Now we have the so-called wise
men, your George Kennans, Chip Bohlens, and what not, your Dean Achesons.
In the aftermath of the second world war, they looked around the planet,
they said weíve lived through two world wars, where are the major sources of
violence and insecurity in the system. They decided, not surprisingly, it was
Germany, Japan and the Soviet Russia. So
they put together a package to buy off the first two and wait out the third.
They structured a future and they restructured the U.S. National Security
establishment to meet that future and their dream, an amazing dream was that
maybe by the end of the century Japan and Germany would be so pacified weíd
never have to worry about them again in terms of great power war and maybe the
Soviet Union would collapse under the weight of its own contradictions and join
our rule set. An amazing vision
from that perspective which takes half a century but we actually pull it off.
Along the way, a transformative event creating the huge disparity
between us and the rest of the world.
We move to an all volunteer force. We
professionalize. We solve the
problem that has bedeviled militaries throughout history - how to get the Army
to actually cooperate with the Navy. The
creation of the Department of Homeland Security is another transformative event
but that is largely an inside job. We
have to locate transformation within the global vision.
We outspend the world on defense. Weíre
spending over $450 billion a year. If
all we only want to defend this country, we could do it for about $100 billion
per year, Iím certain. So why are
we spending $350 billion dollars extra?
I will argue we are conducting a transaction with the outside world. Weíre selling a product.
The world is buying that product when it buys our debt. For
example, we float 130 billion dollars U.S. treasuries first quarter 2003, 4/5 of
it was bought by foreigners. Two
biggest buyers, Japan and China. Two
countries with huge dependencies on Middle Eastern oil.
That was a transaction whether we realize it or not.
You can call that war unilateral
but it was actually paid for by somebody else.
If we donít understand that transaction and donít understand the
service we provide in the course of that transaction, weíre waging war
strictly within the context of war and
not understanding it within the context of everything else.
Now one definition of transformation is you have todayís military
capabilities and what you are going to do is youíre going to whack off what
you donít need about 5% a year and add on what you do need on the far end.
And in 20 years, you have a new military.
But of course, direction is implied.
You have to know tooth from tail. You
have to have a definition of the future of war.
I will tell you that the dominant definition of future war inside the
Pentagon today is the same one weíve had for about 10 years.
Itís China, Taiwan Straits, 2025.
Why? Itís a familiar
image. China is big, its bad and
allegedly communist. I
say we have to find transformation within a larger global vision, a vision that
speaks to all these points.
Now inside the
Pentagon, November 2001. I throw those
bullets on the wall , people would say slow down, youíre getting ahead of
yourself. There is no way all that
stuff is on the table. No way.
Nobody argues any of these bullets anymore because everybody understands
theyíre all on the table. All these things are being changed.
In many ways what we are searching for is an understanding of a new
definition of the American Way, of not just war, but peace. We have an
unprecedented capacity to wage war.
Nobody even comes close. We
do not have nearly the same capacity to wage peace as weíve seen in Iraq since
May of last year. I will argue that
weíve been exporting security
[14.1] around the planet for the last 60
years. For the biggest chunk of
that time period we had a competitor in the process.
If we exported too much to a particular country or region, he would get
pissed off. If he did it, we got
pissed off. He went away in 1990,
demand for our services skyrocket. Here
is the best measure Iíve developed working for Hank Gaffney at Simi
Corporation as a consultant. Iím
going to talk about combined service crisis response days.
Meaning that if the Navy, Marines. the Air force and the Army all send
troops to say Somalia, for 100 days each, Iím going to call that 4 x 100 = 400
cumulative combined crisis response days from the services.. billable
hours which I think is the best measure. Not bombs dropped, billable hours - not just because we value
our people more than anything else, but because they cost more than anything
else. Here are some numbers, here are some decades.
70ís roughly 10,000 days, not including Viet Nam on-going conflict, so
we are focusing on crisis response with some level of combat days, so not
humanitarian assistance or disaster relief.
80ís a rough doubling - spiking in interstate war across the system
according to the great data from the University of Maryland.
Soviets go away, demand for our services increase 4-5 fold.
Best definition Iíve found of a military under real stress across the
did we deal with that spike? A
variety of ways. We
outsourced to contractors,
all the Brown and Roots, we created a new category, military operations other
than war. And frankly, we simply denied it, and our denial was dubbed the
Powell doctrine - which said that we donít go into any situation unless we
have a clear exit strategy meaning as soon as the guns stop shooting, we are out
of there as quickly as possible. Iím going to draw a line here.
Everything below it, basically cats and dogs, youíre going to do this
every decade no matter what - like our every decade intervention in Haiti.
General George Barnett, my second cousin, was ousted as commandant of the
Marine Corp at the end of the first world war because of excessive force used by
the Marines in Haiti. Some things
never change. Everything above
that line is a choice. We decided to go into the Middle East across the 1990ís.
Iran, Iraq, the tanker wars, Israel into Lebanon, terrorism. We decided to keep
Saddam in a box in a 12-year shooting war across which we dropped bombs almost
every single day. We decided to dismember the former republic of Yugoslavia. We
decided to engage in so-called massive nation building efforts in Somalia and
Haiti. And you can see what kind of job we did in Haiti. What was the actual
demand for our services? I would argue it was somewhere north of 250,000 days.
This is what we managed. The question we ask is did we use that asset which is
the most important asset we have, the time and attention the Defense Department
spends on any regions potential or actual instances of mass violence: What did
we get for that expenditure?
Now Iím going to give you the
core - gap argument from the Esquire article, The Pentagonís New Map.
Which got me on a lot of television and generated more hate mail than I
could possibly read. Iím going to give you a stretching argument: Iím going
to say - If we go back to the beginning of the cold war where we had our stuff
and where did our business were largely in sync.
Where we had our stuff and did our business in Western Europe.
Think Berlin Crisis. We had
our stuff and we did our business in North East Asia.
Think about McArthur. Think
about Korea, Think about a Bridge Too Far in Viet Nam.
Basic containment strategy. Box
the Soviets in on either side - preserve Japan, preserve Western Europe.
Four key events across the 1970ís shift our attention to the middle of
the world. So the fact that we are
trying to transform the Middle East shouldnít be a surprise because weíve
been trying to do something there positive for roughly 30 years and failing
dramatically. Four key events shove
us to that part of the world. First
European dťtente settles the question of superpower rivalry between us and the
Soviets and sends that competition south with the fall of the Portuguese Empire
1975 Sub-Saharan Africa. The
Soviets get countries with socialist orientation, we counter with the Reagan
doctrine. The Ď73 war alerts us
to the functioning of the global economy. The rise of OPEC.
The beginnings of oil as a strategic weapon so to speak.
I could show you the crisis response from European Command
shifts from one side of the Med to the other across the 1970ís.
The same thing happens on the other side of the earth. Viet Nam ends.
Fall of Shah of Iran. I
could show you the crisis response data from U.S. Pacific Command - shifts from
one side of Asia to the other. We
discovered this because we stopped responding to typhoons in the Pacific across
the late 1970ís. And we actually
went back and looked at some of the meteorological data to see if there were
less typhoons in the Pacific in the late 1970ís and early 1980ís.
The answer was they are always there, same frequency. Our ships just werenít around to respond to them in the
same degree that they were previous. So
they were the trees falling in the forest with nobody to hear them cause we had
shifted to South West Asia. By
the time we create CENTCOM here in the early 1980ís, over 55% of the
cumulative combined crisis response days for the four services - inside that
red circle (Asia). For the Navy and
Marine Corp, 75%. Our market
had shifted. Now the Bush
administration comes in. They
accuse the Clinton administration of focusing too much on the big pieces of the
International Financial Architecture - not paying enough attention to the
International Security Architecture - decent argument.
And they come in pretty much decided that China is the long term, near
peer competitor - the threat against which we have to size our forces.
There I have the problem with the logic.
In the New Rules Sets work all I did was go between the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon and what I heard at the WTC was China - future of
integration, future of investment, future of deals.
And then I would go to the
Pentagon and say China - future of danger, threat and war.
Which was why we tried to get these two groups to sit across tables and
actually talk to one another.
Because the Pentagonís map and Wall
Streetís map overlapped very precipitously in China.
All that gets wiped off the map with 9-11.
China is a huge beneficiary - a huge beneficiary
. I draw a new map on
going to use this phrase - functioning. Iím
going to say a country or region is functioning if the following characteristics
are roughly met: 1) it welcomes the connectivity and can handle the content
flows that come with that connectivity and globalization.
Everybody likes connectivity. Bin
Laden likes connectivity - loves to get on Aljazeera.
Not everybody can handle the content flows.
Good example - Barbie the Doll was kicked out of Iran about 2 years ago.
Barbie had infiltrated Iranian toy stores through the connectivity of
global retail. She began appearing
on shelves. The Mullahs
called her Trojan horse of western influence.
They created Sarah, moon faced doll, covered head to toe in black cloth.
Put her next to Barbie on the shelf.
Sarah did not sell like hotcakes so Barbie got a sort of a fatwa issued
against her. Detain Barbie wherever you see her was the order.
Barbie became, for all practical purposes, a doll on the run.
You laugh, Saudi Arabia did the same thing the next year.