Reason, Libertarian magazine, June issue sent out to all
40,000 subscribers, on the cover of each issue overhead satellite photo of the
neighborhood of the subscriber with their house circled and the title on the
front of the magazine, ĎWe Know Where You Live John Smithí.
Thatís connectivity in the core in its most amazing format.
The opposite of that, we canít find Bin Laden in Northwest Pakistan
because he is living in a hole in the ground.
Weíve got to get more SOF fighters - Special Operations Forces.
If it is a war against super-empowered individuals, everybody we put on
the ground, in the air or on the sea has to be super-empowered which gives
interesting possibilities for small nations in terms of coalitions.
We shift from big bases to smaller bases - that is Andy Hoehnís work in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. And here is the part that I think the
retired flags on Fox didnít get, during the last war in Iraq.
Weíve spent a lot of money on strategic speed across the 90ís.
I think it is the wrong way to think about speed because I donít think
we ever go to war quickly. I
differentiate between tactical speed that is an obvious good because it gets our
service men and women home at the end of the day, alive in one piece.
Differentiate from that and operational speed which I like to call net-centric
warfareís Wayne Gretsky speed. Wayne Gretsky, greatest hockey player in
history in the NHL. He was asked,
why are you so good, youíre not the fastest skater.
He said, ďI donít skate to where the puck is, I skate to where it
will beĒ. Thatís common operational picture.
Thatís speed of command. Thatís synchronicity.
Thatís moving bytes more than bullets.
Last point, strategic tempo should never be about speed in this country. Nobody likes a rash hyper-power.
We never engage in war quickly. Never.
Iraq invades Kuwait, we respond rapidly - re-invading Kuwait about 8 months
later. Why? Because we
are a democracy. We debate war like
crazy - before, during and after. And
that is not going to change. Nobody wants us to engage in war quickly.
Instead, our strategic tempo should highlight inevitability.
It is the ultimate psy-op. We
told Saddam cut it out. No really,
cut it out. Weíre coming in about six months.
Weíre coming in four months - 2 months.
Weíre coming next week. Weíre
coming Tuesday morning. When
we got there he didnít want to fight. They
were all gone. Why?
Because nobody wants to fight the U.S. military.
We canít find anybody even willing to fly planes against us anymore.
That is the disparity between us and them in actual war.
A very different disparity than the peacekeeping as we discover - that
this is existential dissuasion. It
tells the world, if you really want to break rules. If you really want to be rogue nation, this is what you are
going to get. And we can do
it with ease. What we have
not demonstrated is that we can do the back half work.
Here is my mantra. Disconnectedness
defines danger. It has to change
the way we think about intelligence. Intelligence
community frankly, itís like the drunk looking for his car keys under the
street lamp even though his car is parked two blocks away - because the light is
better over here. We
donít know anything about the gap. We
donít have the intelligence networks for it. 
It is absolutely embarrassing. Thatís
why we get such amazing calls wrong - like Did Libya get far in its WMD?
How far was Iraq? What do we really know about North Korea - almost nothing.
That has to change. Increasingly
we have to reorient not just the intelligence community, but the way we think
about war to the gap. Does it
mean we never hedge against China in the future?
Absolutely not. Does
it mean the vast bulk of our resources and imagination should be focused on what
I would describe as the absolute failure of U.S. National Security 25 years from
now at $450 billion dollars a year? NO. I think we have to spend money to create success every year
between now and 2025. I think we
can do that and maintain a certain hedge against China invading Taiwan.
A new definition of crisis to go with this new map of the
world. Iím going to explain
what I mean by this new definition of crisis by telling you how I was educated
as a young Political Military Analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses at the
end of the cold war. Iím going to
differentiate between what I call vertical and horizontal scenarios.
When I became to C N A, I was taught to think about surprise, strategic
surprise as strictly a vertical scenario, definition of change and real danger -
a vertical scenario. What do I mean
by this classic cold war definition of a vertical scenario?
It unfolds with lightening speed, Itís always a bolt from the blue.
The opponents were conveniently known beforehand in the cold war - so
were our allies. Strategy and battle plans published in thick volumes up on
the shelves - we practiced them day and night.
Tom Clancy made a fortune writing about them. Single hand of poker.
No evolutions or change. You
couldnít be Poland in the middle of world war III (he said III but I think
that was a mistake) and say ďhey, you know what?
Iíd like to reconsiderĒ. Static
timeframe. Youíre going to fight the war.
The world remains frozen in place. Not a lot of good global economic
histories in the second world war. Why?
Because there was none. It
was a global war. Everything froze
in place. Then you figured out who
the losers were on the far end and you took away their stuff.
This is a highly idealized definition of WWI and WWII.
WWI fight it out in Europe, take away the loserís
empires. WWII draw a line though
Europe Soviets get half, we get half. World
War III, delayed gratification, wall comes down, we go into Russia and loot it
for everything we can. Classics of
this genre the Fulda Gap which never happened and the mini-mean version, the DMZ which we still
have. And my problem with this
education was I never actually experienced it across my career - this definition
of crisis. Instead, I
experienced cognitive dissonance. I
kept looking at the world trying to make my mental models fit it. What we saw
across the post-cold war era, something very different.
Eventually I came to dub it the post-cold war horizontal scenario.
This thing that goes up and down, up and down forever and ever. My definitions of this - no clear beginning or end - drags on
forever. Can anybody name the year
the Balkans crisis began? 1390Ö
something. Definition of enemy
changes over time. We go into
Somalia - at first it was famine, then it was lack of governance, then it was
warlords, then it was that one warlord, then we get a bunch of guys killed and
we decide itís really the U.N. that was the problem so we get the hell out of
Dodge. Allies come and go, not just
the French. Coalitions - its almost
like festival seating. Strategy
evolves. Strikes - not battles.
Definition of the problem depends on what Op-Ed you are reading that
morning. In fact, on a good morning you can find two or three - on the same
page. The world goes on. Meanwhile you are babysitting some crappy situation seemingly
in the middle of nowhere.
Two classics of this genre Fighting Monty Pythonís Black Knight, Milosevic
, lopping off limbs of his body politic as he idiotically taunts us and dares us
to fight on. He sits limbless in
the docket spitting at us still. His trial goes on for another year or so.
And then keeping Saddam in the box for about 12 years. What did you get
with that? You made the Europeans a
little happier. You kept oil stable coming out of the middle east.
You let globalization and the go-go 90ís Go-Go because you went-went
there. No circle for this.
Between AIDS and all the deaths from conflict, roughly a holocaust here,
roughly a holocaust. Roughly 6 - 7
million. Doesnít appear on
anybodyís maps -certainly not on the Pentagonís maps.
Page 23 NY Times. Nobody
cares because nothing comes out of there that we fear enough or value enough to
make the effort on. I put these two
together and I describe what I call a system perturbation. A shock to the system
that alters rule sets. Iím
going to talk about Pain and Iím going to talk about Time - sort of the
meaning of life. Iím going
to say a system perturbation begins with a vertical shock
followed by any number of horizontal tails.
Iíll throw up four here illustratively.
Vertical shock: obvious
9-11. Some of the horizontal tails,
what happened to the airline industries. What
happened to the financial sector. The
anthrax scare - fellow traveler or not - I donít care.
Pathway dependency - and the immediate horizontal tail called
Afghanistan. Some of
the tails that come off the original tails - what happens to the airline
industry - happens to the tourist industry all over the world - damages
dramatically the Egyptian economy within weeks. Damages the Israeli economy - by extension, the West Bank
economy because at that point a lot of day laborers coming across the line
backfilling service economy jobs so violence in the Middle East goes up - part
of Bin Ladenís plan? Absolutely.
What happens to the financial sectors - happens to the
insurance industry - happens to the re-insurance industry if you follow that
interesting tail. Spills over into
the airline insurance industry so you see the merging of these horizontal
scenarios. With anthrax we get this
interesting tail called the breakthrough on AIDS drugs patent relief around the
world - helps launch the Doha Development Round.
Part of Bin Ladenís secret plan? I
donít think so - making AIDS drugs cheaper across sub-Saharan Africa? Yet, it
is an interesting line. 9-11
happens. Anthrax guy or gal strikes, 5 dead, 13 sick in the United States.
At that point, Canada, normally a wonderful rule set follower, tells
Bayer, the German giant pharmaceutical weíre going to break your patent on
Cipro, weíre going to crank it generically here in Canada, youíre not going
to get a dime, weíre going to call it a national emergency.
Charles Schumer U.S. Senator from New York says we should do the same
thing. Bush Administration kind of whispers across the Atlantic,
ďWe donít think we need to do it AT THIS TIMEĒ.
Bayer catches the hint. Turns
on every factory it has in the world 24/7, cranks out Cipro at an unprecedented
rate, floods the market at a cut-rate costs.
At that point, figuratively at the back of the room, sub-Saharan African
nations raise their hands and they say, ďHow do you people do that with a
straight face?Ē Weíve been
asking for AIDS drugs patent relief because millions are dying across
sub-Saharan Africa. You say, ďItís complex.
Shareholderís expectations, R&D, patent copyright.
Wish I could help.Ē You get 5 dead, 13 sick and you re-write the rules
in one afternoon. Sub-Saharan
African nations threaten to derail the launching of the Doha Development Round
being held in Qatar November 2001. They
hoped to launch the development round in Seattle in 1999 but Seattle-Man took
care of that. So the powers that be were very intent on showing the world that
Bin Laden does not derail the WTO. Sub-Saharan African nations are going to
derail it on the basis of their anger over the intransigence of the old core on
AIDS drugs patent relief. Bob
Zoellick, U.S. Trade Representative steps to the fore, cuts the deal, Doha
Development round was launched.
A lot of back and forth since then, but one of the
upsides of this whole strain is that you are going to have cheaper AIDS drugs
through the Gap. Itís interesting, soon after that gets announced, China says,
you know what, we have a very serious AIDS problem and decides theyíre going
to start breaking patents all throughout China on creating AIDS cocktail drugs.
Absolutely an amazing story which talks about the unintended