official, "When the political will caught up with what they were doing, which unfortunately took September 11, then they were in a position to take quick action because of all the legwork they had done."

Shortly after 9:30 p.m., President Bush brought together his most senior national security advisers in a bunker beneath the White House grounds. It was just 13 hours after the deadliest attack on the U.S. homeland in the country's history.

Intelligence was by now almost conclusive that Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network, based in Afghanistan, had carried out the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

That morning the president's key advisers were scattered. Cheney and Rice were at their offices in the West Wing. Rumsfeld was at his office in the Pentagon, meeting with a delegation from Capitol Hill. [Audio Clip - Rep. John Mica re: 9/11 meeting with Rumsfeld.  Statement made in 2007 hearing on Pat Tillman's Death]  

Powell had just sat down for breakfast with the new president of Peru, Alejandro Toledo, in Lima.  Tenet was at breakfast with his old friend and mentor, former senator David Boren (D-Okla.), at the St. Regis Hotel, three blocks from the White House. Gen. Henry H. Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was halfway across the Atlantic on the way to Europe. Attorney General John D. Ashcroft was bound for Milwaukee. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III, on the job for just a week, was in his office at FBI headquarters on Pennsylvania Avenue.

In Lima, Powell abruptly ended his breakfast with the Peruvian president after getting word of the second strike on the trade center and made plans to return to Washington. "Get the plane," he told an assistant. "Go tell them we're leaving." He had a seven-hour flight, with poor phone connections, ahead of him.  [Liars burn in hell same as thieves:   'A Magna Carta for the Americas']

"This has bin Laden all over it," Tenet said to Boren. "I've got to go."

He had another reaction in the first few minutes, one that raised the possibility that the FBI and the CIA had not done all that they could to prevent the terrorist attacks from taking place.

"I wonder," Tenet was overheard to say, "if it has anything to do with this guy taking pilot training." He was referring to Zacarias Moussaoui, who had been detained in August after attracting suspicion when he sought training at a Minnesota flight school.   [ I wonder how often CIA people 'wonder' out loud.]

Tenet and Anthony Lake

Mr. Tenet previously served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Intelligence Programs at the National Security Council. In this position, he served as National Security Advisor Anthony Lake's principal intelligence advisor. He has coordinated Presidential Decision Directives on "Intelligence Priorities," "Security Policy Coordination," "U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness," and "U.S. Policy on Remote Sensing Space Capabilities." He was responsible for coordinating all interagency activities concerning covert action.

David Boren

Bio Recovered from Wayback

University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK

David L. Boren, an Oklahoma native who has served the state as governor and US senator, is the thirteenth president of the University of Oklahoma. He is the first person in the state's history to have served in all three positions.

As a state legislator, Mr. Boren was coauthor of a bill that established a statewide system of area vocational technical schools. As governor from 1975 through 1979, he promoted key educational initiatives that continue to serve Oklahoma. Established during his tenure were the Oklahoma Summer Arts Institute and the Scholar-Leadership Enrichment Program. Also, the first state funding for gifted and talented classes was provided in 1976 and, in 1976 through 1978, Oklahoma ranked first in the nation in the percentage of funding increases for higher education.

As governor, he also established a Oklahoma Physicians Manpower Training program, which provides scholarships for medical students and medical personnel who commit to practice in under-served rural areas.

Mr. Boren's involvement in promoting quality education at all levels is further evidenced by his founding of the Oklahoma Foundation for Excellence in 1985. During his tenure in the US Senate, Mr. Boren authored the National Security Education Act in 1992 and legislation to restore the full tax deductibility of gifts of appreciated property to universities and other nonprofit organizations in 1993.


National Security Education Act of 1991  "David L. Boren National Security Education Act"

(c) Purposes
The purposes of this chapter are as follows:
(1) To provide the necessary resources, accountability, and flexibility to meet the national security education needs of the United States, especially as such needs change over time.
(2) To increase the quantity, diversity, and quality of the teaching and learning of subjects in the fields of foreign languages, area studies, counterproliferation studies, and other international fields that are critical to the Nation’s interest.
(3) To produce an increased pool of applicants for work in the departments and agencies of the United States Government with national security responsibilities.
(4) To expand, in conjunction with other Federal programs, the international experience, knowledge base, and perspectives on which the United States citizenry, Government employees, and leaders rely.
(5) To permit the Federal Government to advocate the cause of international education

Language and National Security


David Boren and George Tenet